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Letter from Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio  
to Bernard Stiegler
Thank you very much for inviting me to support Greta Thunberg’s 
actions, and your own, so that future generations may live in a bet-
ter world. I was born at a time when this concern was practically 
non-existent. Particularly for those of my generation, born during 
the Second World War, the question that arose was more of a social 
and political order. How was humanity (in Western Europe, but also 
in Japan, China and North America) going to survive this terrible 
post-war crisis and succeed in transforming it into an egalitarian 
and peaceful world? This did not mean that the equilibrium between 
human expenditure and natural assets was ignored, but that it occu-
pied second place, since the search for individual well-being was the 
goal, and this implied solving all problems through technical prog-
ress. It is understandable: the children of my generation suffered from 
diseases that have today been eradicated in the developed world. We 
are survivors.
I say that, not to exonerate us from our responsibilities, nor to mini-
mize our errors, but to better understand how far we have come since 
that time. After the war, I myself lived in West Africa, where every-
thing seemed inexhaustible: the resources, nature, the ability to prog-
ress. We could feel a certain anxiety, an instinctive indignation, when, 
for example, we visited the home of a District Officer stationed in 
Obudu, near the border with Cameroon, and he showed us with vain 
pride his collection of skulls of mountain gorillas that he had shot. 
My father, a bush doctor in the same area, ironically told tourists on 
safari that the only dangerous animals in the region were mosquitos. 
Forty years later, Peter Matthiessen wrote a beautiful book, African 
Silences, in order to document the disaster. When young people today 
rise up to demand accountability, to demand action – and in this Greta 
is the great figure of our time – it is not only justified, it is urgent, and 
it can no longer await the promises of politicians.
The technocratic argument against decreasing emissions, intended 
to discredit the environmental movement as a whole, is that we can-
not possibly ‘go backwards’, as if overdevelopment and the excessive 
consumption of resources did not themselves amount to a backwards 
step, impoverishing modern society. The other argument, which fol-
lows from the first, is that the development of the non-industrialized 
countries – those countries that supply most of the raw materials 
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used by the rest of the world – depends on this overproduction, and 
any reduction of this production would imply that progress grinds 
to a halt, leading those countries into a backwards slide. Worse still, 
the cheerleaders of overdevelopment point to the threat that such a 
slide could affect rich countries, too, condemning them to return to 
the underdeveloped level of poor countries – offering as examples 
the GDP of Ghana or Vietnam, if not of the poorest countries on the 
planet, such as Haiti or Mozambique. The same arguments are also 
used by politicians to defend neo-colonial situations, by comparing 
the level of former colonies (‘overseas’ or ‘mandated territories’ such 
as the British Indian Ocean Territory or the French dependencies in 
the Pacific and Indian Oceans) to that of newly independent states, 
such as Mauritius or Vanuatu.
In this argument, no mention is ever made of the emotional or edu-
cational parameters that would improve the basis of these compari-
sons, that is, historical elements (the age of these new countries, their 
cruel colonial history, the ancient wisdom of their culture) and ethical 
elements – those parameters of happiness and sharing that appear in 
Amartya Sen’s classification of states, and that place countries such 
as Ghana, Bolivia and Nepal well above the great imperialist systems.
The merit of Greta, and of all those who support her fight – let us 
remember the meaning of the word ecology, the science of the house, 
since after all the world is our only home – is to place ourselves before 
this emergency, this absolute necessity: to examine our values now, 
to make our choices without any further delay, to decide our own 
future and that of our children. This is called the truth, and every-
thing else is just empty rhetoric, a destructive fantasy, a masquerade 
with no way out.
Letter from Hans Ulrich Obrist and Bernard 
Stiegler to António Guterres
11 November 2019, Paris
Dear Secretary-General,
As you have pointed out on many occasions, international efforts 
to commit to a greenhouse gas reduction strategy compatible with the 
objectives set by the Paris Agreement have largely been inadequate, 
despite the forecasts documented by the IPCC and various other 
groups, organizations and scientific teams.
The gap between what is required and what is actually being done 
is often interpreted as a lack of (political and collective) will and 
as showing a rise of (political and collective) apathy. This state of 
affairs, in which we are bearing witness to a collective inability to 
change course, worries everyone: investors and populations alike, and 
in particular the younger generations, who are wondering what world 
they will inherit.
Given the state of emergency to which this state of affairs amounts, 
the transdisciplinary Internation/Geneva2020 Collective, on whose 
behalf we are writing to you, was formed at the Serpentine Galleries 
in London on 22 September 2018, on our initiative – Hans Ulrich 
Obrist and Bernard Stiegler. It is composed of fifty-two members 
from around the world, including scientists, mathematicians, lawyers, 
economists, philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, doctors, art-
ists, business leaders, activists and designers.
We argue that the general lack of will is symptomatic of a profound 
disorientation regarding the challenged posed by the contemporary 
epoch – the Anthropocene. The absence of a theoretical framework 
enabling us to properly understand these challenges hinders the 
implementation of actions capable of truly reversing the tendencies 
that threaten the biosphere. Our main thesis is that the Anthropocene 
era can be described as an Entropocene era, insofar as it is charac-
terized above all by a process of the massive increase of entropy in 
all its forms (physical, biological and informational). The question 
of entropy has, however, been neglected by ‘mainstream’ economics. 
We therefore believe that a new macroeconomic model, designed to 
struggle against entropy, is required.
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 12
In order to investigate these problems scientifically and build dem-
ocratic solutions, we believe that new research methods must also be 
developed, which we call contributory research. In a manner similar 
to what you have described as ‘inclusive multilateralism’, contribu-
tory research aims to foster close associations between researchers 
from different disciplines and territorial stakeholders (inhabitants, 
businesses, associations, elected officials and public administra-
tions) in new territorialized research and experimentation networks. 
In this way, territories could experiment with economic activities and 
technological tools that are at the same time sustainable, solvent and 
desirable. The objective of these networks would be to enable local 
societies to develop reproducible solutions, through processes of rapid 
knowledge transfer and with transposable models.
Adopting a territorialized approach of this type might provide an 
opportunity to reread the reflections recorded by the anthropologist 
Marcel Mauss in various manuscripts written in 1920 and later pub-
lished under the title La nation. Mauss recommended that the devel-
opment of internationalism should not come at the expense of the 
territorial and cultural specificities of nations. He thus outlined the 
concept of the internation, a dynamic through which nations would be 
called upon to cooperate without erasing their local dimensions.
A century after the founding of the League of Nations, it is by 
referring to this work that we believe that such an internation could 
be constituted in order to form the institutional framework of a new 
inclusive multilateralism. Its function would be to encourage, launch, 
support and evaluate experimental operations that could be initiated 
on the basis of a call for tenders, inviting stakeholders from candidate 
territories to collectively engage, and to do so in a network of con-
tributory research approaches and territorial laboratories.
In order to establish a set of specifications for these territorial labo-
ratory initiatives and the networks they will require, the Internation/
Geneva 2020 Collective has defined a set of theoretical questions and 
thematic axes capable of structuring such an approach.
Part of this work, in its general outline, will be debated next 
December at the Centre Pompidou (Paris). Representatives of the 
movement initiated by Greta Thunberg, Youth for Climate, will be 
invited. We will also publish this work, both on the internation.world 
website and in the form of a book that will be published in French by 
Les Liens qui Libèrent.
We would like to be able to present this work to you and your 
staff, and to present it publicly in Geneva, if possible by means of 
a press conference assembling various stakeholders (a team from the 
UN, representatives of the political and economic world, citizens’ 
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movements, academics). Given the importance of these issues, and in 
the hope of sparking an international debate, we would be very grate-
ful if this event could be held in the historic premises of the Palais des 
Nations around the centenary of the League of Nations, which will be 
celebrated on 10 January 2020.
In thanking you for your action and for the attention given to this 
initiative, we ask that you believe, Mr. Secretary-General, in our very 
respectful devotion.




President, Institut de Recherche et d’Innovation
Foreword
The pandemic that has paralysed the world in just a few weeks is now 
making evident the extraordinary and appalling vulnerability of the 
current ‘development model’, and the potential multiplication of the 
combined systemic risks that are accumulating within it. It proves 
that, wherever in the world we happen to be, this model has a death 
sentence hanging over it, if we do not change it. If there are, to this 
day (9 April 2020), still people who wonder why the world economy 
is being held up for a health crisis ‘that causes fewer deaths than do 
car accidents’ – which shows that they do not understand that if the 
number of deaths in France and Italy is limited, it is precisely because 
drastic measures have finally been taken – this testifies to the fact 
that a large part of the problem that threatens us all is the stupidity on 
which this developmental model is fundamentally based.1
This is the case because it imposes mechanistic models on living 
realities (nature and human beings), poisoning them. Failure to under-
stand that the problem is not whether the pandemic causes greater or 
fewer deaths than road accidents is a failure to understand that, in life, 
exponential dynamics are the rule, as Charles Darwin wrote in 1859:
There is no exception to the rule that every organic being 
naturally increases at so high a rate, that if not destroyed, the 
earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair.2
The so-called ‘Spanish flu’ that emerged in North America and 
claimed some 50 million victims, or even double that figure accord-
ing to some estimates, was globalized by what was then the First 
World War. It would probably not have been such a disaster without 
the mechanical acceleration (by ship and other forms of troop move-
ments) of the spread of the virus. Covid-19, for its part, was trans-
ported and saw its spread accelerated by the world economic war that 
our ‘developmental model’ has become, particularly since the ‘con-
servative revolution’.
This is why this developmental model is in reality a model of 
destruction – and this destruction, long regarded as ‘creative’, has 
been accomplished over the past two decades through the global 
civil war now being waged with the computational weapons of mass 
destruction that arise with reticular and disruptive innovation. When 
President Macron declared, ‘We are at war’, he should have added, 
‘and have been for decades’, and, more precisely, ever since the advent 
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of this ‘conservative revolution’ that has systematically and systemi-
cally destroyed the social constructions which had in the past two 
centuries limited, relatively speaking, the anti-social effects of eco-
nomic struggle.3
The collective work that produced this book is based on the claim 
that this destructive development model is reaching its ultimate lim-
its, and that its toxicity, which is increasingly massive, manifest and 
multidimensional (medical, environmental, mental, epistemological, 
economic – accumulating pockets of insolvency, which become veri-
table oceans), is generated above all by the fact that the current indus-
trial economy, as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen said contra Joseph 
Schumpeter as early as 1971, is based in every sector on an obsolete 
physical model – a mechanism that ignores the constraints of local-
ity in biology and the entropic tendency in reticulated computational 
information. A fundamental aspect of this structural scientific archa-
ism is that it a priori eliminates the irreducibly local dimension of 
biological and human phenomena – in order to justify a globalization 
process that has been weakening and ultimately ruining entire regions 
of the world for decades, and that is bound to lead to the multiplication 
of catastrophes such as the one we are currently experiencing, which 
will increasingly combine with climate problems, resource depletion, 
the exacerbation of tensions over access to resources, mental and 
social regression, financial disaster and so on.
It is to establish a precise diagnosis and advocate a general method 
in order to exit from this state of fact without law that this book has 
been written – just before the pandemic – and presented in broad out-
line in Geneva on 10 January 2020. The proposals set out in this work 
respond in advance to the question of a post-pandemic world – and 
with a view to rebuilding, not a war economy, but an economy of tran-
sition towards a global economic peace based on a new economic pact 
and giving concrete form to a peace treaty.
 
After 2008, and after the restoration over the following decade of a 
process of financialization that was not only just as absurd (where the 
banks were recapitalized without in any way requiring them to adopt 
new investment policies) but in fact intensified to an extreme degree 
by digital disruption, it is doubtful whether, in order to build a post-
health-crisis world, it is still possible to trust corporations and banks 
with regard to their willingness and ability to modify their investment 
policies – because, behind these economic powers, there are share-
holders who hold them in check by keeping a gun pointed constantly 
at their heads. This is why, if it is obvious that the primary issue is the 
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reconstruction of functional economic and political localities, which 
alone (and for scientific reasons) are capable of struggling against 
entropy, and the reconstruction of variously reticulated open locali-
ties, then the transitional operator in this regard must be the gradual 
implementation of new binding accounting standards, that is, a form 
of accounting that functionally penalizes entropy at the micro-, meso- 
and macro-economic levels.
This resolute transformation of accounting standards can and 
must occur by setting up networked territorial economic innovation 
workshops around the world, created in order to constitute polarities 
and reticularities of contributory economics, all guided by the abso-
lute priority of struggling against entropy – these pathways being 
by nature diverse. This is what will be developed in what follows, 
and it is why this book proposes that territorial laboratories be set up 
without delay, linked together through an authority to be called the 
internation.
In addition, the fundamental issue concerning accountancy direc-
tives in the age of algorithms is the technology of calculability, which 
must become a technology of incalculability: a new foundation of theo-
retical computer science is essential – and, on this basis, a contribu-
tory reticulation must be put in place. Today’s data economy is based 
on a form of theoretical computer science that is utterly subservient 
to the neoliberal model as defined by Friedrich Hayek and Herbert 
Simon at the Mont Pelerin Society, giving to information the function 
of reducing everything to market calculations – thus eliminating the 
possibility of taking the incalculable into account, even though it is 
the incalculable that always lies at the origin of bifurcations – oppor-
tunities to branch off in new directions, whether positive or negative. 
This point, which is only touched upon in this book (see Chapter 10), 
is now the subject of an informal online working group that aims 
to publish specific proposals in the coming months – proposals that 
should feed into a new European Union policy on basic research in the 
field of theoretical computer science, in turn fuelling a new industrial 
reticulation policy.
Notes
1 And this is why Greece and Croatia, for example, which took im-
mediate containment measures, are, for the moment at least, in a far 
less critical situation.
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2 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 52.
3 John L. Pfaltz, ‘Entropy in Social Networks’ (2012), available at: 
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1212.2917.pdf>, no page numbers: ‘under con-
tinuous change/transformation, all networks tend to “break down” 
and become less complex. It is a kind of entropy.’
Introduction – Decarbonization and 
Deproletarianization: Gagner sa vie in the 
Twenty-First Century
Bernard Stiegler with Paolo Vignola and Mitra Azar
On the Pharmacology of Locality
1 Overview
This book is the fruit of sixteen months of work carried out by the 
Internation Collective (see internation.world), which aims to respond 
to two speeches delivered by António Guterres, Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, the first on 10 September 2018 at the UN and 
the second on 24 January 2019 in Davos, Switzerland, as well as to 
the appeals made on several occasions by Greta Thunberg. COP25, 
held in Madrid in December 2019, showed to what degree neither 
the IPCC, nor António Guterres, nor Greta Thunberg, nor the youth 
movements she has sparked throughout the world, are being listened 
to by the political and economic powers – while public opinion, with 
the exception of the younger generation, seems to have lost its voice 
in relation to these appeals, despite the increase in the environmental 
vote, for example in Europe.
It is the view of the Internation Collective that, in addition to all the 
particular conflicts of interest with the general interest that clearly 
exist on the side of both governments and corporations, thanks to 
which they fail to live up to their responsibilities – which, in the cur-
rent situation, seems to us to amount to a moral, political and eco-
nomic failing – this state of affairs is due primarily to the fact that 
the implementation of truly decisive and effective measures to combat 
climate change, and, more generally, the disorders tied to the excesses 
of the Anthropocene era, depends on profoundly changing the sci-
entific models that have dominated the industrial economy since 
the late eighteenth century. These models all have a fundamentally 
Newtonian construction in the sense that they all ignore the question 
of entropy. Integrating these issues (and the toxic aspects of devel-
opment are all expressions of these issues) presupposes modifying 
the microeconomic and macroeconomic axioms, theorems, methods, 
instruments and organizations of the global industrial economy – an 
industrial economy characterized by the fact that, as technology, it 
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integrates scientific formalisms with knowledge and with technical 
production methods. The need for a change of economic organization, 
due to the toxicity generated by the current industrial economy, was 
highlighted during COP23 by the researchers who signed the appeal 
published on 13 November 2017 in BioScience, in particular in their 
twelfth point.1
Humanity as a whole, represented on the largest scale by the UN, 
has the challenge of formalizing, and bringing into play at the level of 
the planetary economy, new theoretical models equal to the real situ-
ation – a global threat caused by the global economy in its encounter 
with the biosphere, which could in the near future turn into a kind 
of ‘necrosphere’ thanks to the irrational and unreasonable exploita-
tion of what, since Vernadsky, has also been called the technosphere. 
Can such a discourse be heard any more than have the warnings con-
stantly issued since 1992, which, despite the unfolding of countless 
biospheric catastrophes, of which the 2019 fires provide some of the 
most appalling images, have remained without effect?
It may be that such a discourse can be heard, and without delay, if 
it turns this challenge into an opportunity to create new forms of eco-
nomic activity – industrial as well as artisanal and agricultural, along 
with service industries – based on the struggle against entropy. These 
more solvent forms of economic activity must, with a transitional 
and in-depth approach, progressively redefine investment, work and 
employment, by taking advantage of the automation currently under-
way – not so that it will be possible for technology to solve every 
problem, but so that it can strengthen the capabilities of individuals 
and groups in the struggle against entropy, and, in so doing, enable 
them to earn their living [gagner leur vie], to regain their life, both 
individually and collectively.
From ten different angles, corresponding to ten chapters, this 
work proposes:
 ▪ a diagnosis of the present situation;
 ▪ a theoretical formalization of its causes, consequences and 
possible transformations;
 ▪ a method of large-scale social experimentation, based on 
the rapid transfer of the results of contributory research – 
fundamental research, applied research and action research 
– in the form of contributory economic models;
 ▪ the sharing of results and experiments by consolidating 
them on a global scale through a specific organization 
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inspired by the concept of the internation, outlined by 
Marcel Mauss in 1920.
The ten angles are: 1) epistemology; 2) territorial dynamics; 3) con-
tributory economics; 4) contributory research; 5) internation and 
nations; 6) internation as institution; 7) ethics in the Anthropocene 
era; 8) contributory design; 9) addiction and the dopaminergic system; 
10) global political economy of carbon (fire) and silicon (information).
2 The Internation Collective and the Association  
of Friends of the Thunberg Generation
Composed of scientists, economists, epistemologists, philosophers, 
sociologists, lawyers, artists, doctors, engineers, designers and citi-
zens actively engaged in these issues, the Internation Collective was 
formed in order to confront these questions of axioms, theorems, 
methods, instruments and organizations of the global industrial econ-
omy in the context of automation. It aims to progressively transform 
macroeconomic norms, starting from an experimentally-driven tran-
sitional process. The goal of this process is to set up an alternative 
industrial macroeconomy through which all2 aspects related to the 
Anthropocene’s encounter with its own limits would be addressed in 
a functional and systemic way.
The name ‘Internation Collective’ was adopted in November 2019 
– the collective having been formed in London on 22 September 2018. 
‘Internation’ is a neologism put forward by Marcel Mauss in 1920,3 
during the time of the creation of the institution that would on 10 
January 1920 come to be named the League of Nations, at the Palais 
Wilson in Geneva (then called the Hôtel National). On 10 January 
2020,4 the work presented in the following chapters will be presented 
publicly in Geneva at a press conference preceded by a day of work 
and exchange with two international youth movements, Youth for 
Climate and Extinction Rebellion. The press conference will be held 
on behalf of the Internation Collective, but also on behalf of those 
invited to the event and wanting to be present at the table, whether 
they have been invited to take part in these discussions on behalf 
of institutions, associations or informal groups, or are there in their 
own capacity.
The work being done with members of Youth for Climate and 
Extinction Rebellion – two movements striving to push political and 
economic powers to take the action required by the extremely critical 
situation in which the biosphere finds itself, both of which are essen-
tially led by the younger generation – is being carried out within the 
Introduction 21
framework of the Association of Friends of the Thunberg Generation, 
whose project was presented at the Centre Pompidou on 17 December 
2019, created from a proposal to transform the Ars Industrialis asso-
ciation. The vocation of the Association of Friends of the Thunberg 
Generation will be described in an appendix (see the Appendix on the 
Mission of the Association of Friends of the Thunberg Generation, p. 
303). To put it in one sentence, it aims to open up an ongoing dialogue 
with the youth movements struggling to cope with the climate emer-
gency, starting from Greta Thunberg’s demand to ‘listen to the scien-
tists’, and in order to formulate carefully considered proposals from 
various standpoints, enriched by generational differences.
The materials contained in the following chapters have been writ-
ten collectively. They are addressed first of all to the UN and expand 
on points that were raised in a letter addressed to António Guterres, 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (see p. 11). They were par-
tially presented and discussed during a symposium held at the Centre 
Pompidou on 17–18 December 2019, as part of the Entretiens du nou-
veau monde industriel that IRI (Institut de Recherche et d’Innovation) 
organizes there each year.5
3 The UN context
The Internation Collective met for the first time on 22 September 
2018 at the Serpentine Galleries in London, after its director Hans 
Ulrich Obrist suggested that a debate be organized on the question 
of work in the twenty-first century – and in reference to a program 
of social experimentation and contributory research (see Chapter 4) 
launched in Seine-Saint-Denis in 2016 under the name of Territoire 
Apprenant Contributif (Contributory Learning Territory – see recher-
checontributiv.org). Its aim was to explore the question of the future 
of work, and it was conducted within the framework of the Marathon 
(see https://www.serpentinegalleries.org/exhibitions-events/work-
marathon), an initiative of Hans Ulrich Obrist held each autumn at the 
Serpentine Galleries.
The Collective has set itself the task of submitting proposals to the 
United Nations in order to rethink work in the twenty-first century 
on a new theoretical and practical basis, in the context of an essen-
tial transformation of the industrial economy, which at the end of the 
Anthropocene era is confronted with its own toxic effects. In other 
words, it is a question of facing up to the injunctions regularly formu-
lated by the scientific world with regard to the immediate future of 
humanity and life on Earth.
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This meeting was followed by several seminars held in various 
locations, including a session held in February 2019 based on the 
symposium, Le travail au XXIè siècle, organized by Alain Supiot at 
the Collège de France as part of the centenary of the ILO, the proceed-
ings of which have now been published.6 A two-day seminar was also 
held at Maison Suger in early July 2019, within the framework of the 
Collège d’études Mondiales of the Fondation Maison des Sciences de 
l’Homme, which included the participation of members of Youth for 
Climate (see https://youthforclimate.fr).
The first scientific work analysing the threats to the biosphere posed 
by the industrial development of human societies emerged within the 
United Nations context in 1972, with the first Earth Summit held that 
year in Stockholm, leading to the establishment of the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP). Since then, such work has continued 
to develop and strengthen, with almost every new assessment con-
firming and extending the significance of the toxic consequences 
of the current form of industrial development – up to and including 
the most recent IPCC reports, to which the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations has frequently referred, especially since the autumn of 
2018. These reports are highly alarming.
In the same year as the Stockholm summit, the famous Meadows 
report, a commission given to MIT by the Club of Rome, was pub-
lished as The Limits to Growth. A year earlier, Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen’s The Entropy Law and the Economic Process was published 
by Harvard University Press. In 1976, Arnold Toynbee’s Mankind 
and Mother Earth appeared, followed in 1979 by René Passet’s 
L’économique et le vivant.
Long before all these works, an article by Alfred J. Lotka was 
printed in a 1945 issue of the journal Human Biology, entitled ‘The 
Law of Evolution as a Maximal Principle’.7 This article, and Lotka’s 
earlier work (synthesized, in a way, in the 1945 article), are widely 
discussed in the work presented here. Lotka was a mathematician and 
biologist who studied the question of entropy in the field of life as 
early as the 1920s, and his reflections came to the notable attention 
of Vladimir Vernadsky, who referred to them, together with those of 
Alfred Whitehead, in the final chapter of The Biosphere (1926).
4 Conceiving the role of work in the Anthropocene  
with Alfred Lotka
As has already been mentioned, the proposals of the Internation 
Collective presented below were inspired by a social experiment 
currently ongoing in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis. This 
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experimental Contributory Learning Territory is devoted to the rein-
vention of work in the context of a contributory economy. As we will 
see repeatedly, the future of work, forming more or less the heart of 
all these analyses, is fundamentally and functionally tied to climate 
and environmental issues.
In Le travail au XXIè siècle, Alain Supiot writes that
through its work, Homo faber aims in principle to adapt 
its vital milieu to its needs, or in other words, to create a 
cosmos from out of chaos, a humanly liveable world from 
out of worldlessness [immonde]. But conversely, its work 
can, whether voluntarily or not, also destroy or devastate 
its vital milieu, and make it humanly unliveable. The ques-
tion of work and the ecological question are thus inextri-
cably linked.8
Unlike employment, from which it is therefore strictly distinguished, 
just as it is distinguished from labour or toil (ponos in Greek), work 
(ergon in Greek)9 is here conceived above all as a production of 
knowledge.10
In 1945, however, Lotka showed that, for that technical form of life 
known as human life, the condition of the struggle against entropy is 
the production of knowledge. If the organogenesis in which the evolu-
tion of life in general consists produces endosomatic organs that are 
spontaneously ordered by biological constraints, nevertheless, in the 
specifically human form of life, organogenesis is also exosomatic. In 
what Lotka calls exosomatic evolution, artificial organs are produced 
by the cooperation of human groups, and this always involves knowl-
edge, through which their negentropic capabilities are intensified, 
over against their entropic tendencies.11
With respect to cooperation, and with respect to the development 
of the ‘division of labour’ as the acquisition of constantly renewed 
knowledge, recent palaeo-anthropology in North America and 
Australia has shown that these were the condition of survival of 
Homo sapiens, and before that the condition of hominization itself.12 
In his recent work, Richard Sennett has brought these questions into 
the context of the contemporary world.13
Exosomatic organs are bivalent: they are what Socrates called 
pharmaka – at once poisons and remedies (and this is why, by its 
work, Homo faber can as easily produce a kosmos as devastate its 
milieu). The practice of exosomatic organs must therefore be pre-
scribed by theories as well as by the empirical knowledge supplied by 
experience. Georgescu-Roegen takes up Lotka’s perspective, arguing 
that it is the function of the economy to limit entropy and increase 
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negentropy. For Georgescu-Roegen, this means that economics must 
no longer be based exclusively on Newtonian physics, but must inte-
grate both thermodynamics, as the question of entropy, and biology, 
as the question of negentropy.
Here, however, we must reiterate that in Lotka’s view, beyond a 
strictly biological question, it is possible for the economy to limit the 
entropy of exosomatic organs and increase their negentropy only on 
the condition that it valorizes knowledge. It is in order to avoid being 
trapped in a biological model whose inadequacy was described by 
Lotka that we thus refer to anthropy and neganthropy,14 positing that 
what produces neganthropy is knowledge in all its forms.15
Once the vital function of knowledge has been recognized, it 
becomes necessary to analyse the consequences of the fact that, from 
the beginning of the Anthropocene era – if we allow that this can be 
dated from the industrial revolution16 – work has been transformed 
into employment, and the knowledge that had been implemented by 
work has now been progressively transformed into machinic formal-
isms.17 This has resulted in a structural impoverishment of employ-
ment, ever more clearly proletarianized, something that was already 
of concern to Adam Smith, and which will occupy the centre of 
Marxist theory.
Today, we know that above all, this impoverishment consists in:
 ▪ an entropic development of employment, with, as we know, 
disastrous consequences for the environment;
 ▪ a loss of meaning, which lies at the origin of what is 
now called ‘suffering at work’, but which is also the ori-
gin, more generally, of demotivation and the crisis of 
‘human resources’;
 ▪ the replacement of proletarianized employees by automatons 
(whether robotic or algorithmic, as highlighted by an MIT 
report taken up by Oxford), proletarianized jobs tending to 
disappear, and the activity of pure labour (ponos) without 
work (ergon) being transferred to automated machines.
The level of employment, however, which is crucial to the develop-
mental model known as the perpetual growth economy, is for this rea-
son systemically oriented to decline, with the result that the overall 
solvency of the model is necessarily and irreversibly compromised. 
‘Irreversibly’ – unless there is a change of macroeconomic model, and 
of its functions and variables. It is to propose achievable and experi-
mental pathways to such a change, which must occur as a matter of 
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urgency, that the Internation Collective is advocating a specific exper-
imental approach called ‘contributory research’, which was proposed 
in 2014 in France by the Conseil National du Numérique, as part of 
the Jules Ferry 3.0 report.18
5 Detoxifying the industrial economy:  
the contributory economy
The program of the Contributory Learning Territory was developed 
in Seine-Saint-Denis on the basis of this observation of a systemic 
downward tendency of proletarianized employment and the subse-
quent need for the productivity gains achieved by automation to be 
redistributed via work performed and remunerated outside employ-
ment. For this reason, it conducts experiments in the development of 
an economy of contribution.
Work outside employment means a knowledge activity that is yet 
to be economically and socially valued. We maintain that in the con-
text of the Anthropocene era, it is necessary to invest in the develop-
ment of this kind of work, in order to foster the emergence of new 
knowledge – of how to live, make and conceive differently – capable 
of detoxifying the industrial economy.
The goal of the contributory economy, as a macroeconomic model 
based on microeconomic and mesoeconomic territorial activities, 
is thus to revalorize knowledge of all kinds – from that of mothers 
raising their children in the epoch of touchscreens (an issue worked 
on by the contributory clinic of the Plaine Commune Contributory 
Learning Territory) to the most formalized and mathematized forms 
of knowledge, disrupted by ‘black boxes’, as well as the work-knowl-
edge [savoir-faire] of the manual or intellectual worker in the age 
of automation.
In this conception of the contributory economy, which remuner-
ates work through a contributory income inspired by the French 
model for intermittent workers in the performing arts, employment, 
which becomes intermittent, is functionally deproletarianized. This 
also means that new ways of organizing work – inspired first by free 
software, but also by action research methods practised by institu-
tional psychiatry, or those studied by Gregory Bateson (such as the 
Alcoholics Anonymous association) – are implemented through spe-
cific systems and institutions. (Starting from the case of Seine-Saint-
Denis, Management Institutes of the Contributory Economy – MICE 
– have been conceived and designed, a description of which will be 
found in Chapter 3.)
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Here, the decarbonization of the economy therefore passes through 
the deproletarianization of industry. Of course, not all jobs will be 
involved in this evolution. But it will crucially involve all those that 
could tend to decrease the entropic human footprint – the human form 
of entropy production also being called, in the 2014 IPCC report,19 
‘anthropogenic forcing’, referred to more generally, for example in 
geography, as anthropization.
This is why, in what follows, we will use the term anthropy in 
order to qualify the specifically human form of entropy. The increase 
of anthropy (in thermodynamic, biological and informational forms) 
is the specific feature of the Anthropocene era. Conceived in this 
way, and having now developed to such an extent that its own con-
ditions of possibility are inevitably compromised, the issue at stake 
with anthropy is to reconstitute neganthropic potentials. What 
defines knowledge as knowledge, moreover, is precisely its negan-
thropic character.
6 The revaluation of work is the revaluation of knowledge
Inasmuch as it makes it possible to struggle against this anthropy, 
knowledge may be empirical, such as the knowledge of the hand in 
the sense described by Richard Sennett or Matthew Crawford, or, 
again, in the sense of Winnicott’s ‘good enough mother’, who does the 
work of raising her child, that is, cultivating a knowledge of her child 
and thus transmitting knowledge to her child, which is called parental 
education.20 Empirical knowledge can be an art (ars) in the sense of 
the artisan or the craftsman, but also in the sense of the artist, or even 
in the sense of the sportsperson.
Conceptual knowledge may be scientific, or technical, or techno-
logical. As for the social knowledge of everyday life – hospitality, 
companionship, neighbourly relations, festive practices, rules of life 
constituting mores – they are ruined and destroyed by marketing, user 
manuals, the reduction of usages to utility, which comes to replace 
those social practices still containing specific forms of knowledge 
amounting to ‘mores’ or ‘morals’ as collective care, and hence as soli-
darity. Such practices are the basis of what Henri Bergson called obli-
gation, which is the condition of social life, and which, if destroyed, is 
bound to lead to generalized incivility.
We could continue for a long time delineating everything that 
(empirical, conceptual, social) knowledge could be: the task is inher-
ently interminable, because knowledge, like inventiveness, creativity 
or discovery, is infinite in principle and in potential, albeit always 
coming to completion in actualization, the whole issue of reason being 
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to know how to make the most of this difference between potential 
and act (in Aristotle’s sense of dunamis and energeia, the root of the 
latter being ergon).
We should stress here that decarbonization, like deproletarianiza-
tion, does not just concern work and employment activities in produc-
tion or services: the challenge is also the detoxification of consumers, 
that is, the deproletarianization of ways of life.21 Here, an immense 
educational project opens up, whose terms and stakes are profoundly 
new, and which cannot wait for the reformation of educational insti-
tutions (which find themselves in an increasingly parlous state), but 
must on the contrary foster social dynamics of civil society that 
nourish and transform educational institutions. And the latter once 
again raises the question of what was developed in the twentieth cen-
tury under the banner of popular education, and of the relationships 
between democracy and education in John Dewey’s sense.
Here, we posit in principle that all knowledge, of whatever kind – 
empirical, parental, artistic, sporting, scientific, academic or social, in 
all of the senses that can be given to this last adjective – knows some-
thing of the world in that it adds something to this world: it knows 
that this world is unfinished, and that we must continue to make it 
unfold towards a future, to create the advent of something new. This 
adding something, through which the world happens through knowl-
edge, contributes to human worlds in a way that is neganthropic (and 
anti-anthropic, this notion being based on that of anti-entropy that 
will be developed in Chapter 1). Without this contribution, these 
worlds would collapse into anthropy: knowledge, whatever its form, is 
what, in the spontaneous tendency of the universe as a whole to move 
towards disorder, maintains or constitutes an order.
Deprived of such knowledge, employment can become toxic and 
‘devastate’ its milieu, as Supiot highlights. It is precisely in such 
deprivation, however, that proletarianization consists. And here lies 
the deepest origin of the Anthropocene era that is now reaching its 
limits – the IPCC reports precisely describe such limits from the cli-
matological perspective, but the challenge posed by the warming of 
the biosphere does not, unfortunately, exhaust the subject of the lim-
its of the Anthropocene, which will undoubtedly mark all the most 
salient features of the remainder of the twenty-first century, includ-
ing, hopefully, in terms of responses to these limits, and as the over-
coming of the Anthropocene era by the Neganthropocene era.
At the origin of thermodynamic anthropization lies the toxic 
anthropization of human life, itself produced by the anthropization of 
knowledge. By defining knowledge above all as neganthropic poten-
tial (in the wake of Alfred Whitehead and Georges Canguilhem), 
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the elements of a response to António Guterres and Greta Thunberg 
presented here consist, above all, in reconsidering the very purpose 
of the economy in general – in particular when the latter, having 
become industrial, functionally and systemically mobilizes scien-
tific knowledge.
It is this specific relationship of the industrial economy to scien-
tific knowledge that Chapter 1, ‘Anthropocene, Exosomatization 
and Negentropy’ – co-authored by Maël Montévil, Giuseppe Longo, 
Carlos Sonnenschein, Ana Soto and Bernard Stiegler – tries to 
describe. On the basis of this chapter, it is shown that, in a context 
where the Anthropocene is reaching its limits, the economy must be 
redefined above all as collective action in the struggle against entropy 
and against anthropy, given that the various disturbances afflicting 
the current stage of the Anthropocene all consist in an increase of 
(1) thermodynamic entropy, as the dissipation of energy, (2) biologi-
cal entropy, as the reduction of biodiversity, and (3) informational 
entropy, as the reduction of knowledge to data and computation – and, 
correspondingly, as loss of credit, as mistrust, as generalized mime-
tism and as the domination of what has been called the ‘post-truth era’ 
at the very moment when, more than ever, what Alfred Whitehead 
called the function of reason should be brought back to the heart of 
what amounts to an extreme state of emergency.
7 Struggling against anthropy
If it is obvious that the economy consists above all in the produc-
tion, sharing and exchange of value, and if, since the advent of the 
industrial economy, the so-called consumer economy has fundamen-
tally consisted in the production of various forms of value beyond its 
meaning in subsistence economies (which it has done by devaluing 
traditional values, and through the valuing, by the economy, of scien-
tific discoveries and technical inventions via a process of innovation 
whose primary functional element is marketing inasmuch as it ‘cre-
ates needs’), then in the current stage of the Anthropocene:
 ▪ this value has been devalued, which amounts to an extreme 
form of disenchantment, in the sense that Max Weber gives 
to this word22 – but far beyond what he himself could have 
anticipated;
 ▪ the ‘value of values’ ever more clearly becomes that which 
allows this era to overcome its limits – and to thus enter 
into a new era.
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Overcoming these limits can only mean struggling against entropy, 
and against its main source: anthropy. Struggling against entropy is 
what living things do: negative entropy has been referred to in this 
sense ever since Erwin Schrödinger formulated it as a concept in 1944 
in Dublin – during lectures subsequently published as What is Life?.23
As we have already indicated, in 1971, thirty-seven years after his 
encounter with Joseph Schumpeter at Harvard, Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen showed that the industrial economy does not take entropy 
into account, and is thereby necessarily condemned to destroy its own 
conditions of possibility.24 Arnold Toynbee will develop similar argu-
ments by taking up Vladimir Vernadsky’s analysis, in a chapter of 
Mankind and Mother Earth entitled ‘The Biosphere’.25
Negative entropy, which controls the organizational process of liv-
ing things throughout their evolution, can, however, only ever occur 
in a temporary and local way. We argue that this is also true of what 
we call negative anthropy, or neganthropy, and we posit that every 
society is a neganthropic locality belonging to a larger locality of the 
same type, up until the largest locality on Earth, which is the bio-
sphere itself as an absolute singularity in the known sidereal universe.
Conversely and consequently, when globalization (as a toxic and 
unsustainable completion of the transformation of the biosphere into a 
technosphere) systematically eliminates local specificities, this leads 
to a massive increase in entropic and anthropic processes. This is why 
the present initiative, aimed towards the United Nations, also con-
sists, for our collective, in reviving the notion of the ‘internation’ put 
forward by Marcel Mauss in 1920.
8 The notion of the internation and the scales of locality
We argue that reconsideration of the notion of the ‘internation’ must 
start from a negentropic standpoint, by producing neganthropic 
value and by taking into consideration what, inspired by the theory 
of anti-entropy developed by Francis Bailly, Giuseppe Longo and 
Maël Montévil, we will therefore call anti-anthropy. Anti-anthropy is 
distinguished from neganthropy in that it diachronizes a synchronic 
neganthropic order. These (neganthropic and anti-anthropic) values 
are produced by locality as such, which they characterize and, in so 
doing, delimit.
The way in which Mauss described nations in 1920 must be re-eval-
uated according to these notions, which he did not himself have at his 
disposal: nations, like all other forms of those localities called human 
societies (from the clan to the negentropic locality to which the bio-
sphere itself as a whole amounts on the scale of the solar system), are 
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cases of organizations that we call neganthropic in order to distin-
guish them from the negentropy constituted by life in general. The 
use of such a vocabulary is a way of heeding the ‘pharmacological’ 
issue at stake in exosomatic organs as theorized by Lotka. Any econ-
omy worthy of the name must reduce the various forms of toxicity 
produced by these organs to a minimum, through a form of organi-
zation appropriate for both knowledge (and therefore education) and 
exchange (and therefore economy) – knowledge itself being based 
on exchanges, of which the editorial economy, in all its forms, is a 
fundamental condition, along with scientific institutions. We will see 
how this is something about which, like Bergson and Mauss, Albert 
Einstein was concerned, and was so within the context of the League 
of Nations.26
In 1920, in the context of the creation of the League of Nations 
and the debate this provoked among socialists (of which he was one), 
Mauss posited that nations must not be diluted into internationalism, 
contrary to the reaction of most Marxist supporters of the October 
Revolution of 1917: for Mauss, it was a matter of facilitating the ‘con-
cert’ of nations through the constitution of an internation. We can see 
this as a prescient warning that any negation of nations is bound to 
lead to an exacerbation of nationalisms. But we can also see it as wish-
ful thinking, pious wishes – especially after the failure of the League 
of Nations. If this is true, then this wish and its piety (as belief in the 
superiority of the peaceful interest of men) must today be reconsidered 
from the standpoint of an economy conceived above all as the strug-
gle against entropy, and therefore as the valorization of open local-
ity, which for this reason must be founded (this economy and these 
localities) on a new epistemology of economics and the disciplines 
it involves (especially mathematics, physics, biology and theoretical 
computer science), taking the stakes of entropy fully into account.
Taking the stakes of entropy into account means learning to count 
otherwise, by translating these stakes into formal terms, in particu-
lar in the processes of certification, traceability and accounting that 
constitute every industrial economy, and by translating them into 
legal and institutional terms. It is a question of taking account of these 
issues at various scales, and hence of reconstituting them – not as bar-
riers but as crossing points and negotiations of economies of scale, as 
required by an economy of negentropy, and by extraterritorial mon-
etization. All kinds of possibilities are being raised in the work cur-
rently being undertaken in accounting by, in particular, economists,27 
jurists28 and philosophers29 – for example, in Europe, with the setting 
up of what are called ‘satellite accounts’ (see §55).
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9 Economic war and peace
A century after the institution of the League of Nations, a century 
after Mauss’s reflections, the immediate concern is not the avoidance 
of global conflict – even if, over the last decade, such worries are once 
again on the rise, a long way from the ‘optimism’ that characterized 
the end of the twentieth century. The main concern in terms of con-
flict has become economic war, which is ruinous for environments – 
social, moral and mental, as well as physical. It is in this context that 
the most archaic nationalisms are once again on the march throughout 
the world – and, along with them, processes of remilitarization, and 
thus new threats of war, the difference from the context in which the 
two world wars of the twentieth century erupted being the subsequent 
spread of atomic weapons. In other words, the situation is immeasur-
ably more serious than it was at the time of the League of Nations.
Why, in that case, does it seem that nothing can be done to change 
this state of affairs? We argue in Chapter 1 that this is first of all an 
epistemic and epistemological question: the question ‘quid juris?’, as 
Kant introduces it at the beginning of Critique of Pure Reason, must 
be posed anew, and this requires – and in a state of extreme urgency 
– setting up and supporting appropriate contributory research pro-
cesses, supported by a scientific institution that must be created for 
this purpose, and that would constitute the institutional basis of an 
internation.
In 1945, the League of Nations became the United Nations, pre-
cisely because of the failure to contain the exacerbated national-
isms of Germany, Italy and Japan – with all of the consequences we 
know so well, while the world had in the meantime divided into two 
blocs. Now that
 ▪ internationalization is carried out by the market,
 ▪ the Anthropocene has been defined, the question of the 
struggle against entropy thus imposing itself at the core 
of economics, 
it is time to rethink this century-long history from the perspective of a 
critique of the globalized economy that structurally and functionally 
ignores local diversities and specificities insofar as, as neganthropy, 
they generate noodiversity (that is, infinitely varied and precious 
knowledge) – just as negentropic life generates biodiversity.
Note here that initiatives as different as those emerging from the 
territorialist school instigated in Italy by Alberto Magnaghi,30 and 
those of the ‘transition towns’ inspired by Rob Hopkins in the United 
Kingdom,31 above all amount to discourses and practices conducted 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 32
on and through locality – as do, in slightly different ways, the reaf-
firmations of ‘ancestral knowledge’ in South America (for example, 
in the Ecuadorian constitution, or in Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s 
perspectivism32), and of the indigenous peoples of North America 
(in Canada33), reopening the prior question of the status of locality in 
social, economic and noetic life.34
At the same time, it should be recalled that:
 ▪ politeia, as it comes from the Greek experience of the polis, 
and inasmuch as it has always consisted in affirming the 
prevalence of political decision over economic decision, is 
always the privilege of a place, whether it is called a city 
(polis, civitas or republic in the sense of the Renaissance, 
then of Kant), monarchy, empire, nation or union (fed-
eration or confederation as in the United States, India, 
Brazil and so on);
 ▪ the ‘people’ and their ‘independence’ are constituted by 
their territorial right to self-determination, and this is some-
thing that no cosmopolitanism can afford to ignore (starting 
with Kant’s).
At the end of the twentieth century, globalization spread rapidly 
across the entire planet by using the vector of technology to standard-
ize usage, no longer taking any account of the specificities of what 
Bertrand Gille and Niklas Luhmann called social systems, thereby 
ignoring the singular social practices that new exosomatic organs 
also make possible. In this way, globalization has eliminated all local 
scales – from the domestic nano-locality to the national or even con-
tinental (regional in the Anglo-Saxon sense of a geographical unit) 
macro-locality. It has thus imposed a standardized and monolithic 
conception of the market, which attempts to set itself up as a compu-
tational hegemony itself based on the elimination of everything that 
is not calculable.
In this way, globalization has ruined biospheric metalocality, which 
can remain a singularity in the universe (as a living environment) 
only on the condition of protecting its biodiversity, and, when it tends 
to become technospheric, its noodiversity: such is the reality of the 
Anthropocene era that is presently reaching its extreme limits. And 
this is why nationalist extremism is rearing its head almost every-
where, even becoming, or again becoming, the leading political force.
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10 Urban localities and human commerce  
in computational becoming
As for the city – not only in the sense of the small locality of Totnes 
described by Hopkins, but the metropolis or megalopolis, constituting 
what, after the work of Saskia Sassen, it has become customary to 
refer to as the global city – it is also, as Sassen has shown, the site of a 
complex reinvention of locality and citizenship:
The space constituted by the worldwide grid of global cit-
ies […] is perhaps one of the most strategic spaces for the 
formation of new types of politics, identities, and commu-
nities, including transnational ones. This is a space that is 
place-centered in that it is embedded in particular and strate-
gic sites, and transterritorial in that it connects sites that are 
not geographically proximate […]. The centrality of place in 
a context of global processes engenders a transnational eco-
nomic and political opening…35
In this respect, the global city and networks of global cities are not 
just ‘learning territories’ in the sense put forward by Pierre Veltz in 
1994:36 since that time, digital networks have developed at such a rate 
and on such a scale that urban localities have been profoundly trans-
formed: ‘The whole issue of context and of its surroundings, as part 
of locality, is profoundly affected [by digital networks]’.37 As a result, 
new types of borders are appearing, which are not just national or ter-
ritorial, while at the same time we see the formation of ‘a global law 
[…] that must be […] distinguished from both national law and inter-
national law.’38 This is above all a contract law that disintegrates those 
notions of law that emerged from Greco-Roman antiquity, fundamen-
tally tied to the questions ‘quid juris?’ and ‘quid facti?’ as Kant revis-
its them and inasmuch as they concern both science and law. The fact 
remains that these local urban economies and organizations, which 
are reticulated and in this way becoming global, are thus far more like 
‘Trojan horses’ that aid in the penetration of those criteriologies of 
value emerging from the global market as it continues to ignore ques-
tions of entropy, than the converse.
With the erasure of localities insofar as they are negentropic and 
neganthropic, the global market has also destroyed commerce – in the 
sense of the distinction between commerce and the market proposed 
by Armand Hatchuel, Olivier Favereau and Franck Aggeri.39 Here, it 
is important to underline that the notion of the global market is based 
on an utterly fallacious a priori assumption that rational behaviour is 
a calculation, that is, a ‘ratio’, all economic agents then being defined 
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as those who make calculations with respect to utterly decontextu-
alized and delocalized particular interests, supporting, after consoli-
dation, a universal rationality that has more to do with what Adorno 
called rationalization than with what Whitehead called reason. It is 
this that leads to what Supiot has called governance by numbers.40
To conceive the economy in this way inevitably leads to the nega-
tion of politics, as democracy disintegrates into marketing, generating 
among the populations of the whole world a feeling of being dispos-
sessed of their future and of submitting to a functionally blind compu-
tational becoming. This is all the more the case as this computational-
ist hegemony, of which ‘platforms’ have become the operators, now 
in fact controls the reticulation of these global cities. From this, we 
are led to expect a coming catastrophe, and on a timescale so short 
that it could strike with unprecedented violence at today’s youngest 
generations by the time they become adults (and we can then see that 
the benefit of abandoning finality in the name of efficiency is abso-
lutely illusory).
11 The address to António Guterres: a way out of the coming 
hell
On 10 September 2018, ten days before the first meeting of the 
Internation Collective in London, António Guterres delivered a 
speech in New York to the UN General Assembly in which he called 
upon nations to take the urgent measures that the latest IPCC reports 
concluded are necessary. Four months later, on 24 January 2019, he 
made similar remarks to the heads of the global corporations meeting 
at the World Economic Forum in Davos – at which Greta Thunberg 
also appeared, after taking the initiative in August 2018 to speak on 
behalf of her generation by initiating a ‘global climate strike’.
The Internation Collective then decided to send to António 
Guterres, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, the letter that is 
reproduced at the beginning of this book (see p. 11), announcing the 
proposals set out in the following chapters. In this letter, we proposed 
to António Guterres and the UN:
 ▪ on the one hand, a diagnosis of what blocks any concerted 
effort by public and economic authorities to overcome the 
catastrophes now variously anticipated and described;
 ▪ on the other hand, a method for overcoming these blockages 
– this method taking note, first, of the sustainable devel-
opment objectives adopted by the UN in 2015, second, of 
the imperative need for an integrated way of tackling the 
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immense challenges posed by climate change but also by 
its consequences on migration, and third, of the upheavals 
brought by digital technology – as António Guterres high-
lighted on 24 January in Davos.41
We should reiterate that if neither the member states nor global 
or transnational companies act in the way demanded by António 
Guterres and Greta Thunberg, this is the result not just of particular 
conflicts of interest, faced with the need to give priority to the public 
good at the level of the biosphere: it is first of all because of a lack, at 
the scale of nations and corporations, of concepts and methods ade-
quate to the task of facing up to this ‘reversal of all values’ that is the 
ordeal of the Anthropocene in the post-truth era.
What this suggests is that a colossal research effort must be under-
taken in order to meet these challenges, despite the fact that the IPCC 
says that what must be taken without delay is action, and that there is 
no longer any time for a preliminary research process in which reflec-
tion would precede action. This apparent contradiction, however, is 
not something we shy away from, and we have already argued in this 
way: turning this contradiction into a new prospect is both the goal 
and the very method of contributory research.
12 Territorial laboratories and contributory research:  
plan of the work
Years of research have already been conducted in an effort to over-
come dominant forms of thought that remain profoundly tied to the 
paradigm that has led to what the IPCC has announced will be, if it 
does not change course, an inevitable disaster. Beyond that, contribu-
tory research42 consists in the development of laboratory territories 
bringing together, and involving on a daily basis, inhabitants, asso-
ciations, institutions, businesses and administrations. For these learn-
ing communities, it is a question of dealing in a very practical way 
with the immediate challenges of the Anthropocene, such as toxic 
processes of all kinds, while at the same time testing and formaliz-
ing new theoretical models, which must be generic and transposable, 
while at the same time being capable of taking localities into account.
This is why our proposal to the United Nations (via the Secretary-
General) is for a large-scale launch, in all regions of the world, of 
laboratory territories designed to carry out contributory research. 
This would require opening a call for tender endowed with sufficient 
means, calling for applications on the basis of a set of specifications 
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and in relation to which the work we present here is intended as a 
starting point.
As already indicated, the first thesis consists in positing that the 
causes of the main blockage in current economic development are 
above all epistemological. This is set out in Chapter 1.
The integration of the issues and formalisms linked to entropy 
requires territorialized approaches, for reasons explained above. The 
challenge is thus to find ways of shifting from the microeconomic 
level to the macroeconomic level by passing through regional (meso-
economic) strata and sectors. Territorial and urban dynamics, on the 
one hand, and the specificities of contributory economies that value 
work and deproletarianize employment, on the other hand, constitute 
the respective issues at stake in Chapters 2 and 3.
The contributory research method, inspired in part by what the 
German artist Joseph Beuys called ‘social sculpture’, is discussed in 
Chapter 4. As proposed here, that is, in the framework of an experi-
mental approach to be implemented on a global scale, this requires the 
constitution of a scientific institution that should be the starting point 
for an internation – as explained in Chapters 5 and 6.
Such an experimental, theoretical and contributory research prac-
tice requires instruments of deliberation, cooperation and exchange, 
for which new practices of computer design and engineering are 
required. This presupposes a redefinition of those questions we call 
ethical, by, on the one hand, starting from the notion of ethōs – which 
is also to say, of locality – and by, on the other hand, redefining ethōs 
in the global and now technospheric context. These analyses are dis-
cussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
The challenge of climate change is clearly identified, qualified and 
quantified as the question of carbon metabolism in a society based 
on thermodynamic technology, and to begin with the steam engine 
– from the study of which thermodynamic theory emerged. The ques-
tion of silicon technologies – which today have become competitors 
of proletarianized employees and automated decision-making systems 
– is just as crucial in the struggle against crossing the threshold limits 
of the Anthropocene era.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, and in the context 
of a trade war and the rise of smartphones and so-called social net-
works, these silicon technologies have been socialized in the form of 
a systemically addictive exploitation of dopaminergic reward circuits. 
Chapters 9 and 10 discuss these issues, laying out the fundamen-
tal basis of a politics of detoxification based on deproletarianization 
and on forging new relationships with these highly toxic exoso-
matic systems that carbon and silicon technologies have become, the 
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question being to know how to reorient them towards curative eco-
nomic practices.
13 Aporetic questions and problems of locality
Introducing the issue of the struggle against anthropy is a way of 
emphasizing the irreducible character of locality. In the case of the 
exosomatic form of life, however, locality can itself become toxic: 
since exosomatic organs are irreducibly bivalent, they can harm indi-
viduals and collectives, who then suffer from their entropic effects. 
Any crisis situation stems directly or indirectly from such a ‘disad-
justment’ in which the exosomatic ‘pharmakon’ can thus reverse its 
sign and become a ‘poison’ rather than a ‘remedy’. Locality then tends 
to withdraw and to close in upon itself – that is, to fall into decline.
As for the possible toxicity of organs that are in principle benefi-
cial, the early twenty-first century presents itself as a veritable accu-
mulation of such sign-reversals by which the remedy suddenly turns 
out to be poisonous. In every respect, the Anthropocene appears to be 
precisely such a reversal on the scale of the entire planet, and it is now 
clear to what extent such value-reversals can lead to violence. This is 
all the more the case since most of the time, when an exosomatic sys-
tem or device that has more or less established its positivity reverses 
its sign, it happens that the victims of this bivalence turn upon another 
victim, an ‘expiatory’ victim: a ‘pharmakos’,43 as the ancient Greeks 
and the Scriptures of monotheism say, that is, a scapegoat. Locality 
then constitutes itself essentially as a symptomatology of exclusion.
Given that locality is nowadays lived in some way by default, 
claims for it are therefore often made in terms of a closed and ster-
ile assertion of identity – the scapegoat making it possible to conceal 
the challenges involved in a true revaluation of localities based on the 
sharing and exchange of new knowledge, inaugurating a new relation-
ship to technologies and, more generally, to the milieu this forms (an 
exosomatic milieu that, in Chapter 10, Daniel Ross calls an element). 
Locality then becomes the fantasized projection of a given identity, 
and not the process of a perpetually open identification, one that is 
still to come and adoptive, that is, metabolizing its alterity.
A locality is not an identity. On the contrary, it is a process of alter-
ation, composed of multiple smaller localities, and included within 
larger localities. The fundamental question is that of the metabolism 
that is locality qua neganthropic process – including at its highest 
level, the biosphere as a whole, which has now become a technosphere.
The metabolism through which localities enter into relationships 
and exchange alterities is the economy, which is not reducible to the 
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exchange of subsistence or consumer goods, and which always con-
stitutes what Paul Valéry called a political economy of spirit value44 
– the most sublimated level of what Freud more generally called the 
libidinal economy.45 This economy is conditioned in its forms by the 
historical configurations of the exosomatization process.
The process of exosomatization continuously disorients the exo-
somatic form of life. First and foremost, locality is the taking-place 
[avoir lieu] from which an orientation emerges, that is, a meaning – 
an end, arising from a point of view shared by the community, thus 
constituting knowledge, or rather, a bundle of types of knowledge, 
always already on the way to diffracting towards an open and diverse 
future. Such a point of view is a potential for bifurcation, that is, for 
the emergence of a difference qua place – where a phase shift occurs 
in that relationship to matter which we call metabolization, generat-
ing a dimensionality that is both singular and collective. Conceived 
in this way, locality is the engine of difference itself: it is not consti-
tuted by its identity (it does not have one: it arises from the originary 
default that strikes exosomatization – and strikes it as mystery46), but 
by its potential for differentiation.
This is true of locality in all epochs and everywhere around the 
world. The fact that the Baruya are organized into tribes that them-
selves belong to an ethnic group, the tribe itself being composed of 
clans,47 means that it is in the differential constituted by these scales 
of locality that local processes of individuation can arise – these dif-
ferent scales being cosmologically inscribed in localities that exceed 
ethnicity, and this exceeding being the object of what we here call 
noesis qua noodiversity. Locality, in other words, is always expressed 
in points of view that are themselves local in relation to the process of 
unification that the locality forms.
Locality is therefore relational and functions as the place of activa-
tion of another dimension in a field – which is itself the product of 
another differential produced by another locality on another dimen-
sion of the field. Difference is primary, that is, fundamentally tied to 
another difference, rather than to the existence of a pre-constituted 
identity. To re-evaluate localities, conceived as sources of negan-
thropy and anti-anthropy (metastabilized processes in the form of 
social structures and emergent singularities always capable of calling 
into question any constituted order), it is necessary to rethink auto-
mated calculation and algorithms on the basis of a new understanding 
of information theory and computer science. This is outlined in terms 
of its most general principles in Chapter 7, and as a technodiversity 
constitutive of cosmotechnics.48
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Currently, relationships between psychic individuals are generated 
automatically, and this leads – through ‘user profiling’, ‘echo cham-
bers’ and ‘nudging’ – to the literal annihilation of these psychic locali-
ties that are individuals themselves, who find themselves replaced by 
what Félix Guattari called dividuals, in the sense in which ‘patterns’ 
are statistically extracted in a manner already in a way foreshadowed 
by Robert Musil in The Man Without Qualities, at a moment when in 
Italy, German and Japan a catastrophe was brewing.
Here, it is knowledge qua memory (sets of collective retentions and 
protentions) that is very seriously compromised by ‘user profiling’, 
‘echo chambers’ and ‘nudging’, society thus becoming systemically 
amnesic. It is not, however, a question of advocating the protection 
of an ‘authentic’ individual or collective memory that would be kept 
away from or sheltered from calculation: it is a question of the negan-
thropic and anti-anthropic socialization of artificial retention, which, 
as exosomatization, constitutes every form of society, as the totem 
reflected on by Emile Durkheim,49 or as works in the sense of Ignace 
Meyerson.50 Today, digital retention must be theorized in a new way 
so as to be put at the service of the metabolization of localities, rather 
than their purely computational and extractive abstraction.
It is in this sense that Management Institutes of the Contributory 
Economy (MICE) are based above all on deliberative platforms con-
stituted by starting from the local level, and on the basis of projects 
forming micro-reticular exchange structures and aiming towards 
macro-reticular exchange structures.
14 The future according to Bergson
Faced with the mortal and (in the strict sense) apocalyptic challenges 
of the end of the Anthropocene era announced by the vast majority of 
the scientific community, human beings must reconstruct knowledge 
by rediscovering old knowledge, even ancestral knowledge, and by 
producing new knowledge in all fields. Inventiveness, creativity and 
discovery are today, as always, the only guarantees of the future of 
humanity – and of life in general.
Contributory research posits that everyone can and must take part 
in such a production of new wealth, and the contributory economy 
posits that this requires a reasoned, tested and deliberate macro-
economic change, based on taking into account scientific work in 
many fields, in the service of a new economic rationality to combat 
anthropy, opening up an age founded on cooperation and economic 
peace rather than on a form of destruction that has long ceased to be 
‘creative’: the Anthropocene era is the revelation of the primarily 
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destructive character of the ‘creative destruction’ that according to 
Joseph Schumpeter describes consumerist capitalism.
If there are never any guarantees of the future other than those 
brought by inventiveness, creativity and discovery, then what is now 
changing, and in a disorienting way, is the fact that a global economy 
of extraordinary efficiency, which has made it possible to feed, clothe 
and house billions of people, more or less badly, turns out to have also 
been extraordinarily toxic – so toxic that it threatens to put an end to 
what Toynbee called ‘the great human adventure’.51 Here, and in order 
to learn the lessons they teach, we must reread three quite extraor-
dinary – extra-lucid – little sentences that were published by Henri 
Bergson in 1932:
Mankind lies groaning, half crushed beneath the weight of 
its own progress. Men do not sufficiently realize that their 
future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determin-
ing first of all whether they want to go on living or not.52
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1 Anthropocene, Exosomatization and Negentropy
Maël Montévil, Bernard Stiegler, Giuseppe Longo,  
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15 Industrial economy, scientific knowledge, technology  
and the Anthropocene era
The industrial economy took shape in the period from the late eigh-
teenth century to the nineteenth century – first in Western Europe, 
then in North America. In addition to technical production, it led to 
technological production: mobilizing science to produce industrial 
goods. As Marx showed in 1857, capitalism turns knowledge and its 
economic valuation into its primary element.
Newtonian physics and the metaphysics that accompanies it lie at 
the origin of the epistemic (in Michel Foucault’s sense) and epistemo-
logical (in Gaston Bachelard’s sense) framework of this great transfor-
mation – which is the condition of what Karl Polanyi himself called 
the ‘great transformation’.1 In this transformation, otium (produc-
tive leisure time) submits to negotium (worldly affairs). Meanwhile, 
mathematics is applied through ever more powerful and performa-
tive calculating machines – referred to after the Second World War 
as computers.
After precursors such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, himself 
inspired by Alfred Lotka, we will argue in this book that political 
economy, in what is now called the Anthropocene era (thematized in 
2000 by Paul Crutzen, and whose characteristics were described by 
Vladimir Vernadsky as early as 1926), is a challenge that requires a 
fundamental re-examination of these epistemic and epistemological 
frameworks.2
With the work of Charles Darwin, living things came to be seen as 
part of a constantly evolving historical process.3 In humans, knowl-
edge is part of this process, which is performative in the dual sense 
of this word: both in the sense of efficiency and in the sense of pre-
scription.4 This process becomes exosomatic, that is, extra-corporeal, 
as Lotka shows,5 shaping and reshaping ways of life, particularly in 
order to limit the negative effects of technical innovations.
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16 Relations between knowledge and technics: historical 
overview from an industrial perspective
In the context of the industrial revolution, science, economics and 
especially trade were seen as the new basis of legitimacy, security, 
justice and peace. Hume, for example, argued that the gold standard 
spontaneously adjusts the balance of payments between states. The 
underlying scientific paradigm was Newtonian – in which determin-
istic mathematical laws are seen as the ultimate form of knowledge.
From the Newtonian perspective, equilibrium and optimization 
arise spontaneously from the relationships between parts of a system. 
Scientific work is therefore dedicated to describing spontaneous and 
optimal equilibriums. From such a perspective, the scientific formal-
ization of economics and production favours the withdrawal of all 
rational supervision once the desired dynamic is in place, and it can 
be posited in principle that any outside intervention in the spontane-
ous functioning of the system would disrupt the properties of these 
equilibriums. In this sense, scientific and technological developments 
make progress through the optimization of processes and the provi-
dence of spontaneous equilibriums.
Such analyses, however, neglect by construction the context of a 
situation, even when this context is the condition of possibility of this 
situation: this formalization ignores localities. Moreover, following 
the same logic, both in science and industry, and on the basis of the 
axioms of modern philosophy, singular situations (co-implicating a 
primordial diversity of singular factors) are reduced to a combination 
of simple elements that can be known and controlled. For example, 
the production undertaken by a single craftsman or craftswoman 
can be decomposed into simple tasks carried out by several skilled 
workers, then eventually by machines: this is what Adam Smith 
described in The Wealth of Nations,6 an enterprise that will be con-
tinued in the nineteenth century by Andrew Ure, Charles Babbage 
and Frederick Taylor, and applied systemically in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.7
Such a method leads to the progressive loss of the knowledge pos-
sessed by workers as it is transferred to the technological system. 
This tendency was described for the first time by Adam Smith, and 
seventy-two years later by Karl Marx, who called it proletarianiza-
tion. This loss of knowledge is the essential element of a more general 
process that we here refer to as denoetization,8 that is, the loss of the 
ability to think (noesis). Technique becomes technology, and like the 
former it is a pharmakon: as with a drug, it can lead to results that may 
either be toxic or curative.
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17 The life sciences and entropy theory –  
from the nineteenth to the twentieth century
Contemporaneously with these events, new scientific ideas emerge 
with the truly revolutionary perspectives on life opened up by Jean-
Baptiste Lamarck and then by Darwin: On the Origin of Species 
establishes a new and irreversible evolutionary understanding of what 
will become biology (the science baptized with this name was pro-
jected as early as Lamarck, who coined the term). This framework 
will be interpreted by some as another instantiation of the Newtonian 
scientific model; others will emphasize the originality of a scientific 
theory based on historical reasoning in the natural sciences, in con-
trast with physical theories that study universal and permanent laws.
From the evolutionary perspective, from which biology strictly 
speaking will emerge, the living world is no longer a static manifesta-
tion of the divine order: current life forms come from a long process 
of historical becoming. This change of perspective leads to questions 
about the development of humanity and the role played in this pro-
cess by human intelligence and the freedom in which it consists, for 
better and for worse: hence the development of eugenics and social 
Darwinism – contrary to Darwin’s vision, which embraced the idea of 
a singularity of human societies – while, as we will see, Lotka posited 
that the human (that is, technical) form of life establishes an ortho-
genic and not simply biological form of evolution and selection.
The nineteenth century also saw the emergence of another scien-
tific framework, this time in the field of physics: the industrial revolu-
tion brought the development of heat engines, which raised theoretical 
questions that would lead to the birth of thermodynamics. In this way, 
physicists were led to the concept of entropy, and to the realization 
that it is bound to increase in isolated systems – such is the second law 
of thermodynamics. In physics, energy is in principle conserved, but 
the fact that entropy increases means that this energy becomes less 
usable for performing macroscopic tasks.
In a nutshell, the increase of entropy in a physical system is the 
process that consists in passing from less probable macroscopic states 
to more probable macroscopic states. It follows that the increase of 
entropy is the disappearance of improbable initial states, and their 
replacement by more probable characteristics, which has the effect of 
erasing the past. For example, a drop of ink would tend to disperse in 
water until it reaches a uniform situation, which will erase the initial 
position of the drop. This framework challenges the reversibility of 
classical mechanics – the latter having no objective arrow of time – 
and leads in cosmological terms to the heat death of the universe.
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The concept of entropy is tied to Poincaré’s discovery of chaotic 
dynamics and to the refutation of Laplace’s idea that mathematical 
determinism implies predictability. It therefore refutes the general 
notion of the mathematical predictability and controllability of natural 
phenomena. In particular, Poincare’s work was focused on the solar 
system, showing that its long-term stability cannot be established. 
These scientific developments lead to the idea of a precarious cosmos.
Determinism in Laplace’s sense, however, found a second wind 
in the twentieth century with mathematical logic and later computer 
science. These developments took place as industrial production 
was being transformed into a capitalism of consumption, organized 
around standardized mass production. The media, itself becom-
ing ‘mass’, was increasingly designed so as to trigger standardized 
consumer responses.9 The tendency of denoetization that began with 
the proletarianization of producers is thus extended to consumers as 
such – for example, the processed foods produced by the agro-food 
industry lead to an increasing loss of the knowledge of how to cook, 
contributing to the pandemics of non-communicable diseases such as 
obesity and diabetes.
18 The twentieth century and information theory
In this context, the vague notion of information becomes central. In 
1948, Claude Shannon proposed a formalized and calculable concept 
of information in order to understand and optimize the transmission 
of written or audio messages in noisy communication channels10 – 
according to principles that would lead to what is known as signal 
compression, which today allows, for example, high-definition video 
to be transmitted over telecommunications networks. A very differ-
ent concept was proposed by Andrei Kolmogorov during the 1960s 
to describe the difficulty of generating a given sequence of characters 
for computer programs.
Shannon’s theory posits that information is what reduces ambiguity, 
hence it is what is improbable once a probabilistic model has been set 
up. This idea becomes absurd when it is used to study the meaning of 
a message beyond the question of difficulties of (noisy) transmission, 
which was Shannon’s original motivation. For example, sequences 
such as ‘qqqq…’ carry maximum information in Shannon’s sense 
because ‘q’ is the least probable letter, whereas a random sequence, 
for example, ‘ldznck…’, has maximum information in Kolmogorov’s 
sense – it cannot be effectively compressed. These two limit cases 
carry more information in their respective senses than a fragment of 
Corneille of the same length.
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Despite this confrontation of two perspectives making obvious the 
self-contradictory character and thus the theoretical fragility of this 
notion,11 the dominant opinion in current cognitive science – itself 
dominating common as well as scientific representations in digital 
capitalism – is that intelligence is information processing, that is, a 
probabilistic or digital calculation, depending on the point of view 
being privileged, the two frameworks often being mixed together. 
Similarly, information plays a key role in molecular biology, despite 
the absence of a theoretical account of the notion. Finally, by ignor-
ing early critiques by authors such as Poincaré,12 economics has, via 
Herbert Simon and Friedrich Hayek, been conceptualized as a pro-
cess of spontaneous mathematical optimization by ‘rational’ agents 
equipped with an ability to process information – possibly biased for 
biological reasons – in cognitive economic approaches.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the use of computers 
expanded into various forms (such as personal computers, smart-
phones and tablets). Their connection to networks deepened and 
transformed the role of the media. Private interests began to compete 
to attract and hold the attention of users through calculation (antici-
pated to a lesser extent by twentieth-century analogue mass media, 
but at that time what is analysed and controlled is not yet individ-
ual behaviour).
With digital network technologies, the services provided to users 
depend on the data they produce, service providers using this data to 
capture and hold the attention of other users – the whole system being 
based on the exploitation of network effects. These transformations 
are leading to a new wave of automation: algorithms such as those uti-
lized in social networks formalize and automate activities that were 
hitherto structurally alien to the formal economy.
These changes lead to new losses of knowledge and to a form of 
denoetization caused by a destructive form of capturing attention, 
seriously undermining the capacity for attention. Since the domi-
nant view in the cognitive sciences is that intelligence is information 
processing, many scientists consider algorithms to be artificial intel-
ligence, thus ignoring the conditions of possibility of human intel-
ligence, such as attention-formation. At the same time, management 
and commercial platforms break people down into tables of skills, 
interests and behaviours, and these are fed into algorithms, allowing 
targeted political and commercial marketing, and shaping training 
and recruitment policies.
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19 Digital denoetization as the ‘end of theory’  
in the Anthropocene era
The same tendency exists in science:
 ▪ knowledge tends to be balkanized into ever more special-
ized research fields;
 ▪ scientific research thus tends to be reduced to the deploy-
ment of new technological systems for capturing and pro-
cessing information;
 ▪ operational definitions replace theoretical definitions.
Theorization, however, is the condition of science: it constitutes a 
synthetic activity that requires reassessment, based on experience of 
concepts used, history of a field, empirical observation and the per-
spectives of other fields – whether by analogy or by the development 
of theoretical articulations – in coherence with and in opposition to 
earlier theoretical models.13
With the emergency of data mining, Chris Anderson believed he 
could declare ‘the end of theory’.14 This perspective was criticized as 
soon as it was uttered, and eventually in the same magazine, notably 
by Kevin Kelly.15 Nevertheless, the twilight of scientific theorizing 
seems to come mainly from another direction. Following the general 
tendency of society, the loss of the ability to theorize is first of all the 
result of the transformation of human activities. These include institu-
tional restructuring and the increasing weight of scientific marketing, 
both in scientific publications and in terms of the criteria utilized for 
financial decisions.
The decline in theorizing and the scientific denoetization to which 
it leads also stem from an inadequate critical assessment of digital 
technologies and the consequences they bear for scientific activities – 
whether in terms of bibliometrics and scientometrics16 or of statistical 
software used by experimental researchers.17 As a result:
 ▪ the academic and scientific appropriation of these technolo-
gies is lacking (such an appropriation presupposes theoreti-
cal modelling exposed to peer review, and thus to contest 
and debate);
 ▪ their toxic consequences (in Socrates’s sense when he points 
out the toxicity of writing as practised in his time by the 
sophists) are not mastered;
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 ▪ these technologies are not implemented in accordance with 
scientific ends (except for certain purely mathematical 
questions that have been dealt with in detail).
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are also wit-
nessing a growing awareness of the consequences of human activity 
for the rest of the planet, leading to the definition of a new era: the 
Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is characterized by the tendency 
of human activity to destroy the conditions of possibility of human 
existence – both at the level of biological organizations (organisms, 
ecosystems) and at the level of the capacity to think (noesis). In this 
context, the ability to generate knowledge in order to mitigate the tox-
icity of technological innovations, and transform them, is profoundly 
weakened, to the extent that the problem of this toxicity is mostly 
repressed as such by governments and societies – at the risk of being 
recognized too late.
20 Thermodynamic entropy and biological negentropy
From the standpoint of physics, energy and mineral resources such 
as metals are quantities that are conserved. And yet we clearly see 
that these resources are becoming scarce. How is this possible? It 
is the crucial concept of entropy that allows us to understand this 
apparent paradox.
Entropy is a property of configurations, and, more precisely, of the 
evolution of these configurations, which distinguishes it from the 
question of quantities of matter or energy. It is directly tied to our 
ability or inability to make use of these resources. Mineral deposits, 
for example, are exploitable because they can be found at sufficiently 
high concentrations, which is highly improbable (improbable with 
respect to the statistically dominant state of the distribution of this 
material on the planet). In other words, we can exploit these deposits 
because the entropy of the distribution of these metals on Earth is not 
maximally spread.
Such configurations are generated by geological and atmospheric 
mechanisms that are far from equilibrium processes, such as volca-
noes, and through a combination of circumstances occurring on geo-
logical time scales18 – and human activities further concentrate these 
metals through mechanical and chemical work. All these processes 
lowering the entropy of the distribution of metals come at the cost 
of a higher dispersion of energy in the form of heat, whether it is the 
energy of the sun in the atmosphere or the energy (whether from fos-
sil fuels or otherwise) used to refine metals. What we generally call 
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‘consuming energy’ actually means dispersing energy as heat, that is, 
producing entropy.
Nevertheless, a simple accounting of entropy is not enough: the 
measurement of entropy, which is a concentration/dispersion ratio 
with regard to configurations, is meaningful only within the proces-
sual character of the universe and, on Earth, of the biosphere. We can 
imagine possibilities such as destroying life in order to minimize the 
production of entropy on Earth – which is obviously absurd. For a 
precise grasp of contemporary issues, it is on the contrary necessary 
to specify the articulation of entropy and life, first with regard to the 
diverse forms of living things, and second with regard to the specific 
case of human societies.
From a thermodynamic standpoint, biological situations (or con-
figurations) are not at a maximum level of entropy, but nor do they 
tend towards a maximum level of entropy. The low and sometimes 
even decreasing entropy of biological objects seems to contradict the 
second law of thermodynamics, which stipulates that entropy does 
not diminish in an isolated system. Biological situations, however, 
including the biosphere as a whole, are not isolated systems: they 
are open, and they functionalize interrelated flows of energy, matter 
and entropy.
At the level of the biosphere, the Sun is the main provider of 
the free energy (low entropy) used by photosynthetic organisms. 
Consequently, biological situations do not contradict the second law. 
But this is possible only insofar as biological organizations – and by 
extension social organizations – are necessarily local, locally defer-
ring the increase of entropy through a local and organic (organized) 
differentiation of space, and dependent on coupling with their envi-
ronment. In organisms, the relationship between the interior and the 
exterior is materialized and organized by semi-permeable membranes.
How can we further understand biological situations and the way 
they relate to thermodynamics? Here, a brief discussion of the epis-
temology of the application of mathematics is necessary in order to 
understand natural or social phenomena. Prediction requires theoreti-
cally distinguishing the situation that will be realized from other pos-
sible situations. The maximization of entropy is therefore one mac-
roscopic state among other possible states: the state that maximizes 
entropy. Functions fulfilling this role in physics are called potentials. 
There exists a diversity of potentials in the field of equilibrium ther-
modynamics, which are different variants of free energy, involving 
entropy, and whose relevance depends on the coupling between the 
system being studied and its exterior.
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For example, the function that makes it possible to predict the final 
situation of an isolated system is not the same as the function that 
describes a system that exchanges heat with its environment, such as 
a cup of tea exchanging energy with the room in which it is located. 
But in the case of systems that are far from thermodynamic equilib-
rium – situations that require flows with the outside in order to last, 
such as organisms, or a heated apartment – there is no consensus on 
the theoretical existence of such a function or family of functions.
Prigogine’s fundamental idea is that the rate of production of 
entropy (that is, the rate of energy dissipation) could play the theoreti-
cal role of a potential – it would be spontaneously optimized. This idea 
is valid, however, only in (very) particular systems.19 The absence of a 
function playing the role of potential for general far-from-equilibrium 
systems means that our ability to understand and predict such systems 
by calculation, as in the usual kinds of physical theories, is not theo-
retically justified. The epistemological status of mathematization can 
thus no longer be the same20 across these two different cases.
This is why the method of economic analysis that we defend here 
organically articulates mathematics (notably indicators) with delib-
eration in a locality, instead of using a mathematical framework taken 
as universal and permanent (see Chapter 3). From a less technical 
standpoint, Schrödinger introduces the idea that the problem in biol-
ogy is not to understand order by starting from disorder, as in many 
physical situations such as the formation of ice with its crystalline 
structure, but rather to understand order starting from order.21 To 
grasp this idea, he proposed studying negative entropy, an idea that 
was later developed further by Brillouin, who called this negative 
entropy ‘negentropy’.
Negative entropy, however, as a decrease in the dissipation of 
energy, does not purely and simply coincide with the existence of 
biological organizations. Entropy can be lowered simply by reducing 
the temperature, while biological organisms remain organisms only 
between certain minimum and maximum temperatures. A major gla-
ciation would lower the entropy of the Earth (by inversely releasing 
it in the form of heat in the rest of the universe), but it would also 
destroy life.
Furthermore, the functional parts of biological organizations 
often involve a local increase of entropy in order to be functional. 
For example, the diffusion of a compound from the place it is pro-
duced to the rest of the cell is a process of producing physical entropy. 
Nevertheless, this process allows the compound to reach the places 
where it can play its functional role. It follows that the theoretical 
articulation between entropy and biological organization requires a 
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careful analysis that goes beyond the framework of a simple opposi-
tion between entropy (considered as disorder) and negentropy (consid-
ered as order).
21 Biodiversity, anthropic situations in the Anthropocene  
and anti-entropic novelty
Biological organizations keep themselves far from maximum entropy 
configurations by functionalizing the flows coming from their exter-
nal milieu so as to maintain themselves. They actively maintain them-
selves through the interaction between their parts, and between these 
organizations and their milieus. This necessary coupling between 
organism and environment takes place in ecosystems that are them-
selves anchored within larger levels – up to the level of the biosphere, 
which is their upper limit.
The viability of living things derives from the systemic proper-
ties of these different levels, but these are not spontaneous situations, 
such as fires, volcanoes or hurricanes, and we cannot simply relate 
the organization that is life and organic matter to the order we find in 
countless configurations in the universe, and particularly on Earth. 
The way in which biological organizations maintain themselves stems 
from the history that gave rise to them, including the different con-
texts in which the members of a lineage have lived.
The way in which biological organization is maintained is there-
fore fundamentally historical: it unfolds from the natural history of 
the species, the ecosystem or the individual. In the context of the 
Anthropocene era, this historicity implies a particular vulnerability to 
rapid anthropic changes that simultaneously disrupt biological orga-
nizations as a whole at various levels in the biosphere. Examples are 
the effect of climate change on ecosystems or the effect of endocrine 
disruptors on organisms.22 Moreover, living things continue to change 
over time by generating new structures and functions. Biologists 
focus less on individual species than on the conservation of biodiver-
sity, and especially on the conservation of the burgeoning process of 
evolution that we can call biodiversification. This process is itself sub-
ject to anthropic disruptions, preventing life from reorganizing itself.
In a word, biological organizations are precarious because the exis-
tence and nature of their parts are fundamentally contingent. It is for 
this reason that these parts must be actively and constantly main-
tained. It is not sustainable for an organism to stop feeding, drinking 
or breathing without irreversibly sinking into entropy: without dying.
Organizations maintain themselves according to behaviours 
and operations that emanate from their articulation with their past 
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contexts, but which can be reorganized over time – reorganiza-
tions that are forms of learning. These two processes – maintenance 
and reorganization – are disrupted in various ways by the changes 
introduced by human activities, in particular since the dawn of the 
Anthropocene (that is, the industrial era). The presentation of knowl-
edge set out in this chapter, which represents the current state of 
knowledge in biology, also makes clear how, in our view, these ques-
tions have still not been sufficiently theorized, particularly with 
regard to the relationships between entropy, negentropy, the anthropy 
typical of the Anthropocene and what we will at the end of this chap-
ter refer to as neganthropy.
To go further in the analysis of the living dynamics not just of 
maintenance but of reorganization, there is a concept complementary 
to that of entropy (and to that of negative entropy, which is mathemat-
ically and relatively opposed to it – as a relationship between more or 
less ordered states over the course of a process): the concept of anti-
entropy, which refers to biological organizations (organs, functions, 
etc.).23 For this concept, and unlike (digital) information, which is a 
one-dimensional notion (the alphanumeric strings of Shannon and 
Kolmogorov), the geometry, space and time of life are essential. A liv-
ing organism produces entropy by transforming energy, it maintains 
its anti-entropy by constantly creating and renewing its organization, 
and it produces anti-entropy by generating organizational novelty.
The concept of anti-entropy aims to account for biological organi-
zations in their historicity. Current life-forms maintain themselves 
both through the activation of functional innovations that appeared 
in the past (anti-entropy) and through the production of functional 
innovations (production of anti-entropy) arising from the individual 
or the group (population, ecosystem and so on). Not only are such 
innovations unpredictable, but their very nature cannot be predicted. 
As a result, probability theory is insufficient for describing life and 
its evolution. (This also means, as we will see, that there is also a fac-
tual anti-anthropy of the new in the sense understood by both Arthur 
Rimbaud and Henri Bergson24 – this ‘new’ being improbable in the 
sense of Maurice Blanchot.25)
This anti-entropic novelty is specific in that it contributes to the 
ability of biological objects to persist over time by contributing to 
their organization in a given context (which this organization may 
affect). Entropy depends on the coupling of a system with its exte-
rior. Likewise, anti-entropy is relative to an organization, and not 
all objects are organized. For example, considered on its own, the 
heart has no function: it is only at the level of the organism that it 
has a function. Consequently, all discussions of anti-entropy relate to 
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a given organized object, that is, a specific locality – open both to 
an external environment on which it feeds and to its possibilities of 
reorganization.26
22 Noodiversity and anti-anthropy
As Lotka pointed out, from the perspective of their organization, 
and thus of their organs, the specific character of human societies 
lies in the importance of inorganic objects in their social structures 
(their organizations), such as tools, written texts and computers. 
These objects are fashioned and maintained by human activity. Lotka 
referred to the constitution of such objects – theoretically analogous 
to endosomatic organs but external to organic bodies – as exosomati-
zation. This process thoroughly conditions the evolution of the ways 
that human beings live.
Exosomatic productions are the fruits of economic activity, and 
their evolution, which in the beginning is undetectable, does not 
become obvious until the sudden acceleration of technical evolution 
brought by the industrial revolution gives rise to so-called historical 
consciousness and constitutes the Anthropocene era. Lotka highlights 
that, as exosomatic productions, the new objects that arise in the 
course of the evolution of societies, and which constitute their arti-
ficial organs, are not spontaneously beneficial for either social orga-
nizations or psychic organizations. Rather, they are pharmaka, as the 
Greeks said, that is, poisons that can become remedies, and vice versa. 
Lotka develops this point of view in 1945 while considering the awful 
suffering inflicted on human beings during the Second World War.
Inorganic organs are, then, exosomatic productions resulting from 
work. In order for them to fulfil a functional role, and in order to limit 
the destabilization that they necessarily introduce,27 developmental 
and physiological evolution and plasticity must play a major role in 
the course of the process of exosomatization. For example, reading 
enlists the plasticity of several areas of the brain that rely on the writ-
ing system.28
These purely biological and physiological responses, however, are 
not enough to turn a potential poison into an actual remedy: noetic 
activities, which are always collective, and therefore always social, 
and linked to social organizations, are necessary for the achievement 
of the process of exosomatization. Socratic philosophy, for example, 
which can be interpreted as a reaction to writing and to the way it is 
used by the sophists (with potentially catastrophic consequences for 
the city, the polis), will lead to the founding of Plato’s academy – and 
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will for a long time constitute the basis of power across various trans-
formations of knowledge effected on this basis.
In the contemporary context, exosomatization has become thor-
oughly technological (and not just technical). It is today driven by 
marketing, but for a technology to have found its market does not 
imply that it should be considered beneficial. It is just as necessary 
to find the positive modalities of which this technology is in fact the 
bearer, and the practices and social prescriptions that will limit its 
toxicity, which we will call its anthropy, and intensify its curativity, 
which we will call its neganthropy.
This is particularly necessary in the current context characterized 
by climate change, loss of biodiversity and the generalization of deno-
etization: the Anthropocene era and the anthropic excesses described 
by the IPCC, which could totally destroy humanity and life in the bio-
sphere, are highlighted by the fact that when the exosomatization pro-
cess is driven by a market that has become hegemonic, it proves to be 
not just toxic but literally deadly.
For a new exosomatic production to become beneficial, and limit 
its toxicity (in this sense ‘economizing’ it), additional work is always 
necessary, in any epoch of anthropological evolution. Only by under-
standing work in this way can we identify the exosomatic innovations 
(whether technical or technological) actually required by and compat-
ible with a desirable future for a locality – even if this locality is the 
biosphere itself. This is the work of noesis, that is, of thinking, in all 
its forms, and as practical as well as theoretical, familial, artisanal, 
sporting and artistic knowledge, and thus theoretical, juridical and 
spiritual knowledge in the broadest sense. This belongs to what we 
therefore call noodiversity and noodiversification.
From such a perspective, to raise a child is to think, and this think-
ing is also caring (and in this way it constitutes what we call a noetic 
treatment or dressing, pansement), which will turn the singularity of 
this child into a potential for noodiversity.29 Today, technological evo-
lution prevents more and more parents from thinking, and therefore 
from taking care of their children by educating them (by providing 
them with those noetic forms of care, those dressings, pansements, 
that we call cultures). From the perspective of exosomatization inas-
much as it requires such forms of thought and care, knowledge in all 
its forms, both practical and theoretical, plays a crucial role: it makes 
it possible to prescribe functional variants and social practices for the 
innovations introduced by exosomatization. Knowledge is thus artic-
ulated with ethōs (as the site of exosomatization), and, in this way, 
with ethics (as will be discussed in Chapter 6).
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Computers, which are today heavily involved in this curative and 
toxic process, can be defined as automatic rewriting systems. With 
the increase in computing speeds and the growth of databases, the 
ability of computers to process information and perform categoriza-
tions also increases dramatically. Nevertheless, the tasks they are 
capable of performing are not equivalent to the novel innovations pro-
duced by human work. This work produces meaning that is neither 
contained in the initial data nor in the combination of data resulting 
from algorithmic methods. This is why, as we will see in Chapter 3:
 ▪ it is essential to distinguish between work and employment;
 ▪ work outside employment must be economically valued 
within what we describe as an economy of contribution 
– consisting in producing neganthropy, and sometimes 
anti-anthropy, that is, in limiting or even reversing (anti-
anthropically) the anthropic dimensions of any activity 
undertaken by Anthropos.
23 Principles, rights and facts
Stemming from Galileo’s theoretical work, the principle of inertia 
describes a situation that on Earth is highly exotic: it posits that if no 
force is exerted on an object (for example, no friction or gravitation), 
then any object will maintain its speed. This principle obviously can-
not be derived from data, but was posited by Galileo as an asymptotic 
(limit) principle making it possible to understand all other movements 
and to analyse what can affect them, such as friction and gravitation. 
It is also the first principle of Newtonian physics.
Similarly, equal rights among citizens or the equality of the sexes 
are political principles that break with previous – or existing and fac-
tual – situations, and reshape social organizations according to a new 
right, a new rule or state of law [état de droit] that cannot be inferred 
from previous situations. These examples are historically important 
in their respective fields, but this type of process is, in a sense, an 
ordinary part of human activity.
Such processes, in which droit (‘law’, in both the scientific sense 
and the juridical sense, and ‘right’ in the political sense) is distin-
guished from facts, define work by opposing it to proletarianized 
employment (that is, labour, where work ≠ labour in English, Werk 
≠ Arbeit in German, and ergon ≠ ponos in ancient Greek): the first is 
also the perpetual possibility of the invention of a new configuration 
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of meaning. Unfortunately, the current tendency is not towards the 
development of work in this sense, but rather towards a convergence 
between algorithms and human activities that accentuates this pro-
letarianization, that is, the loss of the ability to work in the sense of 
working to turn anthropy into neganthropy.
Currently, the convergence between algorithms and human activi-
ties as this is systematically and systemically exploited by platforms 
that are from every perspective massively anthropic means that work 
is sterilized through being standardized – through being transformed 
into generic information processing. Such a state of fact is eminently 
capable of being changed – and this task should be placed at the cen-
tre of a new conception of design (see Chapter 7).
The scientific consensus is that the current path of civilization 
leads to its destruction. It does so, notably, by reducing and eliminat-
ing anti-entropy and anti-anthropy (as the extension of anti-entropy to 
social organizations), with information technology itself reduced to 
calculation thanks to a one-dimensional flattening that generates what 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy describes as closed systems – that is, systems 
that destroy their own dynamics. It thus seems clear that the ‘cre-
ative destruction’ conceptualized by Joseph Schumpeter has become 
destructive destruction – as was shown in 1971 by Schumpeter’s for-
mer assistant, Georgescu-Roegen.30
Work, unlike mere labour, invents new tools and prescribes new 
practices, which generate new usages, that is, ways of life in the sense 
of habits, customs and cultures (these usages are cultivated, they do 
not merely involve instructions or ‘user manuals’), thus constructing 
new configurations of meaning for human and ecosystemic interac-
tions. Hence work is something other than probabilistic alphanumeric 
combinatorics in a set of predetermined possibilities (computerized 
data processing). This is why a reinvention of work (and with it of 
the economy, both psychic and political) is necessary at all levels of 
society, if we are to confront the current crisis and strive to overcome 
it. For this reason, and as explained in the Introduction, we consider 
it necessary to extend and transpose the concepts of entropy, negent-
ropy and anti-entropy into the concepts of anthropy, neganthropy and 
anti-anthropy, in order to specify the dual character (as pharmakon, 
both poison and remedy) of the exosomatic organ and its practices and 
usages in economics, understood through the relationship entropy/
negentropy and so as to overcome the Anthropocene era (which is an 
Entropocene) in favour of what we call the Neganthropocene.31
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24 A new age of urbanity, a new urban revolution
We saw in the previous chapter that locality becomes a central object 
of science in the struggle against that anthropy that has poisoned the 
Anthropocene era. Locality, however, has become predominantly 
urban, and it is well known that the modern process of urbanization, 
which began with the industrial revolution and intensified during the 
twentieth century as the formation of metropolises and ‘global cities’, 
is a key element in the real battle to limit the effects of climate change.
This is why, even if a number of experiments with ‘territories in 
transition’ (in the sense referred to with this label; see transition-
network.org, founded by Rob Hopkins) are being developed in rural, 
semi-rural or small or medium-sized urban areas, the question of 
locality introduced previously arises first and foremost in urban ter-
ritories. Moreover, it is now clear that the marketing of ‘smart cities’ 
has to a large extent consisted in promoting algorithmic governance 
of the city by means of collecting the data and traces of its inhabit-
ants. Is this the model we should follow?
Contrary to such an approach, we posit that this ‘storytelling’ is 
above all a commercial discourse based on an immeasurable wors-
ening of proletarianization to a uniquely dangerous point, and in 
all respects – and it must be investigated while keeping in mind the 
recent Amnesty International report1 on the enormous threat to every 
form of freedom (political, economic, artistic, scientific, existential) 
posed by the current development of digital technologies, monopo-
lized by a few actors who have become literally irresponsible. On 
the other hand, the enormous transformation presently underway, 
generated by new modes of distributed production – made possible 
by digitally-controlled machines, the ‘Internet of Things’, ‘ubiquitous 
computing’ and everything to which this gives rise in the various 
fields of the urban environment – leads to a true overhaul of urban 
development and to a call for an overhaul of democracy in general, 
and in particular in the milieu of the city. As we will see at the end 
of this chapter, this involves the opening of a formidable project with 
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educational and academic institutions at all levels – and through an 
accelerated contributory research training operation for the personnel 
in charge of education.
Here, we advocate contributory approaches to urban research in 
order to grasp the profound dynamics of what we consider to be the 
possibility of a new urban genius, where the inhabitants would once 
again become the primary source of territorial intelligence, in the con-
text of a contributory economy that deproletarianizes the inhabitants, 
but also their elected representatives and their administrations, today 
totally destitute, and very often manipulated by merchants of new ser-
vices and other illusory promises. With this new urban genius, based 
on this new urban research, technology would be reconfigured and 
redesigned starting from contributory territorial practices themselves.
We lay out the same hypothesis with respect to what we could call 
digital urbanity as we do with the contributory economy in general: 
the efficiency of automation must allow the release of energies and 
time, so that they may be put at the service of urban deliberation, at all 
scales and in the spirt of cooperation that contributory technologies 
make possible. It is equally a matter of struggling against the inca-
pacitation (by proletarianization) to which automation can give rise, 
both in production and in consumption.
25 Reconsidering the digital city according to  
two alternative scenarios
The new urbanity is based on a systemic increase and valuing of 
negentropy at the scale of individual and collective urban behaviour, 
as well as on shared urban knowledge, debated at the various scales of 
urban locality. Such a vision presupposes a profound reconsideration 
of the history of urbanity as it relates to techniques and technologies 
– in particular since the industrial revolution, which fundamentally 
changed urban dynamics – inasmuch as it has led to the development 
of functionalities that are unique to each stage of that history.
Digital and contributory technologies themselves represent a new 
functional horizon. These functionalities can be conceived according 
to two contrasting scenarios:
 ▪ in one, the automated city becomes literally inurbane, that 
is, it destroys urbanity in the original sense of the word, 
because it short-circuits urbanity itself through an imma-
ture implementation of technology and automated functions, 
destroying urban relations – that is, civil, and in that way 
‘civilized’, relations.
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 ▪ in the other, the city reinvents intelligence in the eigh-
teenth-century sense of this word, when it referred first and 
foremost to sociability, such that it enables the whole to be 
greater than the sum of its parts.
Understood from a very general perspective, digital urban technolo-
gies amount to a change of the technical system, and one that gen-
erates a brutal disadjustment in relation to the already-established 
social systems (juridical, political, economic, educational, commer-
cial, administrative and so on). As a result, these social systems are 
destabilized. In this respect, the current epoch is characterized – far 
beyond the urban question alone – by what is now called disruption, 
where technological advances outpace social advances (in a broad 
sense of the word ‘social’, encompassing social systems in the sense 
of both Gille and Luhmann).
Disruption is a fact, and it is hardly credible to pretend to avoid it. 
But the approach envisaged here is to create an ‘alternative disrup-
tion’, as a kind of ‘disruption of disruption’. As it is currently used, in 
the service of business models coming mainly from North America, 
and sometimes Asia (Japan and South Korea in particular), the cur-
rent basis of disruption is not sustainable, given that it produces insol-
vency, incivility and inurbanity.
The digital urbanity to come will be based on a state of affairs that 
is already partially established: that of the reorganization of produc-
tion (in particular, material goods) and the deployment of digital 
urban technologies – forming what Thomas Berns and Antoinette 
Rouvroy have called ‘algorithmic governmentality’. But this techno-
logical state of fact is yet to result in a state of law capable of itself 
establishing a new, recognized and deliberate state of fact – and in this 
way engendering a new urban dynamic. This recognition, this delib-
eration, this dynamic, which are indispensable and urgent, are pos-
sibly only if the following two conditions are met:
 ▪ to take the measure of long-term urban dynamics in their 
relationship to industrialization in particular, and, through 
that, to develop a historical consciousness of urbanity 
(among the inhabitants as well as economic stakeholders, 
administrators and elected officials);
 ▪ to identify the specific characteristics of productive tech-
nologies and disruptive urban technologies that bring to 
its extremities what is often referred to today as hyper-
industrial society – by Pierre Veltz, for example2 – and in so 
doing generate a new age of urbanity.
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26 Beyond the opposition between the machine and the living: 
urbanization as the process of exosomatic organogenesis
It is a question of starting from these specificities in order to initiate a 
new model of urban development that would also involve a new urban 
economic model. However, this requires reconsideration of the urban 
function in general, and of how this is modified by new algorithmic 
urban functions.
It has often been suggested, usually in a metaphorical way, that the 
city is a kind of organism, and that the urban milieu is a kind of con-
nective tissue. Italo Calvino pointed out that it is possible to have two 
seemingly-opposed visions of the city: the city as machine and the 
city as organism.3 Today, this machinization of the city is no longer 
a metaphor: it is effected through the implementation of automated 
functionalities that are deployed via digital urban technologies.
The mechanized city, however, must also become an ‘organic’ city, 
in the sense that it is dynamic only when it grows like a living thing. 
It is obviously not a matter of choosing the machine city over the 
organism city, or vice versa. It’s a matter of turning the machine city 
(and the city has always been a kind of machine, as has been shown 
many times) into a new urban dynamic, that is, an organic dynamic 
– in a sense that we are able to understand via Calvino, and to under-
stand how structures that are apparently purely functional are in real-
ity extensive new dimensions of the living organism, which is there-
fore always also an urban locality in a way that exceeds a mechanistic 
functionalist approach.
The question of the relationship between the living and the machine 
is very old – Descartes reduces life itself to the status of the machine. 
This question can and must be overcome today, particularly after 
the work of Alfred Lotka already mentioned in the Introduction and 
Chapter 1, and through an understanding of the human living thing 
as a process of exosomatic organogenesis. The organogenesis of plant 
and animal organisms is endosomatic, in the sense that the evolution 
of life consists for plants and animals in a diversification of organic 
functions, implemented by organs that are themselves parts of living 
organisms. But man is an exosomatic living organism, and, living 
in society, he builds and institutes exosomatic organisms of higher 
dimensions within which human groups live.
In what follows (here and in the chapters devoted to the internation), 
the human individuals that we are will be called simple exorganisms, 
and the collective individuals that human groups form will be called 
collective exorganisms – a boat and its crew, a factory, a supermarket, 
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a city, the United Nations… As we will see in Chapter 5, two types of 
complex exorganisms must be distinguished:
 ▪ those that assume a function within a larger complex exor-
ganism, as a factory does within a country;
 ▪ those that have metafunctions in relation to law, whether 
these are legal in the juridical sense (including as religious 
canon law) or lawful according to the canon of scientific 
truth of evidence, that is, defining both what is forbidden 
and what establishes regimes of truth, as Michel Foucault 
called them.
Some complex exorganisms are small and short-lived, such as a boat 
and its crew, assembled for the duration of a voyage. Others are vast 
and last for centuries or even millennia, and this is true in particular 
of cities, and more generally of higher complex exorganisms (and a 
city is ‘higher’ in this way to the extent that it is endowed with its own 
legal authority). Cities are themselves aggregates and localizations of 
complex exorganisms within which simple exorganisms cooperate.
In late eighteenth-century England, urban dynamics were reshaped 
around those industrial lower complex exorganisms that were manu-
facturing plants, which were then emerging – and of which Andrew 
Ure was, after Adam Smith, one of the first thinkers, calling them 
factories.4 In the twentieth century, transnational industrial complex 
exorganisms appeared: for a long time, one of the best known and 
most powerful was IBM. In the twenty-first century, planetary com-
plex exorganisms have arisen, tending to install functional monopo-
lies at the scale of the biosphere.
27 Technologies of scalability and economies of scale  
in reticulated urban localities
These evolutions are directly tied to questions of the relations of scale 
resulting from economies of scale that are themselves conditioned 
by technologies of scalability. The data economy amounts, precisely, 
to the systematic implementation of digital technologies of scalabil-
ity, allowing the simultaneous processing of vast amounts of data on 
a global scale, and the achievement of unprecedented economies of 
scale that are both disruptive and predatory.
Such a conception of scalability thus comes at the cost of a rapid 
dissolution of localities, which are absorbed and reduced to pat-
terns to be algorithmically extracted from their populations – a kind 
of value extraction that leads to a drastic reduction of their specific 
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capabilities, that is, of their negentropic potentials. Territories retic-
ulated in this way find themselves subject to extra-territorial logics 
that lead to their incapacitation, which is to say, to the systemic loss 
of those forms of knowledge that constitute what we are here call-
ing urbanity. To achieve digital urbanity – that is, to overcome this 
process of standardization and incapacitation, which also leads to 
structural economic insolvency by undermining purchasing power – 
it is necessary to rethink urban development and the urban future as 
a local process of exosomatization and as the fruitful arrangement of 
local and extra-territorial exorganisms, and, within this process, as 
the production of new forms of value by the inhabitants, understood 
in the broad sense (in the sense that every stakeholder who intervenes 
in the territory counts as an inhabitant).
Metaphorical references to either the machine or the organism to 
characterize the city or the metropolis are often in opposition to one 
another, because the spatial and the material, which are dead, would 
be on the side of functions forming a whole such as is the case for a 
machine, while the social and the inhabitants would be its more than 
material life, a life that would thus be more than functional – ideal, 
cultural and temporal, in this way furnishing the vital energies essen-
tial to urban dynamism.
The concepts of exosomatization and exorganism expose the super-
ficiality of such an opposition. Materializations themselves induce 
temporal dynamics, while also arising from such dynamics. As for 
imagination, intelligence, intuition and reason – both individual and 
collective – they are themselves functions of what Kant called the 
faculties (of knowing, desiring and judging). Such faculties are delib-
erative. Space, constituted by an organogenetic process of spatializa-
tion, is what records the past while at the same time making available 
future habitable possibilities, as the collective dynamics of the inhab-
itants of this space, and, precisely, as urbanity. This is what Calvino 
makes it possible for us to understand.
Digital technologies and their disruptive effects, however, rely on 
the fact that their operation has de-spatializing effects, which are at 
the same time de-temporalizing, as operations become virtual, tend-
ing to disappear into algorithmic governmentality and in this way 
escaping all deliberation. This is what David M. Berry calls infraso-
matization, a concept that will be explored at the end of this chapter. 
This state of fact renders inaccessible and inconceivable a state of law 
capable of constituting a true digital urbanity – given that the latter 
must be deliberative.
This is why the contributory research program proposed here 
consists in locally consolidating an urban awareness of new digital 
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functions. It aims to make the latter into objects of capacitation rather 
than incapacitation – by conceiving and designing services and 
functions that systematically invite and strengthen the deliberative 
capacities of the various groups that together form the inhabitants 
of a territory. By taking up Lotka’s concepts, it is possible to posit 
the following:
 ▪ Inhabitants themselves are first and foremost exorganic 
beings (simple exorganisms), that is, beings endowed with 
artificial organs that are not appendages added onto them 
but rather constitute them as human individuals – and, 
when they live in an exorganic milieu, as urban individu-
als, in a milieu itself composed of specific artificial organs 
such as arteries, sewage and distribution networks, and 
now digital networks, along with many other urban func-
tions that mostly find themselves reconfigured by this new 
reticulation.
 ▪ By assembling together, inhabitants form exorganic com-
munities, themselves forming exorganisms, including the 
urban exorganism itself, that is, lasting entities existing as 
arrangements of functions and exorganic agents – whether 
they are neighbourhoods, workshops, factories, associa-
tions, markets, loyal customers, institutions, reticulated 
organizations of all kinds and, of course, ethnic, religious, 
political and generational communities, and so on.
 ▪ As we have already mentioned, and as Lotka shows,5 the 
acceleration of exosomatization – or what we today call 
innovation, and even more so disruption – can generate seri-
ous problems and reverse the expected benefits of exosoma-
tization by creating disturbances and difficulties, leading 
to destruction when the knowledge required by technology 
ceases to be acquired.6
 ▪ Digital technology is the contemporary pharmakon – and 
this is how Socrates already described alphabetical writ-
ing, then still quite recent. To be a remedy instead of a poi-
son, any new pharmakon requires the definition of shared 
knowledge, amounting to the many kinds of therapies and 
therapeutics allowing exosomatization to be put at the ser-
vice of care. This program has the aim of closely articulat-
ing the dynamics of capacitation, implemented in the con-
text of the contributory economy program, with the urban 
environment and its new functions – which clearly form the 
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new architecture and new infrastructure of the economy 
of tomorrow.
 ▪ This also presupposes the conception of new contributory 
platforms, whose principles will be outlined in Chapter 7, 
where contributory fields are reserved for deliberation and 
preserved from computation – in a functional relationship 
to a new form of social networking, itself structurally local-
ized. Such reserves aim to put the results of automated 
calculation undertaken in all domains at the service of 
decision-making.
To argue these points, however, we must briefly return to the archae-
ology and history of the urbanization process, which begins with sed-
entarization – which some specialists consider to be the true starting 
point of the Anthropocene, a perspective that we will not discuss here.
28 The city, social representation and the industrial  
and economic organization of society
Over the past three decades, the impact of digital technology on pro-
duction has become a constant concern, in terms of its organization 
and the types of goods produced, and their social consequences. The 
effects of the introduction of digital technology in the city (‘smart cit-
ies’, mobility platforms, Building Information Modelling, and so on) 
is a topic that has received regular coverage in the media. But it is less 
common for consideration to be given to the profound links between 
production and the transformations it brings to the city, if not a chal-
lenge to its very existence.
Cities first appeared in the Neolithic period with the development 
of agricultural techniques and animal husbandry that made it possible 
for human groups to settle in one place. Much later, the invention of 
writing would overturn the spatial and institutional organization of 
the Greek city-state, centred around those early forms of public space 
that were the agora and the bouleuterion.7
As Max Weber8 showed, the Middle Ages saw the emergence of 
a more powerful economic organization of the production of mate-
rial goods. And as Jean Gimpel highlighted, a major energetic revo-
lution accompanied the massive deployment of mills and the devel-
opment of mechanics.9 These new means of production transformed 
construction techniques, giving rise to the cathedral builders and 
the social reorganization of the city: mentoring and teaching tech-
niques (apprenticeships, and apprentices touring around France, for 
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example) then appeared – and continue in France to this day through 
the Compagnons du Devoir. This must be recalled at a time when the 
introduction of Building Information Modelling is leading to pro-
found changes in construction, its methods, trades and working condi-
tions, and ultimately to changes in the city as a whole and its relations 
to its inhabitants.
The social city is organized according to workforce needs and 
developmental models: work arrangements evolve according to the 
times, technical developments and political and economic choices. 
Hence the feudal master, by guaranteeing the protection of the serf 
who works for him, makes it possible for the slavery of antiquity to 
be replaced by serfdom. The development of artisanship and trade 
structures the town, transforming it into a city. Mills economize costs 
and reduce the need for manual labour in the countryside. The city 
requires an available workforce and serfs were therefore encouraged 
to leave the countryside, thanks to which they were able to acquire a 
further degree of freedom.
In the nineteenth century, the industrialization of production 
(mechanization, the intensification of the industrial division of labour 
and industrial paternalism), the development of the steel industry, 
networks of transport, energy and telecommunications (railways, gas, 
electricity, telegraphy, etc.) transform the relationships between cities 
(places of production and consumption) and profoundly reshape urban 
morphogenesis.
The production processes heralding the advent of Taylorism in fac-
tories lead to the separation of manufacturing and commercialization 
as craftsmen and women had arranged these in the city since the six-
teenth century. Neighbourhoods and housing are accordingly redis-
tributed between workers, employees and the bourgeoisie. During the 
same period, the invention of department stores sets in train the devel-
opment of the service sector and consumer society – which reaches its 
peak in the second half of the last century.
The twentieth century, characterized by the oil and car industries 
along with the culture industries, in turn gives rise to specific types 
of urban development and planning, such as neighbourhoods seg-
mented according to activity (life, work, leisure and transport), the 
development of road and highway networks, supermarkets, shopping 
centres and hypermarkets, and the setting up of radio and television 
broadcasting networks. These technical evolutions, the new needs of 
industrialists, but also a new vision of the social development of soci-
ety, all lead to the introduction of a functionalist conceptualization of 
city organization, along with new professions such as the urban plan-
ner, sometimes perceived as technocratic. One result is the Athens 
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Charter, the main instigator of which was Le Corbusier. Initially, this 
reflects the impact of the Taylorist organization of production. After 
1945, it integrates the Keynesian-Fordist model of consumerist social 
organization into Europe.
This urban model, strongly tied to the Taylorist proletarianization 
of employment, is today associated with many problems, such as 
ghettoization, the ejection of those with precarious employment (the 
allocation of public or private housing being strongly linked to per-
manent employment), and a host of others. But it is from this model 
that the ‘neoliberal’ city is derived, particularly in the United States 
and Asia. The city centre is made up of office buildings, shopping 
centres and parks, while housing is pushed to the outskirts, dictated 
by the financial means of the inhabitants. Over the last thirty years, 
these developments have been embedded in the process of the global-
ization of trade, leading to the rise of global cities10 occupying strate-
gic functions and organizing flows on a worldwide scale11 – although 
‘hyper-liberal cities’ are now appearing, mainly in Silicon Valley, and 
limited to the headquarters of companies with a global impact, as will 
be explained further below.
29 The new urban morphogenesis
An almost diametrically opposed movement, however, is today fore-
seeable, which could usher in a new age of urban morphogenesis, and 
which needs to be taken into account in a very precise way – after the 
first phase of factory-less industries that led to the relocation of man-
ufacturing to countries with low labour costs, particularly in Asia. 
Today, the relocation of production closer to the catchment area of 
consumption is being given more serious consideration.
This reindustrialization is being prepared with models that require 
little or no wage labour: massively automated factories ‘4.0’, FabLab 
or TechShop workshops, office services, and so on, all requiring cus-
tomers themselves to finalize their orders. The city must therefore 
rapidly consider how to integrate these new production units – these 
workshops open to customers, constituting a new artisanship – into 
its organization and infrastructure. This necessitates reflection on the 
work of Richard Sennett, Matthew Crawford and Pierre Veltz, as well 
as the Maker movement and the Do-It-Yourself movement.
With the development of digital technologies and platforms, sup-
ported by exospheric infrastructure (orbiting the Earth), a new 
industrial revolution is once again transforming the production and 
organization of work, as well as modes of urban construction, trans-
port, planning, management and life. Digital or platform capitalism 
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is characterized by the permanent and planetary interconnection of 
individuals, whose activities are systemically traced and processed 
by the intensive computation of algorithms, allowing them to be con-
trolled by exospheric giants for the purpose of value extraction. This 
data economy is expressed spatially by what marketing refers to as 
‘smart cities’, a term that serves to mask the subjection of territories 
to extraterritorial logics short-circuiting local political authorities and 
the practices of inhabitants. This new urban morphogenesis occurs, 
for example, around Highway 101, which is the backbone of Silicon 
Valley, along which towns are being converted into ‘headquarter cit-
ies’: Cupertino, with Apple’s futuristic new headquarters, 492 metres 
in diameter; Mountain View, where Google’s new headquarters is 
conceived as a true city, integrating numerous activities for employ-
ees who can ‘live and work’ there at any hour of the day; Menlo Park, 
where Facebook’s headquarters is ‘an amusement park for engi-
neers’,12 and so on.
When Amazon was looking for a site for its second headquarters, 
the town of Stonecrest, as Frank Pasquale notes, ‘even offered to can-
nibalize itself, to give Bezos the chance to become mayor of a 345 
acre annex that would be known as “Amazon, Georgia”’.13 Although 
technically the infrastructure of these digital technology companies 
is fully distributed across the globe, the fact remains that these cor-
porations are highly centralized, with Silicon Valley headquarters 
serving as nerve centres. It is there that everything is decided in real 
time, regardless of whatever dot on the map may be under discus-
sion. Research, design offices, strategy and governance: all are co-
located in these headquarters cities, from which pyramid management 
‘steers’ the infrastructure and factories that they have disseminated 
across the globe.
30 The new division of labour and the battle for or against 
control of the new urban genius
These industrial models, which for the moment mainly involve digital 
companies, propose a new ‘fabless’ approach, and pave the way for 
a reorganization of production by bringing it as close as possible to 
the consumer. Automation, and especially the development of CNC 
machines and additive manufacturing (3D printers), linked to com-
puter-aided design (CAD) and client software accessible to the gen-
eral public, are transforming production and its commercialization.
The division of labour can be structured around two scenarios:
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 ▪ large regional production plants (factories 4.0) capable of 
manufacturing a wide variety of parts, for many brands – 
independent of major manufacturers, in line with the con-
cept of fabless manufacturing;
 ▪ small local units carrying out the production of goods, 
dependent on the contribution of the consumer (adaptation 
to need, customization, finishing, assembly, and so on).
According to such scenarios, whether these are large factories or small 
units, they will have little need for paid employment as we know it 
today: either they will be fully automated or the remaining manual 
tasks will be performed by the customer. These new production sites 
– which will not be far from the resident, who becomes a producer-
consumer (‘prosumer’) – will be located right in city neighbourhoods. 
Likewise, ‘factories 4.0’ will seek to be located within their catch-
ment area and their size will depend on territorial needs.
If the model that is currently taking shape continues to develop 
around centralized companies as per the GAFAM (Google, Apple, 
Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) model, cities could become pseudo-
pods (possessing exosomatic tentacles), producing/selling ‘headquar-
ter cities’ for global brands. And if, as we have been considering, this 
model of commodity production is taking on a new ‘fabless’ variation, 
then this implies a new battle with regard to the social and industrial 
development of the city and the territory.
‘Fabless’ models and digital industries amount to a generalization 
of the economic model of the agro-food industries, as Alain Supiot 
has often pointed out. Adapted to industry in general, they would 
lead to design, marketing and choice of materials for the creation of 
commodities all remaining the exclusive property of global brands – 
such as IKEA.
In this battle, and to capture the heart of the city, these industrial-
ists will utilize franchising. Local ‘new artisans’ will manage small 
production units on behalf of these brands. Hence, like chicken or pig 
breeders, they will be totally dependent both upstream (design of 3D 
models [CAO] and manufacturing materials) and downstream (mar-
keting and exclusive commercialization [consumer commercial sites 
and centralized payment]). The ‘owners’ of these local production 
units located in the heart of the city will take on all the risk for the 
benefit of global brands, following the example that has been set in 
agriculture for several decades (battery farms, but also in cereals).
Major industrial brands have long sought to develop a model where 
the risks and costs of production would be reduced almost to zero. 
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This objective could lead the morphology of cities to be redrawn in 
such a way that they would become totally dependent on the mod-
els of these large corporations. Proposed items would be modifiable 
at the margins by the client (via consumer-based CAO software) but 
developed at the global headquarters. This currently emerging pos-
sibility would constitute a ‘relocalization’ of automated commodity 
production designed in ‘delocalized headquarters cities’ – but this 
locality would then be totally under the control of control technolo-
gies, amounting to a dis-society of hyper-control.14
The impact of this organization of production on the organization 
of the city and its (digital) urbanity is what is at stake today. Behind 
the issue of dismantling GAFAM, which is fuelling political debates 
in the United States, it is also industrial organization that is in ques-
tion. If vertical concentration is limited, and if the role of the creator/
designer can be recognized outside the brand, that is, the manufac-
turer, it may be possible for new spaces to be developed that give a 
place to local initiatives.
Thus, in France, Leroy Merlin’s TechShop model15 differs from the 
one described above with regard to IKEA. Leroy Merlin encourages 
TechShop users to obtain their materials from his stores, but leaves 
them free with respect to prototyping and creation. This approach is 
in line with the FabLab16 approach initiated by MIT, but in the context 
of the market and commercialization of the Merlin offering.
Following the worldwide success of the software production mode 
initiated by ‘free software’ communities, this suggests that the FabLab 
mode of object production could be a positive option for the relocal-
ization of production. Nevertheless, this model is not sufficient: it has 
the same weaknesses as the free software model, because it fails to 
take account of regional social data,17 that is, the profound transfor-
mation of the economic model that it implies, calling into question the 
Fordist-Keynesian model of full employment. We are therefore forced 
to reflect further on how to remunerate productive work undertaken 
outside employment.
31 Towards collective territorial agreements and new forms  
of urban intelligence: challenges of contributory urbanity
It is desirable to move towards new territorialized social contracts, 
taking the reduction of salaried employment into account, but so too 
the development of highly localized work outside employment. This 
relocalization of commodity production also requires a new approach 
to the economic, social and ecological equilibrium of the territory. 
Depending on the options chosen by the territory, it is conceivable 
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that this time spent working outside employment could promote the 
power of inhabitants to act18 on their locality.
From this perspective, territorial social contracts would offer social 
redistribution according to a model that is independent of employment, 
one that would recognize capabilizing19 autonomous work undertaken 
during periods that are productive but not part of employment. The 
idea of an unconditional universal basic income (UBI) has been pro-
posed as a way of responding to these challenges. Ars Industrialis – 
which since 27 February 2020 has become the Association of Friends 
of the Thunberg Generation – has, as part of the contributory learn-
ing program at Plaine Commune, been preparing to experiment with 
a conditional contributory income, recognizing work outside employ-
ment and linked to intermittent periods of employment (which is not 
incompatible with UBI).
The contemporary urban revolution is not limited to the ‘smart 
cities’ model. It is characterized by deeper industrial changes, the 
challenges of which, concealed by ‘storytelling’, are still too lit-
tle analysed:
 ▪ the digitalization of all services, products, objects and 
materials (smartphones, GPS systems, sensors, RFID chips, 
connected objects and ‘interactive concrete’) leads to a mne-
motechnical trend in all urban infrastructure, transforming 
the city itself into an ‘augmented space’;
 ▪ urban programming and architectural design, housing con-
struction and the management of urban flows are being 
transformed by robotization, as well as modelling, simula-
tion and virtual reality technologies (Building Information 
Management and Building Information Modelling 
technologies);
 ▪ automated commodity production tends to be relocated 
close to consumers, who are entrusted with the tasks of 
finalizing production in FabLabs, TechShops or other pro-
duction units linked to massively automated factories 4.0.
These industrial transformations, which are occurring in the context 
of a major climatic and environmental crisis, need to be analysed 
from the standpoint of their environmental, urban planning, anthro-
pological and societal challenges.
These transformations contain the risk of turning the city into 
a machine (through standardizing automation of construction and 
urban management, segmentation and hyper-specialization of tasks, 
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‘technological solutionism’20), and consequently of standardizing 
urban life (data capture and user profiling, destructive exploitation 
of attention and destruction of local knowledge, ‘functional sover-
eignty’21 of platforms), thereby eliminating diversity and the singular-
ities of urban civilizations and the political sovereignty of territories. 
Nevertheless, these transformations also open up significant potential 
for the constitution of new forms of urban intelligence.
It is becoming essential for cities and territories to consider the 
contributory/productive dimension of their inhabitants and the eco-
nomic agents they involve. Cities and territories should, therefore, at 
their own initiative, and under their control, install new tools making 
possible the analysis of flows, through which it will be possible to 
reconsider the values entailed for various territorial stakeholders. It 
should thus be possible to locally review the contributory/productive 
investment policies of the whole set of stakeholders operating on a ter-
ritory. This is one of the challenges of Management Institutes of the 
Contributory Economy (MICE), discussed in the next chapter. Such 
an approach, moreover, presupposes a critical awareness of urban 
technologies – for which the concept of infrasomatization is particu-
larly useful.
32 Platformization of the city: infrasomatization and the 
impairment of minding22 and democracy
As far back as 1981, Steve Jobs, then CEO of Apple, famously called 
computers ‘bicycles for the mind’, implying that they augmented the 
cognitive capacities of the user, making them faster, sharper and 
more knowledgeable. More recently, writers such as Nicholas Carr 
have started worrying that the same technological tools could also 
undermine or fragment the possibility of thought. Today, ubiquitous 
computing and reticular digital technologies structure and govern the 
environment and the society in which we live, limiting thought and 
undermining the possibility of certain noetic practices – in particu-
lar, through the hypertrophy of the understanding (in Kant’s sense). 
This evolution of the organization of social functions, which Bernard 
Stiegler describes as ‘automatic society’,23 short-circuits not just 
social relations and political institutions, but also psychic and social 
individuation (in Simondon’s sense).
Today, the automated ‘interpretability’ of voluntary or involun-
tary actions has become omnipresent, and for some constitutes a new 
market. It is largely determined by data capture and processing by 
industry platforms. This infrastructure generates and processes most 
of this data using increasingly sophisticated and secret algorithms. To 
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describe their impact on humans, David M. Berry has developed the 
concept of infrasomatization.
This concept introduces a third term between those that have been 
used to describe organogenetic processes until now – endosomatic, 
when it relates to life in general, and exosomatic, which is specific 
to man. As David M. Berry points out: ‘the specific reticular nature 
of digital technologies creates new non-human and potentially unpre-
dictable entropic effects’.24 Infrasomatization is a kind of computer-
ization or informatization, both a ‘softwarization’ and an automa-
tization of the human milieu. It can be seen as a social structuring 
technology that inscribes new social forms – or anti-social forms – 
within the very bodies and minds of humans, and, consequently, in 
the functioning of their institutions.
Today, it is mainly through smartphones and tablets that we see the 
manifestation of these infrasomatizations. Having become indispens-
able (exosomatic) prostheses for most of us, these terminals create 
a loop between our bodies, our brains and platform servers, in this 
way partially cutting us off from the world outside this loop. This 
occurs in such a way that the opening of thinking is mediated and 
compressed, as consciousness is bypassed and short-circuited by the 
intensive computation effected by algorithms on platform servers.
This loop, made possible by a reticulation that is partially open to 
the outside, prevents human brains from being aware of what derives 
from algorithms and what from their own thinking. Without humans 
being able to perceive it, therefore, and thus without being able to 
bring it to consciousness, the algorithms of intensive computing alter 
thinking and lead to denoetization, that is, hyper-proletarianization. 
Human reason is functionally weakened, if not annihilated, and 
humans become highly susceptible to persuasion and propaganda cre-
ated by troll factories and other industries of lies and manipulation.
Infrasomatization can be mobilized to support specific instances 
of thought, rationality and action – in a form of reasoning that is, 
however, self-defeating insofar as reason must be intrinsically delib-
erative (synthetic, in the senses of Aristotle and Kant). Reason is thus 
increasingly replaced by a purely computational analytical power 
that amounts to the hypertrophy of the understanding (in the Kantian 
sense of the words reason and understanding), creating the conditions 
for a conception and above all a management of common space and 
time that is inherently and functionally anti-democratic.
By replacing local synthetic rationalities with a computational 
function in social spheres, the process of infrasomatization leads to 
the suppression of the deliberative capacity that once constituted the 
functional independence of social life. These conditions create a data 
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intensive economy based on the technological computational possibil-
ity of processing such data – in a way that fails to take account of the 
role of technics in calculation and its effects, in particular in terms of 
feedback loops and performativity. Consequently, this calculation is 
anti-scientific.
So then, if the ability of citizens to think is impaired, how is it pos-
sible for a city to be called ‘intelligent’ – that is, without its inhabit-
ants? These tendencies require the elaboration of a critique and ethics 
of data-processing, particularly from the standpoint of an imperative 
that would be not only negentropic, but anti-entropic, and ultimately 
anti-anthropic, both in the sense specified in the previous chapter and 
in the sense referred to by the IPCC when they discuss ‘anthropogenic 
forcing’, that is, the increase in the rate of entropy due to human activ-
ity. How could such a struggle against anthropy possibly do without 
the intelligence of the inhabitants of the Anthropocene era?
33 Smartness and speculation
The constellations of services with infrasomatizing effects can be 
mobilized into de facto monopolies in specific imbrications: an 
approach that takes the infrasomatizing effects of service ecosys-
tems into account is a better way of understanding the functioning 
of these computing structures than the neutral notion of ‘platform’, 
which tends to use a self-description, and consequently hides more 
than it reveals.
As described by Robert Mitchell and Orit Halpern, the ‘smartness’ 
of the smart city ‘is a function of its extensive use of informatics 
infrastructure’.25 Data streams are collected through sensors and ana-
lysed by learning algorithms, then organized and used for optimizing 
urban interaction by creating different predictive models. Barely vis-
ible if not invisible to the eyes of citizens, these digital infrastruc-
tures impose, by normalizing this situation, an extraterritorial logic 
that bypasses local political authorities and the local practices of the 
inhabitants. The truth of this from revelations from industry insiders 
and those conducting research on behavioural nudging and manipula-
tion has been widely documented and serves to prompt public calls for 
more regulation over these systems.26
In the industrial ‘smart city’ approach, the citizen is viewed as the 
agent who, within a system of loops, feeds the machine-learning tech-
niques of urban digital infrastructure, at the cost of eliminating indi-
vidual rationality in favour of tele-guidance that takes up past actions 
in order to inspire future actions. As a result, smartness ‘reconfig-
ures a human population not just as that which uses infrastructure, but 
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as itself an infrastructure’.27 The current digital business models are 
mainly based on two broad principles:
1 rapidly gaining a leadership position in imposing standards;
2 exploiting recovered data and speculating on it through ser-
vices offered.
In her critical study of actual attempts to build ‘smart cities’, Halpern 
has also convincingly unveiled their fundamentally speculative nature. 
In spite of the good intentions and genuine hopes their designers may 
possess, they rest on the same dynamics as the derivatives that have 
restructured the financial world of the last two decades. They func-
tion as promises, designed to raise – largely unjustified – hopes, soon 
to be abandoned in favour of more promising prospects.
This drift towards ever-elusive futures, which the initiators of these 
projects often find unmanageable (the impact of communication facil-
itates speculative motivations), drives a fundamentally speculative 
economy. At the same time, and aggravating this situation, this spec-
ulative economy makes it possible to finance major corporate R&D 
projects via speculation and public offerings. This dynamic explores 
and tests a wide range of possibilities, but its achievements are lim-
ited and barely visible, and the impact difficult for the inhabitants and 
administrators to assess. The ‘smartness mandate’28 that rules in par-
allel the design of smart cities and the social logic of financial deriva-
tives rewards forms of governance, orientation and control whose 
result is to disorient and mislead our collective decisions.
34 Technological sovereignty, political vacuum  
and new urban genius
The smartification of the city currently underway can be described as 
a platformization of the urban milieu. We argue that in order to pass 
from a ‘smart’ data-mine-city to a Real Smart City, inhabitants should 
actually be ‘capacitated’ (in Amartya Sen’s sense when he refers to 
capabilities) by critical technological practices and not just subjected 
to technology. Technological sovereignty implies that citizens should 
be able to contribute to the analysis and prescription of the function-
ing of the technological infrastructure that surrounds them, and that 
they should be able to question and orient its aims. Chapter 8 returns 
to this point in relation to contributory design.
In Europe more than elsewhere, there has been a calamitous politi-
cal vacuum regarding the question of digital technology – indus-
trial policy having been replaced by mimicry in a way that is both 
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ridiculous and disastrous. This is all the more paradoxical given 
that Europe was at the origin of the World Wide Web. Given the 
Anthropocene crisis, it is now more than ever up to political insti-
tutions to create, at all levels, the conditions for technical change 
that would be in line with a solvent and sustainable social and eco-
nomic project. It is only on this condition that a coherent trajectory 
for technological sovereignty could be defined, corresponding to a 
democratically-elaborated political will. It is indeed a question, here, 
for inhabitants and for public administrations (that is, higher complex 
exorganisms), of reappropriating technology, data and digital infra-
structure (data sovereignty).
A holistic approach is required. It must take account of data gover-
nance, along with the ownership, transparency and criteria of infra-
structure, as well as the right to an explanation.29 It is not enough to 
make changes to the legal system. It is necessary to go beyond this, 
and to seek to understand and challenge the way in which ‘smart’ 
infrastructure recasts certain regulatory or legal limitations as inef-
fective measures. These disruptive situations profoundly affect local 
economies, creating new forms of structural poverty and inequality:
Absent major action on the national scale or clever strate-
gic coordination between cities on the international scale, 
it will be extremely difficult to reverse this already wor-
rying trend.30
Unlike the ‘smartness’ strategies described above, the digital tech-
nologies implemented by these counter-strategies in fact offer, with 
certain modifications (to be specified in what follows and in Chapter 
8), the opportunity to facilitate economic and political projects based 
on giving inhabitants the ability to develop knowledge. Digital urban-
ity projects based on the intelligence of the inhabitants could emerge, 
favouring a contributory urban economy that generates a new ‘urban 
genius’ [genie urbain]: an arrangement of, on the one hand, urban exo-
somatic and infrasomatic organs, and, on the other hand, inhabitants 
who again become contributors, which is also to say, citizens, capa-
ble of developing their own urban planning by enhancing their local 
potentials within the framework of an open but singular economy, and 
knowing how to value its singularity (that is, its neganthropy).
35 Urban intelligence or automated surveillance?
The key argument of the ‘smart city’ marketing concept is that urban 
management will be improved by the maximum centralization of data 
captured on the territory, to be displayed on an ‘urban dashboard’.31 
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For the sales engineers of the companies offering these solutions, the 
aim is to promote, to local decision-makers, the effectiveness of a bet-
ter understanding of the ‘functioning’ of their city, to be achieved by 
‘monitoring’ it in real time and with algorithmic means to support 
decision-making.
The underlying idea is that all the city’s problems are purely techni-
cal, and that they can be more effectively solved using the arithmetic 
of ‘big data’ or ‘artificial intelligence’ than by administrations and 
inhabitants. In this way, debates, democratic deliberations, collective 
learning and administrative decision-making procedures are all tac-
itly evacuated. The initiators of these ‘smartness’ modes of city man-
agement claim automated computation will be able to deal with all 
the problems that will arise in the city of tomorrow: climate change, 
security, mobility, employment, food. This is what Evgeny Morozov 
has dubbed technological solutionism.
As might be expected, the first implementations of so-called smart 
systems have turned out to be anything but capacitating for the popu-
lation. Nor do they make urban management and city life any easier. 
Most of the time, the benefit comes down to strengthened and auto-
mated surveillance for infrastructure and security. Rio de Janeiro’s 
Operation Room (IBM) and New York’s Domain Awareness Systems 
(Microsoft), which clearly fall within this pure logic of security, are 
also part of an attempt to globalize this model on the basis of a milita-
rized conception of the city: the massive use of predictive algorithms 
goes along with the consequent militarization of urban areas, exac-
erbation of social problems, and the creation of socio-economic silos 
and invisible urban frontiers.
Cities must oppose these corporations, whose sole objective is to 
develop new captive and ongoing markets. Whether voluntary or not, 
these systems create new barriers and a new segregated city geog-
raphy. They destroy the historical mixture and creativity of urban 
centres that enabled them to invent new ways of life for the major-
ity of the population. All those already well-known and increasingly 
unbearable scourges of a development that has become inurbane are 
thereby reinforced.
36 Contributory economy, contributory research  
and local platforms
A new urban revolution is taking place with the digital city, which 
must be turned into a new civility functionally linked to the contribu-
tory economy of the city. Whereas, as Cathy O’Neil has shown,32 
the algorithmic governance of ‘big data’ curtails the possibility of 
Localities, Territories and Urbanities in the Age of Platforms 83
bifurcation, this new urban territorial revolution can and must, on the 
contrary, open up new and unprecedented opportunities to struggle 
against the anthropy that is poisoning the Anthropocene era. This 
presupposes, on the one hand, taking the pharmacological dimension 
of all technics constantly and functionally into account, and, on the 
other hand, designing and creating neganthropic infrastructure capa-
ble of facilitating processes of interpretation, deliberation and collec-
tive decision-making.
The Institut de Recherche et d’Innovation (IRI) – in collaboration 
with the Digital Studies Network (see https://digital-studies.org/wp/
en/), the consortium of the European Real Smart City project (see 
http://realsms.eu/about/), local institutions, associations and residents 
of what has been dubbed the Contributory Learning Territory (located 
in Seine-Saint-Denis, in the northern suburbs of Paris) – is trying to 
lay the foundations of an alternative model of urban dynamics giv-
ing inhabitants an active role in the design and making of their envi-
ronment on the basis of the profound transformations taking place 
in the fields of urban planning, architecture, construction and build-
ing management.
This approach aims more generally to develop investments in con-
tributory economic models based on valuing knowledge and the local-
ity from which it emerges, and to do so via contributory platforms 
(very different from the so-called ‘collaborative’ models exploited 
by structurally and functionally extra-territorialized platforms). This 
experiment is based on two pillars:
 ▪ The first is contributory research, which brings researchers 
from various academic fields and territorial actors together 
to work in research and experimentation networks on the 
basis of the principles set out in Chapter 1 regarding the 
need to systemically and functionally value the struggle 
against anthropy. Contributory research makes it possible 
to perform rapid experiments on the territory, involving the 
development of new economic activities while at the same 
time elaborating the new concepts they require (for exam-
ple, in the fields of accounting, labour law, production and 
engineering methods), along with digital instruments for 
building new local ecosystems and learning communities. 
The aim is also to identify generic principles that would be 
applicable at various scales, and that facilitate cooperation 
with other localities. The principles, concepts and methods 
of contributory research are detailed in Chapter 4.
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 ▪ The second is the contributory economy (whose principles 
are detailed in Chapter 3). The new urban genius and engi-
neering required by the critical situation of the biosphere 
demands a new economic form – the contributory economy 
– to struggle against the anthropy generated by proletarian-
ization, by economically valuing capabilization processes 
(processes of deproletarianization) and collective knowl-
edge practices (involving work knowledge, life knowledge 
and theoretical knowledge). This economy and the experi-
mentation underway in the Contributory Learning Territory 
are described in more detail in the next chapter.
37 Communities of territorial knowledge networked  
by noetization
The efficiency gains enabled by automation should allow the freeing 
of time for urban deliberation, which is necessary for deproletarian-
ization and the regaining of knowledge, in the spirit of cooperation as 
theorized by Richard Sennett.33 Reticulated digital technology, which 
is structurally contributory, does make this possible, provided that 
it is designed and implemented with this objective in mind: we will 
return to this point in detail in Chapter 8.
The Italian Territorialist School has developed the concept of self-
sustaining local development, in order to emphasize the balance that 
must be maintained between directing development to fundamental 
human needs (such as social sustainability, which cannot be reduced 
to material needs alone) and enhancing the environmental quality of 
the territory (for the benefit of the territory itself as well as the rest 
of the planet). This approach to spatial planning is not a regressive 
form of localism: it is form of bottom-up ‘re-worlding’. In this sense, 
the concept of open locality proposed here relates to the Territorialist 
School’s concept of inter-local solidarities, allowing flexible and non-
hierarchical links between the sustainable and diversified ways of life 
present in different localities. It thus opens the way to a multiplicity of 
development styles contrary to the universal flattening by neoliberal 
market logics that erase all singularity, and it reconstitutes what was 
referred to above as noodiversity in the sense of an economy strug-
gling against anthropy.
Jose Ramos and Michel Bauwens (from the P2P Foundation) call 
this cosmo-localization,34 that is, the creation of a cosmo-local produc-
tion system in which what is ‘light’, that is, ‘soft’ (like knowledge), is 
shared globally as the commons of ‘open design’, and what is ‘heavy’, 
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that is, ‘hard’, like territorial hardware, is produced locally by ter-
ritorial economic production units. We will see in Chapters 5 and 6 
how this intersects with the conception of an experimental internation 
based on the ideas of Marcel Mauss, but also related to the theme of 
an International of Science, evoked by Albert Einstein.35
In slightly different language, Ramos and Bauwens refer to 
developing a
meaningful (virtualized) knowledge commons of high qual-
ity, open source, circular and community owned designs 
[thanks to which] local production creates a virtual organi-
zations [sic] power to produce high quality goods.36
38 Energy sobriety and equality: sustainable  
and resilient cities in an uncertain future
If silicon lies at the heart of digital infrastructure, as we will see in 
Chapter 10, then in everyday life and construction the main materials 
that are put to use are concrete, paper, wood, brick, plastic, glass and 
steel. Ubiquitous in global cities and in today’s increasingly standard-
ized ‘lifestyle’, these materials lend themselves well to construction 
due to their physical properties (such as changeability from liquid to 
solid states). They are thus quite easy to model with, and require less 
human work force – and its savoir faire.
These materials, however, are mostly extracted and then trans-
ported to more or less distant construction sites: a model that involves 
high levels of energy consumption. These globalized techniques rep-
resent one of the most entropic factors in human life on Earth. And as 
the OECD indicates in Global Material Resources Outlook to 2020:
The economic activities that drive materials use have a 
range of environmental consequences. Some of these con-
sequences can be attributed directly to resource provision 
(e.g. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from extraction and 
processing of primary materials), while others are indirectly 
linked to resource use (e.g. air pollution caused by combus-
tion of fossil fuels).37
This is what the economist Éloi Laurent calls global physical trade.38 
Today’s construction industry generates around 10% of total green-
house gas emissions – and this figure rises to 30% if we also take the 
operating energy of buildings into account.
The model of automated construction as it is proposed today will 
in all likelihood only aggravate the environmental problem. On the 
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one hand, it is still based on a Newtonian framework that ignores the 
laws of thermodynamics. On the other hand, it is leading to increas-
ingly standardized urban landscapes while at the same time creating 
models that are economically and ecologically costly and that lead 
to the disappearance of the singular characteristics of cities. Digital 
technologies for urban and architectural design, engineering, visual-
ization and project management, such as BIM (Building Information 
Modelling and Management), open up new opportunities and pose 
new challenges. They can either aggravate the situation or, on the con-
trary, alleviate it.
A ‘real smart city’ must break social and technical deadlocks by 
opening the way to experimentation with new technical, industrial 
and social models, involving the invention of new ways of dwelling in 
(habitare) and living in (habitus) its socio-technical habitat. To rede-
fine local technics, the right to make mistakes in the pursuit of bifur-
cations is essential. The real smart city will be born from a new, more 
profound understanding of the negentropic and neganthropic tech-
niques of the past, potentiated by emerging technological capabilities 
that will themselves stimulate the valorization of knowledge and thus 
be capable of serving deproletarianization.
The challenge is to redefine digital construction techniques cou-
pling 3D printing, cobots and BIM with pre-industrial construction 
techniques allowing the re-evaluation of raw materials such as earth 
(including clay), stone and wood, as well as short circuits and virtu-
ous recycling metabolisms. In this sense, the design of cities will be 
in direct relation to locally available materials (including in the form 
of waste), and will avoid the exploitation of distant resources (over-
consumption of sand, iron and so on) in ways that generate anthropo-
genic forcings on the other side of the world.
39 BIM, CIM (City Information Modelling)  
and contributory design
Social scientists have long stressed the importance of involving inhab-
itants in the co-production and co-design of services. In Belgium, 
for example, the architect Lucien Kroll has promoted participatory 
architecture, a practice also developed in France by Patrick Bouchain. 
Today’s new urban design tools, such as BIM and now CIM (City 
Information Modelling), offer a vision of new urban futures where 
resident contribution and deliberation become possible – provided that 
the parties involved in this development of the construction industry 
agree to open up the technologies they implement.
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Mobilized from such a perspective, these technologies, which are 
increasingly important in construction, would make it possible to 
integrate at (almost) every moment the contributions of associations, 
professionals and inhabitants of the territory. Building Information 
Modelling and City Information Modelling are multiscalar and allow 
a holistic understanding of the urban, while creating the conditions 
for the territory to make a real contribution to the genesis of its future 
(we will see in Chapter 8 that this requires a generative approach in 
the sense of Chiara Giaccardi and Mauro Magatti): BIM and CIM 
should become the building blocks of an infrastructure of transindi-
viduation that goes beyond the proletarianization effects of infraso-
matization described above.
Practised with a view to neganthropic development, these platforms 
should lead to the creation of new techniques for transforming locally 
available materials. Within the framework of contributory research, 
the processes of citizen creation can be transferable and shareable by 
networked territories, in the sense of Pierre Veltz (1996) but also of 
Robert Hopkins (see https://transitionnetwork.org/people/rob_hop-
kins/). The emergence of similar experiments in bottom-up globaliza-
tion would allow multiscalar (rural as well as urban) territorial net-
works to be constructed in order to achieve neganthropic objectives 
and increase the resilience of cities confronted with large technologi-
cal enterprises.
The urban modelling initiative carried out by contributory 
research workshops on urbanity within the framework of 
the Contributory Learning Territory of Seine-Saint-Denis 
(in collaboration with the Rectorate of Créteil and the CO3 
EU, H2020 project – see www.recherchecontributive.org and 
www.projectco3.eu)
This contributory research project aims to identify and 
develop the potential offered by urban technologies result-
ing from digitalization, in order to initiate a process of 
the appropriation of urban digital technologies by territo-
ries and their inhabitants, leading to the production of new 
urban knowledge. Based on the observation that BIM and 
CIM technologies stem from a much broader grammatiza-
tion process allowing new forms of urban and architectural 
modelling as well as construction and site management, this 
program, which is associated with two architectural firms, 
uses the Minecraft video game and its open source version 
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Minetest as instruments for simulating and visualizing the 
future potential of the city, based on GIS data (geographi-
cal information systems) and BIM, under the umbrella of 
the work undertaken in this territory in connection with the 
Olympic Village and construction sites in Greater Paris.
These technologies are thus being put into practice in the 
territory’s middle and high schools in order to transform the 
disruption caused by urban modelling and planning tech-
nologies into a future for and by the inhabitants. The use by 
students of games such as Minecraft, under the guidance of 
their teachers and across a wide variety of academic disci-
plines, has the aim of gradually leading to the evolution of 
professional digital tools (including the SketchUp software 
and software suites connected with BIM technology). These 
approaches are inspired by the initiative launched in Rennes 
under the name Rennescraft by the artist Thomas François, 
who is also a partner in these contributory workshops 
on urbanity.
40 Recapitulation on the morphogenesis of the industrial city
There are very strong interactions between technical evolutions, pro-
duction processes and the morphology of those higher complex exor-
ganisms that are cities – and which are always more or less rapidly 
changing. The profound links between production and organizations 
are directly reflected in the morphology of the city. In this respect, 
we are undoubtedly living through an exceptional moment of bifurca-
tion, in relation to which, as we have already said, there are divergent 
options. These social reorganizations of work affect how housing is 
structured, how production and commercial units are organized, gov-
ernance tools are institutionalized (guilds, urban administrations, 
trade unions, etc.), as well as the place of religious elements, institu-
tional buildings, the life of the city (shows, games, sports, etc.), lux-
ury facilities, and so on: the set of elements that together make up the 
higher complex exorganism that is the city.39
Cities were fundamentally transformed in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Shortly after the repression of the workers’ revolts of 1848 and 
the seizure of power by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Baron Haussmann 
very rapidly redesigned Paris so as to make the city ‘compatible’ with 
the industrial challenges of the day. The steel industry, transport and 
especially the railway had, over the previous thirty years, already 
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been greatly developed. It was a matter of creating large markets for 
national industry (steel-producing ironworkers) so that it could com-
pete with German and British industries. Haussmann insisted on uti-
lizing metallic structures for all new buildings (opera house, railway 
stations, etc.) and transport infrastructure (railway lines, tramway, 
metro, etc.).
By comparison, today’s challenges are not just about steel and fos-
sil fuels but about data management (but also, in some economies, 
about ‘rare earth’ materials). The data of the city and its inhabit-
ants represents a major potential production investment that consti-
tutes – together with sensors, GPS systems, GIS and everything that 
falls under what we have called infrasomatization – the horizon of 
the smart city and the reason for the interest of large technological 
conglomerations in these subjects (in particular the Google subsidiary 
Sidewalk Labs in Toronto, where the setbacks caused by this program 
were revealed in 2019).
For Haussmann, it was a question of reorganizing the city in order 
to integrate technical progress such as rail and transport, doubtless 
already with the idea of individual transport, even though the auto-
mobile had yet to appear. It was also a question of lighting (oil, gas 
and electricity were at that time in competition), which, together with 
rail, established the concept of the network. Today, the network has 
become not just central, but almost literally a nervous system, with 
the internet being a data network for production processes as well as 
for urban functioning.
In the mid-nineteenth century, the exploitation of manual workers 
who had recently arrived from the countryside, and who had often 
reluctantly become wage labourers,40 generated new ‘demands’ and 
organizations to support them (the trade union movement); these too 
find their place in the structuring of the city. Housing, which is obvi-
ously the primary component of the city, changes rapidly with pro-
duction techniques and workforce needs, and in particular, as we 
have seen, when manufacturing and commercialization (marketing) 
are separated.
Could the paternalism of certain nineteenth-century industrialists 
not be seen as a continuity inherited from feudalism (taking respon-
sibility for the protection of its serfs)? This more or less generous 
paternalism is materialized, on the side of the ironmasters, by the 
organization of housing in cottage settlements, where the industrial-
ists would in their own shops recover a portion of the wages paid. 
Fourierist industrialists would themselves develop projects for uto-
pian social cities built around production workshops (Godin in Guise, 
Menier in Nosiel, etc.).
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 90
After the Second World War, Keynesianism transformed these 
different models of ‘philanthropic’ social housing into the public 
or para-public social housing of the ‘welfare state’. Cities such as 
Johannesburg have been completely transformed by this objective. 
The historic centre of the city (adjacent to the old gold mines) has been 
abandoned for a new city centre, Sandton, centred on the Sandton City 
shopping mall built around ‘Nelson Mandela Square’.
41 Infrasomatization and BIM as possibilities  
of a digital feudalism
BIM was briefly evoked through the discussion of the importance of 
the evolution of construction techniques linked to production: tech-
niques that in the Middle Ages were artisanal, in the nineteenth cen-
tury industrial, and today have become digital and automated. BIM 
is a new stage of infrasomatization, and it leads to the inscription of 
data into every element of building, by constituting a sort of living 
memory referring to catalogues. For the time being, BIM is mainly 
seen as a tool for facilitating project management. The next step is 
the automation of the building site under development, particularly by 
means of ‘chipping’ the elements (building blocks, windows, doors, 
etc.), or increasing the autonomy of robots, as has happened in the 
manufacture of cars, planes and ships.
But the ambition behind BIM is greater still: its objective is to man-
age buildings from design to demolition. A residential building, how-
ever, does not function like a ship, not even like a cruise ship, and still 
less does a city. If these ‘transport/leisure’ places do count as complex 
exorganisms, nevertheless they follow very different organizational 
models from those of a city. Their social organization fundamentally 
contradicts that of the city: even in the least democratic cities, the 
mayor cannot be compared to a pilot or a captain (the only master on 
board apart from God).
One way or another, the resident of a digital city will interact with 
BIM. But this interaction can be conceived according to two quite dif-
ferent scenarios:
 ▪ either residents will be driven by the digital environment 
and conform to the resulting form of organization but with-
out being able to challenge it;
 ▪ or they will be able to contribute – in particular through 
the acquisition of new urban knowledge, productive activi-
ties, deliberations – to the evolution of their living milieu in 
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its locality, and thus participate in the formation of a new 
urban intelligence.
In this second hypothesis, it is likely that ‘BIMed’ urban materials 
and buildings will constitute the platforms of territories, and that 
these territorial platforms will interact with planetary platforms. This 
issue is highly topical at a moment when Sidewalk Labs is trying to 
design the neighbourhoods of tomorrow in Toronto,41 but also in New 
York and many other metropolises.
The very nature of the digital economy means that it involves con-
tributions from the various agents of the integrated services offered 
on these platforms. The platform economy undoubtedly amounts to 
an expansion of the digital economy, which has hitherto been con-
fined to technology companies such as GAFAM. Traditional, uni-
directional value chains are no longer enough for an analysis of the 
flows and uses coming from all these users (customers, communities, 
businesses), who create value for these platforms by enriching them 
with content or by finalizing the manufacture of objects, as we have 
seen. Thus, little by little, two-sided value-chains develop, then multi-
sided, in order to analyse these flows and especially the values cre-
ated by different agents. The flows generated by these platforms are 
becoming as complex as those observed in the city.
Taking these flows and the values constituted by user contributions 
into account forms the basis of the economic models behind GAFAM. 
These companies pool the different values created and monetize them 
only at certain points. In this way, they make services available that 
allow their users – companies or individuals – to contribute and cre-
ate new use values, to be exploited by these platforms for their own 
benefit. Generally speaking, access to such services is mostly free for 
the user, and these services are wrongly believed to be the bearers of 
potential new knowledge – yet they do not, properly speaking, involve 
practices at all, but uses. It is possible to see some analogies with the 
management of the city and the services offered to its inhabitants.
For more than twenty years now, these technology companies have 
gradually built up these ecosystems. The latter retain users, who are 
themselves contributors, and lock them into logics from which they 
find it difficult to escape – users who are as much other companies 
as they are individuals. These ecosystems were originally built on 
the basis of a response to identified needs tied to the digital evolution 
of society: the search engine for Google; the management of music 
for Apple; digital management of book inventories for booksellers, 
then stock management in general, for Amazon. Today, their power 
in terms of user numbers and the volume of data processed amounts 
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to functional sovereignty, as Frank Pasquale writes, or efficient sover-
eignty, as Bernard Stiegler proposes.
Facebook is considering the creation of a currency and the con-
stitution of a ‘court’ capable of handling content disputes, according 
to Nick Clegg, the company’s public affairs chief. If they succeed in 
these plans, it would obviously strengthen the platform’s power to cer-
tify, and thus strengthen its chances of instituting such a sovereignty. 
Both this currency and this ‘court’ could be described as planetary 
counter-institutions based on a model not dissimilar to that of share-
cropping in feudal times.
In the economic model installed by these platforms, access to the 
content, data and metadata they collect, but also the contribution made 
by users to the manufacturing of objects, constitutes the monetizable 
harvest of these platforms. This harvest is possible thanks to the ser-
vices and tools made available to contributor/producer businesses and 
users. Under certain conditions, like the serfs of the Middle Ages, 
these contributor/producer/sharecroppers have access to the tools, 
infrastructure and services shared by these platforms, being able to 
use them and possibly also to derive income from them.
Facebook’s plan to mint its own currency so as to facilitate these 
exchanges puts this company, if not in the situation of a state or nation, 
at least in a position of almost feudal sovereignty with respect to its 
contributing communities and businesses. From the moment that digi-
tal techniques, in an economic context strongly influenced by these 
platforms, are rolled out at the city, local or territorial level, questions 
about the organization and functioning of the city and the territory are 
raised in completely new terms.
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I The Economy of Contribution
42 Introduction
It must be stated firmly: responding to the challenges of the 
Anthropocene is impossible within the framework of the current mac-
roeconomic model as it has been globalized over the last fifty years. 
This position is not ideological, but the result of a rational analysis. 
The challenge of the Anthropocene is to reduce entropy rates, and this 
requires the development of a new macroeconomic model based on 
contemporary scientific understanding. The current macroeconomic 
model, however, ignores the challenges posed by different forms of 
entropy. It is based on indicators (standard of living, gross domestic 
product, debt levels, productivity, monetary value, interest rates and 
so on) that today threaten the future of the biosphere, and thus the 
survival of those who inhabit it.
The current macroeconomic model fails to preserve the natural, 
psychic and cultural resources that are essential for establishing truly 
economic ways of living. As the work of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen1 
shows, however, it is in precisely this sense that human life must be 
economic, if it is to be sustainable into the future: unlike other ani-
mal species, whose life and survival depend on their natural organs, 
human groups, which produce and exchange artificial organs, do not 
evolve just according to the laws of biology. They transform and are 
transformed by artificial organs, whose development was described 
by Alfred Lotka as exosomatic evolution (see Chapter 1 and §§22–23), 
and this also profoundly modifies human milieus and social organiza-
tions. Such artificial organs can both enrich the human world (pro-
vided that they are socialized through a diversity of knowledge and 
practices) and destroy it (by standardizing practices and depleting 
natural and psychic resources): they are producers both of negent-
ropy (diversification and novelty) and entropy (standardization and 
resource-depletion).
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In the era of industrial capitalism, however, the trajectory of the 
evolution of artificial organs, whether as production apparatus or 
epistemological instruments, changed, becoming subject solely to the 
imperatives of the market. The dominant economic model thus dis-
regarded the biophysical limits and conditions of exosomatic evolu-
tion. The result has been a generalized increase in entropy rates not 
just at the thermodynamic level (concentration of anthropic energy in 
atmospheric greenhouse gases) and the biological level (destruction of 
biodiversity), but also at the informational level (post-truth) and the 
psycho-social level (destruction of collective knowledge, widespread 
addiction and psychic ill-being).
Proletarianization, mechanical formalization and finally the gen-
eralized algorithmic automation of production have together led to 
a destruction of all forms of knowledge. Nineteenth-century indus-
trial capitalism destroyed work-knowledge [savoir-faire] by turning 
workers into proletarians, in the sense defined by Karl Marx.2 In the 
twentieth century, this proletarianization was extended to practical 
and theoretical knowledge: the knowledge of everyday life has been 
destroyed by the culture industries and by permanent innovation 
based on marketing, and intellectual knowledge is now disintegrated 
by software substitution, including in scientific activities.3
This amounts to a situation of generalized proletarianization: the 
liquidation of knowledge in all its forms and the dissolution of work 
into employment,4 as ‘work without quality’5 and labour force. It is 
economically unsustainable: whereas the first two waves of auto-
mation – machinism in the nineteenth century and Taylorism in the 
twentieth century – did create jobs, algorithmic automation destroys 
far more jobs than it creates. Such a situation sends the Fordist-
Keynesian model into crisis, a model that had hitherto made it possi-
ble to organize employment and consumption by redistributing part of 
the productivity gains through wages – as Keynes himself envisaged 
in his ‘Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren’.6
43 Rethinking work beyond employment
Faced with the process of proletarianization, we must revalorize work, 
which should itself be redefined through a new concept that is emerg-
ing in many contemporary works. As shown by André Gorz in the 
1980s, work, which became work-employment in the course of indus-
trial modernity, that is, a job that one has rather than work that one 
does, has, for the overwhelming majority of worker-employees, and 
especially blue-collar workers, lost its function as a place of identifi-
cation or a time for personal fulfilment.7 The exponential development 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 98
of automation that has occurred since then has only aggravated and 
generalized this situation, with the rise of what David Graeber defines 
as ‘bullshit jobs’.8 Today, these are no longer just the concern of blue-
collar workers but of office workers, who sell their time executing 
tasks that seem to them to be both meaningless and useless.
Employment activities that are today automated can be so only 
because they are based on the repetition of programmed tasks that 
are standardized and routine, and which can therefore be formalized 
and implemented in (mechanical or algorithmic) automatisms. On the 
other hand, work activities cannot be automated: they are based on the 
transmission, sharing and transformation of knowledge (see Chapter 
4) by living individuals who practise it – knowledge that is always 
local, collective and singular.
Starting from the distinction between ergon and ponos, as explained 
by Jean-Pierre Vernant,9 work must here be understood in the sense 
of a work and in a sense distinguished from labour, insofar as work 
involves not only an expenditure of physical force or energy trans-
formed into exchange value, but an investment of the individual or 
group in the production of a work. Such a concept of work has every-
thing to do with the concept of ‘craftsmanship’ developed by Richard 
Sennett (to go beyond the Arendtian distinction between Homo faber 
and animal laborans10), which refers not only to skilled manual work, 
but to ‘an enduring, basic human impulse, the desire to do a job well 
for its own sake’.11 Such work activities (whether a trade or a craft), 
which concern computer programmers as well as doctors, artists or 
parents bringing up their children, obviously require the acquisi-
tion of skills (routines and automatisms), but above all a capacity for 
innovation, invention or creation, that is, the ability to disautomatize 
automatisms so as to produce novelty, through what Sennett describes 
as ‘intuitive leaps’, which we propose to conceive here as bifurcations 
in circuits of transindividuation.
By working, individuals collectively and intergenerationally con-
nect together: they co-individuate and transindividuate by transmit-
ting knowledge, and develop singular capabilities through which they 
participate in the transformation of knowledge itself by causing it to 
bifurcate in new directions. These improbable bifurcations (which 
cannot be generated simply through performing calculations) come 
to enrich reality in a way that is not reducible to simple algorithms, 
and make it possible to struggle against the entropic effects of mas-
sive standardization, by producing diversification of behaviours and 
practices, and by transforming rules and institutions. In this sense, 
work can be considered an anti-entropic activity (a notion defined in 
Chapter 1, to which is added the notion of anti-anthropy: producing 
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cultural and social singularities and historical novelties), that is, pro-
ducing negentropy.
It is, therefore, a matter of developing an economic and accounting 
model capable of recognizing the positive value of these bifurcations 
as the production of negentropic knowledge. This approach, which 
presumes a theoretical model enabling the qualification and quanti-
fication of the various forms of entropy, negentropy and anti-entropy, 
is part of a transitional context, and, as has already been indicated, is 
based on a method called contributory research (defined in Chapter 4).
44 Rethinking wealth: the practical (and anti-anthropic) value 
of knowledge
By transforming, in the course of their experiences of work, the prac-
tices and institutions that regulate their existence in their technical 
milieus, and by in this way practising knowledge, human beings pro-
duce new forms of life through which they take care of themselves, 
those close to them, and their environments. The practice of any form 
of knowledge is what allows technical (exosomatic) living things to 
make their artificial organs the bearers more of neganthropy than of 
anthropy (see Chapter 1). This is why the lives of human beings are in 
principle organized so as to ensure they acquire and increase knowl-
edge, which is transmitted from generation to generation through 
institutions that make this transmission possible (educational, aca-
demic and scientific institutions).
Knowledge has a practical or anti-anthropic value: work activi-
ties produce a wealth that is irreducible to the production of value as 
thought by classical economics (as use value or exchange value). In 
other words, the value produced by work activities and through the 
practice of knowledge cannot be understood in terms of use value and 
exchange value. This is so because:
 ▪ contrary to information, knowledge does not lose value over 
time, does not wear out as it is practised, but on the contrary 
grows richer as it is transmitted; it is in this sense durable;
 ▪ knowledge is structurally shareable and shared by peers 
and across the generations, growing richer through being 
practised, and its value does not increase as a function of 
its scarcity.
In this sense, knowledge is valuable on its own terms, to the extent 
that it does not wear out over time but is instead constantly renewed – 
provided that it is transmitted and collectively practised.
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It is this practical (or anti-anthropic) value of knowledge that the 
economist Amartya Sen proposes to conceive through the concepts 
of an ‘economics of well-being’ and a ‘human development index’, by 
showing that the development of ‘capabilities’ (the power of inhabit-
ants to act) leads to an increase in the life expectancy of individuals 
and in the resilience of populations.12 Combining these works with 
those of Gilbert Simondon,13 it appears that such ‘capabilities’ are 
never just individual potentials, and can be constituted only through 
processes of individuation that are always both psychic and collec-
tive, and which we call processes of capacitation.
It is such capacitation processes that need to be implemented within 
the framework of a new macroeconomic model based on the strug-
gle against entropy. Such a model should enable the time saved by 
automation to be redistributed, thus granting citizens the means of 
developing work activities and the possibility of practising knowledge 
that produces economic and industrial activity that is sustainable for 
the biosphere and desirable for populations. Such an economic model 
itself requires the implementation of new indicators, capable of tak-
ing account of negentropic activities (of renewing exploited resources, 
preserving biodiversity and producing social and cultural diversity).
45 Defining contributory income
Contributory income is an idea conceived in the context of the con-
frontation of industrial countries with both the tendency towards a 
decrease of employment, particularly due to automation, and the 
pressure of the toxic effects of the Anthropocene era. Experimental 
research is currently being conducted in Seine-Saint-Denis, and con-
stitutes the founding element of an economy of contribution in the 
context of industrial countries. Its implementation outside this con-
text would require adaptations taking account of the specificity of the 
economies and social organizations involved.
The aim of contributory income is to remunerate work outside of 
employment. It is modelled on the French scheme for intermittent 
entertainment workers, which provides technicians and artists in cin-
ema and the performing arts with a resource outside of their inter-
mittent periods of employment, up to a certain percentage of their 
wage income for the year,14 and on the condition that their right to 
continued participation in the scheme depends on at least 507 hours 
of paid employment from the tenth month of payment of the allow-
ance. Contributory income is also a way of organizing work inspired 
by the free software movement, inasmuch as both involve knowledge-
producing communities.
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Contributory income is an extension of these models to activi-
ties beyond just the performing arts and audiovisual production. For 
example, the sectors targeted in the Seine-Saint-Denis experiment are 
child care, food (agriculture and cooking), recycling, construction, 
car mechanics and energy. These activities have been identified on 
the basis of the actual potential of the territory, rather than a priori, 
or in other words through a combination of: 1) existing knowledge, or 
knowledge that can be developed and valorized; 2) economic oppor-
tunities; 3) appropriate capacitation mechanisms; and 4) financial 
investment capacities (territorial or extra-territorial).
Contributory income is therefore conditional: it is not a ‘univer-
sal income’. Universal income replaces the logic of wage labour, and 
there are endless debates about its amount, but it does not, as such, 
have the objective of reducing entropy. Contributory income fosters 
the local establishment of dynamic solidarities. The condition for 
obtaining this income is what we call ‘contributory’ practice, which 
forms part of the socially useful activity of which the economy of 
contribution is composed.
Contributory income brings with it the emergence of the figure 
of the contributor, which complements that already well-established 
figure of the taxpayer-contributor. The notion of contribution comes 
from the legal world: it is the action of contributing to a common 
expense. Contributory income is action relating to a common creation, 
that is, a common investment – in terms of both work and capital. This 
income forms an element in a context of collective creation facilitated 
by the digital environment. It corresponds to a new way of envisaging 
production and the distribution of wealth.
Contributory income, then, is not a guaranteed minimum income. 
Nor is it a form of welfare income: it is an investment income imple-
mented by public authorities as a way of providing the means for the 
development of capabilities. Contributory income guarantees the con-
tinuity of resources for people carrying out activities in which coop-
eration and exchange are important, within collectives that are in one 
way or another working to reduce entropy – in the context of asso-
ciational activities, public services or market exchanges. Contributory 
income will be adapted to the development of laboratory (‘FabLab’) 
logics that arise in the territory. It is a replacement for unpaid work. It 
will contribute functionally to the creation of positive externalities on 
the territories where it is developed.
Contributory income is part of a more general logic of restructur-
ing social transfers and the industrial economy of a given territory. It 
is also part of a vast movement to index income to productivity and 
set up an individual training account. More directly, the financing 
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of contributory income is organized in relation to both a national 
shared investment and local MICE (Management Institute of the 
Contributory Economy).
This joint contribution body (MICE) manages funds to help cre-
ate a governance representative of the stakeholders in the territory. 
It must ensure the transparency of the new circuits of value around a 
local accounting system organized through a common collective cre-
ation account. Collective territorial agreements, negotiated with local 
stakeholders, determine the rules of application of the contributory 
income/intermittent employment couple, as well as income and remu-
neration levels.
46 The progressive implementation of contributory income
Contributory income is not a liberal work incentive (workfare) 
intended as a substitute for the welfare state. Rather, it is part of a 
third, emerging logic, a form of ‘creative welfare’ that combines the 
solid foundation of social insurance with the dynamics of a broaden-
ing of the free spaces necessary for collective production. Within the 
territory, the implementation of this income depends on compliance 
with a traceability label issued for the contribution and awarded by 
the MICE. This label, the ‘anti-entropic quality of the territorial con-
tribution’, is the expression of a dynamic solidarity.
Open and shared accounting tools will make it possible for autho-
rized public servants to certify contributions. A distributed database 
will manage anti-forgery registration lists around a decentralized 
history of transactions made since the opening of the distributed sys-
tem, and this will make it possible for the choices of a territory to be 
subject to social control. The accounting of the contribution will thus 
allow a rebalancing between positive and negative quantities in the 
collective creation account. This account is a tool for the valorization 
of externalities created in situ.
II Territorial Experimentation
47 Methodological specification with respect to  
the general applicability of the method
A methodology combining contributory research and local experi-
mentation must be implemented so that the bifurcations mentioned 
in Chapters 1 and 2, and in §43 – bifurcations that can under no 
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circumstances arise from anticipatory calculations carried out by 
algorithms, automata, statistics or, more generally, procedural models 
– can come to enrich the lives of inhabitants and make it possible to 
struggle against the entropic effects of massive standardization. This 
can be achieved only by producing a diversification of behaviours 
and practices, and, as already indicated, a transformation of rules and 
institutions.
The contributory economy has no fixed model, but it develops prin-
ciples whose conditions of application evolve according to local situa-
tions and the knowledge possessed by inhabitants. Hence, the bifurca-
tions organized by this economy are deeply implanted at a local level, 
while the territory is thereby allowed to remain open: open to other 
territories, and at the level of the nation, the inter-nation and the tech-
nosphere, while retaining control of its neganthropic future. In this 
way, it aims to take simultaneous control of the negative impacts of 
the carbon economy and the silicon economy (see Chapter 10).
The experiments proposed here, within the framework of this con-
tributory research, put inhabitants at the centre of the construction of 
their economic model. They methodologically adopt the principles of 
the contributory economy in a manner dictated by their locality and 
the realities of their daily life. In the course of capacitating them-
selves, that is, regenerating their power to act, inhabitants build their 
own anti-entropic ecosystem, embodying a life lived in common.
It is according to these principles that in France, at the request of the 
Plaine Commune territorial public establishment (EPT) – encompass-
ing an area numbering some 430,000 inhabitants in the northern sub-
urbs of Paris, Seine-Saint-Denis department – teams from the Institut 
de Recherche et d’Innovation (IRI) have spent ten years undertaking 
an experimental program called the Contributory Learning Territory 
(see recherchecontributive.org).
Learning territories are those that create the conditions for their 
inhabitants to practise the knowledge necessary for new activi-
ties to be undertaken in the service of the struggle against entropy. 
Inhabitants refers to the resident populations, associations, economic 
actors, institutions and administrations. Inhabitants contribute to 
rethinking the economy in the face of the realities of automation and 
the reduction of jobs. In this new context, they allow the territory’s 
economic actors to reorganize their economy, as well as allowing the 
related functions of institutions, associations and public services to 
contribute to these reorganizations. In this way, project sites are set 
up (called ateliers, workshops) that initiate new institutional frame-
works guaranteeing the emergence of anti-entropic activities, in turn 
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renewing the solvency of the territory by generating new knowledge, 
and thus new wealth.
The successful emergence of such territories is obviously not a 
given – processes of the transmission, sharing and production of 
knowledge have been seriously altered, having been turned, as we 
have seen, into processes of proletarianization. This is why any sus-
tainable and solvent approach to experimenting with the contributory 
economy model requires the implementation of laboratory territories 
(of which the Contributory Learning Territory of Seine-Saint-Denis 
is the first instance, which can, however, be assimilated to territo-
ries in transition), where this economy is itself based on contributory 
research methodology (see Chapter 4). This is obviously neither a 
recipe to be followed nor some vague outline, but a method aimed 
at initiating the deployment of the economy of contribution in a way 
that best suits the singularity of the territory, and this method operates 
across four stages: the field survey, the setting up of capacitation proj-
ects, scripting, and labelling.
48 The field survey
The implementation of the method begins with a field survey aimed at 
understanding what appears as ‘already there’, and which, depending 
on the case, will need to be valorized or taken care of. By exchang-
ing with territorial stakeholders (residents, associations, businesses, 
public actors), the practices and elements of already-cultivated knowl-
edge, as well as the major needs of the territory – current and future 
– can be identified. It is a matter of forming points of support for the 
synergies to be developed between stakeholders.
The only possible starting point is the potential that exists in the 
location itself. This approach can prove difficult, since such poten-
tials, being far from the ‘mainstream’, are often literally suppressed 
or repressed, or else channelled through an apparatus that tends to 
sterilize them. Furthermore, these potentials can enter into compe-
tition with one another, and thus into conflict. Finally, the solicita-
tion of territorial actors, of residents (including those who are ‘illegal’ 
or in a situation of civil insecurity, for example with respect to their 
rights as residents), cannot be conducted in the form of a simple sur-
vey gathering information, opinions or energies: it requires an input, 
a diagnostic proposal that concerns more than just the local situation 
itself, and in this respect is already a performative operation that from 
the outset initiates a dialogue on the basis of theses proposed by the 
investigative ‘surveyors’. In this regard, the method mobilized by 
John Dewey is both valuable and insufficient.
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The primary aim of this investigation is, of course, to bring these 
‘potentials’ to light, but also to bring to light actions already under-
taken (sometimes in a very advanced way), to analyse them, and, 
finally, sketch a map of the links between the territorial stakeholders, 
highlighting the way in which the activity of an actor is able to posi-
tively and/or negatively influence other actors, and vice versa. In this 
way, particularly important territorial problems will be brought to the 
surface, as well as a network of actors affected by them (for example, 
in areas such as mobility, recycling, food and so on).
49 Implementing capacitation projects
Having identified problems through the field survey, capacitation 
projects are launched. These involve local mechanisms that allow the 
arrangement of meetings between those wishing to engage in a project 
aimed at transforming the territory. A community of knowledge can 
then be created, bearing inventive capacities for new economic activi-
ties in the territory.
These projects are micro-laboratories of contributory research: the 
formation of such knowledge communities demands an approach of 
this kind, which will be described in more detail in the next chap-
ter. Inspired by action research, it aims to bring together academic 
researchers and territorial stakeholders (residents, associations, insti-
tutions, businesses, public services) in order to confront the (theo-
retical) research questions on which the former are working and the 
(practical) problems encountered by the latter. In essence, it is a ques-
tion of setting up a dialogue based on the experience possessed by 
each actor of the problem to be addressed, and of thus stimulating the 
emergence, through mutual learning, of good practices based on new 
forms of knowledge.
To support the work of developing these good practices and this 
knowledge, researchers build upon the work carried out in these proj-
ects, and carry out a value analysis highlighting two levels:
 ▪ what is collectively desirable: the emergence of local devel-
opment aims tied with the problem being addressed, which, 
in order to eventuate, requires the formation and trans-
mission of knowledge; value analysis is thus mobilized in 
order to translate the potential for collective creation for 
all those who are ready for it into work carried out accord-
ing to descriptive criteria necessary for the knowledge to 
be developed;
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 ▪ the benefits that each stakeholder specifically expects, 
leading to the establishment of indicators of new 
expected practices.
These two analytical stages make it possible to weave the relationship 
between the individual and the collective – which is the condition for 
the establishment of relations of solidarity and trust between actors.
50 Scripting, then labelling by MICE
The progress of capacitation projects incidentally feeds the work of 
value analysis. Once this process is sufficiently advanced, a work of 
scripting takes over. Scripting consists in creating a narrative from 
the criteria and indicators by imagining a thematic scenario that could 
be supported by the economy of contribution, and that could therefore 
be produced and organized around an alternation between periods of 
capacitation, supported by contributory income, and intermittent con-
tributory employment, carried out in labelled employer organizations.
This forward-looking scenario thus presents activity proposals 
involving the identified synergies, modalities of capacitation and 
types of intermittent contributory employment. It must allow func-
tional articulation between the three dimensions of the economy of 
contribution, of which the scenario should be an instantiation:
 ▪ the existence of a potential leading to the formation and 
local sharing of individual and collective knowledge, which 
is also a work investment;
 ▪ the existence of a financial investor (public or private, or 
from an association) who can offer one or more intermit-
tent jobs corresponding to the knowledge developed, as an 
activity struggling against anthropy (labelled by the MICE 
– see below);
 ▪ the existence of a contributory income, which is a national 
collective investment financing the formation of knowledge 
(in the current state of the Contributory Learning Territory 
in Seine-Saint-Denis this income has not yet been allocated, 
but simulation processes have been set up pending the legal 
registration of the experiment, as required by French law).
A scenario is therefore gradually stabilized, in a contributory way and 
as a research activity. The final adoption of this scenario, however, 
does not take place until it has been proclaimed by the governing 
structure of the economy of contribution, called the MICE.
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The MICE:
 ▪ labels the activities described in each of the scenarios 
submitted to it (within the framework of the Contributory 
Learning Territory: contributory clinic, contributory urban-
ity, urban agriculture and food, mechanical recycling, 
waste recycling, contributory energy and so on);
 ▪ grants accreditation, in the context of these activities, to a 
network of public and private employer organizations that 
may benefit from intermittent employment;
 ▪ supports periods of the capacitation of inhabitants contrib-
uting to these activities through the payment of a contribu-
tory income, where the conditions under which this can be 
obtained and the amount are defined by collective territo-
rial agreements.
III Effects on Other Economies, From the  
Microeconomic to the Macroeconomic Level:  
Elements of Contributory Accounting
51 System of information, deliberation and meta-deliberation 
for the governance of a territorial commons
The experimentation described in the previous section amounts to 
basing an economy of contribution on a model that functionally artic-
ulates the economy of the commons with the market economy. Indeed, 
the workshops of the capacitation network, in close connection with 
the activities of the contributory ecosystem embodied in the MICE, 
are a territorial resource mobilized by communities of knowledge 
development and practice that define the specific rules of governance 
for this resource. The whole that is this resource, together with this 
community of practitioners and the rules they construct, is in itself, 
a commons: a commons involved in the production of knowledge and 
its mobilization for neganthropic usages.
This approach is directly inspired by that of Elinor Ostrom,15 for 
whom the communities constituting the commons are above all com-
munities of knowledge. It also calls for new metrics, based on a cri-
tique of the existing metrics of a ‘weightless economy’, and in the 
sense proposed by the economist Éloi Laurent in Le travail au XXIè 
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siècle.16 The communities of contributory work that the practice of 
knowledge constitutes are based on social arrangements and systems 
of rules that are themselves the result of the collective practice of 
knowledge. Through these arrangements, stakeholders form them-
selves into contributory and capacitating communities taking care of 
the set of objects that make up the commons they have built together 
through the capacitation network and the MICE.
The governance of this territorial commons occurs at the inter-
face of the network of capacitation workshops and the MICE: this 
constitutes the level of a capacitation meta-workshop. Relations are 
formalized during the different thematic workshops ranging from 
the development of knowledge to new practices enabling microeco-
nomic synergies, and these relations are interpreted and qualified 
within the meta-workshop, but in this case from the perspective of 
a mesoeconomic synergy, and set within the macroeconomic context. 
The objective of this qualifying interpretation is to determine whether 
the knowledge developed to improve the interactions between stake-
holders involved with the capacitation workshops (for example, in 
the fields of health, food and agriculture) can also be mobilized to 
improve relations between activity sectors and institutional sectors 
around more general questions (for example, addressing the issue of 
care on a territorial scale).
In other words, it is a matter of assessing whether the operating sce-
narios of the various capacitation workshops can be combined into a 
territorial scenario of neganthropic usages. And, as with the thematic 
workshops, it is deliberation that forms the basis of this combination. 
To put it another way, a territorial deliberation arranges and synthe-
sizes thematic deliberations, amounting to a ‘meta-deliberation’ con-
trolling the governance process of the commons.
An ad hoc territorial information system feeds into this governance 
by assuring both the conservation and articulation:
 ▪ of microeconomic data structures built around each capaci-
tation workshop (qualitative criteria derived from developed 
knowledge, quantitative indicators of use and exchange 
values describing the synergies between all the activities 
occurring at the workshop);
 ▪ of mesoeconomic data structures built specifically for the 
governance of the commons (qualitative criteria derived 
from developed knowledge or from the development of 
knowledge to synergize the activities associated with dif-
ferent workshops from a territorial perspective, quantita-
tive indicators of use and exchange values describing the 
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expectations of the coordination of the various scenarios for 
capacitation in the territory).
This information system is a support for the dialogical relationship 
between several levels of capacitation. The congruence of micro- and 
meso-data structures (the same mode of organizing indicators of use 
and exchange value around knowledge criteria, at all levels) is sought 
in order to facilitate the interpretation of the effect that the develop-
ment of knowledge in a workshop can have for another workshop, or 
for the territory as a whole. This is in no way for the purpose of aggre-
gating the assessments of use value carried out in the various work-
shops. The information system is not intended to automate the struc-
turing of data, nor, therefore, to base a territorial analysis of value on 
a single method of calculation.
52 Wealth, calculation and accounting
Within the meta-workshop, microeconomic data structures are inter-
preted in order to feed into territorial deliberation – or, as just dis-
cussed, meta-deliberation. More specifically, they are intended to 
inspire the participants in this meta-workshop (who may be represen-
tatives of thematic workshops, or other stakeholders, with meso- or 
macro-economic influences) to build social and participatory indica-
tors in order to aid deliberation.
Conversely, mesoeconomic data structures inspire the construc-
tion of indicators to aid in the deliberation carried out within thematic 
capacitation workshops. These indicators specify and document the 
judgments concerning use value made by a stakeholder. By construct-
ing these indicators, the stakeholder who participates in a workshop 
communicates with other participants, but also – thanks to the sup-
port of the territorial information system – with the participants of 
other workshops. At the same time, this participant has access to indi-
cators built by other stakeholders in the same workshop and relative 
to the same knowledge, but also relative to other knowledge devel-
oped in other workshops.
Indicators aiding in deliberation therefore allow stakeholders to 
distinguish and combine in their decision-making, and thus to gram-
matize: 1) the value judgments that other contributors to the commons 
make with respect to what knowledge-practice enables in terms of new 
synergistic uses necessary for governing what is held in common; 
and 2) a value judgment that is specific to that particular stakeholder 
and that relates to what he or she expects from their contribution in 
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common, that is, the advantages and constraints that these new uses 
are likely to confer to and impose on that stakeholder.
Resulting from the dialogical interaction between the various the-
matic workshops and meta-deliberations, the territorial deliberation 
process as a whole always relates to both: 1) issues of common inter-
est, with regard to which specific problems of territorial life are clar-
ified, and then feed into collective choices; and 2) issues of greater 
individual interest that motivate stakeholders in their personal and 
professional lives. The direct consequence is that stakeholders whose 
decision-making involves methods of value analysis specific to the 
exercise of their activity – geared, for example, to the management of 
public goods and services, local market valuation, globalized market 
finance or the gift economy – must all be able to interact and delib-
erate, in order to: 1) agree on the definition of a collective method 
of governance, that is, of the organization and management (particu-
larly, economically) of the commons; and 2) adapt their own methods 
to take account of the requirements stemming from their inclusion in 
the commons.17
As a result, multiple methods of value analysis coexist:18 this coexis-
tence of different approaches to value analysis determines a territorial 
locality of valuation. The calculation of contributory income within 
the MICE is based on a ‘meta-method’ that makes it possible to bring 
these approaches coherently together so that stakeholders will wish 
either to finance contributory income or to benefit from it. More gen-
erally, value analysis in an economy of contribution is founded on the 
dynamic analytical cross-linking of several ‘cost centres’, ‘profit cen-
tres’ and ‘knowledge centres’. It is based on:
1 micro- and meso-data structures, whose interpretation 
makes it possible to produce
2 indicators aiding with territorial deliberation, which makes 
it possible to feed into
3 a common accounting of wealth creation (adequacy of 
knowledge to neganthropic synergies, cost of participation/
management of anti-anthropic capacitation), an accounting 
that must then be put into dialogue with
4 the accounts associated with other economies (of capitaliza-
tion, risk, public goods and services, capabilities and so on).
The system composed of these data structures, this delibera-
tive process and this organization of accounts is called contribu-
tory accounting.
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53 Valuation scales and contributory income
The economy of contribution is not based on envisaging a direct and 
immediate link between the accountancy of wealth (as knowledge) 
and the account-keeping of the stakeholders who try to benefit from 
this wealth. Among the institutional embodiments of this economy, 
contributory income19 is probably the most visible benefit with regard 
to the modalities of changes of scale (from the local to the national).
In the economy of contribution as defined in the preceding para-
graphs, when this income is allocated to an inhabitant who, in the 
context of their work of practising knowledge in a capacitation work-
shop, constructs an indicator to aid in deliberation,20 the work fos-
tered by this allocation of income has an influence on all levels of the 
economy. Moreover, it can respond to multiple motivations. Indeed, 
the contributory income distributed to the (nanoeconomic) inhabit-
ant who participates in this (microeconomic) workshop at the same 
time involves:
 ▪ an allocation of dynamic solidarity as described in the first 
part (macroeconomy);
 ▪ an incentive-based redistribution of the accounting products 
generated by (mesoeconomic) industrial reorganization and 
recorded in the (macroeconomic) national public accounts;
 ▪ a productive investment on the part of stakeholders (from 
nano-, micro-, meso- and macro-economies) capable of 
developing these synergies.
54 A new model to confront misgrowth
One of the peculiarities of the economy of contribution model is that it 
does not measure the wealth of a nation ‘at the end of the value chain’ 
and with regard to the monetary standard. The aim of this model is 
to make wealth that has been produced in common – knowledge – 
the ‘centre of gravity’ of a multitude of ‘satellite’ approaches to value 
analysis and accounting. These approaches are undertaken in concert 
at all levels of national economic space, and all of them are calibrated 
by a collective view – constructed by deliberation at the territorial 
scale – focused on the adequacy of knowledge for a neganthropic 
reorganization of these territories. The multiple monetary representa-
tions of value, as well as the various forms of calculation that precede 
them, and of the different forms of accounting that make it possible to 
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render an account of them, are not disconnected from the structuring 
of data in the localities of knowledge-practice from which they arose.
This is why, as we have already indicated, the shift from one level 
to another of national economic analysis (from the nanoeconomic 
– domestic – level to the macroeconomic level21) is not envisaged 
through a transmission from one level to another of data relating to 
one and the same issue, as is currently the case for the calculation of 
GDP (or public statistics in general), but through a dialogical interpre-
tation and a specific form of structuring, and through a formalization, 
at each level, of data relating to multiple issues and that has been pro-
duced following formalizations carried out at all other levels.22
It is also and perhaps above all necessary to use existing knowl-
edge-practice, and dialogue between several levels of interpretation, 
to grasp the nanoeconomic, microeconomic, mesoeconomic and mac-
roeconomic determinants of the future development of knowledge, 
that is, to evaluate the quality of capacitation systems so as to take 
stock of the growth dynamics of knowledge in terms of its adequacy 
for reorganizing neoliberal industrial economies.23
In fact, investment in the work of knowledge-practice cannot be 
satisfied with the current frameworks dedicated to macroeconomic 
analysis. These frameworks are static, whereas the economy of con-
tribution requires accounting in a shifting frame. This framework 
must communicate with other economies by relying on innovative 
systems that make possible a dialogical relationship between micro- 
and meso-economic analyses, in order to institutionalize a multisca-
lar value analysis.
What matters is above all that this allows analytical objects and 
analytical concepts to be redefined in the short space of time required 
for the evaluation process (and not only over the longer-term institu-
tionalization of systems). This requirement is necessary for modelling 
the analytical relationship between the two central organizing con-
cepts of the economy of contribution, which are entropy and knowl-
edge, which is also to say, entropy and wealth.24
The relationship between entropy and knowledge must be seen in 
relation to an open locality, and with regard to the evolution of the 
limits imposed on human societies by the Anthropocene era. The need 
to take the measure of the adequacy of knowledge for the reorganiza-
tion of economies, therefore, does not refer to a performative mea-
sure useful only for the governance of a territory: it aims to qualify 
the knowledge produced and the reorganizations that result from it, 
on the particular territory but in relation to the global stakes – which 
calls for the setting up of a worldwide dialogue on the territorial 
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accounting of the economy of contribution as a basis for the contribu-
tory accounting of the internation.25
The valorization of that to which wealth gives access – that is, 
to what is enabled through knowledge – must indeed be based on a 
perpetual renewal of the representation of wealth, with regard to the 
dynamics of thermodynamic, biological and informational entropiza-
tion. More specifically, from an economic perspective, it is a matter of 
seeing how capacitation allows a reduction of informational entropy 
within the territorial economy, and how this reduction of entropy pro-
motes synergies between territorial activities – in particular industrial 
synergies, which can be interpreted as being negentropic from a ther-
modynamic, biological and psychosocial standpoint.
Investing in the work of knowledge-practice means investing 
directly in informational negentropy and valuing this negentropy for 
the fact that it itself has neganthropic implications: this is the primary 
function of contributory income. But this alone is not enough. It is 
also necessary, in valorizing neganthropy, to devalue anthropy. More 
importantly, value analysis in an economy of contribution should not 
be limited just to articulating current representations of value – even in 
the most negentropic way. The practice of knowledge aims above all 
at a new relationship to investment, pertaining to the vocation to invest 
in an activity, and not to be legitimated in terms of ‘value’ in the sense 
that contemporary economics gives to this word.
55 Conclusion: valorizing localities within a new macroeconomy 
adopting the accounting perspectives opened up by the 
European Union and the United Nations
Capacitation processes, which involve the transmission, sharing and 
transformation of knowledge, always occur under local conditions. 
Even if they always involve delocalization – on a market, in librar-
ies, on scientific networks, in schools and universities, or through 
other types of exchanges – practical and theoretical knowledge varies 
according to epochs and techno-geographical milieus: it evolves over 
time according to technical mutations that transform the spatiotem-
poral conditions of existence for individuals and societies. The pro-
cesses of transindividuation in which knowledge consists amount to 
spatial and temporal localities giving rise to singular and diversified 
events (which we have described as anti-anthropic bifurcations).
An economy that values the production of anti-anthropy through 
the practice of knowledge presupposes the valuing of localities, as 
well as exchanges at all scales, ranging from the domestic (nanoeco-
nomic) level to the biospheric (macroeconomic) level. This is why a 
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contributory economy must contribute to the reinvention of the inter-
national level in relation to an internation – as described in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6 – that does not deny localities, but on the 
contrary mobilizes them for the sake of the whole that is the planetar-
ized economy.
Such an evolution can get underway only through territorialized 
and reticulated contributory research experiments, within the frame-
work of an internation that is itself experimental and transitional, and 
which could just as easily consist in an experimentation and appro-
priation of the possibilities of European accounting.26 The choice of a 
local adaptation of the European SEC 2010 standard is in this respect 
not insignificant. Taking note of the spirit and the letter of the Eurostat 
text,27 which institutes this system by signalling the possibility for a 
member state of the European Union to construct as many satellite 
accounts as necessary for the analysis of its political economy, the 
economy of contribution is based on building a mesoeconomic satellite 
account of deliberation.
This account, organized in the same way as other satellite accounts, 
will record monetary data extracted from the central framework 
of national accounting, and non-monetary data aimed at precisely 
depicting its own function: analysis of the influence of the develop-
ment of knowledge (anti-anthropy) on the reorganization of the terri-
tory (neganthropy). The account of each member state of the European 
Union applying the ESA 2010 system will be consolidated accord-
ing to specific methods within a common framework that aims to 
describe the economy of the European Union and its interactions with 
other macroeconomies.
More broadly, ESA 2010 is a local EU version of the principles of 
the United Nations System of National Accounts, ESA 2008, jointly 
produced by Eurostat, the OECD, the World Bank and the United 
Nations. And as future French national accounts communicate with 
the EU-wide ESA 2010, so too the latter communicates with the UN’s 
ESA 2008. In an ideal neganthropic scenario, deliberative satellite 
accounts could be established at the levels of national, regional (con-
tinental) and global accounts, and communicate with each other and 
with other satellite accounts at each of these levels, in order to provide 
a real prospect of internation accounting.
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56 Primary aims of contributory research
Contributory research can be considered to be a form of social sculp-
ture (that is, of the contribution of psychic individuals to collective 
individuation in Gilbert Simondon’s sense, collective individuation 
being here that of a community of knowledge), based on a culture 
and a sculpture of the self, in the sense that the ancient Greeks (along 
with, on that basis, Michel Foucault) referred to tekhnē tou biou: tech-
nics of the self.1
In this approach, culture, arts and knowledge can all be viewed as 
transindividual processes (producing what Simondon called the tran-
sindividual, that is, shared signification) through which groups, and 
individuals within these groups, cultivate themselves (as one culti-
vates a garden), ‘sculpting’ themselves by sharing and through com-
mon practices, as well as by bringing these practices into confronta-
tion with each other. It is in this sense that the artist Joseph Beuys 
spoke of social sculpture.2 One could also speak – and perhaps more 
correctly – of a form of gardening: culture is understood here as a 
kind of ‘permaculture’ (that is, of permanent culture), forming a local 
ecosystem, based in this case not on biodiversity, but on noodiver-
sity (see §§9 and 22) – that is, on the cultural diversity generated by 
exosomatization.
In the context of the acceleration of technological innovation that 
has now become ‘disruptive’ innovation, which defines the most 
recent period of the Anthropocene – after the accelerations of exoso-
matization that were represented initially by the ‘Trente Glorieuses’, 
then by the opening of the World Wide Web and the reticulated and 
generalized digitalization that was its result – the speed of penetra-
tion of the new technologies emerging from that permanent innova-
tion characteristic of economic war leads to a structural lateness of 
knowledge in all its forms in relation to technological evolution. This 
lateness – which was already examined and anticipated as the great 
problem of the future by Lotka in 1945 – leads to a permanent dis-
adjustment that proves to be less and less bearable for societies, 
which find themselves literally dis-integrated (a society is a process 
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of integration of its members within social systems, themselves com-
posed of what we have called lower complex exorganisms [see §82], 
which themselves constitute functions of the division of labour in the 
sense of Emile Durkheim, that is, inasmuch as it generates what he 
called the organic solidarity of the social group3).
Because it causes this delay and therefore this structural deficiency 
of knowledge, which is also to say its discredit, economic war and the 
resulting acceleration of the process of exosomatization (more com-
monly known as the process of production) intensify the toxicity of 
exosomatic organs. It is with a view to struggling against this state of 
fact that an economy of contribution has been conceived that serves 
decarbonization insofar as it depends on the revaluation of knowledge 
– and therefore on deproletarianization. It is precisely in this sense 
that the economy of contribution, which is conceived as a process of 
deproletarianization, and in this way as an economy of detoxification 
struggling against anthropy, requires research itself to become con-
tributory: research methods in the sciences (physical sciences, life 
sciences, earth sciences, human and social sciences), in technologi-
cal research, in design and in the arts, must become inclusive in this 
sense, that is, integrative and open, and in this way produce negan-
thropy and anti-anthropy (see §8).
Conceived in this way, contributory research methods are based 
on the constitution of research communities integrating the diverse 
forms of knowledge, both practical and theoretical – of everyday life, 
civility, crafts, trades and professions, thus extending well beyond 
the world of academic research, artistic research, technological 
research and industrial research. Moreover, this is how, faced with 
the Anthropocene event, a new ecology of educational subjectivity can 
be formed, taking account of its technical conditions and related evo-
lutions, that is, of the development of exosomatization, by fighting 
against its toxicity and by cultivating its curative potential for new 
psychic and collective individuation.
57 On the need to set up networks of laboratory territories
The disintegration brought about by the acceleration of technological 
evolution combines its toxic effects with the effects of specialization 
on the organization of research, accentuating the search for efficiency 
while weakening finalities – both theoretical (formal coherence 
beyond specialization), as we saw in Chapter 1, and practical (coher-
ence of social cohesion and psychic cohesion, solvency and sus-
tainability). In the social field, this is reflected in an ever-widening 
gap between design, production, distribution and consumption (see 
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Chapters 2 and 8). This results in a transformation and ultimately a 
fundamental deterioration of the conditions of psychic and collective 
individuation, leading to collective disindividuation and social disin-
tegration, atomizing all forms of relations by subjecting them to ‘top-
down’ statistical calculations carried out at the scale of the techno-
sphere, erasing localities and thus liquidating the very criteria of the 
‘superiority’ (of higher complex exorganisms) through which various 
forms of legitimacy are constituted and maintained.
Conversely, contributory research aims to set up territorialized 
laboratories forming networks of localities. This will contribute to 
the collective and ‘bottom-up’ creation of the new criteria needed to 
struggle against anthropy in the Anthropocene era – leading to the 
constitution of collective creation accounts and to the new forms of 
accounting mentioned in the previous chapter. It will also allow a 
rapid transfer of research results to the various levels of territorial-
ity that form societies. Just as transfer centres or clusters have been 
set up over recent decades in order to accelerate the appropriation of 
academic research by economic actors, and in particular small and 
medium business (see, for example, the Université de technologie de 
Compiègne), so too these learning territories are intended to give rise 
to rapid transfer processes, but in this case involving territorial societ-
ies undertaking research work together with inhabitants.
58 Contributory research and digital studies
Between the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries, technical condi-
tions became technological conditions, leading to the generalization 
of proletarianization (loss of knowledge, externalized and fixed in 
artifacts): integrating scientific formalisms not mastered by the users 
of technologies stemming from this new stage of exosomatization, 
technologies have led to the proletarianization initially of workers, 
then of consumers, then of middle management, then of the tertiary 
sector, then of executives,4 and finally of scientists themselves (via 
‘black boxes’). Inasmuch as it profoundly reshapes urban fabrics and 
social connections, the infrasomatization discussed in Chapter 2 is the 
most advanced stage of proletarianization – and it (dys)functionally 
proletarianizes both citizens and the politicians who represent them.
The key question to be addressed by contributory research is that of 
generalized proletarianization. This is in turn tied to the question of 
a new relationship with technology, based on the goal of deproletari-
anization, that is, a relationship in which the inhabitants of territories 
are not merely users of technological systems and public or private 
organizations and services, but rather enter into a relationship with 
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technology based on studying it collectively, both practically and the-
oretically, so that these researcher-inhabitants can understand, pre-
scribe, transform and practise it. Territorial laboratories are for this 
reason called upon to reinvent industrial design in all sectors.
The term ‘contributory research’ was first used within the frame-
work of the French Conseil National du Numérique, in its report 
entitled Jules Ferry 3.0,5 with the aim of closely linking academic 
research on the digital with teaching practices used in schools. The 
report concluded that, to the extent that digital technologies trans-
form the activity of the mind as well as social relations and scientific 
practice in all their dimensions, a new epistemic and epistemological 
organization of research and teaching institutions is required.6
Shortly before this report was published, Bernard Stiegler had 
proposed contributory research to the office of the then Minister of 
National Education, Vincent Peillon: having posited that, before dis-
tributing computer equipment and software in schools, it was neces-
sary to study their effects in depth and in a transdisciplinary way, and 
to launch large-scale research programs for this purpose, the response 
received was that neither the minister nor teachers have time to wait, 
in the face of a veritable invasion of smartphones, tables, social net-
works and new media into classrooms and schoolyards. It was in 
order to respond to this problem (and this state of fact) that it was 
proposed to set up research laboratories, for example on mathematics 
teaching, with, on the one hand, researchers in the epistemology of 
mathematics, exploring the consequences of algorithmic calculations 
on the structure of axioms, theorems and theories, and, on the other 
hand, in institutions, classes and their teachers – in this way territo-
rializing research. The result was the proposals made by the Conseil 
National du Numérique, the primary objectives of which were:
 ▪ to launch a transdisciplinary research process addressing 
all academic disciplines, dedicated to the study of digital 
technologies (on the model of the Digital Studies Network7), 
by systematically and territorially integrating this with edu-
cational institutions (along with students and parents, or 
parents’ representatives);
 ▪ to organize a rapid transfer of technological and scientific 
advances (across the disciplines, from mathematical phys-
ics to legal, economic and artistic studies, and including 
cultural practices in the broadest sense – which obviously 
includes sport) to societies, at all levels of territoriality, 
and first of all at the most local level, where for structural 
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reasons such research is always carried out, then consoli-
dated at less local levels.
In a disruptive period, all types of knowledge, technics and art have 
to be thought again from scratch – while revisiting in return, and after 
the disruptive shock, earlier forms of knowledge and social practice. 
In order to do so, we need to provide therapeutic prescriptions for dis-
ruptive technologies, which initially appear to be toxic. The perspec-
tive opened up by contributory research aims to revisit the notion of 
‘social sculpture’ as it was coined by Joseph Beuys during the 1970s, 
and to do so within the contemporary technological context and the 
framework of digital studies.
59 Disruption, algorithmic governmentality as ‘anti-social 
sculpture’, and noetic permaculture
If, from the perspective of the art market, the term ‘social sculpture’ 
could conceivably seem dated, it would nevertheless be absurd, from 
the standpoint of art history, or of art in general, to say of an artist that 
he or she is ‘dated’ – unless, precisely, one does not recognize him or 
her as an artist. Similarly, forms of knowledge in general do not ‘date’: 
they are not like commodities that can become obsolete or go past 
their expiry date. Knowledge is cumulative, and every form of knowl-
edge is representative of a historicity that is irreducible, and conse-
quently knowledge constantly finds itself revived and reactivated in 
new forms – the advent of Einstein does not mean that Newton has 
reached his expiry date, but rather that his work returns and is resitu-
ated. This is what is at stake in what Socrates called anamnesis, and 
what Husserl called Rückfrage.
As for Joseph Beuys himself, who coined the concept of ‘social 
sculpture’, he is sometimes considered controversial: on the one hand, 
because of his links with Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy; on the other 
hand, because the very term ‘sculpture’ sometimes leads to a confu-
sion in which a separation would seem to be reconstituted between an 
active master-sculptor and a passive material on which this sculpting 
action would be exerted. It is for this reason that we refer to gardening 
and noetic permaculture.
Anyone familiar with the work of Joseph Beuys knows that views 
of this kind contradict his own proposals. The fact remains that we 
obviously need to clarify the issues at stake with the terms ‘social’ 
and ‘sculpture’ (which is also to say, what is meant by ‘social sculp-
ture of the self’ and ‘social plastic’). More precisely, it is a matter of 
reconsidering the proposal for a ‘social sculpture’ – inasmuch as, 
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in Beuys’s approach in the early 1970s, artistic practice and politi-
cal economy were tied strongly together – in relation to contempo-
rary modes of the technical and technological mediation of the world. 
It was in this sense that Beuys referred to ‘social plasticity’,8 where 
modelling and social transformation become a total work, considering 
every individual as an artist, themselves constituting, together with 
other individuals, a ‘creative power’.
This creative power to work [oeuvrer], that is, to open up [ouvrir], 
and therefore to constitute neganthropic and anti-anthropic localities, 
is collective individuation as such, as noetic (perma)culture. It thus 
participates in ‘social sculpting’ that configures the forms and func-
tions of the world in which these cultivator-sculptors live, cultivator-
sculptors that we should all once again become, and we should do so 
from, essentially, the perspective of the Anthropocene era – where 
there is widespread participation in both the production of symbols 
and production in general: as we know, Beuys claimed that the cre-
ation of the German Green Party (Die Grünen) was a work of art.
60 Sculpting, gardening and cultivating memory  
in the twenty-first century
In the history of philosophy, the use of the word ‘sculpture’ should 
be traced back through Martin Heidegger to Aristotle. It is related to 
the term ‘tekhnē’, which can itself be translated as both technics and 
art, and where sculpting means forming: giving form to matter – the 
analysis here occurring in the context of what will later be called (by 
commentators on Aristotle) the theory of the four causes,9 distinguish-
ing between the material cause, the efficient cause (that is, technics), 
the formal cause and the final cause. It should be noted here that mat-
ter (hylē) is for Aristotle a dunamis, that is, a potential, while shaping 
matter (as a conjunction of the efficient or technical cause, the formal 
or theoretical, first of all as contemplative, cause, and the final cause, 
in the sense of its completion, which Aristotle calls entelekheia) is its 
passage into actuality, that is, its energeia. The passage from dunamis 
to energeia is the basis of Aristotelian ontology, that is, of its concep-
tion of what can be and what must be.
If we now consider social behaviour, and therefore the forms of 
motility of noetic living things, as cases of dunamis, then we can bet-
ter understand how the concept of social sculpture is close to Bildung 
(formation, training, education), the notion of noetic culture and edu-
cation as it will be conceived by the heirs of Immanuel Kant – from 
Fichte and Schelling to Nietzsche, via Schiller, and as a shaping or 
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putting into form in the sense of individuation, culture (if not of wor-
ship, culte) and gardening.
The behaviour of psychic individuals – of which a society is com-
posed as a set of collective individuals themselves forming social sys-
tems and complex exorganisms – is formed through education as a 
‘sculpture’ of retentions (habits or memories) and protentions (expec-
tations or desires). This does not mean, of course, that individuals are 
objects, putty in the hands of their educators: this question was widely 
explored, for example by Wilhelm Dilthey, in the twentieth century. 
Those who are educated are so precisely with a view to allowing them 
to develop, by themselves, their potential as subjects who are not just 
particular, but singular – and as participants, from their singularity 
(like artists), in a process of collective individuation called knowl-
edge. This is what Kant called maturity.
Since at least the Upper Palaeolithic (the time of cave painting, the 
oldest examples of which are perhaps 70,000 years old, according to 
a recent discovery in Australia, said to be the ‘cradle’ of shamanism), 
the retentions and protentions of individuals have been sculpted and 
gardened by social organizations (rituals and institutions, whether 
political, religious, philosophical, academic or educational) through 
the practice of knowledge (knowledge of how to make and do, how 
to contemplate – theorein – and how to live) or arts (ars, art and craft 
techniques, arts of living, creative and performing arts, techniques of 
the self and spirituality – noesis, nous – in the tekhnē tou biou). This 
knowledge and these arts, which are always techniques (even though, 
today, contemporary art has great difficulty in seizing hold of tech-
nologies, an issue that forms part of what we call organology), are 
neganthropic practices through which individuals take care of their 
environment, constituting their commons, and learn to live together 
by sharing common retentions and protentions – through the memory 
of a singular past and the projection of an unforeseeable future, the 
arrangement of memory and milieu constituting what Watsuji Tetsuro 
called fūdo.10
In the disruptive period, the social organizations through which 
individuals transmit, practise and transform their knowledge and their 
arts, trades and techniques, seem to be structurally and constantly 
overtaken by radical and permanent innovation, leaving individuals 
and groups devoid of knowledge, that is, links. The practices consti-
tuting common knowledge as well as academic knowledge become 
obsolete, replaced by marketing injunctions implemented via algo-
rithmic technologies functioning in real time – and, more precisely, 
up to two thirds of the speed of light in the centralized memories 
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of so-called ‘intensive’ computing, which extracts patterns that are 
called ‘big data’.
Indeed, the current functioning of the digital technical system that 
serves the consumerist data economy leads to the capture and control 
not just of attention, but also of the retentions and protentions of users 
of digital devices, connected objects and ‘social’ networks, and by the 
automatic generation of their profiles. Algorithmic environments sug-
gest programmable and standardized behaviours that solicit and direct 
their drives towards consumer products: the constitution of mimetic 
and consumerist crowds and the depletion of libidinal energy11 thus 
lead to the production of a psychosocial anthropy from which nothing 
but the worst can arise.
61 Anti-social sculpture and the data economy  
as platformization
The development of new ways of recording and reproducing knowl-
edge (through technologies of grammatization), beyond those consti-
tuted by writing (which lay at the origin of the Western epistēmē), 
gave rise after the Renaissance and the printing press to technologies 
of mechanical grammatization (in the nineteenth century), analogue 
grammatization (in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and digi-
tal grammatization (in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). It is 
through these reproductions of movement (first of all, the gestures 
of workers) and of the knowledge tied to movement (including as a 
moving image and as mobility now directed by GPS) that the various 
stages of industrial society emerged.
Industrial exosomatization – which constitutes the Anthropocene 
era – was first concretized as modes of production based on the 
machine, then, after Taylorism, with the consumerist economy based 
on the culture industries, that is, on the control of behaviour by cap-
turing attention and controlling collective retentions and protentions, 
and finally, as a data economy based on the control of individual 
retentions and protentions via smartphones, algorithms and statis-
tics, referred to as algorithmic governmentality, platform capitalism, 
or surveillance capitalism, where statistical computation constitutes 
societies of hyper-control (well beyond what Gilles Deleuze, after 
William Burroughs, called control societies).
These grammatization technologies have transformed both the 
practice and the status of knowledge, and, consequently, the social 
organizations that this knowledge supported – and that in turn sup-
ported it. As Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer described, the 
culture industries, as ‘mass media’ based on analogue technologies, 
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have ‘shaped’ consumerist behaviour in line with the investments and 
economies of scale effected by industrial production. Based on digital 
technology, that is, on the application of calculation to any event func-
tionally transformed for that purpose into data, and above all incited 
as data, the reticular computational industries have, via social media 
and smartphones, led to algorithmic governmentality, as Thomas 
Berns and Antoinette Rouvroy have described it.
This transformation has given rise to the stage of generalized prole-
tarianization, where work-knowledge, life-knowledge and theoretical 
knowledge have all been massively short-circuited by what eventually 
led to a kind of ‘anti-social sculpture’ – that is, to that which Beuys 
was fighting to prevent from becoming generalized. This occurred 
because what had initially amounted to the fundamental principles of 
an editorial and hypertextual digital network called the World Wide 
Web was systematically and rapidly destroyed by what gradually 
came to replace it: platforms. And especially Facebook. While web 
pages and websites were at first open to a wide variety of formats, 
intended to be read by noetic (human) readers before being read by 
machines, this has been progressively replaced in the data economy 
with processes that generate pre-formatted data for the sole purpose 
of being calculable by and transformable into ‘big data’, that is, pat-
terns drawn from higher level data. In this way, web pages and web-
sites whose metadata allowed automated linking without eliminating 
the reading paths traced by HTML then XML links, and which were 
shared by reader-writers, came to be replaced by Facebook pages and 
other hyper-standardized formats, while ‘tweet threads’ and other 
technologies based on mimetic processes, and ‘peer review’ based 
on ‘likes’, have ended up producing the precise opposite of what Tim 
Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau had imagined at CERN when, in 
1989, they launched the software suite that would become known as 
‘the web’ – and transformed the face of the world.
62 Six reasons to reinvent knowledge and deproletarianize: 
towards a new noetic contract
That reticular digital technologies have become anti-social is a fact – 
a state of fact. Once again taking up this initial program for the web 
is, however, not only possible, but essential, and this necessity must 
become a principle – a state of law. And first of all in Europe: it is in 
Europe that the web was conceived, and where the president of the 
European Commission aims to reduce carbon emissions, and there-
fore, in our view, must also reduce proletarianization.
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The acceleration of anthropic (entropic and human-originated) ten-
dencies by current platforms12 cannot last: it precipitates the catastro-
phe that the Anthropocene has become. This is why it is strategic to 
relaunch fundamental and applied research in the field of theoretical 
computer science as well as in computer engineering and design. To 
do this, it is necessary to practise contributory research, that is, to 
start from local social and territorialized practices, producing new 
forms of knowledge generated by the appropriation of these technolo-
gies, and transforming these technologies in return.
In other words, the study of the specificities of knowledge tied 
to digital technologies must be placed at the heart of contributory 
research. This is so for six reasons:
 ▪ the shift from a conception of entropy based on standard 
information theory to a conception that integrates the notion 
of negative entropy – which Schrödinger conceived so as 
to account for the specificity of the biological domain, and 
which eventually necessitates the introduction of the con-
cept of anti-entropy (see Chapter 1) – requires the redefini-
tion of the theoretical basis of computer science;
 ▪ Lotka introduces into this new standpoint the question of 
exosomatization, and makes it possible to formalize in the-
oretical terms the pharmacology of exosomatic organs inso-
far as they are always potentially both toxic and curative;
 ▪ on this basis, taking account of the problems caused by 
exosomatization (and by its acceleration, tied both to eco-
nomic war and to the efficiency of computational technolo-
gies) makes it possible to conceive a new ‘noetic contract’, 
so to speak, inasmuch as contributory research, which is 
structurally transdisciplinary, approaches the vital prob-
lems posed by the current period of the Anthropocene era 
on the basis of a common aim, which is the optimization of 
the exosomatic condition of human societies so as to reduce 
not only their carbon footprint, but, as we have seen, their 
anthropic tendencies in all areas, reflected first of all by the 
loss of knowledge and vast processes of proletarianization;
 ▪ contributory research, which always involves doctoral or 
post-doctoral research activity, is fundamentally experi-
mental research in two senses: 1) it practises technologies 
that it critiques, prescribes and transforms, which has else-
where been referred to as practical organology; 2) it under-
takes these practices on territories whose inhabitants are put 
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in the position of being non-academic researchers (at least 
in the usual sense of the word ‘academic’ today), but urban 
or rural researchers, in this or that field of communal life – 
that is, of life in complex exorganisms that themselves form 
what we call commons;
 ▪ such territorialized research, based on the contribution of 
all its partners to the development of practical or theoreti-
cal knowledge, and conducted on the basis of theses (with 
respect to anthropy and the possibilities of limiting it) and 
hypotheses (with respect to possible scenarios for the con-
cretization of these theses through territorialized collec-
tive actions, and beyond these territories themselves), is 
above all a matter of work, in the sense that to work first 
of all means to open, that is, to add to the world what it had 
not previously contained – this addition amounting to a 
care taken of this world at a more or less local level, and 
in networks with other territories of care, and therefore in 
exchanges with them;
 ▪ here, working does not necessarily mean being employed to 
do a job, and it is because he placed work at the heart of 
what he called social sculpture that Beuys spoke of human 
creative power and human capacity invested in work.
63 Designing our existence and digital studies
In order for a social sculpture of the self to emerge in digital soci-
ety, it is necessary to establish, at various scales of territoriality (from 
rural or urban locality to the locality of the biosphere that has been 
transformed into a technosphere), territorial capacities for prescrib-
ing and modelling individual and collective practices of the digital 
systems that are today composed of traces, memories and psycho-
social relations, and for making the media that underlies all of this 
once again into supports of knowledge. To forge and conceive society 
through individual and collective contributions is the path towards 
contributory design, described in 2007 in Le ‘design’ de nos exis-
tences,13 which reopens, in the blind and suicidal development of the 
technosphere, the possibility of giving rise to future bifurcations. The 
objective of digital studies (which does not just study the digital, but 
reconsiders the history of knowledge as a whole from the standpoint 
of the role that technics has always played as a milieu of tertiary 
retentions) is to theorize and therefore to prescribe the conditions in 
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which digital technologies completely reshape the construction of dis-
ciplinary knowledge (disciplinary epistemologies) as well as everyday 
knowledge and artistic knowledge (social sciences and aesthetics).
Contributory research, as we have just described it, is largely based 
on the contributory potential of reticular digital technologies. As will 
be seen in Chapter 7, this involves distinguishing fields of calcula-
ble data that algorithms can compute in order to aid collective deci-
sion-making from non-calculable data and non-computable subjects 
of deliberation. In a territorial laboratory of contributory research, 
researchers from different disciplines work with the inhabitants of 
the territory to develop such platforms. These contributory platforms 
facilitate the regular publication of research results, along with public 
debate about these results – particularly within MICE, as described 
in Chapter 3.
Contributory research is based on practice and deliberation – artis-
tic practice itself being understood as a form of knowledge produc-
tion. Art conceived as such a social culture of the self, as gardening, 
is ‘socially engaged’. But no art that has been recognized as such by 
posterity would have been possible without, at the time, such ‘social 
engagement’ – over time becoming characteristic of the form of soci-
ety constituted by the social element.
The various forms of art’s engagement in the social element have 
changed profoundly over time – and have done so at least since the 
ornate caves of the Upper Palaeolithic. Art will be variously magi-
cal, basilical, imperial, tragic, religious and eventually political, then 
modern – up to contemporary art. We will not try to characterize 
these periods here. We will point out, though, that in each period art 
was engaged in a significant way in the processes of differentiation 
between lower complex exorganisms and higher complex exorgan-
isms (see Chapter 2).
In the contemporary period, then, art, along with scientific and aca-
demic research and social critique, constitutes a dimension of what 
could be called public activism in the epoch of network communi-
cations – where activism is understood as the passage to actuality 
(energeia) of a social potentiality itself conceived as dunamis (see §6). 
The aim of an ‘eventwork’ (in Brian Holmes’s sense; see https://brian-
holmes.wordpress.com/2012/02/17/eventwork/) consists in articulat-
ing artistic research with other research – including political econ-
omy, and as contributory economy – in order to address contemporary 
challenges. The notion of eventwork thus names the relationship 
between the event and work by insisting on the social transformation 
and collective individuation involved in work activities, and on the 
bifurcations that can be produced by these activities.
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64 Artistic engagement in contributory research – in the wake 
of the new patrons, and of François Hers, Robert Smithson, 
Black Mountain College and Alcoholics Anonymous, in the 
reticular digital context
In such a context, the role of the artist is not to create artworks or 
objects that spectators can contemplate, but to create new situations 
in which the public can engage. To do work here means to open new 
ways of doing, living and thinking – as Nietzsche invited the ‘art-
ist philosopher’ to do. The artist of the Anthropocene, an era that is 
reaching its limits, is a relational actor in the world, who produces 
situations and opens improbable bifurcations, rather than an autono-
mous actor in the world who produces objects (cf., the concept of the 
artist qua proposer). It is a way of thinking and caring [panser] – in 
an Anthropocene reaching its limits – what François Hers called the 
new patrons of art, as well as of reviving both what Robert Smithson 
opened up in ‘land art’ in terms of anti-anthropy and the Black 
Mountain College inspired by John Dewey.14
Digital technologies represent a new stage of the process of exo-
somatization based on hypomnesic tertiary retentions, which have 
become thoroughly computational. It is not just a matter of a change 
of system or technology as occurred in the past (as described by 
Bertrand Gille, for example, in The History of Techniques, or by 
Maurice Daumas in A History of Technology and Invention): it is a 
mutation in the very nature of exosomatization, including its direc-
tion, its conditions of solvency and durability, and so on.
This mutation generates massive, undifferentiated proletarianiza-
tion that dis-integrates all forms of knowledge, and does so by iso-
lating and specializing them more than ever, subjecting them in this 
way to the matrix of the hyper-industrial division of labour, some of 
the limits of which were already described by Durkheim. Moreover, 
this mutation also dis-integrates, for every social framework, the most 
elementary modes of life – from daily dental care15 to the observation 
of exoplanets, via parental and institutional education, military and 
financial decision-making, relationships with others and with one-
self, and so on.
This colossal transformation today requires the formation of a new 
era of knowledge, and tight cooperation between forms of knowledge 
– their reintegration, which must follow, by thinking and by taking 
care [pansant], the terrible disintegration that has brought human-
ity to the brink. It is to confront these challenges that contributory 
research has been conceived. And it is for this reason that it is greatly 
inspired by the work of Donald Winnicott, who, during an emergency 
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situation in the Second World War, took care of infants separated 
from their mothers and fathers, just as, during the same period, 
François Tosquelles had to take care of psychiatric patients at the 
Saint-Alban hospital who had been condemned by the Vichy regime 
to die of hunger, and just as Gregory Bateson theorized the therapy 
invented by Alcoholics Anonymous to initiate contributory processes 
of detoxification.16
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5 Internation and Nations
Michał Krzykawski, Edoardo Toffoletto, Bernard Stiegler
65 Introduction and reminders
In this book, we reflect on the need to take account of the various lev-
els and scales of locality – from rural or urban locality to the locality 
of the biosphere as a whole that has become a technosphere as a whole 
– while positing that localities, in their struggle against anthropy, 
should, at their various scales, experiment with contributory research 
approaches, and with forms of social creativity that will make it pos-
sible to generate concerted transitional proposals aimed at overcom-
ing the limits of the Anthropocene era. We will now argue that such 
a concerted effort should occur within an institutional system that is 
itself experimental and transitional, which we call an internation, tak-
ing up, as already mentioned, a proposal by Marcel Mauss. The inter-
nation would thus be a kind of crucible in which a new form of noetic 
superiority could develop, constituting what we will call a process of 
the individuation of reference, forming a higher complex exorganism 
of reference – in a sense that will be clarified in §69.
We posed in Chapter 2, and as an initial thesis in §27, that the legiti-
macy of collective decision beyond the particular interest, and as an 
expression of the public good, is what distinguishes higher complex 
exorganisms in general, which constitute public authorities, from 
lower complex exorganisms, which are mainly devoted to ensuring 
subsistence – as units of production, distribution and exchange. The 
objective of this fifth chapter is to set theoretical milestones for the 
emergence of the internation as a higher complex exorganism of ref-
erence. Only the constitution of such an international exorganism, 
drawing on the achievements of all scientific disciplines, can make 
it possible to develop, in a short space of time, a rational method with 
which to confront the true problem of the Anthropocene, which is the 
generalized increase of entropy in all its forms. This amounts to leav-
ing behind the dominant macroeconomic model through a process 
of concerted territorial experimentations based on the contributory 
research described in the previous chapter.
We borrow the concept of the internation from Marcel Mauss, 
who introduced it in 1920.1 This, however, involves more than just 
a simple reworking of the concept – of which Mauss gave only the 
barest outlines. The theoretical challenge consists in reinventing 
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the internation by taking into account thermodynamic, organic and 
exosomatic constraints that Mauss could not have known, but which 
today are unavoidable if we are to seriously address the problem of 
the Anthropocene. It is precisely these constraints that lead us to re-
examine the questions, however thorny and historically loaded they 
may be, of the nation, the nation-state, superiority and sovereignty, 
as well as the question of locality, which must be revalorized so as 
to make it a pillar of a new political economy – beyond all forms of 
localism and nationalism, which can lead only to global chaos, and 
which are nothing but reactions of closure and ill-being induced by 
the globalized production of entropy.
66 Chapter summary
This chapter unfolds in two stages.
The first stage will be a matter of redeveloping the concept of the 
internation in the current geopolitical context, which is primarily 
technological. Rather than defining the internation, we will attempt 
to determine the conditions under which it can emerge and take shape 
through local experimentation. It is only at local reticulated and asso-
ciated scales that it is possible to struggle against the entropic tenden-
cies characteristic of our epoch. If these tendencies are intertwined, 
it is because they are all results of the obsolete and blind macroeco-
nomic model that systemically destroys the ecosystems of the bio-
sphere, just as it destroys political, social and cultural ecosystems.
With the second stage – which starts from a historical path that 
makes it possible to reveal the foundations of superiority, so as to 
transform them according to the needs of the twenty-first century, 
and to do so on the basis of the scientific knowledge inherited from 
the twentieth century – the question of a new supranationality will 
be posed. While it cannot do without the national level in order to 
maintain itself as a superiority of reference, it is nevertheless neces-
sary to consider this national level in a different light: the national 
level, as an open system that in principle opposes homogenization and 
excludes any form of withdrawal into itself, must be reconsidered as 
the synthetic and local level of a set of localities that will be under-
stood as nation-locality.
In the next chapter, a third stage will be developed, in which we 
will try to rethink what, shortly after the Great War, Albert Einstein 
called the ‘International of Science’. The experimental internation, 
as a supranational level of reference, can emerge only from scien-
tific engagement freed from all submission to the anthropic macro-
economic model that has led to the present situation. This response 
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must, on the basis of the unconditional requirements of scientificity 
as regards the administration of proof, be nourished by the controver-
sies without which no science worthy of the name can develop: this 
evident fact must become the very germ of the internation.
A fourth stage will be developed in Chapter 6, which is thus a kind 
of addendum to the present chapter. In that chapter, the consideration 
of thermodynamic, organic and exosomatic constraints will lead to 
rethinking institutions from the perspective opened up by what we 
are calling the internation. The climate crisis, which is not just a ques-
tion of global warming, is above all an institutional crisis, and at all 
levels, insofar as institutions have proven incapable of struggling 
against entropy or have contributed to its increase – themselves gen-
erating their own forms of anthropy. And their deficiency has become 
more serious with the disruption produced by platforms.
Faced with this institutional crisis, we outline here the principles of 
a new theory of institutions, which feeds into the contributory econ-
omy, as well as the contributory urbanity founded on the intelligence 
of urban dwellers, and as an alternative to the noetic misery and pov-
erty of ‘smart cities’ – the vocation of institutions in the internation 
consisting in organizing, articulating, negotiating and adjusting the 
biological, social and technical systems that define humanity.
First Stage of the Internation: Nations and the Internation
67 Nations, globalization, internationalism and the internation
The rise of populism and the return of nationalism that marked the 
second decade of the twenty-first century are reactions to a form 
of technological acceleration that is utterly subject to the blind and 
entropic macroeconomic model, and to the psycho-social and politi-
cal repercussions to which it gives rise. After four decades character-
ized by one-sided praise of globalization – which this acceleration has 
suddenly turned into disappointment and exposed as manifestly dan-
gerous, shifting from the ultra-liberalism of the conservative revolu-
tion to massively transhumanist libertarianism – this globalization, 
having reduced the world to a market, has ended up worldless and 
befouled [immonde].
The distinction between globalization and worlding [mondialisa-
tion] is not just a linguistic subtlety. A worlding worthy of the name 
brings out, from the diversity of worlds, a desired and open com-
mon world. Globalization that reduces all relations to questions of 
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competition, themselves utterly controlled by calculation, flattens 
worlds by denying the anti-anthropic promises they bear within them 
as forms of the ability to bifurcate.
The internation, projected here as an institutional, transitional and 
global experiment, based above all on the confrontation of scientific 
arguments, takes as its essential thesis the need to rethink localities, 
and nations as levels of such localities. As we have seen, the notion 
of the internation was proposed by Mauss in the context of the cre-
ation of the League of Nations and in response to the scepticism of 
proletarian internationalism, which was at that time focused around 
the October Revolution of 1917. More than the detail of the legal and 
institutional aspects of the League of Nations, Mauss admired the 
spirit in which President Woodrow Wilson initiated the proposal to 
create it (whose name takes up one of Immanuel Kant’s proposals in 
‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’2) – with-
out, however, being able to involve the United States due to his term 
of office ending in 1921.
The implication of the Wilsonian spirit praised by Mauss was that
the international system should be based not on the balance 
of power but on ethnic self-determination, that their secu-
rity should depend not on military alliances but on collective 
security, and that their diplomacy should no longer be con-
ducted secretly by experts but on the basis of ‘open agree-
ments, openly arrived at’.3
The idea of the nation, from the perspective formed by the idea of the 
internation outlined by Mauss, which thus expresses the principle of 
ethnic self-determination, and which remains embedded in the politi-
cal thought of the nineteenth century, must obviously be reformu-
lated, recontextualized and critiqued in order to be brought into the 
twenty-first century and with regard to the struggle against anthropy 
in which this century must consist.
In Mauss’s time (and after the First World War), the primary inter-
est expressed with the neologism internation lay in its intention to 
combat nationalism: Mauss’s optimism saw in the birth of the League 
of Nations an institutional framework in which neither nationalist clo-
sure nor undifferentiated liberal or proletarian internationalism would 
prevail. For us, this interest consists above all in the idea of preserv-
ing the diversity of the levels of locality, of which the nation is histori-
cally a political synthesis, within which, over a long period of time, 
the superiority required for the unification of complex exorganisms 
has developed.
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According to Mauss, if the internation is opposed to nationalism, 
which ideologically and economically isolates the nation, it never-
theless does not deny the nation – and in this it is as opposed to the 
‘a-nation’4 as much as it is to nationalism. The concept of the interna-
tion was therefore intended as a pillar of a form of internationalism 
aimed not at erasing nations but at uniting them, by conceiving them 
in a new way.
68 Internation and technosphere
To properly understand the notion of the internation, we must focus on 
the ‘inter’, that is, on the modality by which these socio-political enti-
ties that are then called nations interact with each other. If it is easy for 
us to understand this critique of the autarkic closure of nationalism, 
less obvious is Mauss’s crusade against the dominant internationalism 
or globalism, which produces the ‘a-nation’, that is, the repression of 
national singularities in order to increase the unity of the global level. 
Mauss teaches us, however, that no global unity can last if it is based 
on eliminating national differences.
The question of the internation, seen retrospectively and from a 
twenty-first century perspective, must be posed first and foremost 
as a technological question, insofar as both geopolitics and interna-
tional relations are conditioned by technological development – in 
particular, inasmuch as technology is driven by digital giants and 
the ‘high tech’ industry. In this unprecedented context, the vocation 
of the internation is not just to reinvent the interrelations between 
nation-localities but also to recognize that they are now conditioned 
by the techno-logical-cum-techno-spherical system – forming what 
Vernadsky already called the technosphere.
It is therefore not simply the biosphere that constitutes the milieu of 
interactions between geopolitical exorganisms but the technosphere, 
and it is in relation to the latter that questions of global sustainability 
and global solvency must now be raised. This amounts to responding 
to and for the biosphere through a new rationality that knows how to 
articulate the biological and the technological, well beyond techno-
cratic solutionism and the impoverished vision of technological ‘sin-
gularity’ promoted by transhumanist libertarians.
Intrinsically tied to the internation as the horizon of this new 
rationality, the nation is a level on a scale of localities, and this level 
retains a privilege insofar as it still today synthesizes the unity of 
the territorial noetic diversities of which it forms the horizon:5 if this 
national-local scale retains a privileged position, it is not only because 
of the historical reasons to which we will return in §§72–73. It is also 
Internation and Nations 139
and first of all because it is composed of a set of localities that it has 
the ability to synthesize at a higher local level.
Conversely, the revalorization of locality that we advocate here 
as an economy of the struggle against anthropy requires rethinking 
the general principles of the nation in functional relation to the gen-
eral principles of the internation – principles that will be outlined 
in Chapter 6 as new conditions for reticulations between localities, 
where the national level assumes the function of interfacing between, 
on the one hand, microeconomic and micropolitical levels, and, on the 
other hand, macroeconomic and macropolitical levels. Hence, the idea 
of the internation is presented as the possibility of an institution orga-
nizing political localities, both noetic and technological, at all levels, 
from the nano-level of the citizen-individual to the meta-level of the 
internation itself, constituting in this way what we describe in §§74ff. 
as a higher complex exorganism of reference, itself composed of 
nation-localities as higher locally sovereign exorganisms at this level, 
where the sovereignty of reference constituted by the internation is 
the opening of sovereignties to alterities with which they compose the 
technosphere, threatened today with major poisoning and needing to 
find the pathway to new forms of cooperation from a neganthropic 
perspective.
69 Sovereignty on the scale of localities in the technosphere
From such a point of view, sovereignty is exorganologically condi-
tioned by the internation qua noetic community of global negan-
thropic knowledge, which belongs to a scale of locality higher than 
the national-local scale (the locality of the biosphere as a whole), 
but which posits in principle that it can maintain its superiority only 
when it respects the sovereignty of its nation-localities precisely as 
noetic localities constitutive of a primordial noodiversity. In other 
words, whatever the scale of its locality, sovereignty must deal with 
what is higher or superior than it, while this superiority can exercise 
its authority only through its local differentiations. Always already 
other than itself, it is reducible neither to a local ‘essence’ (origin of 
an identity) nor to the facile organic image of a whole made up of 
parts: exosomatic organs require an approach other than any form of 
bio-economics or bio-politics, the latter always being tempted to draw 
inspiration from social Darwinism.
If we may risk an analogy, we can posit that, just as the biosphere 
is a locality within the solar system, so too local forms of sovereignty 
(national or otherwise: indigenous peoples are not nationalities, even 
though they today define themselves as nations, but in an ancient 
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sense of this word) are localities in the internation at the level of the 
biosphere-cum-technosphere, and as the site of articulation of multi-
polar and multilateral forms of political life, in the technospheric and 
planetary geopolitical system, a site that functionally promotes noodi-
versity, that is, the diversity of knowledge, along with the technodi-
versity that is its material support.6 Noodiversity is the starting point 
of the internation: it is only through the cultivation of the diversity 
of knowledge – all forms of which are universalizable, but which, on 
the other hand, can be cultivated only locally – that it is possible to 
limit the anthropy produced by exosomatic evolution. It is precisely 
for this reason that the internation, as a higher complex exorganism of 
reference, must protect this diversity of local knowledge against any 
attempt to homogenize it, that is, against all entropic and anthropic 
tendencies, while producing negentropy, anti-entropy, neganthropy 
and anti-anthropy, which can only be done locally.
It is only within this conceptual framework that it is possible both 
to free the notions of nation and locality from far-right, nationalist or 
fascist fantasies (which can perfectly well become realities, and as 
nightmares, however fantastical they may be) and to go beyond the 
neoliberal and extractivist implications of the slogan ‘think global, 
act local’ – which precisely means short-circuiting democratic sover-
eignties, and which ends up becoming a sterile and now toxic banality, 
impudently exploited by management as well as by marketing.
70 Institutional entropy and the re-worlding of the 
technosphere: questions of social physics
This perspective makes it possible to overcome the false problem of 
the opposition between worlding [mondialisation] and localities. As 
António Guterres has pointed out, only humanity as a whole can 
respond to the global crises that lie ahead. But this is possible only 
if globalization is replaced with an authentic worlding of the techno-
sphere – as the world-becoming [devenir monde] of what would other-
wise become befouled [immonde].
If the internation is the framework for the interaction between com-
plex exorganisms, which express diverse localities, then the solu-
tion to global crises, although necessarily global, is only concret-
ized locally, and therefore always différantly: by noodiversifying. 
For example, in order to implement the transition to alternative and 
renewable energy, each political locality, which is first and foremost 
an exosomatic biological locality, can only respond to this issue in a 
singular way, according to what takes best advantage of the poten-
tialities of its territory – if it would not occur to anyone to invest in 
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hydroelectric power in a desert, it is worth considering investing in 
solar energy there.
But the singularity of a political locality also lies, first of all, at 
the institutional level. After thirty years of one-sided praise of glo-
balization and the rhetoric of the ‘end of history’ (Fukuyama), it has 
become urgent – and vital – to recognize the local character of institu-
tions. The struggle against institutional entropy is the exact opposite 
of a global and nonsensical homogenization of political institutions. 
On the contrary, this fantasy does nothing but disastrously accelerate 
institutional entropy.
Institutional entropy has accelerated and worsened over the course 
of the world’s becoming capitalist. The exosomatic evolution of the 
last three centuries, initiated by the first industrial revolution of the 
second half of the eighteenth century and characterized by the devel-
opment of mechanics, was structured by an intimate relationship 
between economics and modern physics, as we saw in Chapter 1. It 
is this theoretical and sociological tie that allows Philip Mirowski to 
define industrial economics as ‘social physics’.
The liberal economic model has always advocated the practice of 
free trade in a ‘free’ and homogeneous space, that is, devoid of geopo-
litical divisions. Adam Smith himself, however, emphasized to what 
degree this image of society, derived from a pure and simple transpo-
sition of Newtonian mechanics into the social and political field, is a 
chimera, such mechanics being itself based on a Cartesian conception 
of an infinite and homogeneous space – constituting here a theatre of 
socio-economic relations where the market replaces society. Such a 
space is governed by an invariant, the token of which happens to be 
the notion of energy – an intrinsic condition for the establishment of 
such a space, where objects and their interactions are all quantifiable 
with the help of mathematical instruments, from money to data and 
via algorithms, exospheric satellite infrastructure and GPS.
The theoretical foundation of free trade – which removes all insti-
tutional barriers, be they national, customary, fiscal, monetary, lin-
guistic, etc., and which overcomes all physical obstacles, by reducing 
distances, penetrating mountains, crossing oceans and deserts along 
containerized routes and the air routes of cargo planes, which are 
large emitters of carbon dioxide – conceives geopolitical cleavages 
as physical obstacles, as frictions that hamper the free circulation of 
objects and symbols.
Mathematically speaking, the formula for economic value is derived 
from the formula for physical force. From this point of view, any 
obstacle disperses force – and therefore economic value. The limit of 
this perspective is that it fails to take entropy into account, and holds 
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to the absolute conservation of energy, that is, capital, where force = 
value. Furthermore, it defines work as force, and not as knowledge.
By allocating capital where it can make the greatest profit, regard-
less of the distance between producer and consumer, the theory of this 
kind of limitless global free trade fails to take account of the (envi-
ronmentally, psychosocially or geopolitically) entropic impacts of the 
movement of commodities. Conversely, we conceive here the possi-
bility of the internation as a higher complex exorganism of reference 
in which commerce between localities (both symbolic and economic) 
is functionally designed to intensify neganthropic exchanges – that is, 
such that delocalization is an agent that increases potentialities and 
defers anthropy by noodiversifying it.
It should be recalled, here, that locality is not simply a spatial con-
cept. It does not just designate a delimited territory on this or that 
scale. The various levels of locality constitute in the nation-locality 
a fractal diaspora – where the nation-state is the sovereign exorgan-
ism within which sub-national localities materially and symbolically 
exchange, where these sub-national localities may very well co-
belong to other sovereign exorganisms. Here, the sub-national refers 
to the micro-level, with nation-states constituting the macro-level as 
the local articulation (at the national level of locality) of the meso-
levels, with the internation being the meta-level of locality.
As a new horizon of the anticipation of the future in the 
Anthropocene era, the internation operates across all levels by affect-
ing them and, in so doing, by mobilizing them as the motive formed by 
this new perspective in the biosphere, which itself forms in the solar 
system the largest locality of all living localities, having been trans-
formed over the last three million years into a technosphere, and now 
having to struggle against anthropy – in the Anthropocene era – by 
reconstituting new kinds of open neganthropic localities.
71 States of fact in contradiction 
and the projection of a new state of law
At a time when nationalisms and populisms seem, almost everywhere 
throughout the world, to dominate the public sphere, it is necessary 
to say why and how localities, including national localities, have a 
future – and are an inescapably political condition for the articula-
tion between nanoeconomies, microeconomies, mesoeconomies and 
macroeconomies, all reticulated at the level of the technosphere. A 
radically different approach to the nation, as well as to other forms 
of locality, is necessary in order to overcome both: 1) the glo-
balizing impasse that is the end of the Anthropocene; and 2) the 
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nationalist-localist tendencies that form local impasses correspond-
ing symmetrically to the global impasse – of which Trumpism and 
Bolsonarism are the models for all the closed localisms now emerg-
ing everywhere.
That the modern idea of the nation, especially as nation-state, is 
challenged by the contemporary state of the world – often described 
as post-national – and that the nation-state has become ineffective 
in that world, are undeniable facts. The fact that existing nations, 
which in the past constituted a territorial level of locality synthesizing 
smaller localities, cannot be erased and ignored, and must be rein-
vented beyond the nation-state model of the nineteenth century, in 
particular as a new arrangement between scales in the era of the tech-
nosphere surrounded by its satellite-belt exosphere, and as the condi-
tion of any political legitimacy, is another contemporary state of fact 
– equally evident. These two states of fact amount to a contradiction 
that calls for the establishment of a new state of law. This new state of 
law can be based only on a revaluation of locality in its various forms, 
within the various forms of knowledge, and of which the nation-state 
will have long been the territorialized reality, itself based on the right 
to self-determination of peoples, claimed by them with the advent of 
the bourgeoisie, and in order to free itself from pre-modern forms of 
domination – both secular and religious.
The challenge for an internation conceived on the basis of these 
considerations is to redefine the nation as a relevant level of articula-
tion between the nano-, micro-, meso- and macro-economic scales, in 
relation to the economic, political and noetic life of societies – beyond 
the mortifying and sterile fantasy of national ‘identity’. The nation 
must be redefined as a form and level of historical social organization, 
one that made possible the establishment of civil liberties, the redis-
tribution of wealth, and the negotiation, at the level of this national 
locality, of the economic and technological processes characteristic of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The reinvention of this level in the new technospheric context is 
what all forms of ‘nation-state’ politics have failed to accomplish 
since the turn taken after the Thirty Glorious Years. The salvation of 
any political legitimacy, like the reinvention of the democratic exi-
gency, involves the reinvention of a national territorial locality. The 
latter must not become an obstacle to the higher interests of the tech-
nosphere, but should, on the contrary, become the operative level of 
an open revalorization of locality as the condition of all noodiversity, 
all solidarity and any peaceful future faced with the challenges of the 
Anthropocene era reaching its limits.
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In 1920, Mauss did not hesitate to assert that ‘nations are the 
most recent and the most perfect forms of life in society’.7 Such an 
assertion can with hindsight only appear to us to amount to stagger-
ing imprudence – after the glorification of the Italian, German and 
Japanese nations, but also after Croatia and Serbia, which marked the 
twentieth century, and, today, the USA or China, or India, Burma, 
and so on, which mark the twenty-first century. It should be noted, 
however, that Mauss, as an anthropologist, was attempting to desig-
nate a state of fact that tended to constitute a state of law in a context 
that was already characterized by the upheavals characteristic of the 
Anthropocene era – since, basically, the nation-state was the histori-
cally dominant form of social organization in the Anthropocene era, 
establishing this era as such, and doing so at least until the end of 
the Second World War: the Philadelphia Convention is addressed to 
nation-states.
72 The aporia of locality
The term ‘nation’ was claimed by nationalist and populist movements, 
while the slogan ‘regaining control’ (state control being a typical trap 
of the Western metaphysics of mastery8) was the key idea that led the 
UK into Brexit. The regressive and illusory tendencies generated by 
the states of fact described above – and largely caused, in the case of 
Brexit, by true negligence on the part of the European Commission, 
which was largely premised on the destruction of European democra-
cies9 – haunt what must be understood as an aporia of locality.
How can locality be established by surpassing itself, like Baron 
Munchausen? And what role can the national level, sole guarantor 
today of political and civic effectiveness,10 now play in this establish-
ment? The challenge here is not simply to oppose reactionary or reac-
tive (in the sense of Deleuze reading Nietzsche) movements that seize 
upon the issue of locality, or simply to reject their nationalism:11 the 
challenge is to relate the question of the nation to that of the organiza-
tion of scales of locality – the complete opposite of the fantasy of iden-
tity, but without ignoring the issues involved in territorial integrity, 
inasmuch as it can and must be integrative.
Alberto Magnaghi, for example, can in this way write ‘of the need 
to encourage the growth of local societies intent on constructing vir-
tuous relations with their own built environment by reinterpreting 
local territorial values’. He continues:
From this point of view, the local project is the political 
manifestation of a need, a requirement or an idea in response 
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to the challenge of neo-liberalist economic globalization 
and to overcome the current ambivalent twofold reaction 
to it: on the one hand, the self-excluding resistance of local 
communities defending their own identity through closure, 
refusal to innovate or entertain outside relations; and, on 
the other, the competitive content of local systems and cities 
exploiting and denaturing their own environmental, territo-
rial and human heritage in the anxious race to gain an upper 
position by slavishly following the exogenous rules of the 
world market.12
Or again:
In the local project the density of social and economic inter-
actions being pursued is what is required to create a suffi-
ciently closed system compared with the potential destruc-
turing due to pressure from globalization. At the same time 
there is a need to build the necessary openness so as not to 
fall into the isolation of ‘sad localisms’, unable to react to 
the context. If a local system is too ‘closed’ or too ‘open’, 
for opposite reasons it will be destructured, either through 
exclusion or exploitation and standardization.13
It is necessary to go beyond the classical and universalist critique of 
nationalism, and the pseudo-‘defence of democracy’ ultimately based 
on the supremacy of the market, by distinguishing ourselves from the 
so-called post-nationalist liberal positions or so-called international-
ist radical leftist positions that ignore the primordial question of local-
ity and the struggle against anthropy considered from the exosomatic 
standpoint put forward by Lotka.
On the cusp of the third decade of the twenty-first century, local-
ity and territoriality must therefore be reinvented, and the nation, as 
a historically configured form of collective life, is an essential level 
in this reinvention – and the only legitimate one – provided that this 
level is itself profoundly reinvented, which is possible and credible only 
if it is set at the heart of the territorial economy, and transforms the 
international economy – and does so on the basis of a fundamental 
revaluation of all ‘knowledge-forms’ (to take up an expression used 
by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition) that passes 
through the technodiversity discussed in Chapter 7 – and first and 
foremost as the design of deliberative digital platforms that are in this 
respect neganthropic.
Reconceptualized as remaining, in the global macroeconomic and 
technological context, a sine qua non of political governmentality, 
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and not just computational and commercial governmentality, the 
nation becomes, in the Anthropocene era, the operator of the legiti-
mate establishment of relations of scale between localities (from the 
psychic locality that is an individual in itself to the biosphere as the 
locality of life in the known universe), provided that:
 ▪ this key element is re-inscribed in a process of scalar reticu-
lation that gives rights to smaller localities and so comes to 
inscribe these rights and inscribe itself in the broadest of 
localities: the biosphere as the largest of the commons in 
the sense established by the theory of the commons;14
 ▪ nations and their various networks of scalar reticulations, 
engaged in experimental economic approaches that valorize 
the struggle against anthropy, cooperate and collaborate 
within an organization that is itself experimental, and that 
we call the internation.
What we discover at the end of the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury is that globalized capitalism and territorialized democracy are 
undergoing a divorce.15 In this divorce, the conflict that has arisen 
is between the industrial economy and national politics. It is only by 
reconsidering political economy in terms of the question of the strug-
gle against anthropy that it is possible to overcome this extremely 
dangerous state of fact.
73 Spirits, matter, localities, fūdo
Reconceptualized as nation-localities, nation-states, which form the 
member states of the United Nations, are also localizations of the 
spirit in the sense of esprit described by the Polish-born French psy-
chologist Ignace Meyerson, who placed the exosomatic openness that 
constitutes what he called works at the heart of the individuation of 
the spirit: ‘The spirit of man is in his works.’16 Here, we must under-
stand work [oeuvre] in the sense of a work [ouvrage]. For Meyerson, 
as for Augustin Berque and Watsuji Tetsuro,17 the works that weave 
an inhabited territory constitute a spirit. Here, spirit is not opposed 
to matter: on the contrary, its activity consists in producing objective 
forms that matter through being defined and recognized (by diverse 
means) as works.
Language, science and customs are cases of the objectification 
of the spirit through its works – and form a neganthropic locality. 
The spiritual reality localized in a nation does not exist outside the 
locally arranged noetic acts that make this reality possible: Meyerson 
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argues that if this objectification, typical of the spirit as specific to 
the human, appears to be universal, the way in which it functions 
is always specifically attached to a given place, for the works of the 
human mind are inseparable from the geographical, historical, insti-
tutional and socio-cultural context and situation.18
What constitutes a nation-locality is everyday life that is shareable, 
subject to transformation, and in this way constitutes communities of 
experience and thus of knowledge of all kinds. As a specific site of 
spiritual objectification, however, a nation-locality exists at differ-
ent scales, and therefore cannot be homogeneous either physically 
or noetically (spatially or temporally). One never belongs to a single 
nation-locality. An individual belongs to several localities that can be 
localized within the locality-nation and beyond it, and as a plurality 
of nation-localities, for example as multilingualism, or as an inter-
national community of knowledge – work knowledge, artistic knowl-
edge, sports knowledge, theoretical knowledge, spiritual knowledge. 
In ancient Greece, the Olympic Games, with poetry, thus constituted 
the culture of Greece beyond the level of the cities.
The feeling of belonging to a nation-locality emerges in a place 
where individual and collective action – imbued with more or less 
local customs, traditions and forms of knowledge, and open to the new 
and the other – occurs as the pursuit of a psychic and collective trans-
formation of the inhabitants of the place. This is the issue at stake in 
what Simone Weil described in terms that can seem frightening – but 
which must be read – such as rootedness and uprootedness.19 In this 
regard, the feeling of belonging to a locality-nation is never taken for 
granted, and is in no way a national identity. It is an identification, 
which is not an identity (which would be stable), but a metastable and 
constantly changing process of individuation.20
Such individuation (always both psychic and collective) is a work, 
more or less difficult, before which the perpetual temptation is to 
flee – and to seek scapegoats. What is therefore called the identity 
of a place, which manifests itself much more by its difference than 
by its identity – by its character, that is, its ēthos – must always be 
staged. This putting on stage is always dangerous and ‘pharmacologi-
cal’: a place can surpass itself only through a power to fiction (which 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein call ‘fictive ethnicity’21), 
itself always susceptible to becoming the dogmatic basis for a tempta-
tion to flee the work that is the collective individuation imposed by 
exosomatization.
What we define as nation-locality should be heard as an echo of 
the concept of fūdo, developed by the Japanese philosopher Watsuji 
Tetsuro, and of the concept of ecumene, developed by the French 
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geographer Augustin Berque. Much more precise attention than these 
thinkers gave must be paid, however, to the way in which the fūdo 
constituting the ecumene is exosomatically anthropized, as well as 
neganthropized, and to the conditions in which technics and works, 
in Meyerson’s (and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s) sense, can be used for 
anti-anthropic ends, and, in so doing, can maintain the neganthropy 
without which there can be neither sustainable noetic locality nor any 
resilience of the biosphere-cum-technosphere.
We know from historical experience that the geographico-philo-
sophical notion of place, whether fūdo or ecumene, can be made to 
serve nationalist discourses, from National Socialism to the Japanese 
ultra-nationalist government of 1942. It is for precisely this reason 
that it is essential to reconceptualize the irreducible question of place 
by starting from the questions raised in this regard by physics, biol-
ogy and anthropology (from Mauss to Leroi-Gourhan, via the ‘entro-
pology’22 of Lévi-Strauss).
With the experimental constitution of an internation to accom-
pany, in a transitional way, the experiments on laboratory territories 
proposed above, it is a matter of developing a new political economy 
bringing these territories into contact with the rest of the economic 
world. The internation is thus a space for the negotiation and consoli-
dation (both conceptually and as a form of accounting) of the con-
ditions of negentropic economic change. It is based on an economic 
revaluation of all forms of knowledge, and on the arrangement of 
scales according to theoretical models implemented in accounting 
instruments (see Chapter 3).
Reinvented starting from localities, nations can enter into meta-
morphosis, and, consequently, transform their outdated historical 
condition as national forms, structures and institutions, in order to 
become sovereign bodies that nevertheless recognize the superiority 
of the internation as a higher complex exorganism of reference, and 
align with it in their conjoined struggles against entropy. This ‘supe-
riority’ of the higher complex exorganism, however, which is also 
and more commonly called sovereignty, is not self-evident, these two 
notions being historically loaded just as is the notion of the nation. 
It is for this reason that a historical sojourn is necessary in order to 
discover the foundations of these notions, and to know in what way to 
transform them.
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Second Stage of the Internation: Sovereignty, Superiority 
and Supremacy - Complex Exorganisms of Reference
74 The foundations of ‘superiority’
Throughout history, and even in prehistory,23 the foundations of 
‘superiority’ have not ceased to evolve – the ‘Western’ basis of this 
distinction being established around the seventh century B.C.E., 
between Greece and Judea, and coinciding with the appearance of the 
book, both as a formulation of the secular law of the city and as the 
sacred writing of divine law. These theologico-political bases, them-
selves constituting an onto-theology, will define what is entailed by 
sovereignty, and will do so by defining what constitutes autonomy. 
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the superiority of higher com-
plex exorganisms (which became feudal and then monarchical) 
was established in the West, and continued practically up until the 
Renaissance, through the recognition of the primacy and supremacy 
of papal authority.
With the Renaissance, that is, with the appearance of humanism 
and the Reformation, and then with modern philosophy – which 
unfolds at the moment when accounting records are becoming wide-
spread, along with money,24 while the relationship to texts is totally 
transformed25 – the path to modernity is opened up. This modernity, 
especially when it is translated into industrial modernization, was to a 
large extent installed with what will lead to the establishment, in most 
of Europe, and then throughout the world, of the form of society and 
government called the nation-state.
The sovereignty of the nation-state was essentially stabilized 
after the French Revolution, under the influence of what was called 
Enlightenment philosophy.26 The notion of the nation is much older 
(the word refers to the heathens, then the lineages, then the co-natives 
of a single place). It is on the basis of the discourse on ‘the right of 
peoples to self-determination’ – the people forming a nation of co-
natives of the same place – that the law of nations effects a fundamen-
tal redefinition of sovereignty by postulating that everyone is capable 
of accessing reason (and as such are all equal). And it is on this new 
basis that the ‘national movement’, which in the nineteenth century 
transformed the whole of Europe, understands (in various ways) the 
new superiority that was thereby affirmed, and affirmed as the sover-
eignty of the people27 – Napoleon claiming to embody this sovereignty 
solely in himself.
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The ‘national’ movement that transformed all of nineteenth-century 
Europe shaped the way that societies appropriated industrial develop-
ment and technology – this appropriation constituting what the his-
torian Bertrand Gille will call an ‘adjustment’ between, on the one 
hand, the technical system, which was still largely local, but which 
had begun to enter permanent evolution (through what will later be 
called permanent innovation), and, on the other hand, the social sys-
tems, themselves synchronized and governed by the state, which 
therefore gives itself, for this reason, new institutions28 that constitute 
its superiority as the sovereignty of public authority. The apparatus 
of the modern state was prepared in the eighteenth century on the 
basis of the glorification of knowledge and education against dogma 
and tradition. Its development will be concretized by the unification 
of territories such as Italy or Germany that had hitherto been highly 
fragmented – these unifications taking place around languages, litera-
tures, knowledge, and of course, the new class that was then on the 
rise, newly knowledgeable, emerging from the ‘Republic of Letters’ 
and called the bourgeoisie (Diderot being in this an exemplary figure).
Defining a new territoriality whose religious markers had begun to 
fade, this national unification around a state that is becoming secular 
promotes techno-industrialization, which in turn reinforces this unifi-
cation. The resulting state of affairs (railways, distribution networks, 
the telegraph and the press) is imposed in a way as the fruit of such 
unifications: these fruits are called progress. Colonialism also gives 
rise, especially in France, to an unprecedented form of nationalism 
and (good) ‘national conscience’, of which Jules Ferry was one of the 
creators, legitimizing this approach by referring to Condorcet and the 
Enlightenment – in other words, the sources of progress.29
The nation-state was the European form of industrial economic 
development. It is in this that its fate is fundamentally tied to a moder-
nity that is more economic and social than philosophical – the modern 
philosophy of the seventeenth century laying the axiomatic, concep-
tual and theoretical foundations of nineteenth-century modernization, 
in particular via modern physics, and on the basis of the Cartesian 
program of the mastery and possession of nature, which is today pro-
foundly in question, and which was borne and concretized by the 
industrial economy, both liberal/capitalist and planned/communist, 
thereby constituting the conceptual basis of what is now recognized 
as the Anthropocene era.30
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75 Welfare, supremacy and the ‘Trente Glorieuses’
In the twentieth century, John Maynard Keynes and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt produced a new version of the nation-state, Anglo-Saxon 
and North American, as a federal state promoting and guaranteeing 
welfare, that is, a public good superior to particular interests and 
imposed upon them as the very law of solidarity in the federal nation 
– which is no longer a nation of natives but of migrants, whose unifica-
tion took place before Roosevelt to a great extent through Hollywood, 
the first major film to be produced there, Birth of a Nation, being 
explicitly racist, and affirming the supremacy of the white race, 
which will be partly corrected but not erased by Gone with the Wind. 
Roosevelt’s new approach responded, at the same time, to: 1) the 
internationalism proclaimed by the Bolshevik revolution at the end of 
the First World War; 2) the nationalist and fascist drift of the nation-
state, of which Italy, Germany and Japan will in one way or another 
reveal the cost and the dangers of the ‘national-state’ invention;31 3) 
the profound irrationality of the law of the disembedded market, as 
described by Karl Polanyi; 4) the Taylorian revolution (the ‘scientific 
organization of labour’) that installed consumerism and what Joseph 
Schumpeter would in 1942 call ‘creative destruction’.
The period that was later called the ‘Thirty Glorious Years’, arising 
after the Second World War from both the Philadelphia Convention 
and the struggles waged throughout Western Europe, is also that of 
the triumph of the nation-states of the so-called free world, as (accord-
ing to its advocates) the very embodiment of justice and reason. At 
the same time, however, the colonized territories set out on their long 
struggle for liberation.
From the 1970s, this model fell into ‘crisis’, initially caused by 
OPEC decisions, and the world would once again change profoundly. 
The ‘nation-state’ matrix began to decline while the technical system, 
particularly via what was being prepared with the first forms of digi-
tal and telematic networks, was initiating a new stage of globalization 
– all of the consequences of which would not unfold until the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century.
76 The effects of proletarianization and the future of public 
authority in the Anthropocene
With proletarianization, the lack of recognition of knowledge within 
academic institutions themselves (initially the crisis of the school, 
now the crisis of the university), as well as the effects of the media 
on public debate, and, finally, the technospheric development of 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 152
the technical system through its digitalization, bringing about an 
upheaval throughout all the dimensions of everyday life, along with 
the analytical systems of scientific activity – all this and numerous 
other things (under the pressure of the commercialization of every 
kind of service) have very deeply affected the conditions of the real-
ization of a public authority and public decision-making, and there-
fore of the possibility of defining the common good. Furthermore, the 
integration of scientific research and academic activities into the aims 
of R&D in the service of an inextricably economic and technological 
war has progressively cast suspicion on science as well as on reason 
– and, eventually, on progress in general, whether scientific, techno-
logical or social, that is, on the very will for emancipation.
As we have seen, however, the sharing and recognition of knowl-
edge underpinned the very idea of the nation as a political and state 
organization. What first presented itself, especially in France from 
the 1960s onward through what has been called ‘French theory’, as a 
social critique of the state – academic or activist – of which Marxism 
in general was the matrix elsewhere, and otherwise, and earlier, and 
of which 1968 was the protean and specifically juvenile (which does 
not mean errant, but profoundly new) manifestation, has thus become, 
since then and after the conservative revolution, the popular rejection 
of a failed state that has in turn provoked a regressive and disturbing 
nostalgia for the old and authoritarian forms of the nation-state.
Revisited by taking account of the analysis by Marcel Mauss, the 
questions of the relation to the national scale, and of the nature and 
functions of public authority, today require the rearticulation of the 
questions of economics and politics to territorial localities and to the 
industrial technology that traverses and transforms them – currently, 
by disintegrating them, and where their integration, as a source of 
wealth and not just of value,32 requires locality itself to be integrated 
as a neganthropic function at the technospheric scale. Only a political 
economy of the internation that establishes its relevance at the national 
level as an organization of relations of scale makes it possible to hope 
for the rapid concretization (in the state of climate emergency) of the 
rearrangement advocated here – in particular with regard to the tran-
sition from the microeconomic and micropolitical level to the macro-
economic and macropolitical level, and to the metapolitical and there-
fore supranational level.
Let us call metapolitics what must be elaborated at the level of what 
we call the internation, by way of updating the Maussian outline. 
As for the macropolitical relevance of the national level, it is con-
stituted as much in historical terms (as the legacy Mauss describes 
in La nation) as in terms of ‘social physics’, so to speak (see p.103), 
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inasmuch as the geophysical and geotechnical contents of the relations 
between members of the same society cannot ignore: either 1) the 
social dimensions preserving the relative proximity that a territory 
forms, without which there is no sustainable functional solidarity; or 
2) the technical and technological dimensions that are constantly re-
dimensioning this proximity – and that are perfectly capable of anni-
hilating it, this being what is happening at this very moment.
It is not our intention here to prescribe – in any way – the types of 
reticulation that can and must be carried out ‘below’ and ‘above’ the 
national level. We do posit, however – and in the same spirit as David 
Djaïz – that to want to dispense with this level, or to make it merely 
the organ for the sovereign functions of maintaining order and secu-
rity, is to remain totally helpless in the face of the claims of platforms 
to functional sovereignty33 or efficient sovereignty (which is a contra-
diction in terms). We posit that because these are based exclusively on 
calculation, they are bound to lead to both the structural insolvency of 
economic circuits and the hyper-exponential growth of entropy in its 
various forms.
77 New supranationality and new sovereignty
It is a question of a new supranationality, respectful of national locali-
ties, which are also democratic centres at the scale of the experience 
of social physics, which obviously need to be reinvented, and re-
credibilized, and by revalorizing all scales of locality directly linked 
with the economy. Such a question must therefore be rethought, and 
at the same time so too must the nation be rethought, as a synthetic 
and local level of a set of localities forming a territorial coherence, 
and itself inscribed in a locality that is both biospheric and techno-
spheric – a meta-local (and not ‘global’) level in which, as a prom-
ise put constantly to the test, the individuation of a new sovereignty 
needs to take place.
As the key issue at stake in the construction of the European Union, 
the question of a new supranationality has until now been quite poorly 
posed. And the question of earlier forms of supremacy, in its various 
forms, as the diverse forms of superiority of higher complex exorgan-
isms dominating the lower (from shamans to scientific authorities, via 
religious institutions), has been poorly studied from the standpoint of 
political philosophy – and insofar as it has long been, throughout his-
tory, the theopolitical question.
In fact, if clans constitute tribes, which constitute ethnic groups, 
and vice versa (see §13), it is because the latter project the boundaries 
of what, for example in the Baruya world, passes through dreaming34 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 154
– through which a cosmology is configured. If for millennia so-called 
‘civilized’ social organizations, in the sense of being composed of 
towns, cities and other sedentary urbanities, always articulated power 
and mystery,35 it is because, in any sustainable social organization, a 
way of projecting that which constitutes the incalculable horizons of 
the future is required, beyond profane institutions. As for the mean-
ing of this word, profane, it will change figuratively in the nineteenth 
century, designating the one who does not know what the scholars and 
scientists know, who know above all that science is open, unfinished 
and always fed by the experience of its non-knowledge, and as the 
limits of reason.
When philosophy arrives in the Modern Age, followed by indus-
trial modernization, and finally by what Max Weber described as 
secularization, this higher or superior level, ‘above’, is imposed, for 
example, on ‘enlightened monarchs’ as the power of reason – which is 
then in no way reducible to the ratios and calculations that, neverthe-
less, spread into society from the Renaissance onwards as account-
ing techniques and the management of money and credit36 by means 
of ratios, which involve the understanding. As for reason, it is what 
grants access to ends.
78 Rehabilitating reason and its mystery by restoring 
knowledge communities
The difference between lower complex exorganisms and higher 
complex exorganisms, a difference that we must know how to make,37 
raises the question of the highly ‘mysterious’ nature of this superior-
ity and this difference. We say that this is and will always remain 
‘mysterious’ because it is irreducible to any calculation whatso-
ever: superiority, which stems from this difference that can never be 
emancipated either from a necessary fiction or from an irreducible 
performativity, can obviously, and in the name of this ‘superiority’,38 
very quickly and very easily be transformed into an ethnocentrism 
and oppression of minorities, and more generally into the creation of 
scapegoats. This constitutes the pharmacology of superiority, which, 
while positing that superiority stems from what stands beyond any 
locality, and in this way opens up any locality, can always neverthe-
less be localized and institutionalized in dogma, whereby the noetic 
promise reverses its sign, and becomes betrayal.
For millennia, superiority took the form of the spirits of magical 
society, the deities of mythological society, or the one true God of 
monotheisms. We now posit that, in secularization, this superior-
ity amounts to what opens societies to their future as neganthropic 
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and anti-anthropic potential – as capacities for struggling against 
anthropy through knowledge, which has been progressively reduced 
in and by secularization to mere calculation, and, now, to probabi-
listic correlations. It is above all in this sense that we understand the 
need to reconstitute a supranational dimension founded on communi-
ties of knowledge, cultivating what makes all knowledge an opening to 
that which remains irreducible to mere calculation, a dimension that 
should be embodied in what Mauss called the internation, and that 
should take shape by supporting the laboratory territories whose cre-
ation we are advocating (see Chapter 4).
Modern superiority has been the superiority of science, long con-
sidered to be the specific feature of the West – underpinning the uni-
versality of its economic and political categories. The ‘proof’ of this 
superiority, that is, its recognition, then took the name of ‘progress’, 
so we said – whether this is interpreted in the sense of the liberal heirs 
of the Enlightenment or in the name of Marxism, all of these then rec-
ognizing in industry a fundamental positivity from which will arise 
a positivist current. The scientism to which this will lead, finding 
its superior form in what Albert Einstein will call a ‘paradise lost’,39 
will lead precisely to inferiorizing this supposed superiority, that is, to 
reducing it to pure efficiency, whether it is placed into the service of 
the military enterprise, as Paul Valéry, Edmund Husserl and Albert 
Einstein will deplore, or disintegrated by the submission of science 
and knowledge in general to economic war, knowledge finding itself 
precisely proletarianized in one way or another – on the basis of a 
founding axiom that posits that everything is reducible to calculable 
information.
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6 Internation and Institutions
Michał Krzykawski, Edoardo Toffoletto, Bernard Stiegler
Third Stage of the Internation: Science
79 Evolutions of the process of the individuation of reference 
up until Einstein
In Chapter 2, and at the beginning of the previous chapter, we distin-
guished complex exorganisms from simple exorganisms, and we then 
distinguished two kinds of complex exorganisms, called lower and 
higher, inferior and superior. We have posited that these are always 
constituted in relation to an extraterritorial process of the individu-
ation of reference, which nourishes and prescribes this ‘superiority’. 
For millennia, this prescription was magical, mythological, dynastic 
or religious. It is only with modernity that the superiority of reference 
became secularized, identifying with the ideal of knowledge that, in 
Kant’s eyes, Newtonian physics still represented1 – the ‘Republic of 
Letters’ then constituting the new space of extraterritorial reference, 
thus initiating what Max Weber would describe as secularization.
Only a form of science integrating what Immanuel Kant, like 
Auguste Comte, could not yet have known, and, furthermore, a 
revaluated science integrating the questions raised by the irreducibly 
pharmacological dimension of exosomatization and by the reconstitu-
tion of noetic locality as the functional fabric of an economy of the 
struggle against entropy – only such a science bears the possibility of 
reconstituting a prescription of reference capable of opening localities 
up to one another at every scale, including national localities, syn-
thesizing them within an internation that is united so as to overcome 
the limits of the Anthropocene era. Faced with the challenges of the 
absolute need to struggle against entropy, and against its anthropic 
forms, only a new union of nations based on the mutual recognition 
of the openness of science, and of its legitimacy regained through its 
commitment to this struggle, will make it possible to reopen prospects 
capable of mobilizing, at the same time, public opinion, younger gen-
erations of learners and researchers, economic investors and public 
institutions supporting laboratory territories that are candidates for 
territorial experiments in contributory research.
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In the ‘post-truth era’, it is only in this way that the internation could 
reconstitute an exorganism of reference based on a leap and a rebound 
in scientific cooperation. In his article ‘The International of Science’, 
dated 1922, Albert Einstein pointed out that economic development 
was then largely based on intellectual work. In 1919, commenting on 
the founding of the League of Nations, he stated:
Nowadays we are faced with the dismaying fact that the pol-
iticians, the practical men of affairs, have become the expo-
nents of international ideas. It is they who have created the 
League of Nations.2
Einstein was acutely conscious of how nationalist passions were 
destroying the ‘community of the intellect’ (Gemeinschaft der Geister), 
that is, the community of the ‘men of learning’ (Wissenschaftler), who 
are themselves representatives of national traditions. As a result, 
he was initially enthusiastic when the International Committee on 
Intellectual Cooperation was set up by the League of Nations in 1922:
This commission was to be a strictly international and 
entirely non-political body, whose business it was to put the 
intellectuals of all the nations, who were isolated by the War, 
in touch with each other. It proved a difficult task; for it has, 
alas, to be admitted that […] the artists and men of learning 
permit themselves to governed by narrow nationalism to a 
far greater extent than the men of affairs.
Einstein stressed that this task could not ‘be achieved by treaties 
alone. The minds of the people must, above all, be prepared for it’.3
What he called the ‘International of Science’ was intended to bring 
about this spiritual change.
80 The New International of Science
While there are still artists and men of learning, particularly in 
Europe, who support nationalist-populist tendencies, or who are 
unable to follow an authentically international way of thinking, since 
that time there have emerged those who compromise with the ‘univer-
salism of the market’ that subjects science to the imperatives of eco-
nomic war – a compromise that reinforces the ‘return of nationalism’, 
including among some intellectuals. In other words, questions about 
the role of science in relation to politics and economics have changed 
– and this is suggested in particular by that scientific community rep-
resented by the IPCC and the debates that can be provoked within 
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the scientific community itself concerning causal and risk factors, and 
therefore prevention.
Contrary to what the IPCC makes possible, the global problem with 
science, as a production function as well as a potential legitimization 
of what it is in the international that goes beyond local boundaries, is 
indeed that scientific activities have largely been subjected, through 
this economic functionalization, to the prescriptions of an industrial 
economy that produces massive amounts of entropy and is based on 
proletarianization. This entropic economy thus liquidates the singu-
larities of which knowledge has always been composed, repressing 
the question of localities within science itself. Consequently, public 
authorities and local political institutions at every scale find them-
selves functionally delegitimized.
In 1939, Paul Valéry wrote:
All these values that rise and fall constitute the great market 
of human affairs. Among them, the unfortunate value, spirit, 
continues to decline.4
The sacrifice of the theoretical ideas of science and the principles of 
scientific research to the short-term interests of a macroeconomic 
model that has become unsustainable and insolvent is the final stage 
in this devaluation of science as it engenders the post-truth era, a 
total loss of trust, and therefore a strong potential for violence in this 
context of mistrust, in which only a revalorization of knowledge can 
make it possible to hope that this state of affairs will be overcome – 
and that a new period of peaceful economic cooperation, respectful 
of localities, will enable us to reopen future prospects at the scale of 
the biosphere.
Einstein’s proposal to set up a new International, that of science, 
must be rethought with a hundred years of hindsight, and with a view 
to putting science back in the service of the common good and on 
the scale of the biosphere – and not to abandon it to the particular 
interests of states or corporations, however powerful they may be. As 
Einstein stressed in his time, international intellectual exchange must 
become the reference point for the global struggle for peace, which 
nowadays involves the struggle against entropy in all its forms. But 
this also requires a reconsideration of the place of science in society – 
and a reconsideration of science as a whole, not just as a succession of 
disciplinary particularities.
The interests of science – to be understood here in a broad sense: 
from the human and social sciences (including philosophy and the 
humanities) to mathematics and the neurosciences – do not conflict 
with the interests of the economy. On the contrary, what science 
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(starting with economic science) must once again be able to do for eco-
nomic thought (for the thinking of economic actors, from the entre-
preneur to the client, via the investor and the regulator) is to provide 
it with a new rational basis, irreducible to the ‘irrational motives of 
rationalization’ that André Gorz calls ‘economicizing’,5 and rehabili-
tating reason, as Achille Mbembe recently proposed in Klagenfurt.6 
The interests of science run counter to the interests of what has 
become a diseconomy, and this situation will remain unchanged so 
as long as the macroeconomic model continues to be based on mas-
sively entropic economies of scale that are ruinous for knowledge and 
devastating for the environment – what Olga Goriunova and Matthew 
Fuller rightly call devastation.7
81 Concerning Europe and the performativity of narrative
In this respect, what we call the internation must represent the redefi-
nition of the tasks of universities – in relation to what Kant defined 
as ‘scientific societies’ (Societäten der Wissenschaften), which form 
an independent organization propagating and developing knowledge 
for the good of societies,8 and, in particular, in an industrial society 
where the economy has become the issue at stake in the very survival 
of the biosphere, where the aim must be to constitute a new economic 
rationality. This rationality can only be anti-entropic, that is, in this 
case, capable of shedding new light on nations as localities and on 
their fundamental role in the development of noodiversity.
The industrial revolution, which can be understood as one of the 
beginnings of modernity, was possible only on the basis of the discov-
eries made by Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, Humboldt and many other 
European thinkers, who provided us with a new representation of the 
world by breaking with ancient cosmology. What is now urgently 
needed is a noetic revolution based on new scientific advances that 
have invalidated a good number of modern assumptions. In making 
this revolution, however, which must be accomplished by forging new 
concepts rather than erecting barricades, it is necessary to take new 
technological challenges into account, and to reopen, between the 
sciences, an essential process of reflection beyond specializations, in 
relation to the humanities, and by facing the colossal challenges posed 
by the technological transformations tied to digital networks.
Ursula von der Leyen, the new president of the European 
Commission, argues that Europe must become the first climate-
neutral continent and a leading ‘exporter of knowledge, technology 
and best practice’. But this exciting and exhilarating challenge can 
be met only on the basis of a research program commensurate with 
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such ambitions, which should be launched in close consultation with 
‘scientific workers’ and ‘intellectual workers’,9 and provide for politi-
cal decision-making an incontestable intellectual basis, free from 
the short-termist limitations that have been imposed on all forms of 
research by the diktat of short-term efficiency.
It is in this sense that Jacques Derrida was able to say, in 2004, 
on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Le Monde diplomatique, 
that ‘we must fight for what of Europe remains irreplaceable for the 
world to come’.10 The struggle to cultivate this ‘irreplaceability’ of 
Europe, and against its museification (result of what Achille Mbembe 
describes as the inescapable mourning of its pretention to centrality11), 
should continue within the internation through its localities and in 
dialogue with localities outside Europe. Europe, having lost its central 
geopolitical position in the process of the industrial development of 
the world, still has the means to contribute to a new public authority 
and a forum for deliberation with a view to realizing a new account of 
the industrial economy.
Meeting this economic challenge means revaluing the different 
forms of knowledge and recognizing them as the linchpin of a new 
industrial economy resolutely committed to deproletarianization (of 
designers and producers as well as consumers and regulators), as the 
condition of decarbonization. In her banquet speech upon receiving the 
Nobel Prize for Literature, the Polish writer Olga Tokarczuk stated:
How we think about the world and – perhaps even more 
importantly – how we narrate it have a massive significance.
And as she also pointed out:
Today our problem lies – it seems – in the fact that we do not 
yet have ready narratives not only for the future, but even 
for the concrete now, for the ultra-rapid transformations of 
today’s world. We lack the language, we lack the points of 
view, the metaphors, the myths and new fables. Yet we do 
see frequent attempts to harness rusty, anachronistic narra-
tives that cannot fit the future to imaginaries of the future, 
no doubt on the assumption that an old something is better 
than a new nothing, or trying in this way to deal with the 
limitations of our own horizons. In a word, we lack new 
ways of telling the story of the world.12
It is not the vocation of the internation to offer new narratives. 
Nevertheless, insofar as it could contribute to the emergence of a 
higher complex exorganism of reference appropriate to the vital issue 
of the struggle against entropy and anthropy, the internation, for 
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which we propose a transitional and experimental constitution, can 
and must respond to these disruptive transformations of the world that 
Tokarczuk describes as ultra-rapid, and that are becoming destructive 
of this world. For this, it will be necessary to rely on the methods of 
contributory research and experiments in learning laboratory territo-
ries. Only in this way can the vastness of noetic space be reopened 
on territories from which new narratives for the future could thereby 
emerge, shared by these territories, and irreducible to the construc-
tions of ‘storytelling’ pre-formatted by marketing.
Fourth Stage of the Internation: Organology  
of Institutions and Internation
82 Institutions as complex exorganisms
The internation faces the challenge of encouraging the renewal of 
noetic forms of life, which can be developed only on a more or less 
local scale, and, as far as artistic, scientific, economic and juridical 
forms of noesis are concerned, can be maintained only by a process of 
deterritorialization (and dissemination). It is faced with this irreduc-
ible relationship between the noetic and the local that institutions must 
be thought anew, as international and national-local exorganisms. It is 
through the reticulation of these exorganisms that the internation can 
be constituted, and constituted in the spirit of what Einstein called the 
International of Science.
The widespread increase of entropy is characteristic of the 
Anthropocene. This state of affairs has arisen, to a significant extent, 
due to the crisis of institutions, especially at the supranational and 
national scales. Indeed, if supranational institutions have all too often 
become agencies of the macroeconomic model that tends to systemi-
cally weaken national-local institutions and to impose itself on all 
forms of authority without respecting them,13 the recommendations 
given by international institutions, and in particular the UN, do not 
have the necessary impact on the reality of ‘business as usual’ and its 
impoverishing and literally exhausting short-term logic.
Moreover, these recommendations often appear too abstract or too 
general to be implemented by nation-states, which are systematically 
encouraged to compete with one another internationally, and so con-
tent themselves with actions that only simulate struggling against 
entropy, these simulations ultimately protecting their own short-term 
interests. This blatant disconnection of the international, national and 
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local scales of instituted life is the main cause of public powerlessness 
and the inability to confront global problems or to recognize them as 
they are, without fleeing from reality. It is precisely in order to recon-
nect these scales that there is an urgent need to rethink the institute 
starting from locality and to reinvent the ways in which localities must 
be associated with one another through an open and working – that is, 
active – internation, on the scale of the biosphere-cum-technosphere.
Being an irreducibly ‘exorganized’ form of life, that is, conditioned 
and organized by its artificial organs, human life is impossible with-
out institutions – from the shaman to the UN. In their current state, 
however, and faced with the challenges of the Anthropocene inas-
much as it amounts to an Entropocene, institutions appear less and less 
legitimate and credible, because they ignore the stakes of anthropy.
As a variety of organized states of matter, human life must be 
instituted in order to produce neganthropy. This is why the institu-
tions that compose the internation as a higher complex exorganism 
of reference at its various scales can and must rediscover (urgently) 
their final and common cause, which is to struggle against entropy. 
Institutions, however, can effectively carry out this struggle only if 
they take account of the thermodynamic, organic and exosomatic con-
straints that must be observed.
83 Institutional metabolism
Such an observance – which should be read here starting from the 
religious connotation that it implies, but obviously without being con-
fined to it, and taking account of change, as these thermodynamic 
constraints teach us14 – obliges us to carefully distinguish between 
instituting and institutionalizing, as well as to rethink this distinc-
tion in this threefold context. Generally speaking, an institution is 
an organization instituted for an established purpose or practice. To 
institute this end and establish this practice necessarily implies their 
institutionalization. Today, the issues of the public good and the gen-
eral interest observed at the scale of the technosphere consist in deter-
mining the conditions under which these institutionalized forms of 
life can maintain, in themselves, by themselves and through new rela-
tions with non-institutional actors, the ability to institute new prin-
ciples and actions capable of giving rise to their own transformation.
Like all existing things, institutions are doomed to die. This is 
what is happening now, in this transitional period through which 
we are living. If this death is irreversible, it must not, however, pro-
voke despair, and it can and even must always ultimately appear as a 
chance. As collectivities of living organisms endowed with artificial 
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organs (what we call complex exorganisms), we are capable of defer-
ring the advent of the irreversible by instituting and institutionalizing 
anti-entropic and anti-anthropic processes typical of collective life 
and its modes of organization (within higher complex exorganisms).
The death of institutions, from which we suffer as the development 
of anomie, and which confronts us with great dangers, obviously also 
contains something beneficial: it can and must enjoin us to redefine 
the final cause of their existence. To attempt this redefinition on the 
basis of thermodynamic, organic and exosomatic construction and 
the post-Newtonian framework it forms implies reviewing the ques-
tion of stability in a new light, and overcoming it with the concept of 
metastability by redefining the relationship between necessary insti-
tutional sustainability and the irreversible and equally necessary tem-
porary character of any institution.
Let us examine the phenomenon of instituting and institutionalizing 
collective life in the light of the arrow of time, which means that time 
always flows in the same direction, like a horizontal hourglass (ori-
ented by entropy) and not just a vertical one (oriented by gravitation): 
once an institution is established, its entropy is bound to increase with 
time, this increase being irreversible. If we admit that an institution is 
an open system, we can see that it is through the exchange of infor-
mation, prescriptions and actions (participating in the constitution of 
processes of the transindividuation of reference) that an institution 
maintains its negentropic power, such that it is capable of instituting 
new processes within itself (through what we call its anti-anthropy), 
and consequently of delaying its hardening (its sclerosis) through the 
continuous process of its own metamorphosis.
The dynamics driving these two processes of instituting (‘found-
ing’) and institutionalizing (prescribing from this ‘foundation’) make 
it necessary to redefine institutions both intra-institutionally and 
inter-institutionally. These two planes amount to two sides of what 
might be called institutional metabolism, insofar as negentropic pro-
cesses can be institutionally established only if both of these sides are 
taken into account at the same time.
An institution can preserve itself through its inter-institutional 
relations as it exchanges and composes with its milieu, itself com-
posed of other institutions. In order for this exchange to be the opera-
tion of an inter-institutional transformation, however, an institution 
must be capable of adopting intra-institutional changes that allow it 
to maintain a high energetic potential (that is, a potential différance 
from individual and collective drive-based automatisms and transi-
tional power in the sense of Donald Winnicott, forming knowledge 
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that itself constitutes circuits of transindividuation) and to open (by 
working) new possibilities of inter-institutional exchange.
Openness on an inter-institutional and multiscalar level – on the 
scales of smaller localities, starting from the nano-locality that is the 
individual itself, and larger localities, the largest of which is the tech-
nospherized and exospherized biosphere15 – can arise only from open-
ness practised on the intra-institutional level. And the institutional 
deficiency that we have been experiencing since the Entropocene is 
due to the absence of such a double opening, and its scalability, as 
well as ignorance of the dynamics that make it effective, and a bearer 
of negentropy and neganthropy.
In the name of efficiency, platforms claim to fill this institutional 
malaise with calculation. This false road, which is a calamitous 
impasse, in the strict sense of the words ‘calamity’ and ‘impasse’, 
demobilizes institutions and their officials (those who assume such 
functions as were first laid down in ancient China and as scalabili-
ties in that vast locality), and renders them powerless in the struggle 
against entropy. This is so because purposes in general and those of 
the ‘functionaries’ thanks to whom or because of whom an institution 
functions or dysfunctions (through its metabolism and its catabolism) 
are simply not reducible to efficiency.
84 Metabolism and anabolism in higher complex exorganisms: 
from Newton to Whitehead and Lotka
Calculation is not a response to institutional deficiency. On the con-
trary, it aggravates the calamitous effects of anthropic transforma-
tions of habitable environments, both for living things in general and 
for exorganic living things, whether natural or social. The challenge 
consists in reinventing institutions capable of anti-anthropic transfor-
mations, that is, institutions that act beyond calculation: only delib-
eration still allows hope for a ‘shift’ that is not completely chaotic.16
The institutional fact, like calculation, is a human fact – constitutive 
of any humanity that has not yet sunk into the inhuman. These human 
facts, however, must not lead to a deadening anthropization: they must 
encourage anti-anthropic flourishing. Opting for anti-anthropy in the 
context of the institutional organization of human life (non-inhuman 
life, which is also to say, capable of taking the interests of non-human 
life into account) implies, however, opening the question of collective 
individuation based on a transindividuation of singularities that are 
nourished – always on a more or less local scale – by those traces of 
human experience that form knowledge and accumulate as a noetic 
necromass composed of works (in Meyerson’s sense).17
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The question of collective individuation, therefore, amounts to the 
question of knowing under what conditions an institution can and 
must encourage this or that transindividuation through the transfor-
mations arising from the noetic necromass (which Simondon calls 
the preindividual fund), which becomes a germ for anti-anthropically 
organized forms of life (as the psychic individuation of singularities). 
The noetic necromass, however, is first and foremost composed of 
recordings and repetitions of all kinds (as objects, tools, fetishes, ritu-
als, archives, writings, where the latter may be handwritten or printed 
manuscripts, whether ideographical or alphabetical), photo-graphs, 
phono-graphs, and so on, and finally ‘data’ of all kinds, fundamen-
tally transformed into calculable information in a technosphere sur-
rounded by an exosphere of satellites.
An institution is anti-anthropic insofar as it recognizes its local 
and therefore restricted condition, and that what it has is irreversibly 
temporary and therefore precarious. This is where the Newtonian 
manner of conceiving institutions and their sustainability becomes 
highly toxic and deficient. ‘The duration or perseverance of the exis-
tence of things is the same, whether their motions are rapid or slow 
or null’, Newton posited in his Principia.18 From a processual stand-
point, however, the opposite is true: the perseverance of things is 
due to their movement, itself generated in the process of their infinite 
transformations.
If these transformations occur in things that are finite, these are 
not, however, finite forms, insofar as, by transforming themselves, 
they become other than themselves – ‘oneself as another’, as Paul 
Ricoeur said.19 And if they seem to constitute perceptible forms, these 
are only temporary states in the infinite process of their transforma-
tion. What remains indefinitely the same is that everything is con-
stantly changing all together (this union constituting what Whitehead 
calls concrescence), while the sameness of this metamorphic process 
appears through temporary and infinitely differing forms that consti-
tute, on the scale of exorganisms, their noodiversity.
Modern institutions, along with modern thought about institutions, 
have never recognized this temporary character – which is inherent 
to them and the very condition of their sustainability. Consequently, 
modern institutions, and our institutions are still modern, remain con-
ceptually disarmed and prove to be incapable of embracing irrevers-
ible change as a vital constraint on the physical world and everything 
that emerges from it. It is therefore necessary to mobilize, at the level 
of institutional foundations, the concept of concrescence proposed in 
Process and Reality, together with Lotka’s analysis in ‘The Law of 
Evolution as a Maximal Principle’.
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85 From Newton to Bergson: institutions as treatments for the 
aporias of the struggle against entropy
This disarmament becomes particularly striking with the advent of 
the conservative revolution, which amounts to a systemic attack on 
modern institutions belonging to nation-states, now paralysed by the 
imperative to adapt to the new global reality which was essentially 
that of economic warfare – soon to be doubled by technological war-
fare. Institutions have thus been deprived and in a way stripped of 
their potential to institute negentropic processes that would allow 
them to respond to this change by adopting it – instead of resigning 
themselves to adapting to it, and consequently ‘losing their soul’ as 
well as their ēthos (see Chapter 7).
Admittedly, to conceive institutional sustainability on the basis of 
change is a difficult, and above all counter-intuitive, task: as Newton 
describes it, duration always seems to us to start from stability – 
including as what we have the right to demand of our institutions. 
Change, on the contrary, especially when it is constant, presents itself 
as evidence of instability.
It must be said that modern common sense, as well as modern gen-
eral culture, have failed to incorporate thermodynamic constraints – 
from entropy as conceptualized by Clausius to entropy as rethought 
by Schrödinger and Georgescu-Roegen in relation to, respectively, 
living organisms and the economic process, even if the ways they do 
so are limited. Only Bergson really took note of what fundamentally 
changes with respect to time and space reconsidered as dimensions of 
a process – and he did so by anticipating Lotka, defining intelligence 
as above all fabrication (Homo faber).
Entropy remains for us a ‘prodigiously abstract’ concept, as 
Poincaré said,20 and seems to have little to do with matters that con-
cern us ‘down here’ – even though the need to feed oneself, to ‘clean 
up’, to educate children, and so on (all these being diverse forms of 
economy), are daily and constant experiences of the need to counter-
act the increase of entropy, accelerated as it is by the appearance of life 
in the biosphere: there is no local increase of negentropy that does not 
come at the cost of a relative increase of entropy. This is why most of 
our theoretical approaches to economics, including those focused on 
the free market, politics, society, technology, nature, culture, nation 
and institutions, are based on assumptions that no longer hold in the 
face of the scientific achievements of the twentieth century, from 
thermodynamic physics and biology to technology and sociology.
The common sense [bon sens] – if not common sense [sens commun] 
as sought by Kant and Whitehead – that makes us associate duration 
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with stability and change with instability, comes from the percep-
tion of objects, beginning much earlier than Newtonian mechanics. 
In fact, the distinction between stability and instability dates back to 
Eleatic (and Parmenidean, since Heraclitus says something quite dif-
ferent) antiquity. The Newtonian approach to time, space, place and 
movement was revolutionary because it showed that these quantities 
must be taken into account beyond the objects we perceive through the 
senses – as we saw with respect to inertia (see Chapter 1). Newtonian 
mechanics, however, did not question the ancient distinction between 
stability and instability, rest and movement. Consequently, the notion 
of equilibrium could be defined only in terms of stability, while insta-
bility refers to disequilibrium.
86 Fighting against breakage: the institution as 
metastabilization and disruption of disruption
Rethinking institutions by taking thermodynamic, organic and exo-
somatic constraints into account obliges us to review the dynamic 
between instituting (founding) and institutionalizing (transindividu-
ating) on the basis of the notions of metastable equilibrium and phase 
transition, referring to physical properties as different states of matter 
that themselves call for overcoming the opposition between form and 
matter – what Gilbert Simondon calls the hylomorphic schema. As he 
showed, ‘to define metastability, it is necessary to establish the notion 
of the potential energy of a system, the notion of order, and the notion 
of the increase of entropy’.21 Taking these notions into account makes 
it possible to define a metastable state that is quite unlike a stable state 
inasmuch as its equilibrium is always precarious and constitutes a 
phase in a temporal process: if the equilibrium can be macroscopi-
cally maintained with weak perturbations, strong perturbations can 
induce a transformation of the state, which thereby becomes more 
stable or passes to another state of metastability.
With regard to living organisms or open exorganic systems such 
as institutions, their metastability must be recognized as their vital 
and more than vital condition (binding the generations on the basis of 
the continuity of the noetic necromass inasmuch as it bears the anti-
anthropic potential for bifurcations). A metastable exorganism can 
maintain itself as ‘alive’ (that is, participating in the psychic and col-
lective individuation of a set of exorganic individuals) as long as it 
retains the energetic (that is, anti-anthropic) potential that makes it 
capable of maintaining metastability in the process of transforming 
itself and the milieu within which this transformation takes places, 
and of which it is a performative occurrence. To struggle against 
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entropy and anthropy is possible neither for stable institutions nor 
for unstable institutions. Institutions holding the promise of a future, 
that is, of neganthropy, must be metastable in order to adopt meta-
morphic reality and contribute performatively to its concrescent real-
ization. Here, adopting means adopting oneself through the other by 
transforming oneself into this alterity, and this implies metastabiliz-
ing oneself and remaining perpetually open to intra-institutional and 
inter-institutional alterations.
In this respect, metastability is a state from which to investigate 
the responsibility of institutions. If it proves incapable of maintaining 
its metastable equilibrium – which means that the logic of this main-
tenance has nothing to do with political or ideological conservatism: 
it calls for the constancy of change, and in this sense for the radical-
ity of potential bifurcations, that is, for what Simondon calls major 
improvements, rather than the ‘minor improvements’ that constitute 
‘reform’, however radical it may seem to be – an institution can be 
considered irresponsible, insofar as it does not respond to the increase 
of entropy and, consequently, works towards destabilization.
An unstable institution can be considered irresponsible in that it 
disregards the very principle of transformation and becomes an agent 
of entropic deformation, because it cannot inscribe the temporary 
into its physical temporality. Indeed, any transformation requires the 
existence of an old form – which can be defined as the past – to be 
transformed and renewed in a metastable equilibrium that opens the 
future. The temporary that is not inscribed in temporality cannot pro-
duce new institutions – be they organizations or established practices 
– because it contributes to the destabilization and decomposition of 
the state of things, rather than transforming it so as to give rise to new 
compositions.
It has today become urgent and crucial to respond with institutional 
metastability to disruption as a strategy of the technological giants, 
given that the latter are causing unprecedented social destabilization. 
This disruption is purely destructive, and this destruction is openly 
articulated in two famous Facebook slogans: ‘Move Fast and Break 
Things’ and ‘Move Fast With Stable Infra[structure]’.22 If breaking 
things and moving quickly are done without any relationship to the 
past, which excludes any real transformation and promises imminent 
chaos, stable infrastructure is what makes this über-closure absolute – 
and absolutely entropic – and brings no hope for the future inasmuch 
as the future is strictly and radically indeterminate, that is, incalcu-
lable, improbable and unknown.
However serious the chaotic threat posed by this hyper-closure 
may be, it has, to date, been fundamentally misunderstood or denied. 
Internation and Institutions 173
Confronting this threat means taking as a starting point the fact that 
the institutional challenge to be met in the years to come will be to 
produce a metastable institutional disruption, but so as to find a new 
metastable equilibrium on the scale of the technosphere, through 
which the institutional struggle against entropy would become not 
only possible, but obvious. This means that we must act rationally 
within metastable institutions and take care of things – instead of 
breaking them.
87 Five principles for metastable institutions nourished by 
transdisciplinary disputes
Metastable institutions must be immediately reinvented, if we are to 
truly ‘change course by 2020’ and ‘avoid runaway climate change, 
with disastrous consequences for people and all the natural systems 
that sustain us’, as António Guterres said in September 2018.23 Of 
course, such a reinvention is beyond the capacities of our collective. 
If, however, we base ourselves on shared knowledge and scientific 
understanding, and if we admit, as is the rule in the field of reason, 
that solutions that are achievable in the short term but compatible with 
the long term in a thermodynamic, biological and exosomatic proces-
suality can be elaborated only through transdisciplinary disputes, then 
we propose five principles, as a way of outlining a point of depar-
ture for a debate on institutions in the internation as a higher complex 
exorganism of reference, composed of multiple localities:
1 A neganthropic and anti-anthropic (see §§21–22) institution 
is a complex exorganism capable of transforming its form 
and structure, and of doing so in relation to its milieu, this 
transformation taking place in this milieu that itself meta-
morphoses in return. Such an institution makes it possible 
to invent new processes on the basis of already institution-
alized forms.
2 The real power of a neganthropic and anti-anthropic insti-
tution comes from its energetic potential, which it knows 
how to conserve and save for new transformations allowing 
it to postpone irreversible institutional sclerosis. Such an 
institution recognizes transformation as its mode of exis-
tence. The capacity to transform should therefore become 
the object of a specific and primordial institutional care.
3 A neganthropic and anti-anthropic institution is sustainable 
only as an exorganism associated with other institutions, 
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and it recognizes that this associative relation constitutes 
the unsurpassable condition on the basis of which the insti-
tutional production of neganthropic and anti-anthropic pro-
cesses is possible on the scale of the technosphere and as 
a world-making [faire-monde] rather than as befouling and 
de-worlding [immondialisation] that in turn provokes reac-
tions of closure.
4 Whether large or small, international, national-local or 
infra-national, any neganthropic and anti-anthropic institu-
tion exists and is inscribed in different scales of locality. 
Local energy can be conserved, and can feed into anti-
anthropic practices, only locally, and on the condition that it 
is valued beyond its own locality. That the institutional fact 
is irreducibly a local fact does not mean, however, that insti-
tutions on the scale of the biosphere are doomed to fail: the 
biosphere is itself a locality. Institutions on the biospheric 
and technospheric scale are necessary, and they must be 
capable of preserving their metastable equilibrium through 
neganthropic actions taken at more or less local scales – and 
respecting local specificities, which are always singular. 
The neganthropic ‘global’ can exist effectively only on the 
condition of being transformed locally.
5 Instituting and institutionalizing so as to produce negan-
thropy is possible only through deliberation, that is, through 
the co-production of rational argument, which must be 
functionally distinguished from competition as a power 
struggle. In this respect, neganthropic and anti-anthropic 
institutions must become the bouleteriou of the twenty-first 
century: in the cities of ancient Greece, the bouleuterion 
was the building where the assembled citizens met to delib-
erate, so as to open up the future within becoming, through 
an elaboration of the boulē.24 On the threshold of the third 
decade of the twenty-first century, and faced with the 
global challenges of the Anthropocene, these bouleteriou 
should be rethought within a contributory general economy 
(in Georges Bataille’s sense25). As a higher complex exor-
ganism of reference, the internation encourages deliberation 
in its localized institutions at more or less local scales and 
recognizes that a common and internationalizable wish – to 
have ‘something […] (more) desirable’26 in view when deter-
mining the boulē – can be realized and negotiated in its 
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multiple local variants, which are differentiated from one 
another to such an extent that they transform the wish itself.
A lasting, amicable institution, open to life and respectful of ther-
modynamic, organic and exosomatic constraints, is one that is capa-
ble of putting itself into question, as well as recognizing itself as what 
Jacques Derrida sometimes defined as a ‘counter-institution’. For 
Derrida, a counter-institution had to guarantee a place for ‘expertise 
and experimentation’, as well as the ‘incalculable’.27 Derrida never 
talked about metastability. Rethought in the light of phase transition, 
however, the counter-institution can be understood today as the meta-
stable institution. This is certainly not just a simple terminological 
substitution. For Derrida, a counter-institution is of non-governmen-
tal origin, which suggests that its raison d’être is instead to be found 
beyond the framework of established institutions. Today, however, the 
institutional challenge consists in developing a new concept of gov-
ernmentality as metastability, that is, the ability to maintain a meta-
stable equilibrium in a process of infinite transformation.
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88 The new industrial context: from uses to practices
The industrialization of production (described by Marx in the second 
half of the nineteenth century) and the advent of consumer capital-
ism, that is, the creative destruction theorized by Joseph Schumpeter, 
have led to the proletarianization of ways of life, now prescribed by 
marketing campaigns, themselves prepared by market research.2 
These evolutions have tended to contribute to the replacement of aes-
thetic experience, which requires subjects to participate in the sym-
bolic, with aesthetic conditioning, the aim of which is to capture, 
channel and standardize the attention of consumers in order to direct 
them towards consumption.3 As Mauro Magatti and Laura Gherardi 
point out in their more recent analysis of contemporary capitalism, 
the negative consequences of the consumerist economic model are 
today showing themselves in all their power: ‘individualized hyper-
consumption’, ‘weakening of social bonds and shared meanings’, 
‘anomie’ and ‘psychic suffering’ are today all issues under the socio-
logical microscope4 – and they combine with the anxiety, anguish and 
sometimes suicidal acts caused by the ruinous effects of the accelera-
tion of the Anthropocene.5
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In his work on technology, Simondon already pointed out the risks 
inherent in the industrialization of production and the circulation 
of ‘closed’ technical objects on the market: users come to possess 
‘indecipherable’ objects whose internal workings remain foreign to 
them, with which they cannot connect and through which they can-
not individuate themselves.6 The socialization of everyday objects, 
which traditionally occurred through the intergenerational transmis-
sion of knowledge and practices, now occurs through uses prescribed 
by standardized instructions and pre-programmed user guides, which 
thereby replace the singular and noodiversified arts of living that had 
hitherto been generated by local processes of collective individuation.
Despite the alternative potential afforded by the free software 
movement and related approaches, the way that environments and 
everyday objects (internet, web, smartphones, connected things and 
habitats) have been digitalized has to a large extent exacerbated this 
tendency – and apart from the production of highly professional soft-
ware, free software itself has mostly been diluted into contributory 
models of open source production. This is how proletarianization 
intensifies as it develops in all dimensions of existence: through the 
diffusion of electronic objects whose functioning remains inacces-
sible to users. Without the development of the technical culture neces-
sary to transform uses into practices, the technico-economic models 
that control the functioning of these digital systems (platform capital-
ism and the data economy) mainly aim to collect a vast set of traces 
and to control behaviour, leading to what Antoinette Rouvroy and 
Thomas Berns describe as ‘algorithmic governmentality’.7
In recent years, the promise of digital networks has given way 
to profound doubt. Such doubts first emerged among hackers and 
‘hacktivists’ (who are generally the best informed about techno-
logical developments), but now there is concern among the general 
public, as well as non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty 
International, who in a recent report highlighted how digital giants 
threaten fundamental rights.8 This ‘net blues’9 is intrinsically linked to 
the evolution of digital media: as Geert Lovink has shown,10 the tran-
sition from the web to platforms, along with the appearance of large 
‘social’ networks, ‘apps’ and smartphones, means that ‘link practices’ 
are being degraded into an ‘economy of likes’, ‘captology’ and ‘nudg-
ing’, giving rise to various forms of social toxicity: individual pro-
filing, information filter bubbles, the destructive economic exploita-
tion of massively anthropized social relations and psychic resources, 
including in infants, for whom the consequences are extreme.11
As we have seen in previous chapters, from a geopolitical stand-
point, the hegemony of platforms has led to the replacement of 
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territorial sovereignties (urban, national, international) with a func-
tional or efficient ‘sovereignty’,12 subjecting populations to the control 
of the web giants and no longer to the authorities of political represen-
tatives. At the same time, localities are increasingly short-circuited, 
leading to concomitant increases in the rates of the various forms of 
entropy (thermodynamic, biological and informational).
89 Contributory design and digital studies
From the standpoint of design practice itself, these evolutions, which 
are anthropic in the sense put forward in Chapter 1, tend to replace 
the exercise of invention with the imperative of innovation: as Pierre-
Damien Huyghe describes, design tends to be ‘sloppy in the manage-
ment of innovation’, to the detriment of reflection on utility and car-
ing about the forms that characterize it.13 Hence designers, too, are 
subject to the process of proletarianization and that to which it gives 
rise: work without qualities.14
There is abundant research on specialized design, user experience 
design (UX), interface design (UI), ‘design thinking’, and so on, but 
research aimed at transforming methods and technologies in order 
to strengthen social ties and the production of practical value (in the 
sense we have established) is far less common. If it is a question of 
implementing ‘design for the real world’, however, that is, design in 
context and aware of its ‘moral responsibilities’,15 then design cannot 
ignore either the contemporary digital technical milieu or its social 
function. The question thereby raised is how to take advantage of 
digital transformations so as to reinvent uses in everyday life, and, 
especially, to transform these (individual and standardized) uses into 
(singular and collective) practices.
We ourselves will refer here to contributory design, tied to contrib-
utory research, and in view of a contributory economy. This contribu-
tory economy must be political as well as mental: it must be, in a way, 
a general economy in the sense of Georges Bataille, which means that 
it is necessarily contributory. This entails the redefinition of the func-
tion of the multidisciplinary activity that is design, as part of what 
was first of all a socialization and consumption function, just as 
knowledge becomes a production function (see Chapter 4). As part of 
its social and political functions, in the context of the Anthropocene 
era and disenchantment with digital networks, design must funda-
mentally rethink the functioning of digital technologies,16 if it is to be 
able to lay claim to the organization of new modes of collective life 
integrating the neganthropic function of reticular and scalar locali-
ties, and enabling inhabitants, through contributory technologies, to 
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adopt new technical milieus – today characterized by the process of 
infrasomatization described by David M. Berry (see Chapter 2). It is 
therefore a question of encouraging the invention of new design prac-
tices (called ‘practical organology’ by the Digital Studies Network) 
associating inhabitants and enabling them to locally prescribe trans-
formations of their everyday environments.
To do so, it seems necessary to accompany these practices with 
critical reflection based on digital studies, and to design, with theo-
retical computer scientists and software development engineers, new 
digital systems and devices (hermeneutic functionalities and delib-
erative social networks) to support and intensify contributory prac-
tices that can also be said to be generative in the sense proposed by 
Mauro Magatti, Chiara Giaccardi and Laura Gherardi. This chapter 
will therefore try to suggest two directions for design in hyper-indus-
trial societies:
 ▪ the intensification of contributory design practices, involv-
ing inhabitants in the design and construction of their 
technical and urban environments through ‘generative 
social actions’;17
 ▪ the design and development of contributory digital tech-
nologies, allowing individuals to express themselves and to 
stage confrontations between points of view, thus generat-
ing processes of discussion, debate and collective delibera-
tion, which are constitutive of collective intelligence.
It is a matter of initiating the development of a new technical cul-
ture (based on collective practices rather than individual uses) and 
a new industrial and technological politics (supporting the develop-
ment of open, deliberative and contributory systems and caring and 
learning communities) – with a view to a contributory psychic and 
political economy.
II Open Cities and Contributory Design: Design  
that Serves ‘Social Generativity’
90 Open city, territorial design and the ethics of cooperation
By making the unfinished or incomplete character of infrastructure a 
condition of possibility of the open city, Richard Sennett18 invites us 
to consider the city as an open system, capable of being transformed 
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over time and of hosting improbable events (unlike closed systems, 
characterized by their functional overdetermination, integration, 
homogeneity and predictability). Recall here that an open system is a 
negentropic living system in the general system theory of Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy – and that the city is here conceived as a complex exor-
ganism in the sense proposed in Chapter 2.
According to Sennett, the design of the open city must make use 
of incomplete or unfinished architectural forms capable of being 
modified over time, according to the needs of the inhabitants and by 
these very inhabitants themselves: the forms must be able to change 
together with the functions of the buildings, thus becoming living, 
evolving structures. To this principle of incompleteness should be 
added the need for urban density and social and cultural diversity, 
which makes possible unexpected encounters and improbable bifur-
cations. Like Saskia Sassen, Sennett thus invites us to conceive bor-
ders (between cities, between neighbourhoods, between buildings) as 
membranes rather than as walls, or in other words as always porous 
boundaries, places of interaction and exchange.
Within such urban forms, it is necessary to develop what Sennett 
describes as an ‘ethics of cooperation’:19 collective activities in which 
individuals come together in order to face the difficulties of everyday 
life. The design of the open city thus revives the participatory archi-
tecture projects developed in particular by Lucien Kroll, constituting 
knowledge communities (involving work knowledge, life knowledge, 
technical knowledge, theoretical knowledge) that are opposed to the 
individualistic and competitive tendencies of contemporary capital-
ist societies.
91 Social generativity
These rich and dynamic forms of collective life, over the course of 
which inhabitants confront problems, research solutions and explore 
unforeseen possibilities, also lie at the heart of what Magatti, 
Giaccardi and Gherardi describe as ‘social generativity’, which in 
their view is the only viable response to the crisis of hyper-consum-
erist societies. Social generativity is a form of self-realization – that 
is, individuation – in which the individual acts in a positive and cre-
ative way, thus contributing to the production of his or her milieu by 
promoting the realization of other individuals. Generative action is 
characterized by a threefold enrichment:
 ▪ capacitation, in Amartya Sen’s sense;
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 ▪ the satisfaction of the individual, who realizes an inner 
desire by exercising his or her creativity;
 ▪ the improvement of the social and technical context, of 
which individuals take care collectively and for the sake of 
future generations.
Generative social action is a dynamic collective process that unfolds 
in a variety of organizations, through which the group makes its orig-
inal contribution to the world and leaves a trace of its passage. Such 
a process makes it possible to struggle against the entropic effects of 
institutionalization (see Chapter 6), producing novelty on the basis 
of shared enthusiasm. In this way, psychic individuals can discover 
that their own realization contributes to the realization of others: to 
their freedom – beyond any logic of control or domination. It is in 
this sense that Magatti, Giaccardi and Gherardi call for a ‘generative 
society’ that allows, builds and strengthens the infrastructure sup-
porting collective care activities, the circulation of knowledge and 
the constitution of sustainable communities generating shared value:20 
this is how, in their vocabulary, a contributory political and psychic 
economy can be described.
Shared value, which is here referred to more generally as practi-
cal value, goes beyond the market or purely financial accounting. On 
the economic level, the production of value comes from a relation-
ship between contributors and their relationship to their environment, 
through which communities of neganthropic knowledge can be consti-
tuted (see §5). Shared value comes from the knowledge that circulates 
between individuals and enables them to take care of their common 
exosomatized milieus (which are complex exorganisms) by actively 
participating in the production of their everyday environments.
III The Hermeneutic and Contributory Web: Algorithms in 
the Service of Collective Intelligence
92 Social calculability and the destruction of noodiversity
In his contribution to the book Digital Studies. Organologie des 
savoirs et technologies de la connaissance, David Bates shows how, 
during the initial formulation of cybernetics, the models it produced 
and the reflections on the possibilities of artificial intelligence were 
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far more cautious than is the case in the highly ideological computa-
tional cognitivism that has led to the transhumanist fable:
Looking back at the very beginnings of the digital era, when 
what was to become the computer was beginning to be con-
ceptualized, and when the idea of artificial intelligence was 
beginning to make its appearance, […] the notion of com-
puter science was not […] entirely settled on the notion of 
automaticity. Primitive computers, as intellectual technolo-
gies, aspired to the characteristic flexibility of the brain [its 
plasticity], precisely because it suggested the possibility of 
creative intelligence that went beyond mere automatism.21
At that time, the notion of intelligence first and foremost meant the 
capacity for dis-automatization and tolerance for errors. The wish 
to eliminate error and to automate everything inevitably generates 
an anthropic tendency whose effects we are now witnessing in most 
aspects of everyday life.
Indeed, many studies now show the entropic effects (standardiza-
tion, homogenization, synchronization) of the current functioning of 
digital technologies, in particular on social relations and language 
practices. These two essential dimensions of human political life are 
today subject to the market logic of the digital economy of attention or 
expression: social relations and language practices are systematically 
calculated, standardized, homogenized, ‘dis-idiomatized’ and ‘de-his-
toricized’. Algorithmic calculations applied to social relations or lin-
guistic practices tend to eliminate the inherently singular and improb-
able dimension of social encounters and individual expressions.
First of all, this concerns social relations. While John L. Pfaltz 
shows that social networks tend to spontaneously produce stereo-
typical graphs and function according to entropic tendencies, Cléo 
Collomb, Igor Galligo and Filipe Pais show that social networks like 
Tinder, based on the quantification of ‘likes’ or ‘matches’, lead to an 
entropic dissemination of attention and a depletion of libidinal energy, 
which encourages the repetition of pre-programmed addictive uses 
rather than focusing on an object of desire, which is always singular, 
improbable and incalculable.22 The process of idealization through 
which the object of desire is singularized is thus short-circuited by the 
functioning of real-time dating applications, which generate ‘zapping’ 
and hyper-solicitation effects, as well as a standardization of practices 
and profiles.
Second, it concerns linguistic practices. The work of Frédéric 
Kaplan on linguistic capitalism shows how Google’s business model 
makes it possible to exploit user-generated linguistic material for 
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commercial ends, by speculating on word searches.23 In return, this 
new real-time linguistic market has effects on the evolution of lan-
guage practices: autocompletion algorithms automatically transform 
user searches into statistically probable and economically profitable 
expressions. Google’s algorithms thus tend to subject so-called ‘natu-
ral’ languages to the constraints of the global economy, eliminating 
the least calculable idiomatic forms that lie at the base of the dia-
chronic evolution of languages, and therefore of their diversity and 
historicity, bypassing the localities within which idioms occur. These 
problems of ‘dis-idiomatization’ also arise with machine translation 
software, in particular because the ‘pivot languages’ used by algo-
rithms impose the lexical and grammatical structure of English dur-
ing the translation process, thus leading to a ‘linguistic imperialism’ 
based on denying the real diversity of languages.24
93 Thinking and generating meaning and signification beyond 
information theory: towards deliberative contribution 
platforms
These phenomena are described by Maël Montévil in terms of 
entropy.25 Montévil describes Google Translate as a statistical 
machine that uses a database to determine the most probable trans-
lation. It is a machine that finds the statistically average translation 
according to the data at its disposal, but it is unable to introduce a 
new word into the target language, or, when necessary, to explain 
the meaning of a phrase rather than translating it. In short: it cannot 
depart from literal translation in order to better convey the meaning 
of the text.
Such practices, however, form the heart of the work of the transla-
tor. Translators seek, not the most probable translation, but the best 
translation for a particular context, occasionally choosing to invent 
a new word or to clarify the meaning without offering a word-for-
word translation. They thus produce meaning in a dynamic, origi-
nal and improbable way, amounting to a production of anti-entropy 
in the linguistic field. Antoine Berman brings decisive elements to 
bear on these questions in The Experience of the Foreign, and Yuliya 
Goncharova and Philippe Lacour develop original proposals with the 
TraduXio digital environment.26
Conversely, replacing the work of translation with a purely compu-
tational and statistical operation results in massive entropization of 
the linguistic field, manifested in a loss of meaning (creating mean-
ing, unlike signification, always constitutes an event or a bifurcation 
that is highly improbable, and in this way anti-entropic). Montévil 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 186
shows that these effects result from a problematic concept of trans-
lation, based on Shannon’s information theory,27 which considers 
translation to be a transmission of information without concern either 
for the signification or the meaning of the transmitted message, and 
in this way imposes algorithms possessing an irrelevant mathemati-
cal structure.
To avoid such entropic phenomena, it is necessary to design and 
develop algorithmic models that are not based on information theory 
alone, but take the effects of interpretation and meaning into account. 
Observations of this kind call for the design and development of, and 
experimentation with, alternative systems based on the contributions 
of reflexive subjects, making room for interpretive, deliberative and 
incalculable fields within data structures, and developing algorithms 
to assist with interpretation and deliberation, and not just the extrac-
tion and exploitation of statistical data. As Geert Lovink points out 
in his work on platform design, the centralization of networks, the 
hegemony of the web giants and the social destructiveness of the digi-
tal are not inevitable.28 And Dominique Cardon’s work shows that, 
far from being mere technical tools, algorithms are historical prod-
ucts that are bearers of political projects, constantly evolving, shaping 
uses and disrupting the traditional functioning of human societies.29
Digital technologies are indeed bearers of different modes of par-
ticipation: participation can range from a simple production of navi-
gational traces (the main object of the data economy and social net-
works), to contributory forms of editing, aggregation and discussion 
of contents (such as the online encyclopedia Wikipedia), editorial-
ization and commentary (such as micro-reviews of films) or original 
publication (such as blogs). Such singular and contributory practices 
can be intensified, provided that we thoroughly rethink data architec-
ture and the functioning of social networks – which so far and for the 
most part remain functionally anti-social.
94 Incalculable deliberations and interpretations  
within knowledge communities and the future of the World 
Wide Web
To struggle against the anthropy generated by the tracing and profil-
ing of individuals, functionalities must be developed that cannot be 
reduced to simple calculations of probabilities: incalculable delib-
erative and hermeneutic fields must be constituted in the service of 
knowledge communities that are themselves deliberative. The prin-
ciples underpinning this were laid out in Chapter 3 and the sections 
devoted to the Management Institutes of the Contributory Economy 
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(MICE). The expression of singular points of view, by nature irreduc-
ible to treatments that would reduce them to the status of particulari-
ties, already constitutes the horizon of much research in the field of 
the annotation and interpretation of textual, audio or visual files, lead-
ing to the comparing of contributions and deliberations within com-
munities of amateurs, researchers or citizens. This work, however, 
remains marginal compared to the platforms that currently dominate 
digital networks.
To develop the contributory design of new territorialized platforms 
(where geographical information systems could be used for purposes 
very different from automated guidance), and, on this basis, territo-
rialized contributory economies that are generative in the sense of 
Giaccardi, Gherardi and Magatti, systems must be created that do 
make use of algorithmic automatisms, but only in order to put them 
at the service of deliberation, which is also to say, the power to dis-
automatize. Through successive consolidations, dis-automatization 
makes it possible to generate neganthropic practices – knowledge 
practices. These must themselves be based on anti-anthropic devia-
tions that, by means of singular propositions that are irreducible 
to probable evolutions, introduce bifurcations that constantly fuel 
knowledge, its institutions and those who practise it. It is therefore a 
question of making the calculations of algorithms serve psychic and 
collective functions that escape all calculation, but which produce a 
constant enrichment of the social, economic, political, legal, artis-
tic and scientific life of groups. From the epistemological standpoint 
introduced in Chapter 1, this means returning to the Kantian distinc-
tion between intuition, understanding, imagination and reason.30
In this sense, a new deliberative, hermeneutic and contributory web 
is needed to fight against anthropy. Such a revitalized web would 
revive the inaugural spirit of the World Wide Web launched in 1993, 
but cannot possibly be limited to the semantic web, as the latter cur-
rently functions on the sole basis of statistical calculations. A new 
web-based network,31 on the contrary, requires the design of new 
architectures and structures of both data and algorithms, supporting 
new types of functions related to indexing, categorization, annotation, 
visualization, recommendation, editorialization and group-formation, 
and articulating these contributory functions with algorithmic data 
processing, as well as with the primary functions of a new kind of 
social network.32
Such platforms, which must emerge from communities of practical 
organology in the sense we have described, require theoretical com-
puter science to be given a new foundation on a set of axioms and 
theorems based on the reconsideration of the faculties of knowing, 
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desiring and judging – in Kant’s sense – in the era of digital technolo-
gies. They must take note of the originally exosomatic dimensions of 
the cognitive faculties and functions, in particular with regard to cate-
gorical forms of the understanding (which continues the investigation 
of the questions begun by Durkheim in the late nineteenth century33). 
New publication systems must be developed, tested and practised in 
all spheres of everyday and urban life, as well as in academic and 
artistic communities, restoring to the digital technologies emerging 
from the World Wide Web the function of providing a space for dispu-
tation and public debate, which was their initial vocation before they 
became systems for the control and surveillance of populations.
95 Examples of contributory technology
A Note-sharing and contributory categorization platforms
In all the systems tested at IRI since 2006 (and since 2001 at IRCAM, 
the theoretical foundations of which were developed and prototyped 
as early as 1993 as part of the BNF computer-assisted reading station 
– see http://www.enssib.fr/bibliotheque-numerique/documents/42680-
la-lecture-assistee-par-ordinateur.pdf), the question of contribution 
has been approached starting from the figures of the ‘amateur’ and 
the researcher (see https://iri-ressources.org/themes/theme-7.html). 
Beyond ‘participation’ or even ‘collaboration’, contribution estab-
lishes a relationship of co-individuation between the participants in 
a project involving the production of knowledge (work knowledge, 
life knowledge, theoretical knowledge, aesthetic knowledge, practical 
knowledge and so on).
A1 Example: Lignes de temps
The first empirical experiment with a contributory categorization 
protocol designed to encourage transindividuation was initiated at 
the Centre Pompidou’s Institut de Recherche et d’Innovation. It was 
a note-taking system for lectures and conferences, first developed in 
2009 as the Lignes de temps software (see http://ldt.iri.centrepompi-
dou.fr), then the Polemic Tweet application in 2010 (see http://polem-
ictweet.com), and finally IRI Notes in 2018.
The system works in three stages: 1) presentation of the protocol to 
explain to contributors that their notes will be published and synchro-
nized with the recording of the course; 2) use of the note-taking inter-
face, which is equipped with colour-coded metacategories (important, 
comment, problem, keyword) constituting tags and therefore vectors 
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for further discussions, debates and recommendations; 3) publication 
of the recording, indexed by categorized notes that have been taken, 
allowing direct consultation of the tagged units of meaning and the 
ability to use an intra-video search engine based on the content of the 
notes taken (see Figure 1).
The aim of such a system is to make noetic processes traceable by 
revealing both consensus and dissensus, sites of disputes and bifur-
cations that allow knowledge to evolve and transform. Subjects of 
consensus lead to the production of shared categories constituting a 
horizon of understanding, while subjects of dissensus are objects of 
deliberation on the basis of alternatives amounting to choices involv-
ing the future. In contrast to statistical treatment that minimizes the 
standard deviation, the aim is instead to foster a diversity and differen-
tiation of perspectives and interpretations.
Figure 1. Visualization of convergences and divergences of interpretation in 
Lignes de temps and IRI Notes
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A2 Example: Hypothes.is
The same principle of categorization is applicable to still images (with 
the IconoLab tool) or texts (the Hypothes.is tool). In this case, anno-
tations in the margins constitute a dialogical space of interpretation, 
dispute and discussion (see Figure 2), but they can also contribute to 
the production of contributory glossaries (for each term, competing 
definitions can be proposed, different translations, occurrences of this 
term in the annotated documents, and so on).
B Deliberative social networks
Research carried out by Harry Halpin and Yuk Hui34 has shown that 
a social network like Facebook is built on the principle of Moreno’s 
social graphs, that is, on the idea that the individual is the primary 
node in the network. Beyond this techno-methodological individual-
ism, which tends to privilege the personalization of a profile based on 
equivalent parameters (the user becoming only a showcase of oneself 
among a multitude of others), Halpin and Hui propose an approach to 
Figure 2. Annotation in Hypothes.is and glossary supplied by annotations
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social relations based on the group.35 This tends to give value to the 
associated milieu36 and therefore to functions that formalize sharing 
between members of the group.
What comes first is no longer the individual, but his or her rela-
tionship to the associated milieu: his or her belonging to one or more 
groups, his or her work on one or more projects, his or her contri-
butions on this or that theme… In the framework of social networks 
of this kind, the function of algorithms is no longer the statisti-
cal processing of user data in order to predict behaviour, but rather 
qualitatively analysing annotations in order to identify interpretive 
convergences or divergences, and suggesting the formation of peer 
communities and the organization of disputes (around scientific, 
political or aesthetic arguments).
Such an approach also means offering network user-contributors 
greater room for manoeuvre with regard to the government and devel-
opment of the network. Indeed, what characterizes a group is first of 
all its autonomy, that is, its ability to set its own rules: a group must be 
able to decide how the sharing of its contributions will be organized. 
This can result in the questioning of those metacategories that consti-
tute the common language of annotation, or in decisions relating to 
the publication of collective work.
But this also means that the group must be able to transform its 
workspace by contributing to the open co-design of the categorization 
platform. A deliberative or contributory social network must thus be 
equipped with open systems, insofar as the editorial gesture insepara-
bly implies mastery of both the tool and the content. In relation to this 
issue, and in order to develop this type of data structure and related 
algorithms on a ‘scalable’ level, it will be necessary to take inspira-
tion from the specifiable models conceived according to the SGML 
standard and in terms of DTD (document type definition), which was 
at the origin of HTML and therefore of the World Wide Web.
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96 Reconsidering ethics from the perspective of the 
technosphere
This chapter will attempt to elaborate a general approach to ethics in 
which ethical life is understood in tandem with technics conceived 
as the set of technologies organizing noetic life in the technosphere. 
The technosphere is itself considered as the locality of twenty-first 
century hyper-industrial societies. The organization of noetic life is 
a technological question that should be discussed in ethical terms 
in that it obliges us to critically revise what we experience in our 
everyday life: human behaviour, duty and character are now shaped 
by automated artificial systems. In the current stage of exosomatic 
evolution, these artificial systems have become planetary exorgan-
isms – both organized and organizing – within which and through 
which we live both as individuals and as political communities. As an 
unprecedented articulation of organic and inorganic matter that has 
now reached the technospheric stage, this exosomatic organization of 
life requires a profound reconceptualization of ethical life.
Talking about ethical life today is no easy task – that is, in the con-
frontation of life with the toxic effects of the Anthropocene era. The 
sense of ethical life has been distorted by the ‘greenwashing’ strat-
egies of global corporations. Shamelessly refusing ethics insofar as, 
for the Greeks, aidōs (shame), along with dikē (justice), are the very 
conditions of ethical life, these companies exploit rising environ-
mental concerns in order to protect, unchanged, their unsustainable 
business models.
When considering what ethical life can and should really mean in 
this situation, it seems that the question of ethics must be displaced 
from the sphere of personal choice to the sphere of the hyper-indus-
trial organization of artificial systems. Since these systems do not just 
influence personal choices but also precede and outstrip them through 
the algorithmic infrastructure of the new data economy, where the lat-
ter evades social and political control, the fundamental ethical issue 
must relate to the hyper-industrial conditions in which an ethical life 
is possible. Addressing the question of ethics within these hyper-
industrial conditions is possible only by questioning the current mac-
roeconomic industrial model and the technological usage it imposes.
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Ethical life can only be an illusion in a macroeconomic indus-
trial model based on the systemic exploitation of increasing entropy 
rates – for this is the principle of economic growth conceived on the 
basis of GDP in its transformation of use value into exchange value. 
In hyper-industrial societies that are plundering a burning biosphere, 
the question of ethics is first of all a question of the organization of 
the economic process – even though ethics is obviously not limited to 
economics, unless we understand the latter with Georges Bataille as a 
general economy and with Freud as libidinal economy.
A different organization of the economic process is needed to 
breathe new life into ethics. It is possible to live well in the hyper-
industrial societies of the twenty-first century, provided that we 
rethink and care [repænser1] – that is, take care of, theoretically and 
practically – the question of the relationships between ethics, eco-
nomics and technology. This is what we hope to do in this chapter, on 
the basis of an interpretation of ēthos.
The chapter consists of six parts – the first two parts being intro-
ductory. The first part determines four conditions of possibility of 
ethical life in the twenty-first century: these conditions are techno-
logical, technospheric, hyper-industrial and exosomatic. The second 
part shows – through an examination of the problem of abstraction in 
the field of ethics – why our general approach to ethics can be seen as 
a critical extension of a normative/applied ethical approach. The third 
and fourth parts are devoted to the notion of ēthos, reinterpreted in 
the context of algorithmicization and automation. The fifth part, on 
the vital link between ēthos and locality in the context of technodi-
versity, argues that the latter, as the very condition of technological 
sustainability, and as the exosomatic condition of noodiversity, has 
been endangered, as has the biosphere. Finally, the last part is devoted 
to the ethical organization of life on Earth in relation to food produc-
tion and animal-human relations in the Anthropocene.
97 Four conditions of possibility for ethics in the  
twenty-first century
The first condition of possibility for ethics in the twenty-first century 
is technological – and an ethical question can arise only because exo-
somatic organs are not spontaneously beneficial. In arguing that the 
question of ethics should be addressed as a technological problem, 
however, it is first necessary to make a distinction between the French 
term technique – which we can translate into English as technics (for 
example, in translations of the works of Stiegler) and into German 
as Technik – and what is commonly referred to as technology. If the 
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term ‘technology’ refers to technological equipment, technics encom-
passes all human actions based on knowledge. All human action has 
something to do with tekhnē, which means that ‘delimiting the field of 
technics’ is difficult.2
Unlike French, German, Italian, Finnish, Polish and other Slavic 
languages, the English language makes a distinction between technol-
ogy, technique and technics.3 If the term ‘technology’ probably exists 
in all languages, it generally refers to technological equipment rather 
than to what Simondon described in terms of a metatheory of technics, 
which would pave the way for the ‘integration of technical reality into 
universal culture’.4 Consider, for example, that what Michel Foucault 
described as techniques de soi has been translated into English as 
technologies of the self.5
Using the term ‘technology’ in this way, however, can lead to some 
confusion. With the advent of cybernetics in the 1950s, ‘technology’ 
was also used to refer to high-tech systems, that is, organized inor-
ganic matter,6 and, more recently, the organizing inorganic7 – but 
these high-tech systems have nothing to do with what Foucault under-
stood by techniques of the self, that is, practices aimed at taking care 
of the self. Here, we will prefer the term technique to that of technol-
ogy, not just to avoid terminological confusion, but to show that the 
very possibility of taking care of the self must be carefully rethought 
in relation to high technology.
Given that high-tech systems strongly (dis)organize the possibility 
of an ethical life – and do so at lightning speed, leaving societies in a 
state of disorientation – the distinction between technique or technics 
and technology makes it possible to argue that:
1 technique must be addressed firstly as a local and localized 
form of knowledge of how to do [savoir-faire], how to live 
[savoir-vivre] and how to conceive and theorize;
2 technique, as a form of knowledge, must be reinvented 
starting from technological systems, these new artificial 
organisms both deforming and transforming techniques as 
human ways of making ‘life worth living’.8
The second condition of possibility for ethics in the twenty-first 
century is technospheric. The technosphere is not just a digital milieu 
– where the latter is real and not virtual, as might have been thought 
two or three decades ago.9 It also constitutes a new system that, while 
still requiring humans, nevertheless functions autonomously, and, 
therefore, escapes human control10 to the point of appearing inhu-
man. The technosphere, however, remains first and foremost a space 
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of human activity, characterized by the intervention of technological 
systems and technosciences into nature.
In the wake of Bonneuil and Fressoz, Latour, Bińczyk and many 
others, it is possible to define the technosphere as responsible for 
anthropogenic changes in the biosphere and the reorganization of 
social and biological structures.11 In this regard, any ethical action 
should be taken or judged starting from ‘technonature’,12 that is, from 
the perspective of a new living space on Earth where, on the one 
hand, the modern distinction between nature and technics seems to 
be porous, and, on the other hand, the metabolic system of the bio-
sphere – which makes life on Earth biologically possible – is on the 
verge of collapse due to our use of industrial technology. Here, the 
ethical task is to determine a new technospheric metabolism in which 
life-sustaining processes can produce sustainable and anti-anthropic 
compositions of organic and inorganic matter/energy.
The third condition of possibility for ethics in the twenty-first cen-
tury is hyper-industrial. Contrary to the analyses of Alain Touraine 
and Daniel Bell, the celebrated post-industrial society never appeared, 
unless the conception of industry is reduced to the presence of blast 
furnaces and coalmines.13 We do not inhabit post-industrial societies, 
but rather hyper-industrial ones, in which everything ‘has become 
subject to modelling and industrial activity – distribution, health, lei-
sure, education, and so on’.14 Absent a technology policy, this hyper-
industry has ultimately led us to an increasingly disturbing era of 
surveillance, where it is ‘human experience as free raw material for 
translation into behavioral data’15 that has become subject to model-
ling. In this unprecedented situation, any discourse on ethics must 
take this hyper-industrial fact into account: our data, as a new raw 
material in the service of old, obsolete, unsustainable and structurally 
unchanged economic models, is extracted from our daily activities.
In a very general way, capitalism in the industrial age is based on 
the exploitation of energy resources. Unlike the nineteenth-century 
capitalist model, however, which depended on the extraction of fossil 
fuels, and where this dependence certainly did not disappear in the 
twenty-first century, the economic model based on digital platforms 
additionally exploits the reserves of libidinal energy from which the 
extracted data originates. These two variants of systematically orga-
nized extraction have the same destructive impact on forms of life: 
the human milieu – which can be developed through noetic activi-
ties and the exchange of new forms of knowledge, rather than through 
algorithmized and controlled information exchange – is destroyed 
just as much as the environment. Yet only a well-cared-for human 
milieu can take care of the environment.
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The hyper-industrial condition thus obliges us to develop a more 
complete assessment of the technosphere. Just as the biosphere 
appears to constitute a locality for all living organisms in the solar 
system, so too the technosphere must be understood as a planetary-
scale locality for hyper-industrial societies and approached as a no 
less critical object of care. The future of the biosphere is techno-logi-
cal. Consequently, the technosphere must be preserved as our techno-
bio-logical condition of life on Earth. This means that our relationship 
to technology must change along with changing the current macro-
economic model, based as it is on the limitless exploitation of energy 
resources: natural and noetic, and, in a way, only techno-physical.
The fourth condition of possibility for ethics in the twenty-first cen-
tury is exorganological, and it relates to what Alfred Lotka described 
as exosomatic evolution, that is, ‘increased adaptation [of the human 
species] achieved by the incomparably more rapid development of 
“artificial” aids to our native receptor-effector apparatus’.16 These 
artificial aids are exosomatic organs – from knives, arrows and cart-
wheels to autonomous cars; from the abacus to calculators, computers 
and ‘clusters’ – which develop outside the body and have an increas-
ingly important impact on the organization of life on Earth.
Chapter 1 showed that exosomatic evolution is an extension of 
biological evolution, and that the economic process is a condition of 
exosomatic evolution. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen builds on Lotka’s 
observation:
With the exosomatic evolution, the human species became 
addicted to the comfort provided by detachable limbs, 
which, in turn, compelled man to become a geological agent 
who continuously speeds up the entropic degradation of the 
finite stock of mineral resources.17
From an exorganological standpoint, ethics can accordingly be 
defined as a multiplicity of new techniques of the composition of 
life with artificial organs – organs on which noetic beings become 
more and more dependent during the course of biological-exosomatic-
economic evolution. At the same time, they become more and more 
powerful, but this power necessitates knowledge-based economic, 
juridical, political and ethical regulations. This process and these 
regulations, however, threaten to be reversed by current production 
methods (and the use they make of these organs), which make life on 
Earth biologically unsustainable. It is only by taking these four condi-
tions and their systemic interconnections into account that it is pos-
sible to formulate ethical proposals commensurate with the transition 
required by the current stage of the Anthropocene era.
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98 Uses and abuses of abstraction
Under these conditions, the general ethical approach that we pro-
pose here can be seen as a critical extension of the normative/applied 
approach to ethics used by experts on ethics and ethical committees, 
whose role is to determine whether a new technological product is 
good or bad for individual users, society, freedom, democracy and so 
on. In 1991, observing how genetic engineering was being used to 
increase the power and profits of the economic model, André Gorz 
pointed out: ‘To make “ethics” the preserve of experts is tantamount 
to abstracting it from everyday life and culture, to preside over its 
extinction.’18 Given the growing impact of artificial intelligence tech-
nologies (brain-machine interfaces, hands-free computer control, the 
use of algorithms more generally) on hyper-industrial societies, how-
ever, there does exist a need for ethical experts, provided that they 
have the courage to firmly oppose short-term and short-sighted inter-
ests of global corporations, and are in this way able to pave the way 
for a new understanding of public policy in the technosphere.
The recommendations of ethics experts and ethics committees can-
not just go along with ‘business as usual’. Experts and committees 
cannot just rely on good intentions or wishful thinking while avoiding 
the real problem by saying nothing about how these recommendations 
could be implemented in a way that transforms them into effective 
ethical principles. We need recommendations that are courageous, 
and especially the kind of courage that dares to know (sapere aude), 
which Kant made the spiritual principle of the Enlightenment – only 
such courage responds to the now famous question addressed by Greta 
Thunberg: ‘How dare you?’19 Only courage of this type will make it 
possible to rebuild and reinvent public power as a milieu for ethical 
action in the age of algorithms.
At the same time, however, and in the wake of Gorz, we must also 
carefully rethink the dynamics of the relationship between abstrac-
tion and ethics – to see how the imposition of general ethical rules 
abstracts them from the local circumstances in which authentic ethi-
cal actions, both individual and collective, take place. Jacques Derrida 
has shown that by ‘forces of abstraction’ we should understand 
‘deracination, delocalization disincarnation, formalization, univer-
salizing schematization, objectification, telecommunication etc.’20 If 
these forces can also be defined as forces of evil or sickness (‘the evil 
of abstraction’21), it is because, when abstraction forgets the local cir-
cumstances of its origin, it becomes ineffective. 
There is actually nothing abstract about Derrida’s definition of the 
machine and technics as ‘sites of abstraction’. On the contrary, what 
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he is trying to tell us by his specific use of the term ‘abstraction’ is 
something very concrete, and relates to what we are living through in 
absolute terms:
1 on the one hand, technology tends to fashion a universal 
and homogeneous system;
2 on the other hand, the system tends towards totalization, 
which means that the more the system is developed, the 
more it is abstracted from local realities, which it trans-
forms according to its own disruptive logic, and the more it 
frees itself from the control of these concrete and heteroge-
neous localities.
Moreover, and counter-intuitively, this tendency towards the univer-
salization of the technical system makes it increasingly specialized.22 
Wherever it is that we have to live, according to the customs of our 
plural singular places, we are organized by the same totalizing system 
and condemned to let a small group of specialists design this system 
and decide how it functions.
99 ‘This is all wrong’: abstraction, localities, noodiversity
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the internal logic of 
the technical system – inherent to the very ‘nature’ of technics – has 
been subjected to an economic process that has, in this way, become 
totalizing. Furthermore, economics, originally a social science and 
even an element of everyday life (as oikonomia), has been left in the 
hands of an equally small group of specialists. ‘This is all wrong’, 
as Greta Thunberg observed in September 2019 at the UN Climate 
Action Summit in New York. A substantial part of this hyper-indus-
trial evil – this very old but constantly reinvented evil genius (genius 
malignus) using every effort (omni sua industria) to deceive us, to put 
it in Cartesian terms23 – is due to the use made of abstraction in eco-
nomic and technological processes (and here we continue David M. 
Berry’s reflections on infrasomatization, discussed in Chapter 2). In 
this regard, an irrevocably critical task of ethics is to take the dynam-
ics of abstraction into account.
If abstraction is always necessary for ethics to be able to define eth-
ical rules for the technosphere, as well as for the technological macro-
systems of which it is composed, abstraction is nevertheless also what 
can blind us to micro-levels and meso-levels. It is by starting from 
these levels, and distributed across these scales, that an ethically 
organized technosphere – as a complex set of reticulated open ethical 
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systems, more or less local, but always localized in their histories – 
can and must be rethought.
A systemic change must be made in the common approach to eth-
ics, as well as in the use made of it by experts and ethical commit-
tees working in hyper-industrial conditions, shaped by technoscience 
in tandem with the economic world. Seeking to determine whether 
a new technological product or service is good or bad for societies 
within the global techno-economic/techno-scientific system, which is 
itself headed in a bad direction, remains far too abstract an approach 
to be effective in relation to lives lived locally. This irrevocably criti-
cal task of ethics, therefore, is also a meta-task in the sense that it aims 
at determining the right place(s) for ethics and at adjusting the balance 
between the universal and the local, the totalized and the singular, the 
specialized and the common. In short, it is a question of rethinking 
ethics in the technosphere on the basis of those habitual or customary 
places that the Greeks called ēthē (plural of ēthos).
In this respect, a formal distinction between ethics and morality 
should be reintroduced in order to go beyond the restriction imposed 
by moral philosophy. In a word, ethical life, as long as it means act-
ing well, is always conflictual. Acting well, doing the right thing, 
does not necessarily mean following what is defined as acceptable, 
right or just by moral philosophy. Morality is an abstraction as long 
as it is detached from mores, ‘customs’, that is, ēthos or Sittlichkeit. 
Redefining ethics consists in observing how all of us can and must 
speak about ethics through the multiplicity of European philosophies 
and languages as their material supports,24 but also in discovering 
how this multiplicity can be aligned with non-European ēthē and 
work at the planetary level through the means of multilingual techno-
logical organs.
It is not strange that the reduction of technology to mere functional-
ity goes hand in hand with the advent of a monolinguistic culture that 
affects local ēthē in the same way as agricultural monoculture affects 
biodiversity (see also §105). Breathing new life into ethics means rec-
ognizing that linguistic diversity is much more than something to be 
preserved through the logic of the cultural exception. Rather, it should 
be seen as the material condition of what Adam Smith described as 
the wealth of nations, and it is the essential condition of what we are 
here calling noodiversity. To rethink the wealth of nations from the 
perspective of general ethics, however, and going beyond the abstract/
abstracting notion of growth, requires a deeper understanding of how 
ethical life is linked in an exorganic way to ‘technical inventions as 
behaviors of the living’,25 and how this universal exorganological 
relationship is differentiated at local scales.
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100 Ēthos and algorithms: ancient and modern  
meanings of ēthos
The word ‘ethics’ derives from the ancient Greek word ēthos, which 
originally meant habitual site and later meant custom or habit.26 Ēthos 
is a particular character, belonging both to the community (customs) 
and to the individual (moral character) who displays his or her char-
acter in action and speech. As the particular character of a commu-
nity, ēthos is manifested in its customs, habits and traditions: it is an 
unconscious and non-rational articulation of how things should be on 
the grounds that this is how they have ‘always’ been. In everyday life, 
the ethical character of individuals reflects the ēthos of their commu-
nity: people follow the customs and beliefs that bring them together.
As Martin Heidegger shows in his ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, ēthos 
coincides with the abode, dwelling place, which appears as a histori-
cal destination that has guided the actions of people from time imme-
morial.27 The force of the ēthos can be so great that a person who 
defends it is ready to stand up against public law, as was Antigone, the 
heroine of the eponymous tragedy of Sophocles, caught in a contradic-
tion between the ēthos that orders her to act in a certain way and pub-
lic law that forbids it. As G. W. F. Hegel shows in his interpretation 
of the ethical world in Phenomenology of Spirit, Antigone’s ethical 
individuality, represented dramatically, is determined by her singular 
way of dealing with this contradiction.28
The force of ēthos does not mean that all inherited ēthos would be 
just, but only that it imposes itself, in the name of divine justice, as if 
it were. This is why ethical life is not just a question of following local 
traditions. On the contrary, ethical duty sometimes calls for challeng-
ing narrow-minded habits, repressive traditions and unjust laws, even 
if this can lead to heartbreaking tragedies. Ēthos is inseparable from 
conflict, shame and crime, and this is why ethical reflection often 
takes place in tragedy.
In the contemporary world, people’s abodes are determined in a 
radically different way. Of course, custom and habit still play a role. 
But the ēthos of the contemporary world is increasingly marked by 
‘algorithmic life’ and ‘algorithmic governmentality’, which condition 
ethical life itself.29 This does not mean that algorithms would dic-
tate ethical rules, but that the social space in which ethical action can 
take place is prearranged by algorithms. Such are the means of what 
Rouvroy and Berns call ‘statistical governance’: it does not control 
what is real, but structures what appears to be possible, while at the 
same time tending to suppress alternative virtualities.30
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Some areas of statistical governance are conceived by public 
authorities.31 Much larger areas, however, and their essential techno-
logical architecture, are created by large global corporations, which 
ultimately respond only to the needs of capitalism.32 The world is not 
governed by an enormous self-aware mega-AI as in science fiction 
dystopias, but it is run by countless algorithmic systems that imper-
sonally and automatically innervate social bodies. Why and how can 
algorithmic governance have an effect upon and even overdetermine 
the ēthos of the world in the most general sense?
101 Ēthos, algorithms and temporality
First, like classical ēthos, social algorithms frame social reality by 
determining who can do what. Ancient ēthos assigned different tasks 
to different types of people, for example, men were expected to wage 
war and women were expected to bury the dead. Contemporary social 
algorithms also indicate what different people can do, and, in princi-
ple, they can perform this role in a more sophisticated way than could 
ancient ēthos, because they can assign tasks to people according to 
their personal traits, and not just according to broad characteristics 
such as gender or race. Social algorithms can thus be used to select 
which people can obtain a loan, receive better health care, get a job 
or receive a place in a higher education institution. It has been shown, 
however, that instead of decreasing discrimination, they can in fact 
increase it: they tend to solidify the past, the state of fact, by locking 
people into their previous social positions.33
Second, like the classical ēthos, and as we have also seen with the 
process of infrasomatization, social algorithms govern social reality 
in a way that is unconscious and hence all the more difficult to chal-
lenge. Ancient ēthos was not questioned by the people: they observed 
the rules because their ēthos was ‘ordained by the gods’. A social 
algorithm is not dictated by gods, but programmed by engineers, 
called ‘data scientists’, and by following the orders of their clients. 
But the people who are subject to it can neither know it nor question 
it. From their perspective, algorithms are impenetrable ‘black boxes’. 
Moreover, with advanced machine learning, they evolve into black 
boxes for the engineers as well.
If ēthos thus controls life with the force of the unconscious (and of 
the superego within the unconscious), social algorithms govern with 
the force of the unthought, as N. Katherine Hayles has said.34 This 
can happen, for example, if algorithms for selecting who gets access 
to higher education select some candidates and exclude others with-
out the candidates ever being able to know why they were selected 
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or rejected (either because the algorithm is a commercial secret or 
because it relies on undetectable datamining processes) – even if the 
law requires that a person can know and challenge the datasets and 
processes used in the assessment of his or her case.35
Social algorithms, however, are not of the same order as ēthos: they 
involve different temporalities. First of all, they have different rela-
tionships to the past. An ēthos has no definite origin: it is only a habit 
that has ‘always’ been there, and it remains valid only as long as peo-
ple continue to repeat it. The algorithm has an origin, because a busi-
ness or a corporation has set its objectives, a team of programmers 
has built it, and it limits itself to realizing its program. An ēthos is 
different from a social algorithm in that it is open to reinterpretation, 
reform and rebellion: it is valid only as long as people accept it. But a 
social algorithm, which can be updated by its programmers, cannot be 
modified by the people it governs: one cannot say no to an algorithm.
Furthermore, and as a consequence, an ēthos and a social algorithm 
have an utterly different relationship to the future – and the temporal-
ity of a machine is fundamentally different from human existential 
time: by physical and mathematical (probabilistic) necessity, techni-
cal systems function according to a causal logic by which past events 
determine future events (including as probabilities, and by exercising 
retroactive feedback loops). In a traditional computer program, this 
means running the program itself. Modern machine learning technol-
ogies seem to be different, in that they rewrite their rules according 
to patterns that are uncovered in the available data, so that they are 
based on recursivity rather than repetition36 – and operate precisely 
through these feedback loops. Nevertheless, AI always functions 
through past possibilities (in the program or the data), and in this 
sense it is still fundamentally different from existential time, which 
develops by encountering impossibilities.
Existential time is capable of opening up to chance, which is the 
very foundation of human freedom, and this is what an algorithm can-
not see. A social algorithm does not admit criticism, and it is not truly 
open to chance. In this sense, it leaves no room for existential choice, 
including the demands of justice, tragic action and finally ethical 
action itself. This is why it would be dangerous to allow social space 
to be completely saturated and overdetermined by social algorithms 
– precisely because they tend to become anti-social by substituting 
themselves for all ethical existence.
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102 Automation and ēthos as ‘a mode of relating to 
contemporality reality’
In 1984, Michel Foucault took up the notion of ēthos in relation to 
actuality, that is, in relation to contemporary reality. Commenting 
on Kant’s famous text, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is 
Enlightenment?”’, published two hundred years earlier on the thresh-
old of what we call modernity, Foucault posited that the latter should 
be defined ‘as an attitude rather than as a period of history’.37 With 
the advent of modernity, ēthos as a habitual site underwent a trans-
formation that would update its classical meaning. An ethical attitude 
then becomes ‘a mode of relating to contemporary reality’: to the now. 
If Foucault never stops referring to the ancient sense of ēthos, it is 
because the modern attitude always appears as a task, even if it is 
quite different from that of Antigone, for example. Positing that ēthos 
is always a ‘voluntary choice’, Foucault describes the modern ethi-
cal attitude as ‘way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and 
behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging 
and presents itself as a task’.38
Let us try to develop this in order to understand this ethical trans-
formation more clearly.
The immemorial, which is always given to us in the form of a law, 
must change in order to endure. We, however, who transform this law, 
if not we who go beyond it through a continuous task of reinterpret-
ing its principles (archai), we are obliged to respect its immemorial 
character. And this task, one might add in the wake of Bergson, pres-
ents itself as an obligation, that is, as the irreducible condition of ethi-
cal life. Indeed, Bergson posits that obligation is not only one of the 
two sources of morality: it is also a social bond that ‘links us to other 
members of a society, a bond of the same kind that exists between 
one ant and the others in an anthill, or the cells of an organism’.39 
Yet it is precisely by this ob-ligation that we are forced to go beyond 
Foucault’s line of questioning, and to rethink what ēthos, as ‘a mode 
of relating to contemporary reality’ means today: in many respects, 
the actuality of the second decade of the twenty-first century is no 
longer what it was when Foucault wrote these lines.
Despite the fact that it is barely thirty-five years that separates us 
from Foucault’s text, the fundamental difference between his world 
and ours is technological. In order to define the meaning of an ethi-
cal attitude, therefore, it is necessary to take note of the technologi-
cal condition of our own ‘mode of relating to contemporary reality’. 
On the one hand, an ethical attitude is governed by social algorithms 
from which it is difficult to escape, because they transform – if not 
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annihilate – the very possibility of a social bond. On the other hand, 
an ethical attitude must recognize how it inevitably remains vul-
nerable to automation, which makes every ethical act impossible, if 
an ethical life involves making decisions (in relation to the ancient 
sense of ēthos) and, therefore, forges an attitude that results from this 
decision-making and remains voluntary (compared to the modern 
sense of ēthos).
In our present age, it seems urgent to rethink ēthos after ‘auto-
matic society’,40 in order to transform the immemorial (the archaic) 
and to determine the new conditions of possibility for ethics after 
automation. This is why the philosophical ēthos – which Foucault 
describes as ‘a critique of what we are saying, thinking and doing, 
through a historical ontology of ourselves’41 – needs once again to be 
transformed in order to become a technological ēthos. In brief, if the 
Foucauldian approach to critique as the foundation of ēthos is still 
valid today, it must nonetheless be rethought in relation to technol-
ogy, which precedes ontology. An ēthos – such as a philosophical life, 
which Foucault theorized via Pierre Hadot and in the wake of his con-
cept of way of life – would thus be taken as an experiment in techno-
logical life.
103 The techno-logical reinvention of ethics
An action can be considered ethical as long as the person who acts is 
responsible for what he or she does, and is capable of anticipating the 
consequences of those actions. It is for this very reason that an ethical 
act can never be automatic: it is always already singular in the sense 
that it calls for a decision that dis-automatizes the individual who 
makes it. Jacques Derrida often insisted on the impossible nature of 
this decision, which emerges from the profound meaning of the ethi-
cal or ‘the ethicity of ethics’.42
Yet as soon as we take ēthos for an attitude or a ‘way’ – a way of 
being or acting, with regard both to oneself and to others – ethical life 
does not lead to the impossible, but becomes a question of techniques 
and technology, which encourages us to see it anew through the ‘evo-
lution of techniques of the self’.43 For Foucault, techniques of the self, 
as modes of action, make us capable of taking care of ourselves, and, 
therefore, of interacting with others. Drawing from Greco-Roman 
philosophy and from the monastic principles typical of Christian spir-
ituality at the beginning of the Roman Empire, Foucault distinguishes 
three types of techniques of the self: 1) writing letters to friends in 
order to reveal oneself; 2) examining oneself and one’s conscience in 
order to assess what has been done; 3) acts of remembrance.
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Consider an example: imagine that you are a monk living in the 
fourth century. Your monastery is located in some part of the Roman 
Empire. You speak Latin, which is the lingua franca, just as English is 
today, while Rome means – urbi et orbi – the whole world, in the same 
way that what we call globalization has, since the twentieth century, 
meant the whole world. You write a letter to your friend, in which you 
reveal yourself: examining what you have done, you undertake an act 
of remembrance, which takes effort on your part. But why make this 
effort to write? Why do you need a friend to know you, and why do 
you need to take care of yourself through this knowledge of the self 
that you obtain techno-logically?
Based on letters from the Stoics, interpreted during a seminar at the 
University of Vermont in 1982, Foucault would reply that it is through 
these techniques that you practise an ethical life: techniques allow 
you to access the truth about yourself, but also to ‘transform truth 
into a permanent principle of action’.44 It is this self-revelation that 
becomes ēthos, and this forms part of what the Greeks and after them 
Foucault called tekhnē tou biou.
The overwhelming majority of our contemporaries, however, are 
not monks. An attempt to transform the philosophical ēthos into a 
technological ēthos therefore also implies popularizing it, in the sense 
of enabling people to practise it in their everyday life and through the 
organizations and institutions they create. If it is true that techniques 
of the self, indispensable as they are for the leading of an ethical life, 
are subject to evolution, especially when technics becomes technol-
ogy, then the same must be true for this life insofar as the conserva-
tion of the ēthos requires a meticulous transformation of immemorial 
ethical principles.
It is therefore a question of knowing how to lead an ethical life in 
the milieu of reticular digital technologies, inasmuch as they form a 
new type of associated milieu.45 Under what conditions do these tech-
nologies – such as infrasomatic systems, platforms, devices, inter-
faces, functions, algorithms, formats and data structures – allow us to 
take care of ourselves, and under what conditions do they prevent it? 
How can we reinvent ethical life at a time when a large proportion of 
our actions have been automated?
If these blunt questions are necessary, it is not possible to answer 
them in a serious way without questioning the hyper-industrial orga-
nization of these new technologies, which consists in extracting data 
beyond any control. As long as the absence of a technological politics 
ensures the continuation of this extraction, talking about ethical life 
will be an occupation for philosophers without consequence for soci-
ety. It is possible to free ēthos from what it contains that is obsolete, 
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however, only if it is transformed so that it remains a ‘progressive 
consideration of self, or mastery over oneself’,46 in the data age.
Without being able to intervene in the becoming and future of the 
data we share in everyday life, and faced with the abuses perpetrated 
by the technological giants, the possibility of achieving such mastery 
is in many respects illusory. This is why opening the epoch of tech-
nological ēthos consists first of all in regaining control over our data 
by redefining its very structures, and by making it a key question for 
a new political economy, in order that it serve new modes of social 
organization that will once again make it possible to act ethically.
104 Ēthos, locality, principles and values
Characterizing techniques of the self, and remembering his earlier 
works, Foucault explains:
It is one of my targets to show people that a lot of things that 
are a part of their landscape – that people think are univer-
sal – are the result of some very precise historical changes.47
How are we to understand these changes in our age, in 2020, given 
that our landscape is shaped by a quasi-universal technological sys-
tem, and that it is composed of ‘things’ that are increasingly standard-
ized according to the tendency towards totalization and unification 
typical of new technologies? How can we organize an ethical techno-
spheric landscape, and why is the relationship between the landscape 
and the technological ēthos so vital for this organization? How can we 
redefine knowledge of life so that a digital society worthy of being 
called a society can emerge from it?
The tendency to totalization and unification characteristic of tech-
nology forces us to rethink the irreducible character of ēthos, as well 
as the relationship between the universal and the particular. The lat-
ter must be seen in compositional rather than oppositional terms, this 
composition defining the ethical ecosystem. An ēthos is local pre-
cisely because it is a character that is localized in a habitual site. Yet 
it would be wrong to reduce this local appearance of an ēthos to the 
notion that ‘small is beautiful’.
What we call locality appears on different scales, and continuously 
varies from one specific locality to another. And it is precisely this 
variation, articulating localities through their singularities, that can 
be considered universal. The one can appear only through its multiple 
– more or less local – appearances. And conversely, if each of these 
forms can be said to be universalizable, it is because they all repeat 
themselves in their multiple variants, while belonging to different 
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places. This dynamic relation between the one and the many lies at 
the heart of the ethical ecosystem composed of open localities and 
delimited by porous borders.48 This openness is not the result of an 
ethical choice. It is the vital condition of any so-called open system 
(in Bertalanffy’s sense49), just as porous borders are indispensable for 
such a system, because they allow exchanges at the universal scale.
What we define as an ēthos can be conserved (and localized) only 
in a more or less local open system. In fact, a universal or global ēthos 
does not exist, which also means that so-called universal values do 
not exist: all values belong to a particular local landscape. And if ever 
such values are proclaimed as universal, this proclamation is made 
by or on behalf of a privileged group – white middle-class males, 
Western states, multinationals, and so on50 – who defend their politi-
cal interests on the back of this claim to universalism. This is why it 
is all too often only a seditious pretext to silence, stigmatize or attack 
those who are too readily accused of not respecting such a claim.
In the current period of transition that calls for global responses, we 
must more than ever be wary of those who invoke universal, imme-
morial or atemporal values: it is this false universalism that prevents 
us from thinking about transformation. Nevertheless, the ethics that 
we are trying to conceive here is not particularist: it is situated, and 
for this reason it is responsible. It relates less to values than to prin-
ciples, and to the organization that makes it possible to uphold these 
principles, allowing citizens to form and transform their own val-
ues – through their everyday ethical practices, and at different scales 
of locality.
105 Technodiversity
If the totalizing, unifying and globalizing technical system consti-
tutes a threat to ethical life, it is because it tends to destroy locali-
ties by means of standardization, and to degrade the complexity of the 
habitual bonds that allow ethical life between and within localities. 
Taking account of the way technology has evolved – from technical 
objects to the technological mega-exorganism in which we live – 
shows that the totalizing and unifying tendency of technology results 
from the logic of its evolution. And if it never ceases to surprise us, 
or even to outstrip us to the point of seeming inhuman, it is because 
technology takes the form of a unifying and totalizing system long 
before the people who believe it is they who are using technological 
devices realize that they are in fact the ones governed by that which 
they are using. This is because each innovation that occurs in the 
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course of technological evolution also generates both increasingly 
advanced specialization and a diversity of uses.51
Because the technical system in which we live is global, we need 
global ethical rules for the design, production and commercialization 
of the elements of technical systems – particularly in relation to the 
application of artificial intelligence. As long as regulations stem from 
so-called universal ethical values, however, the ethics of technics will 
serve the interests of technology companies for which technology 
remains reduced to pure functionality, dictated by imperatives com-
ing from a macroeconomic model that is economically and environ-
mentally unsustainable, as well as ethically unsustainable: it destroys 
localities as sites of the practise of ēthos, as well as neganthropic 
generativity.52
It is clear that technologies have functions that make economic 
life possible. We must, however, see technology in a different light, 
beyond these functionalities, in order to free ourselves from the 
global techno-economic trap and to bring about a technological ēthos 
as ‘a way of relating to contemporary reality’. With its current ten-
dency towards unification and totalization, as well as specialization 
and personalization, technology appears almost as a quasi-universal: 
human animals are specifically human because they use technics in a 
way that is incomparably more developed than non-human animals.
Anthropology is technology insofar as the techno-logical condition 
of human existence can be defined as universal. What remains to be 
discovered is that this technological fact appears in ‘particular cos-
mologies’53 and the multiple localities of which they are composed. 
The challenge is then to rethink technics on the basis of the category 
of diversity – which we so often evoke under the pretext of defend-
ing culture (cultural diversity against the cultural homogenization 
resulting from globalization) or the environment (biodiversity against 
monoculture).
Ethical life is unsustainable independently of technodiversity. It 
is precisely for this reason that technodiversity must be protected, in 
order to save localities and to make their inhabitants capable of trans-
forming them technologically, and, therefore, capable of preserving 
their ēthos. It may be that what is needed is not to fight against the 
totalizing and unifying force of technologies: they constitute what 
makes us human, all too human – but also inhuman. What is needed 
is to think and take care [panser] of this inhuman aspect of ourselves 
and our technologies, in order to struggle with them for a diversified 
distribution of technological power, respecting local open systems as 
sites of the practise of ethical life.
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106 How can we live well with animals while feeding ten billion 
people in 2050?
The development of human technology in industrial capitalism, espe-
cially since the ‘great acceleration’, has led to unimaginable animal 
suffering. Ethology brings us increasing evidence of near-human lev-
els of consciousness in vertebrates, and of cognitive processes pos-
sessed by animals in their habitats. Yet the animal condition has never 
been more tragic than it is today.
Whether we like it or not, from an ethical standpoint this fact is 
becoming an increasingly heavy burden to bear: the process of meat 
production in intensive farming can well engender what Primo Levi 
has described as ‘the shame at being human’.54 In the context of the 
animal industry, this inhuman power of human technologies – those 
human industrial machines that exploit animals in search of a con-
stantly greater return at lower cost, which excludes any possibility of 
animal ethics – perhaps hits home here more than it does elsewhere, 
even if we prefer to turn away from it. ‘The relations between humans 
and animals must change’, declares Derrida, adding that this duty is 
as much ethical as ontological.55
These relations must change not just with respect to the moral con-
sideration of animals: the consideration of non-human species must 
transform our ēthē, that is, our ways of life, standardized as they are 
in terms of what we eat.56 These relations must also change because 
the industrial degradation of animal life, which we must learn to rec-
ognize as existences,57 has become a threat to humanity. Not enough 
attention is given to the fact that human consumption in general and 
the industrial production of meat in particular have a major impact on 
climate change (as carbon production), on the sixth mass extinction, 
and on the health of the inhabitants of industrial societies. The current 
system of food production and distribution is largely anthropic, and 
is one of the factors contributing to the increase of thermodynamic 
entropy (concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) and 
biological entropy (agricultural monoculture destroying biodiversity: 
forests, animal habitats and local human ways of life). Given this state 
of affairs, the question that must be asked is whether the production 
and distribution of industrial food can be anti-anthropic.
Can industry in general and the food industry in particular encour-
age anti-anthropic behaviour towards our animal friends and anti-
anthropic eating habits, taking account of the fact that they have radi-
cally changed during the development of industrial capitalism, and 
particularly after the advent of the great acceleration?58 According 
to UN estimates, the world’s population is expected to increase from 
Ēthos and Technology 213
7.7 billion today to 9.7 billion in 2050 (see https://population.un.org/
wpp/). Feeding ten billion people, 70% of whom will be urban dwell-
ers, will not be possible unless we invent new industrial food produc-
tion and distribution methods.
The urbanization of the planet, responsible for the shrinking of 
rural areas59 and the emergence of megacities, notably in develop-
ing regions, is one of the most striking features of the Anthropocene. 
Faced with this situation, a transformation of food production and dis-
tribution systems now appears to be the very condition of sustainable 
urbanization. In fact, this unprecedented global urbanization forces 
us to raise the question of eating beyond individual food preferences. 
In order to combat the anthropic impact of intensive farming, con-
certed political action must be taken to change the questions we ask 
about population health, local economies, environmental protection, 
the interests of producers and those of animals.
In an effort to anticipate the future consequences of global urban-
ization, we argue that the transformation of urban culinary practices 
can be seen as an opportunity and a means to produce change in the 
Anthropocene era, rather than being simply a matter of giving up the 
pleasure of eating well. Vegetarian cuisine has great urban potential: 
it is capable of transforming local culinary practices and, therefore, 
of preserving them, while contributing to the development of new 
knowledge of how to do, make and live. The ethical imperative formu-
lated by Jacques Derrida – we must eat well – implies that we should 
today take the food industry as an object of critique within the frame-
work of a new political economy. With the advent of the global expan-
sion of the ‘total market’,60 the giants of the food industry have not 
only destroyed local ways of life: through marketing strategies and 
the programming of consumer choices, they have also changed the 
eating habits of Western societies while extending the Western food 
model to countries whose traditional cuisine contained less meat.61
This is why the question of food in hyper-industrial societies must 
be raised not just in relation to the global system of meat production 
and consumption, and as a threat to life, including human life, in the 
biosphere. A sustainable food production/consumption system must 
also be reinvented: it should be focused on localities and their culi-
nary practices in order to combat an insipid monoculture, that is, one 
devoid of knowledge, savoirs, and therefore of flavour, saveurs: the 
vital link between food and diversity must be reopened in a way that 
fits with our now urbanized planet.
It will not be possible to leave the Anthropocene without asking 
how to live together with animals, whose welfare is a major ethical 
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issue. Hyper-industrial societies capable of recognizing the interests 
of animals will in fact be those capable of taking care of themselves.
On the cusp of the third decade of the twenty-first century, the 
ethical question must be raised as that of the organization of life in 
hyper-industrial societies, rather than as that of values. Faced with the 
planetary disorientation produced by technological disruption, ethi-
cal thought is above all a question of critical thinking. The challenge 
to be taken up in the epoch of algorithms and generalized automa-
tion is to determine the conditions under which ethical acts are pos-
sible through everyday practices at more or less local scales and on 
the basis of a territorialized contributory economy, based on the ethi-
cal, practical and economic valuing of more or less local knowledge 
(from the domestic nanoeconomy to biospherically-situated scien-
tific knowledge).
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9 Planetary Detox and the Neurobiology of 
Ecological Collapse
Gerald Moore, Nikolaos A. Mylonas, Marco Pavanini, Marie-Claude 
Bossière, Anne Alombert
We as a civilization are too much like someone addicted to a 
drug that will kill if continued and kill if suddenly withdraw. 
James Lovelock1
I Introduction
107 Addictogenic society and adaptation to stress
To the surprise of commentators worldwide, in his 2006 State of the 
Union Address, George W. Bush began a call for investment in cli-
mate change solutions with the assertion that ‘America is addicted 
to oil’, and, moreover, that ‘the best way to break this addiction is 
through technology’.2 The claim was met with dismay by critics who, 
insisting on the need to differentiate between economic necessity and 
the euphoria of uncontrolled consumption, saw the 43rd president 
as legitimating hyperbole usually identified with the political left. 
Others have sought to demonstrate that the metaphor is not metaphori-
cal: ‘Just as the consequences of alcohol abuse, from DUIs to cirrho-
sis, are symptoms, global warming is a symptom of oil addiction.’3
The tension between the two positions can be resolved by loosen-
ing the etiological criteria of addiction in line with contemporary 
research. In this context, it makes more sense to speak of our increas-
ingly pathological attachment to the world of technological pharmaka 
enabled by oil, rather than being directly addicted to the black stuff 
itself – whether oil or carbon in general (see Chapter 10). Our focus 
is therefore less on a narrow definition encompassing only the stereo-
type of far-gone, destitute, and seemingly irrecuperable abusers of a 
small range of traditionally recognized addictogens, like alcohol and 
heroin, and more on what the social psychologist Bruce K. Alexander 
terms ‘addiction3’: a category that admits the prospect of consuming 
more or less anything to the extent of consequential ‘overwhelming 
involvement’ (shopping, eating, video games, pornography,…), and 
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which for the most part sustains the appearance of normality by deny-
ing the potentially ‘fatal consequences’ of our actions.4
If, as Alexander claims, addiction is a ‘substantial and growing 
danger in the 21st century’,5 this is, contrary to myth, not because 
we have been seized by uncontrollable hedonism (we have known for 
close to thirty years that the neural mechanisms for craving are bound 
up with but not identical to those of pleasure6). Rather, it is because of 
the short-term therapeutic role addiction continues to play in facilitat-
ing our adaptation to the stressful environments of contemporary liv-
ing, however detrimental it proves to be beyond that.
108 Addiction, entropy and microworlds
Foreshadowing Bush, and with a greater emphasis on the simultane-
ous curativity and toxicity of technology than we find in his eulogiza-
tion of ecotech, in 1977 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen wrote of ‘man-
kind’s addiction’ to the ‘comfort offered by the exosomatic organs’. 
This addiction, he continued,
which is completely analogous to that of the first fishes 
which evolved into air-breathing reptiles and thus became 
irrevocably addicted to air, now constitutes a predicament 
because the production of exosomatic organs became from a 
certain moment on dependent on the use of available energy 
and available matter stored in the bowels of the earth.7
The analogy risks being unhelpfully simplistic if read as diluting the 
concept of addiction to the point where even air is seen as addicto-
genic. But Georgescu-Roegen’s argument seems more refined if we 
link it back to his work on the use of technology to stave off entropy 
– and what the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi terms ‘psychic 
entropy, a disorganization of the self that impairs its effectiveness 
[…] to the point that it is no longer able to invest attention and pursue 
its goals’.8
Through the technological organization of our local milieus, we 
construct our own little ecological niches, or microworlds, and cre-
ate our own interiority in the process. This is what Bernard Stiegler 
calls the anti-entropy of ‘work’, in strict opposition to the entropic, 
or ‘anthropic’, exhausting, forces of ‘labour’.9 This sense of work is 
fundamentally related to what Csikszentmihalyi famously calls the 
vitalizing, ‘transcendent’ happiness of ‘flow’, or immersion in a self-
contained and autotelic world of one’s own making, oblivious to the 
distractions of competing external stimuli. It is what he refers to as 
‘being in the zone’. Csikszentmihalyi also sees, however, that flow 
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experiences, from watching television to performing surgery, can be 
powerfully addictive, providing zones of calm focus in the midst of 
bewildering transformation.10
Subsequent research, most notably by the addiction anthropolo-
gist Natasha Dow Schüll, has shown that the gap between therapeutic 
work and toxic addiction may be imperceptibly narrow. Technologies 
from gambling machines to smartphones, often designed explicitly 
with addictogenesis in mind, serve as substitutes for world- and self-
creation, a means of restricting the turmoil-afflicted mind with goals 
and direction, alleviating stress and anxiety – in other words, psychic 
entropy – for those otherwise unable to achieve flow states.11
109 Dysregulation of the dopaminergic system, delocalization 
and consumption
Proponents of ‘entropic brain theory’ in neuroscience similarly posit 
that stability-reinforcing patterns of activity associated with addiction 
(as well as OCD and depression) ‘could be functional in […] working 
to resist a more catastrophic collapse’ into the regression they identify 
with ‘primary’, or elevated-entropy, states of consciousness.12
Yet regardless of the relative health, or capacity for withstanding 
environmental perturbation, afforded by these zones, a potentially 
explosive problem results from the way that local sites of anti-entropy 
tip out entropy into their surrounding environments, be they individ-
ual bodies or the societies that house them. Mental stability comes at 
a price, and one that becomes all the costlier when the stress produced 
by the labours of our ever-expanding technosphere goes hand-in-
hand with exosomatosis, or the spiralling doses of technology needed 
to prop up our ailing biology and planet. This ailing has become all 
the more acute of late, on account not just of climate change, but 
moreover because of a mooted ‘evolutionary mismatch’ between the 
anthropic forcings and pressures exerted on us by our technologically 
organized milieus and the ability to accommodate them afforded by 
our evolved (‘endosomatic’) physiology – most notably, an overbur-
dened and increasingly dysregulated dopamine system.13
The central contention of this chapter is that the two phenomena 
are indissociable: we cannot hope to combat the collapse of our plan-
etary ecosystems if we do not first address the ‘functional uncou-
pling’14 of Homo sapiens from the delocalized global spaces to which 
we are ever-increasingly pushed to adapt. At the very heart of eco-
logical catastrophe is a chronic-systemic crisis of our psychological 
and social habitats, caused by populations who consume to dangerous 
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excess as the only available strategy for coping with the pressures of 
exploitation to which contemporary society exposes us.
II The Entropocene as Limbic Capitalocene
110 What the words pharmaka, anthropy and health mean here
It is a fundamental premise of this book that ‘Technology’, in the 
words of John Stewart, paraphrasing Stiegler, ‘is Anthropologically 
Constitutive’.15 We cannot grasp what it means to be human without 
reference to the technical prostheses that regulate our experience of 
time, desire and attention, not to mention our ability to participate in 
the expected norms of society. Our tools are as vital to social life and 
the life of the (noetic) mind as oxygen is to our physiological exis-
tence. For our evolved physiology to be continually reinvented by 
our technics, however, there needs to be a biological correlate that 
explains our plasticity; one that allows for who we are to be trans-
formed by what we use to navigate the world.
The latest suggestion attributes the enlarged cerebral cortex of 
members of the genus Homo to a ‘dopamine dominated stratum’, 
which differentiates us from earlier hominid ancestors by account-
ing for enhanced sensitivity to social and environmental cues, as well 
as diminishing aggression in favour of sociality and cooperation.16 
The dopamine system thus constitutes the neurobiological interface 
through which the human organism learns from and adapts to its sur-
roundings, governing our responsiveness to external stimuli.
While it has long been understood that certain pharmaceutical sub-
stances, like alcohol or nicotine, exert a decisive modulatory effect on 
dopaminergic activity, and correspondingly on our behaviours, it is 
now becoming increasingly apparent that our experience of the world 
is continually rewritten, via the brain, by the technical objects that 
organize our lifeworlds. There is no hard and fast distinction, in other 
words, between pharmaceuticals and the simultaneously toxic and 
curative pharmaka that are technologies.
From ritual drinking and smoking, to the ever-larger and more 
energy-demanding cars needed by commuters (Georgescu-Roegen’s 
example), to the takeaway coffees and smartphones that now serve as 
unavoidable entry-points into the contemporary world of work, whose 
very necessity disinclines us to acknowledge the extent to which we 
are automated to accommodate their present, our social and men-
tal lives are habitually structured around the legitimation of certain 
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modes of addictive, up-dosed technology consumption. But just as 
breathing oxygen is a principle cause of carcinogenesis, the life cre-
ated or sustained by our exosomatic organs is also inseparable from 
what, following Stiegler, we are here calling anthropy and the deterio-
ration of our artifactual environments. In a vicious circle of consump-
tion, leading to environmental destabilization and to further, more 
pathological, consumption, the greater the stress placed on us by those 
environments, the more we become reliant on the therapy provided by 
the very technologies that do so much to cause the stress in the first 
place, and at ever greater cost to the planet.
The impact of some of this dependence is already well estab-
lished and, indeed, being tackled, for instance, in the commitment 
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals to reducing 
deaths from ‘non-communicable’ diseases by one third. The WHO’s 
report on Health in 2015: From Millennium Development Goals to 
Sustainable Development Goals devotes two whole chapters to NCDs: 
one focusing on mental health, dementia and substance abuse; and 
another on maladies stemming from poor lifestyle and preventable, 
anthropically-caused, environmental conditions including cancer, 
chronic respiratory problems, and so-called ‘diseases of poverty’ and 
‘despair’ like cardiac illness and diabetes.17
The report remains conspicuously silent, however, on what can be 
identified as the underlying dopaminergic and ecological – and above 
all, economic – causes that link the two chapters, and has just as little 
to say about newer forms of environmental illness tied to the exces-
sive consumption of more recent technologies. The effects of exces-
sive screen-time on childhood development, and of social media on 
the health of our democracies,18 are only now becoming the object 
of emerging scientific knowledge. The recourse to digital tablets by 
exhausted parents, who for respite use them to pacify small children, 
has led to diagnoses of attentional deficiency and linguistic and emo-
tional under-development often confused with autism.19
111 A dopaminergic history of industrial capitalism  
and proletarianization
In another indication that the fallout of technological intoxication 
calls for an understanding of addiction that takes us beyond conven-
tional ideas about the scale and social impact of problematic con-
sumption, connections have been made between election-hacking in 
the United Kingdom and United States, and digital media consumers’ 
craving for a ‘buzz value’ that trumps the veracity of online content.20
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Luca Pani is the progenitor of the aforementioned theory of an 
‘evolutionary mismatch’ between ‘current environmental conditions 
in industrialized countries’ and the ‘completely different’ ones ‘in 
which the human central nervous system evolved’. One ‘remarkable 
example’ of this uncoupling of the human organism from its habitat, 
he argues, is the development of ever more powerful delivery mecha-
nisms of drugs into the brain, the cumulative effect of which is to
interfere with the global adaptation of an individual to its 
environment, producing not only an impairment in his/her 
hedonic capacities, but also a more disruptive effect on the 
cognitive and emotional abilities that are necessary for an 
effective interaction with the external world.21
The claim is made specifically in relation to hypodermic needles, 
crack pipes and the organic solvents often sniffed by addicts. But 
it also lends itself readily to a reading of the increasing potency of 
everyday technologies across the whole history of capitalism, which 
should no longer be separated into distinct producer- and con-
sumer-led phases.
What began with the trade in spices and sugar, proceeds through 
tobacco, opium and caffeine on the way to pornography, pop music, 
modified corn starch and carfentanyl. The portable screen as a route 
of administration for the intoxications of ubiquitous gambling and 
fake news is just the latest stage in this history, and needs to be under-
stood ecologically, in relation to the environmental stresses that push 
people in their direction, most notably the proletarianization of world-
building, which the industrial production of craving, if not pleasure, 
seeks to offset. The passage to commodity-harvesting of compara-
tively mild psychoactives previously used only for medicine coincides 
with the early-modern onset of what the environmental historian 
Jason W. Moore calls ‘Cheap Nature’, referring to the un(der)paid toil 
extracted by merchants who would credit themselves for the industry 
of slaves, not to mention that of plant matter and the progressively 
depleted soil of the plantations.
This concept of Cheap Nature, encompassing ‘Cheap Food’, 
‘Cheap Energy’, ‘Cheap Raw Materials’ and ‘Cheap Labour’, all 
priced in a way that ignores the long-term consequences of systemic 
overwork, takes us to the heart of what Moore reclassifies as the 
‘Capitalocene’.22 But there’s also another, vital, ‘cheap’ at stake, here: 
one that cuts across the binary of nature and culture, forcing us to 
see the collapse of planetary ecosystems in terms of the degradation 
of our social-technological environments, and the undue stress that 
this places on our biological functioning. Let us call it Cheap Desire, 
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or Cheap Attention, in reference to a will that the climate-change-
disavowing mentality of business-as-usual needs to be infinite. The 
exhaustion of this will, both individually and collectively, is bound up 
with increased reliance on the manufacture of habitual and frequently 
addictive consumption as a coping strategy.
112 The Anthropos of the Anthropocene
The long-standing but increasingly explicit elicitation of dopamine 
release in the human limbic system functions as the under-acknowl-
edged engine of contemporary economics, not least because it consti-
tutes the flipside of our enforced adaptation to the disadjusted envi-
ronments in which we consume. Biologists have been warning for 
years of the risk posed to our health and intelligence by endocrine-
disrupting pollutants,23 but the reciprocal reinvention of humans and 
the technosphere is yet more profound than even this warning implies.
The Anthropos of the Anthropocene is one whose biochemistry is 
undergoing constant modulation by extractive technologies that engi-
neer consumptive habits to maintain the waning levels of demands 
around which global order is organized. In the words of Bruce 
Alexander, addiction has been ‘globalized’ through the exploitation 
of the very nervous system via which we interact with and learn from 
our surroundings. This ‘dopamining’ is, in turn, inextricable from 
capitalism’s production of ‘psychosocial dislocation’24 and our corre-
sponding attempts to withdraw from what David Graeber has called 
the ‘dead zones’ of our traumatized working habitats.25
When Jason W. Moore speaks of the ‘Capitalocene’, he does so to 
avoid holding the planet’s various populations equally responsible 
for an ecological catastrophe caused vastly disproportionately by the 
‘developed’ capitalist economies of the prevailing world system.26 
In so doing, he runs the risk of unduly divorcing us from complic-
ity, as if capital is somehow distinct from the people who continu-
ally remake and enact it; hence our (Stieglerian) stated preference for 
Anthropocene, with its echo of Entropocene.27
A more nuanced assignation of responsibility comes from refram-
ing the problem of causality in relation to habit-creation and the 
manipulation of the pleasure circuitry of the brain. The American his-
torian David T. Courtwright has coined the expression ‘limbic capi-
talism’ to describe the coupling of the entrepreneurial exploitation of 
the ‘evolved drives’ of our neural infrastructure of reward, with the 
provision of goods and services designed ‘to cope with the damage’ 
inflicted by free markets on the psychosocial structures that enable us 
to absorb the shock of change.28 Limbic capitalism has been brought 
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to the fore by the combination of relentless labouring under condi-
tions of mounting precarity and deficient social support systems, 
which places the burden of coping firmly on the side of individuals 
whose only survival mechanisms become the panoply of cures-for-
sale offered up for consumption by the market.
Recent research into the social psychology and neurobiology of 
addiction suggests that this process should no longer be framed around 
the idea of the brain being irreversibly ‘hijacked’ by substances that 
destroy its natural chemical composition.29 But there is a legitimate 
question of our complicity in the surrender of an agency that is only 
ever fragile. We willingly, albeit passively, submit to bombardment 
by ever more refined forms of stimulation to distract us from the per-
turbations of a market system that – be it via workplace deregulation, 
or through the imposition of structural adjustment programs on devel-
oping countries – systematically dissolves the capacity of communi-
ties to employ collective niche construction in the service of vitality, 
that is, to participate actively in the formation and modification of 
their living environments.
113 Anaesthesia and destruction
Bringing together Moore and Courtwright enables us to see that the 
‘Entropocene’ is also a ‘limbic Capitalocene’: an epochal disaster 
encompassing not just the planet and human civilization, but one 
moreover rooted in a retreat into oblivion that Alexander describes 
as a ‘rational’, ‘adaptive’ response to the entropic climate in which 
we labour.30 Ecological catastrophe is less about a surfeit of human 
ecosystem-engineering than its absence: the surrender of agency to an 
automation of the nervous system by technologies that think and feel 
in our place.
The result is a vicious cycle of excess, where climate change is 
biochemically intertwined with the overworking of the dopamine 
system, produced by the ever more efficacious doses of intoxicants 
we consume to anaesthetize ourselves against the impact of social 
breakdown. And this means that attempts to deal with climate change 
will only be treating its symptoms, and doing so in vain, unless they 
also engage with the addictogenic, ‘hyperdopaminergic society’ that 
lies at its origin. By the same measure, the solution will not reside in 
implementing consumption abstention, ‘dopamine fasting’, or a global 
‘Twelve Steps’ programme either.
We cannot do without our pharmaka, and nor can we simply elim-
inate their constitutive toxicity through some fantasized process of 
purification that preserves only their curativity. But we can aim for 
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an organization of society that curbs their toxic power by generat-
ing alternative forms of therapy. Such a reorganization would aim 
to lessen those stresses, which leave us in such need of noetic ban-
dages and treatments [pansements] that we find ourselves consum-
ing these intoxicating pharmaka to pathological, destructive excess. 
Understood in these terms, the project of planetary detox intersects 
felicitously with the philosophico-political aims of the internation: to 
cultivate locality and a restoration of depleted social bonds as a means 
to recapacitate the agency that we have surrendered to the compul-
sion to consume.
II Dopaminergic Animals in a Hyperdopaminergic Society
114 Culture, dopamine and attention
The crux of what looks like our collective pathology revolves around 
the relationship between culture and the neurotransmitter, dopamine, 
whose functions include bonding, the facilitation of experiential 
learning (through acquiring what we have throughout this book called 
retentions), habituation and anticipation (as what we have called pro-
tentions). The principal role of dopamine concerns its involvement 
in the seeking out of novel information and the encoding of repeat 
behaviours that prove initially rewarding, or ‘salient’. To put this in 
the recent language of Yuk Hui,31 it works to absorb contingency into 
a routine, by bringing us to crave the stability of habitual repetition.
The process begins at birth: one currently dominant idea builds on 
the attachment theory of John Bowlby to argue that the limbic sys-
tem is responsible for the formation of social bonds between mother, 
child and the extended family.32 Bowlby observed that young chil-
dren starved of maternal attention quickly adapt to their environmen-
tal instability by becoming withdrawn and emotionally detached, 
reacting more to the novelty of new toys than to the unfamiliar adults 
who bestow them.33 These changes are now understood in relation to 
neuroplasticity, meaning the ability of the neuronal organization of 
the brain to be dopaminergically moulded by the stimuli of its sur-
roundings. Rat studies have shown that contact between mother and 
child influences not only the development of dopaminergic circuits 
in the newborn’s brain, but also conditions the parents’ emotional 
and physical attentiveness, by bringing them to suffer the absence of 
their offspring through craving more familiarly recognized as love. 
Pups reared in prolonged isolation demonstrated ‘elevated baseline 
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dopamine levels and increased dopamine release in acute stress in 
adulthood’.34
The dopamine system, in other words, compensates for the lack of a 
familial anchor point by facilitating the creation of stabilizing habits 
in the face of stress. Through it, we reach out and latch on to anything 
able to create an emotional impact, with our neuronal circuitry reor-
ganizing to become more responsive to the source of reward, pruning 
away synaptic relations linked to the decreasingly necessary wider 
orbit of attention, in the process. This mechanism for coping with the 
absence of a social bond proves highly adaptive, equipping us to live 
through anxiogenic periods of instability.
But it is also linked to ‘enhanced sensitivity to psychostimulants 
such as cocaine’ and ‘may lead to increased vulnerability to addic-
tion’.35 Addiction thus ‘shared a common neurobiology’ with attach-
ment,36 in an identity that explains the scientific recognition that 
love bears all the neurobiological and psychological hallmarks of 
substance dependence. It should also, therefore, be seen as a kind of 
substitute for social investment – a way, we might say, of fabricating 
(ontological) ground, there where its absence becomes most apparent. 
The effect cuts both ways, with addiction characterized by a retreat 
from the social relations for which it substitutes. Looking at the 
tightly knit networks of companionship that often exist among street 
users, we can also see how it functions as a complicated attempt to 
create social attachments where they are found wanting.37
115 The biology of attachment and the dopaminergic genesis of 
the mind
The biology of attachment is one way of making sense of Bernard 
Stiegler’s claim that addictions are not solely pathological, but 
simultaneously toxic and curative.38 It likewise sheds light on an 
established, but debatably successful, therapeutic tradition of seek-
ing to replace toxic addictions (heroin, smoking, alcohol) with ‘bet-
ter’ ones (to God, methadone, vaping, AA meetings and running, for 
instance).39
Catherine Malabou is another recent exemplar of this tradi-
tion, arguing that ‘addictive processes have in large part caused the 
Anthropocene, and only new addictions will be able to partly counter 
them.’40 We need to be careful not to conflate ‘better’ with toxicity-
free, or next-generation technological quick fixes, intended to facili-
tate consumption, however. The looming future of geo-engineered 
skies, seeded with a shield of aerosol phosphates to protect the planet 
from the solar heat building up behind it, has already been compared 
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to enabling alcoholism, as the ‘dialysis that allows the patient to con-
tinue drinking’.41
The release of the dopamine neurotransmitter is at the heart of our 
capacity to adjust to environmental change, and its relation to man-
aging uncertainty, in particular, explains why it has arguably played 
a vital role in both making and now unmaking the modern global-
ized world. Writing in The Dopaminergic Mind in Human Evolution 
and History, the psychologist Fred H. Previc argues that the story of 
human ecological history is one of increasing dominance of dopamine 
in the brain, which he links, in turn, to the rise of ‘abstract intelli-
gence, exploratory drive, urge to control and conquer’, as well as 
acquisitiveness, goal- and future-directedness, long-term planning 
and the pursuit of religious and scientific truth.42 The emergence of 
the dopaminergic mind is developmental rather than evolutionary, a 
product of ecological shifts inducing neurochemical, but not genetic, 
change. It begins with prehistorical alterations in diet before intensi-
fying around 6,000 years ago, alongside the growing need to compete 
for resources and ensuing calculations of settled societies.
Here, Previc’s argument resonates with major evolutionary-anthro-
pological claims about the inability of our cognitive architecture 
comfortably to manage large numbers of social relationships and the 
breakdown of our sense of communal belonging and motivation to 
participate in the life of the collective, once a certain scale threshold 
is passed.43 We can identify Neolithic sedentarization and, in particu-
lar, the ensuing rise of cities (see Chapter 2) as a significant source 
of this growth of competition, because they removed people from 
the familiar, small-scale networks of extended family life and trans-
planted them into ‘depersonalized’44 urban settlements where they had 
to ‘suppress suspicion of others’, negotiate cultural politics and ‘adapt 
to densely crowded neighbourhoods’ of complete strangers: ‘unfamil-
iarity became the measure of human relations’.45
The result of this heightened stress, Previc contends, was neuro-
chemical imbalance, triggered by the depletion of serotonin and nor-
epinephrine relative to dopamine. The next stage of his argument cor-
roborates Peter Sloterdijk’s identification of early-modern European 
expansionism with the rise of ‘risk-taking’, ‘disinhibited’ subjectiv-
ity.46 Previc posits that the reorganization of society around dopamine 
was a decisive factor in colonialism, the growth of capitalism and the 
Enlightenment – and has become even more pronounced since the 
second, ‘hyperdopaminergic’, half of the twentieth century.
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116 Neoliberalism as a hyperdopaminergic system
‘Hyperdopaminergic society’ describes the neoliberal era of enforced 
adaptation to the demands of free markets; the ideology of ‘disrup-
tion’; and the proliferating use of dopamining techniques to colo-
nize what has elsewhere been termed the ‘available brain time’ 
of consumers.
A highly dopaminergic society is fast-paced and even 
manic, given that dopamine is known to increase activity 
levels, speed up our internal clocks and create a preference 
for novel over unchanging environments.47
Previc reels off a list of ‘hyperdopaminergic disorders’, including 
depression, obsession-compulsion, autism, schizophrenia, Tourette’s, 
Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s. We can also add ADHD to this list, 
though it is also, ironically, linked to traits that can thrive in hyperdo-
paminergic conditions.
The D4 dopamine receptor is believed to have evolved around forty 
thousand years ago, at a time when the enhanced susceptibility to 
stimulation it confers would have proved adaptively advantageous for 
ancestors who took risks to explore new territories in search of food. 
Nowadays, the allele is thought prevalent in sufferers of attention 
deficit disorders, who end up being pathologized by the absence of 
unexplored Palaeolithic landscapes in the cramped and understimu-
lating conditions of contemporary urban living.48 Homogenized, met-
ric-heavy and greenspace-poor classrooms would be foremost exam-
ples of environments to which holders of the gene now risk being 
maladapted.49
The attempt to diminish this maladaptation, by increasing our mar-
gins of tolerance for the ‘inconstancies of the environment’ (to borrow 
a phrase from Georges Canguilhem50), is a major cause of addiction, 
which should be recognized as another hyperdopaminergic disorder; 
perhaps even the most prevalent one. Its inclusion within this category 
of stress-related illness need not presuppose the classical and now, 
it is argued, outdated ‘disease model’, which treats dependence as a 
neurobiological disorder of the dopamine system, routinely said to be 
triggered when the brain is ‘hijacked’ by a limited range of corruptive 
intoxicants. If this model offers an all-too-easy mechanism for sepa-
rating out problem drinkers, junkies and pornography users from mere 
model consumers, contemporary research is moving in the opposite 
direction, disentangling addiction from threshold-surpassing quanti-
ties of specific substances to focus more on the hyperdopaminergic 
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setting that occasion an increasingly universal culture of obsessive 
consumption.
Addiction is now increasingly located at the intersection of the neu-
roplastic brain with the instability of what the clinician Jean-Pierre 
Couteron, a former president of France’s Fédération Addiction, has 
baptized ‘addictogenic society’.51 Pathology no longer resides solely 
in the addict, but is learned, stemming from the viciously circular 
moulding of synaptic circuits around manufactured intensities that 
substitute for the social bonds we are losing the luxury of forming. As 
our surrounding environments become more hyper-competitive and 
antisocial, ever higher doses of supply-maximized stimulus respond 
to both rising baseline levels of dopamine and the desensitization that 
follows from the brain’s adjustment to habituation.
III Adaptation and Encapsulation
117  Capitalism and dependence
Addiction as a strategy for managing ecological stress is what we saw 
with the ‘Gin Craze’ of anomic, industrializing London, and in the 
gambling and opium dens through which the dislocated peoples of 
dopaminergic society absorbed the disadjustments of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Phenomena like ‘white morbidity’52 and 
the current American opioid crisis combine with the ‘soaring’ non-
medical recourse to Tramadol in parts of Africa and Asia,53 to say 
nothing of the ubiquity of staring vacantly at the screens of our digital 
devices, as instances of what Bruce Alexander describes as capital-
ism’s contemporary ‘globalization of addiction’.
There is nonetheless a difference between earlier, historical, epi-
demics and those that mark our hyperdopaminergic present. Patterns 
of abuse appear alongside periods of rapid technological change – the 
evolution of distillation and techniques, or instruments, of stimulation 
delivery – as new sources of stimulus overwhelm the social norms 
organized around older forms of technology.
But there is reason to think the organization of culture can prove 
highly effective in regulating consumption. One post-millennial 
rereading of China’s Opium Wars emphasizes the success of tradi-
tional Chinese smoking rituals in absorbing the massive increase in 
supply and facilitating the management of functional habits. Frank 
Dikötter attributes much of received wisdom regarding opiate-addled 
Chinese people to colonialist-biological stereotypes of evolutionarily 
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weak-willed Orientals, which resurgent nationalism also exploited. 
Far more destructive, in terms of eliminating the social shock absorb-
ers of ‘backward’ imperial culture, were the nationalists’ politics 
of prohibition and the emergence of the disease model of addiction, 
which rewrote history to cast opium as wholly and singularly toxic: a 
destroyer of agriculture, work ethic and national character.54 Fredric 
Jameson has written that ‘the postmodern, or late capitalism, has at 
least brought the epistemological benefit of revealing the ultimate 
structure of the commodity to be that of addiction itself’.55 But this 
was perhaps already apparent from the time of the Opium Wars, with 
opium’s change in status coinciding with its commodification.
In any case, as has been argued elsewhere, historical addiction 
epidemics have tended to fade out as affected societies readjust their 
educational norms and social organization to accommodate hitherto 
disruptive technologies.56 Bernard Stiegler has argued that, in our 
present age of the economics of ‘disruption’, the historical pattern of 
innovation leading to a ‘readjustment’ of society around new tech-
nologies, breaks down.57 It comes as no surprise that global consump-
tion has skyrocketed over the last thirty years, during the very period 
when knowledge of climate change might have suggested that we 
would be taking actions to curb it.
118 The conservative revolution of consumer capitalism
Since the conservative revolution of the 1980s, relentless waves of 
technological change have combined with labour market reforms 
intended to reduce the welfare safety net and spur us on to adapt to 
a more aggressively competitive, Darwinian way of life, dressed up 
as creative destruction. There is no time for systems of social support 
and integration to catch up with the disintegrations created by waves 
of technological-stimulatory overload. Coupled with the built-in obso-
lescence of technological devices designed for shortness of lifespan, 
these changes make chasing to keep up with the rest of society our 
default mode of existence.
It is in this context that the contemporary pattern of consumption is 
to have multiple, overlapping addictions, overlain on a metanarrative 
of unending adaptation, which leaves us struggling to create curativ-
ity with intermittent, ‘hormetic’ doses.58 A constant state of excitation 
has become the ideological rule, irrespective of the longer-term dam-
age this inflicts on our capacity for life-building.
Previc also suggests that, while posing potentially ‘the greatest 
threat to mental health’ in the industrialized world, the prevalence 
of dopaminergic disorders is ‘much rarer or at least less severely 
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manifested in non-industrial societies’.59 Emerging research on the 
serious under-diagnosis of mental illness in the developing world 
raises questions about the latter part of this claim.60 So, too, should 
the continuity of ecological factors behind the rise of addictogenic 
societies. We can read the adaptationist economics underpinning the 
manufacture of dependence in the West as a direct continuation of 
the policies of dependence-inculcation trialled and imposed on Africa 
and Latin America, first through colonialism and then through the 
‘structural readjustment’ programs of the IMF and WTO. The effect 
of both has been sustained disadjustment, where consumption comes 
to substitute for community-led vitality and social support systems.
119 Colonialism, opium war and forced adaptation
Between the seventeenth and early twentieth centuries, the British 
East India Company imposed organizational reforms on Indian 
agriculture that, in addition to causing massive starvation and cata-
lysing the Opium Wars, also set the tone for the whole of the lim-
bic Capitalocene. Prior to colonization, subsistence farming on com-
munal land had been the norm. A traditional system of grain storage 
and reciprocal, mutual support enabled farmers to stave off the worst 
of climatic instability. But the British enclosed the commons and 
compelled the sale of grain reserves to drive up agricultural pro-
ductivity, forcing the replacement of subsistence crops with those, 
including opium, specifically cultivated for export. The same opium 
was dumped on China to create habits and a demand that would be 
financed by the sale, hitherto refused, of Chinese tea to a British pub-
lic newly enraptured by caffeine.61
Similar stories of enforced adaptation come from Latin America, 
where the carefully managed diversity of indigenous agriculture gave 
way, under duress, to the dominance of calorie- and dopamine-boost-
ing sugar for export, which, in turn, freed up European labour to focus 
on urban industrialization.62 Later, postcolonial efforts to overturn 
industrial underdevelopment and the dependence of the developing 
world on Western industrial technologies were battered into submis-
sion by Western loans, distributed in the manner of a dealer looking 
to snare new clients, which merely reinforced relations of patronage. 
The conditions of loan receipt, and eventually also of their forgive-
ness and restructuring, went further in necessitating the destruction 
of techniques of social readjustment deemed to be constraints on the 
free functioning of the market.63
‘Resilience’ came to denote the very opposite of how the philoso-
pher of medicine, Georges Canguilhem, understands health: not the 
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capacity to reinvent one’s milieu in the face of environmental pertur-
bation, but relentless adaptation to the demand to open up domestic 
economies to international competition. The proletarianizing effect 
of dependence on licensed Western technologies is redoubled by the 
active inhibition of local forms of community vitality.
120 Globalization and dopamine
Dopamine is linked to globalization, on the one hand, by its contribu-
tion to abstract spatialization, exploration, conquest and the pursuit of 
stimulation; on the other hand, by its links to the destruction of local-
ity to which we are now bearing witness. If the history of dopami-
nergic society is coextensive with that of the stresses and seductions 
of the city, with the latter now collapsing from the centre outwards, 
the two may yet also prove coterminous. Much recognisably modern 
state-building was also born of the pressures of urban intoxication. 
Well into the nineteenth century, cities were plagued by cholera-
infested water, the pernicious effects of which were diminished by the 
‘antidiarrheal properties of narcotics and the antimicrobial properties 
of alcohol’.64 According to Courtwright the building of waterworks 
and public fountains provided both hygiene and alternative sources of 
much-needed stimulation.
Public parks and spaces worked to similar counter-stimulatory 
effect. Their ongoing disappearance is already recognized as a con-
tributory factor in the rise of the ADHD that has been described as 
the other ‘side of the same mental coin’ as addiction,65 due to the 
way in which both conditions habitually entail a compulsive switch-
ing of focus away from socially preferred objects of attention, and 
towards more potent, distracting, sources of stimulus like screens and 
video games.
One of the great problems of the digital stage of dopamining, on 
this note, is that the conventional organization of our lives and ana-
logue living spaces routinely provides little in the way of sufficiently 
attractive alternatives to coax those who have withdrawn from society 
back into it. If the city just about survives as a commercial entity, that 
is surely in large part because its high streets have been colonized by 
outlets furnishing the very objects of addiction and heightened stimu-
lus, like smartphones, electronic cigarettes, coffee and alcohol, that 
push us away from it. As a site of ritual coming together and localized 
point-of-retreat, it is ceding its place to the delocalized, virtual micro-
spheres of Amazon, Netflix and social media.
Hence, more broadly, the irony of our unfurling planetary cri-
sis: it corresponds to the fracturing of the world, understood in the 
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Heideggerian sense of an ecology of possibility. Bruno Latour has 
recently analysed the politics of climate change disavowal around 
the idea of the ‘absence of a common world we can share’.66 Faced 
with the choice between sacrificing their way of living, or maintain-
ing business-as-usual at the price of condemning vast swathes of the 
globe to devastation, Latour argues, governing elites have retreated 
from the aspiration to rule in the interests of the many, and simply 
seek to sequester themselves away in privatized niches, from which 
they can ride out the Apocalypse.
121 Spheres, bubbles, foam
Latour’s argument works equally as a description of a much greater 
spectrum of limbic Capitalocenic behaviour, insofar as disavowal – a 
classic symptom of addiction – has become the default mode of expe-
rience; insofar as we are all seemingly engaged in a process of with-
drawal from the universal public spaces formerly characterized by 
joint attention, collective projects and what Jacques Rancière would 
call a ‘common aisthesis’, or unifying experience of what amounts to 
the same place.67 In dopamined, addictogenic society, the shared world 
succumbs to fragmentation into the hermetically self-contained bub-
bles of private islands, gated communities and internet echo chambers 
in which one can escape the feelings of stressed-out hopelessness.
The reference to bubbles, here, recalls not only the filter bubbles 
of Web 2.0 evoked by Eli Pariser,68 but also the social and psycho-
logical structures of immunity, the ‘capsule architectures’ and ‘foam’ 
of Peter Sloterdijk: ‘In foam worlds, the individual bubbles are not 
absorbed into a single, integrative hyper-orb’,69 but remain separate. 
The limbic Capitalocene reveals itself as just the latest stage of the 
foaming of the world into self-contained capsules.
According to the psychiatrist Daniel Casriel, this search for insu-
larity and ‘safe spaces’ is exactly what is at stake in addiction. Casriel 
understood ‘encapsulation’ as a third way out for those maladapted for 
‘fight or flight’ to ‘anesthetize’ the feeling of being unable to cope.70 
And his generation of drug therapists sought to counter the tendency 
towards withdrawal by recreating a bridge between the addict’s zones 
of retreat and the public sphere by reabsorbing individual bubbles of 
foam into a communal milieu.
Their project of detox through a reintegration of addicts into the 
public sphere was derailed by a combination of rehab consumerism 
– that is, of treatment models that reinforce the very proletarianizing 
tendencies they are supposed to combat – and the shift of policy-mak-
ing towards the ‘War on Drugs’. But proponents of this re-synthesis of 
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the public also ran up against the complexities of seeking to replace 
toxic forms of dependence with others deemed beneficial. Even dur-
ing the 1970s, therapeutic communities of the kind pioneered by 
Phoenix House were accused of functioning as ‘encapsulated addict 
worlds’,71 where addicts were allowed to live without thought for their 
reinsertion into the shared space from which they had withdrawn 
through addiction.
IV Towards a Psychosocial Ecology of Detoxification
122 The symptomatic effects of worldwide withdrawal
If climate change is a problem of the limbic Capitalocene, which 
is to say, a phenomenon of addictive consumption induced by gen-
eralized proletarianization, then what would that mean for how we 
treat it? Interestingly, there is a parallel argument present both in the 
dominant paradigm of addiction treatments and partly also in the dis-
courses of climate change. Its main logic consists in emphasizing the 
necessity of a radical break with existing patterns of consumption.
We owe to Daniel Ross the observation that, in an image much 
exploited by the industries of climate denial, the public imagination 
is dominated by visions of carbon cuts leading to enforced cold tur-
key: abrupt withdrawal from a way of life organized around technol-
ogy-led consumerism, followed by the misery of endless abstinence, 
planet-wide ‘counting the days’, and slip-ups where we indulge in 
fracking ‘just one more time’. In the best-case version of this scenario, 
we might manage to get by as ‘functional’ addicts, carefully allowing 
ourselves a few minutes of internet, oil and shopping for plastic per 
day, but only in the strictly controlled doses already (ineffectually) 
advised in the small print of greenwashed society. Anything to avoid 
the intolerability of withdrawal symptoms that would be experienced 
both individually and collectively: perhaps not the vomiting and diar-
rhea induced by discontinuing opioids, but certainly anxiety, irritabil-
ity and fatigue. And who knows how these would scale up at the level 
of politics and society?
Distaste for such symptoms, not to mention conviction in their abso-
lute unviability, has already been circularly deployed to proscribe the 
diagnosis of addiction in relation to pathological digital media con-
sumption.72 Environmental writers have been equally quick to insist 
that abstention from technology consumption is simply not an option. 
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Saving the world, it is routinely argued, will require more and greater 
technological modernity, not a reversion to ‘collective sacrifice’.73
The dubious advantage of framing ecological collapse in terms of 
the intolerable price of cold turkey, and more broadly of clinging to a 
disease model of addiction that allows us to distance climate change 
from pathological consumption, is that it exonerates us from taking 
preventive climate action until it’s effectively too late – until, that is, 
we hit the mythical, iceberg-free, point of ‘rock bottom’.
123 To touch or not to touch the (rock) bottom
Most famously spelled out in the second of AA’s Twelve Steps, ‘rock 
bottom’ is the moment where we supposedly, finally, take the crucial 
measure of admitting ‘hopelessness’ and ‘complete defeat’ in the face 
of a ‘mental obsession so subtly powerful that no amount of human 
willpower could break it’.74 It dawns on us once the object of addiction 
becomes so all-consuming as to exclude everything else we hold dear 
from the increasingly narrowed orbit of attention. According to this 
logic, the typical alcoholic is so selfish and lacking in care that they 
will only be roused to action when it becomes a matter of literal life 
or death. Only having lost their job, their money, their family, their 
health and perhaps even their home – and now their planet – will they 
recognize the need to replace their own defective willpower with the 
motivation provided by AA, through God.
We should note a degree of wiggle-room in the original formula-
tion of the Twelve Steps. AA co-founder Bill W refers to some early 
success in recruiting ‘young people who were scarcely more than 
potential alcoholics’, and even states one aim of the nascent society as 
being to spare them hell by ‘rais[ing] the bottom the rest of us had hit 
to the point where it would hit them’ sooner. That ambition was ulti-
mately abandoned and he concedes that ‘few people will sincerely try 
to practice the AA program unless they have hit bottom’.75
The rock-bottom doctrine has since hardened into a cornerstone of 
the rehab industry, in spite of doubts over its basis in evidentiary sci-
ence. According to the addiction writer Maia Szalavitz,76 the conse-
cration of hitting bottom is due in part to a judicial system that legiti-
mates the counterproductively punitive treatment of addicts, not least 
by dressing up retribution as tough love. Writing in The Sober Truth: 
Debunking the Bad Science Behind 12-Step Programs and the Rehab 
Industry, the Harvard clinician and psychiatrist Lance Dodes is simi-
larly critical. For Dodes, it is a myth that constitutes the ultimate form 
of marketing for a defective cure we are encouraged to consume all 
the more fervently when it emphatically doesn’t work.77
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The continued success of the commercialized rehab industry can-
not be divorced from the way that its failures are routinely explained 
away through reference to clients who, having yet to hit the nadir 
required to spur them towards committed sobriety, just don’t want ‘it’ 
badly enough. The typically neoliberal emphasis on deficient personal 
responsibility conveniently covers over more compelling accounts of 
rehab’s production of relapsing recidivists: namely, its replication of 
the paralysis and enforced adaptation to the very kind of (institution-
ally imposed) stressful circumstances that push people towards addic-
tion in the first place.
Fortunately, however, abstention is no longer the shibboleth it once 
was in therapeutic circles. The majority of the ‘addiction treatment 
industry is based on a defective model that has been unchanged since 
the 1930s’, namely one built on the reification of the Twelve Steps 
into the kind of doctrinally rigid and proletarianizing, mass-produced 
consumerist model never envisaged by the Kropotkinian forefathers 
of Alcoholics Anonymous. Ideological dogmatism and the marketing 
of abstractly universal and ultimately branded modes of therapy have 
rendered many therapeutic institutions incapable of the self-transfor-
mation they preach, unwilling to share and create knowledge with 
‘rival’ providers, and unwilling to devolve decision-making auton-
omy to patients who are frequently there by coercion, court-mandated 
to undergo rehab as an alternative to prison, and with no option but to 
comply with inflexible regimes imposed on them from above.78
124 The origins of the Alcoholics Anonymous movement – 
contributory therapy
But ‘there is also significance evidence’ of ‘empathetic and empow-
ering approaches that let patients set their own goals’79 yielding 
greater success than those that ultimately reproduce the environ-
mental dislocation underpinning recourse to addiction. An emerging 
panoply of alternatives to the dominant one-size-fits-all programs of 
rehab includes elements of a return to the roots of AA in the anar-
chist theory of ‘mutual aid’.80 Previous chapters in this volume have 
sketched out how localities might be revitalized around the use of 
digital platforms to cultivate participatory, citizen-led, research, as 
per the territorial experimentations being undertaken in the Plaine 
Commune Contributory Learning Territory. In a clear nod to the ethos 
of self-organizing and spontaneously-emerging community support, 
their potential is to provide groups and networks of groups with their 
own means of generating self-knowledge, which enables them, in 
turn, to transform and revitalize through their own efforts the toxic 
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environments that make hyper-consumption a therapeutic response to 
disadjustment.
One pioneering experiment of this nature is Plaine Commune’s 
‘Clinique Contributive’ (see recherchecontributive.org/clinique-con-
tributive/), which, under the auspices of the child psychiatrist Marie-
Claude Bossière, brings together researchers, healthcare professionals 
and parents of young children diagnosed as suffering from the effects 
of overexposure to the distractions of digital technologies. Its aim is 
to combat screen addiction by creating a locality in which parents 
can learn from one another in a non-judgmental setting and generate 
shared knowledge about the developmental impact on their children 
of both parties’ excessive consumption. The clinic also provides the 
basis for recreating the extended care networks whose erosion has 
made often isolated, tired and stressed-out adults cling to the comfort 
of their smartphones in the absence of better psychosocial integration. 
In exploring the connections between fatigue and the sustained use 
of sleep-impoverishing devices, they discover alternative forms of 
invigoration to digital overstimulation.
Contributory therapy thus becomes a technique for inventing forms 
of emotional and social connection that transcend commercialized 
individualism, new forms of philia tied to the pursuit of the com-
mon good, echoing the kind evoked by Aristotle in Books VIII and 
IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. We can also see it as a form of work 
(not labour – see Chapter 3) and as a process of ‘capabilization’ (see 
Chapter 4) in which the contribution to knowledge allows people to 
become what they are ‘able to do and be’.81
125 The therapeutic group – therapeia and philia
The therapeutic potential of contributory research can also be under-
stood through the insights into human development of the Russian 
psychologist Lev Vygotsky. Vygotsky’s conviction was that human 
action is a transformational process where individuals, Homo sapiens 
as a species, and tools, exist in a network of mutual co-creation. In 
an essay on ‘The Collective as a Factor in the Development of the 
Abnormal Child’, Vygotsky characterized the social dimension of 
development as a ‘function of collective behaviour, as a form of coop-
eration or cooperative activity’.82 He borrowed from city-planning 
the concept of a ‘zone of proximal development’ to articulate how, 
with the help of peers, or of another more competent individual, the 
child becomes able to do things that she was not previously capable of 
doing.83 Vygotsky saw this phenomenon occurring especially in play-
ful situations, where the ‘child always behaves beyond his average 
Planetary Detox and the Neurobiology of Ecological Collapse 241
age, above his daily behaviour; in play it is as though he were a head 
taller than himself’.84 Development, he argued, emerges from a social, 
relational context in which the individual and the group grow into 
something different, by creating new norms in their relationship with 
the environment.
One of the few attempts to transfer this perspective into practice 
took place in the East Side Institute in New York, where, in the 1970s, 
the therapists Fred Newman and Lois Holzman combined Vygotskian 
conceptualizations of development with Wittgenstein’s work on lan-
guage to create the psychotherapeutic method of ‘Social Therapy’.85 
Social Therapy starts from the premise that individuals ‘are forced to 
adapt to conditions which increasingly and more and more obviously 
are against not only their own interests but those of the human spe-
cies as a whole’,86 with drugs and homelessness being part of a wide 
range of failed attempts at adaptation. And it understands the group 
as a ‘unit of transformation/change/growth/learning’ through which 
individuals can be transformed without a specific focus on ‘fixing the 
problems’ of its members.87
The group becomes both a method and a result, its activities serv-
ing as an emotional zone of proximal development. This volume’s 
chapter on ‘social sculpture’ outlines a similar ‘transindividuation’ of 
individuals within a collective through knowledge-sharing. Despite 
criticizing the rigidity of the Alcoholics Anonymous, Dodes likewise 
reinforces the value of this kind of localized therapeutic community, 
suggesting that ‘groups would be a highly valuable component’ in the 
treatment of addiction ‘if they were designed to help patients […] to 
experiment with new ways of relating’.88
126 The mother of all critical situations
From this perspective, the function of addiction is to facilitate the co-
creation of forms of life hitherto impossible to imagine. And the rela-
tionship between what constitutes the possibility and impossibility of 
future development should be considered one of the most important 
steps in a therapeutic endeavour.
In his book, The Psychology of Experiencing: The Resolution of 
Life’s Critical Situations, another Russian, Fyodor Vasilyuk, sought 
to investigate
just what a person does when there is nothing to be done, 
when he or she is in a situation that renders impossible the 
realisation of his or her needs, attitudes, values, etc.89
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Such moments are ‘critical situations’ in which the individual is 
unable to ‘cope with the existing external and internal conditions of 
life’.90 The same encounter with a metaphorical brick wall is addressed 
in DeYoung and Krueger’s understanding of psychopathology as a 
‘persistent failure […] to generate effective new goals, interpretations, 
or strategies when existing ones prove unsuccessful’.91
The Anthropocene presents us with the mother of all critical situ-
ations, one that threatens the very habitability of the planet, over and 
above exposing as ineffective the existing norms around which our 
lives are organized. Yet it therefore also offers an opportunity for 
the abandonment of old norms that are making us ill, and an overdue 
end to hyperdopaminergic society. Hence its paradoxical promise of 
renewed vitality.
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10 Carbon and Silicon: Contribution to an Elemental 
Critique of Political Economy
Daniel Ross
127 Introduction: aporia of sustainability and the blind-spot
We are confronted in the twenty-first century with an array of seri-
ous problems but among them two immense challenges stand out: on 
the one hand, those problems presented by carbon technologies, and, 
on the other hand, those posed by silicon technologies. While it may 
seem that nothing can trump the planetary threat of climate change, 
in fact both of these challenges involve existential threats and dan-
gers amounting to what is sometimes called ‘extinction risk’, not least 
because these two challenges are absolutely inextricable.
What follows is an attempt to outline the stakes of this situation in 
an age that has come to be known as the Anthropocene. An idea of the 
conditions within which those stakes are unfolding can be illustrated 
by juxtaposing two recent official declarations:
1 On 8 October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) published a special report on Global 
Warming of 1.5°C: the ‘Summary for Policymakers’ argues 
for the urgent necessity of aiming to limit global tempera-
ture increases to no more than 1.5°C, stating that keeping 
climate change at or near this limit can today be achieved 
only if global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions are reduced 
by 45% (from 2010 levels) by 2030 and are reduced to zero 
by 2050, which can be achieved, according to the IPCC, 
only with rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented transitions 
in energy, land, urban, infrastructure and industry systems, 
far beyond what would be possible under the current nation-
ally-stated mitigation ambitions.1
2 One month after this declaration by the IPCC, on 5 
November 2018, President Xi Jinping of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) spoke at the opening of the China 
International Import Expo in Shanghai, reportedly stating 
that ‘China is a big market of over 1.3 billion people’ and 
that he ‘would turn his country of 1.3 billion into global 
consumers’2 by increasing imports to USD$45 trillion 
over the next fifteen years, as well as continuing to pursue 
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economic policies aimed at a correspondingly large increase 
in the domestic consumption of domestically manufactured 
consumer products.
The IPCC claims with ‘high confidence’ that there are ‘a wide 
range of adaptation options that can reduce the risks of climate 
change’. Furthermore, the PRC shows evidence of understanding the 
seriousness of global warming and at least some commitment to pur-
suing climate policies that encourage the development of renewable 
energy resources, the transition away from fossil fuel-based transport 
and so on.3 Despite these positive signals and efforts, we nevertheless 
believe that throughout the world there is a fundamental disconnec-
tion between discourses and policies on ecology and discourses and 
politics on economics: can commitments to large decreases in global 
carbon emissions really be maintained while at the same time main-
taining commitments to large increases in global consumption and 
manufacturing? We believe that the disconnection if not irreconcil-
able contradiction between these discourses and commitments ulti-
mately reflects what could be called an aporia of sustainability.
In other words, contemporary geopolitics seems marked by the 
virtual impossibility of finding a viable macroeconomic pathway out 
of the contradiction between economic imperatives founded on the 
existing ‘perpetual growth’ global macroeconomic model and eco-
logical imperatives founded on the discoveries by climate science 
about the effects of anthropogenic atmospheric emissions. More than 
that, we contend that the difficulties involved in the attempt to resolve 
this aporia are greatly exacerbated by technological processes of other 
kinds, processes presently giving rise to what Bernard Stiegler has 
recently termed an ‘immense regression’.4
With respect to the last of these questions, we believe that there is 
a widespread intellectual and political blind-spot about the economic, 
political, psychological and sociological significance of the vast tech-
nological transformation that has unfurled across the past quarter 
of a century. More specifically, it is today crucial to understand the 
complex and fundamental ways in which the economic and ecologi-
cal poles of this aporia of sustainability relate to and are compounded 
by the transformation of computation, information and network tech-
nologies, and the algorithmic technologies that link them all together.5
The elimination of this blind-spot should therefore be an urgent 
priority, and the combination of the aporia of sustainability and the 
unfolding of a process of immense regression incontestably amounts 
to a global crisis. If so, then this situation, like any crisis, calls for 
a critique, on the basis of which alone it is possible to make good 
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decisions. In that light, what follows can be considered as a prelimi-
nary contribution to what we propose calling an ‘elemental critique’, 
that is, a new critique of political economy founded on the respective 
technologies of carbon and silicon.6
128 On the notion of an ‘elemental’ critique
Before attempting to identify the content of any such critique, some 
words concerning the term ‘elemental’ may be advisable.
1. The focus on ‘carbon’ and ‘silicon’ indicates that this is indeed a 
matter of the crucial place of the sixth and fourteenth atomic elements 
of the periodic table in the technological transformations of the nine-
teenth, twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the span of time covered 
by the so-called Anthropocene era. To this extent, the ‘elemental’ 
character of the critique we are proposing means that it does not for-
get the fundamentally ‘material’ character of these transformations, 
even if this is always and everywhere a question of what these mate-
rials can be organized to do and what they can organize us to do, in 
terms of both supporting and undermining the possibility of individual 
and collective autonomy.
We could also relate this notion to Whitehead’s account of math-
ematics as a ‘primordial element’ in the history of thought that, com-
bined with today’s physical understanding, suggests the possibility 
of ‘some new doctrine of organism which may take the place of […] 
scientific materialism’.7 For us, however, this element is not just scien-
tific but technical, and the ‘organism’ under the microscope is not just 
organic but, in Stiegler’s terms, ‘organological’.8 In the case of silicon 
technologies, digital and computational technologies have also made 
it possible to analyse, isolate and manipulate the atomic elements of 
the periodic table, as well as the genetic elements of which DNA is 
composed, giving rise to new and powerful technologies combining 
and recombining these elemental materials in ways that can be both 
beneficial and monstrous.
2. More importantly, however, by ‘elemental’ is meant the 
Aristotelian notion that, for sensible beings, each of the senses has its 
own ‘element’. The distant echo of this can be heard, for instance, in 
the quotidian English expression according to which those who find 
themselves in circumstances to which they are very well-suited can 
be defined as being ‘in their element’ (a professional swimmer in a 
swimming pool, for instance, or a river9).
For Aristotle, the element is what suffuses the milieu of a sensible 
being, through which perception operates (in the case of vision, for 
example, it operates not through light but, more primordially still, 
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through ‘the transparent’10). This element itself, however, is very dif-
ficult for the sensible being to perceive: as Stiegler has often men-
tioned, Aristotle offers the example of the fish, which, according to 
Aristotle, ‘would not notice that the things which touch one another in 
water have wet surfaces’.11
The element of the fish, water, is so intimate to its existence as to 
escape perceptibility (with the possible exception of the flying fish, 
who may have an intermittent experience of this element, in briefly 
leaving it). One of the most recent formulations of this idea by Stiegler 
is the following:
A change of technical system always initially entails a dis-
adjustment between this technical system and what Bertrand 
Gille called the social systems, which had hitherto been 
‘adjusted’ to the preceding technical system, and which 
had therein formed, along with it, an ‘epoch’ – but where 
the technical system as such fades into the background, for-
gotten as it disappears into everydayness, just as, for a fish, 
what disappears from view, as its ‘element’, is water.12
In the case of the elemental critique being proposed here, this does 
not mean that we have no awareness of the suffusion of carbon and 
silicon technologies in our surroundings: the thick anthropotechnical 
film of automobiles, electrically-powered devices, smartphones and 
internet devices that covers the Earth and surrounds our existence is 
transparently obvious to everyone. Rather, what is meant by the quasi-
imperceptibility of the element is that there is something about our 
entanglement with these technologies, and in particular with silicon 
technologies, that we find very difficult either to pinpoint or to grasp.
This is so precisely because of this suffusion and because there is 
no positive prospect of any disentanglement (other than through a shift 
towards some post-silicon technologies, which are likely in any case 
to bear many of the same characteristics as silicon technologies in 
terms of being digital, networked, algorithmic and so on). This is the 
issue at stake in the proposals outlined in Chapter 4 concerning the 
design, development and implementation of deliberative technologies 
(and for a precise description of these technologies, see Chapter 7).
Contemporary technologies, and especially silicon technologies, 
are so difficult to perceive because, although they consist in noth-
ing but external devices (or the possibility of internal devices such 
as those of neurotechnology), they are nevertheless always and con-
stantly occupying us and within us, almost haunting us. Technics is the 
spectral element that constitutes ‘the transparent’ for noetic beings: 
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our attention perpetually operates through such technologies but is 
only intermittently attentive to such technologies.
3. ‘Elemental’ has a third sense, indicated for instance in Sigmund 
Freud’s description of the fate of microscopic organisms in a petri dish:
An infusorian, therefore, if it is left to itself, dies a natural 
death owing to its incomplete voidance of the products of its 
own metabolism. (It may be that the same incapacity is the 
ultimate cause of the death of all higher animals as well.)13
What Freud describes here amounts to the entropic consequences 
for any kind of being occupying a closed system in which it lacks 
the means to eradicate the toxicity brought by its own waste prod-
ucts, throwing the system into uncontrollable disequilibrium and ulti-
mately leading to its collapse. In the case of the ‘metabolism’ with 
which we are dealing for the ‘higher animal’ that we ourselves form, 
a being that in Aristotle’s terms is not just sensible but ‘noetic’, which 
is to say a being that knows, this ‘metabolism’ is not just biological 
but fundamentally and irreducibly psychological, sociological and 
technological.
The ‘metabolic’ productions of the technical, knowing beings that 
we ourselves are also contain the possibility of exposing our ‘ele-
ment’ to potentially fatal toxicity, when we lose the intergeneration-
ally transmitted capacities of knowledge and care required to take 
care of life in any particular technical system. But when this becomes 
a matter of our ‘noetic element’, the entropic consequences entailed 
by this ‘self-poisoning’ are no longer just thermodynamic or biologi-
cal but psychic and social. All technical systems are localized, but 
the locality of today’s technical system has reached the scale of the 
biosphere itself (this is what, throughout this work, has been called 
the technosphere): in such circumstances, where there is effectively 
no ‘outside’, the risks of toxicity are that much greater.
129 The division of twenty-first century technologies
Some remarks are necessary about the attempt we are pursuing here 
to distinguish carbon technologies from silicon technologies. The 
first is that this is neither an absolute distinction nor an opposition: 
in the world in which we live today, almost every internal combus-
tion engine that is manufactured for an automobile is also a computer, 
with the ICE powering the CPU and the CPU governing the rhythms 
of the pistons and so on. Even more obviously, every digital device is 
powered by electrical energy, a high proportion of which is produced 
through carbon combustion of one kind or another.
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These specific examples point to a far more general characteristic: 
just as we are inextricably entangled with the technical milieu we 
have constructed across the entire biosphere, so too are the various 
kinds of technologies inextricably entangled with each other (and 
with us), thereby forming what Bertrand Gille called a technical sys-
tem. It is a ‘structural’ or synchronic system in the sense that each 
technical artifact finds its possibility only in relation to a plurality of 
others which it cannot do without.
The second thing to say is that these names, carbon and silicon, 
are to some extent an abstraction in the sense that we are creating a 
very broad categorization that is in some way just a useful fiction. In 
practice, they could be construed in a more inclusive way as refer-
ring to technologies lying outside the strict (atomic) bounds of these 
‘elemental’ characteristics. There exists a complicated relationship 
between the dominant technologies involved in the technical system 
of a particular epoch and the form of thinking that is possible in that 
epoch. Norbert Wiener, writing at the midpoint of the last century, 
argued that the ‘thought of every age is reflected in its technique’,14 
and he delineated the shifts of technical system from the eighteenth 
to the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries in a way that is congruent 
with the division we are proposing here:
If the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are the age 
of clocks, and the later eighteenth and the nineteenth centu-
ries constitute the age of steam engines, the present time is 
the age of communication and control.15
Wiener associates the first of these epochs, that of Newton and 
Huyghens, with the age of navigation made possible by precision 
instruments, opening up a new scale of maritime commerce based 
on ‘the engineering of the mercantilists’, while from the nineteenth 
century and ‘almost to the present time’, the Newcomen engine and 
its heirs would give rise to all those large-scale industries based on 
thermodynamics and irreversible processes, and most recently the 
communication age, based on a ‘split between the technique of strong 
currents and the technique of weak currents’, has led to a proliferation 
of electronic instruments opening onto the age of the ‘automatic com-
puting machine’.16 The range of technologies included in each of the 
very broad categorizations we are describing here is thus quite large. 
Furthermore, it is always the result of local and historical processes 
that can both begin and end, where the end is not determined in any 
teleological way by the beginning, and where there is nothing perma-
nent or eternal about this distinction.
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Nevertheless, thirdly, our contention is that, in this epoch, an 
account of these particular abstractions can nevertheless be fruitful. In 
the technical system of the twenty-first century, or at least of its first 
two decades, it is indeed possible to make this distinction between 
two vast technological categories. For example, a high proportion of 
the largest global companies measured by revenue are based on carbon 
technologies,17 while a high proportion of the largest global companies 
measured by market capitalization are based on silicon technologies18 
(these two facts also indicating something about the relationship 
between the present and the future, as perceived by investors). More 
than that, it is necessary to make this distinction in order to elucidate 
fundamental questions of political economy that have thus far tended 
to be avoided in most theoretical or policymaking considerations with 
respect to the consequences generated by our own metabolic products.
For these reasons, we will now outline what is intended by each of 
these categorizations respectively, in relation to their genesis, func-
tion and fate.
130 Carbon technologies:  
Palaeolithic fire in the Anthropocene era
Hominins acquired the ability to create and use fire as early as the 
Lower Palaeolithic and the controlled use of carbon combustion 
became common in the Middle Palaeolithic. From that moment, the 
beings that would become ourselves found themselves within a fiery 
element defined by the capacity for artificial, controllable energy 
production and consumption founded on the flammability of organic 
materials. From the moment cooking was invented, this capacity was 
a matter of the potential to produce and consume energy in order to do 
work, thereby opening the possibility of ‘ways of life’, or what Marx 
called a ‘mode of consumption’:
the hunger that is satisfied by cooked meat eaten with knife 
and fork differs from hunger that devours raw meat with the 
help of bands, nails and teeth.19
Both dangerous and beneficial, controllable within the risks of being 
extinguished or turning wild, this first symbol of technics was also 
the first object of care, long before the Neolithic Revolution. In addi-
tion to warmth and cooking, the development of the controlled use of 
carbon combustion gave rise to other technologies, such as smelting, 
forging and gunpowder.20
But the modern history of carbon technologies obviously begins 
with the invention of heat engines powered by hydrocarbons derived 
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from fossilized organic matter. More specifically, it begins with 
the external combustion engine, and more specifically still with 
the industrial (or thermodynamic) revolution that was set off by the 
steam engine envisaged by the University of Glasgow repairman 
James Watt, which he patented in 1781 and which was to transform 
manufacturing and rail and maritime transport throughout the nine-
teenth century.
In the twentieth century, fossil fuel power plants linked to elec-
tricity grids would further vastly transform both production and 
consumption, and automobiles equipped with internal combustion 
engines would transform road transport and make possible the rise of 
global aviation. The combustion of hydrocarbons, however, inevita-
bly releases a significant level of ‘metabolic products’: while for the 
ten thousand years prior to the industrial revolution the global atmo-
spheric CO2 concentration was 280 parts per million, in 2018 it stood 
at 410 ppm, with annual emissions and concentrations continuing 
to increase.21
131 Silicon technologies
Turning to the history of silicon technologies, the first integrated cir-
cuit was produced in 1958, the first CPU in 1971, the Apple II and 
Commodore PET home computers entered the market in 1977, the 
Microsoft Windows ‘operating environment’ was first released in 
1985, the World Wide Web was opened to the general public in April 
1993, Amazon was founded in July 1994, the domain name google.
com was registered in September 1997, the Tencent and Alibaba con-
glomerates were founded in 1998 and 1999 respectively, the Facebook 
social network was made universally open in September 2006 (with 
active users rising from 100 million in August 2008 to two billion 
in June 2017), the capacitive multi-touch smartphone known as the 
iPhone was launched in June 2007 and Uber’s mobile app and trans-
port services were officially launched in July 2009.
It is notable that this timeline of significant dates increasingly 
focuses on consumer-based silicon technologies, reflecting the vast 
entrance of these transformational technologies into the consumer 
market over the past forty years. It is also notable that we have chosen 
to end it in 2009, reflecting that the last decade has seen a period of 
consolidation and monopolization of the silicon economy in the hands 
of a small number of super-giant corporate players.
Today, it has become transparently clear to everyone that silicon 
technologies have transformed every aspect of production and con-
sumption,22 along with scientific and technological research of every 
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kind, and this is especially so in the quarter of a century that has 
transpired since the internet became public and global. All of this 
amounts to a vast ‘disruption’ of the technical system, along with 
every other psychosocial and institutional system.
This history is obviously familiar, and its facts are moreover avail-
able to anyone anywhere with a smartphone and internet access. 
Compared with the history of carbon technologies, however, which 
have existed in one form or another for hundreds of thousands of 
years, the silicon technologies just listed have a history lasting just 
a few decades. On what basis can this amount to some vast and fun-
damental division, or does their rapid ascent and ubiquity generate 
a kind of illusion of exaggerated significance? In fact, silicon tech-
nologies must be inscribed into a much older genealogy, even if still 
not quite as long as the history of the acquisition and use of fire. But 
this is possible only if we consider these technologies not in terms of 
their atomic or molecular composition but in terms of their elemen-
tal function.
132 Retentional technologies and the industrial  
capitalism of production
If the elemental function of carbon technologies fundamentally con-
sists in the production of chemical energy in order that it can then 
be transformed into mechanical or electrical energy and consumed as 
work, then the elemental function of silicon technologies fundamen-
tally consists in the production of an artificial memory that, too, can 
be put to work in manifold ways. Silicon technologies are retentional 
technologies (to borrow a term from Husserlian phenomenology). In 
Stiegler’s work, this very long history of retentional technologies (and 
especially of what he calls hypomnesic technologies, those technolo-
gies that are purposely rather than accidentally retentional) has been 
explored in detail and with respect to a wide variety of dimensions.
If we here prefer to refer to silicon technologies – while keeping in 
mind the mnemotechnical history that extends through cave painting, 
the invention of writing systems (including alphabetization, which 
remains an almost unchanged standard from the Roman Empire to the 
Digital Leviathan), the printing press, the phonograph, the radio, cin-
ema, analogue television and the becoming-digital of everything that 
we now see unfolding with silicon technologies strictly speaking – if 
we refer to silicon technologies, therefore, it is only because the prolif-
eration of uses, services and functions associated with this latest stage 
of memory technology seems so greatly to exceed the mere ability to 
‘record the past’. And yet, this is precisely the basis of all of them.23
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The industrial revolution whose possibility we previously ascribed 
to Watt’s steam engine could never have occurred without retentional 
technologies of a kind we have hitherto failed to mention: those tech-
nologies by which the complex and continuous gestures of workers of 
all kinds were broken down analytically into their discrete elements, 
in order to be then programmed back into machines powered by the 
heat engines of Watt and his successors. The paradigmatic case of 
such a machine is Jacquard’s loom, but a thousand examples could no 
doubt be cited.
The basis of this analytical process is what Stiegler refers to as 
‘grammatization’, the process of turning something temporal (like 
speech) into something spatial (like writing), by turning the continu-
ous into the discrete, on the basis of which it can be analysed and 
reproduced. The noetic, political and economic consequences of gram-
matization can be to support new forms of knowledge, but grammati-
zation can also lead to what Stiegler calls ‘proletarianization’ (draw-
ing on Gilbert Simondon’s reading of the Grundrisse’s ‘fragment on 
machines’). If proletarianization has in traditional Marxist discourse 
been understood to refer to the systematic separation of workers from 
the means of production, Stiegler’s use of the term draws attention to 
the way in which those means first of all consist in the knowledge pos-
sessed by workers and transmitted intergenerationally.
It is this knowledge that is literally removed from the minds of 
weavers and programmed into Jacquard’s loom and a thousand other 
machines, dispossessing the workers of their knowledge and literally 
destroying the intergenerational transmission of all manner of skills 
and crafts. In addition to the ownership of the energy-production 
capacities of the heat engine, what in fact made the rapid accelera-
tion of the industrial revolution possible was thus the ability of the 
capitalist to dispossess the worker of the knowledge of how to make 
things, knowledge that was then turned into information and recorded 
and exploited in the retentional technologies of machines: it is here 
that the history of industrial automation and artificial intelligence 
truly begins.
Industrial capitalism based on production thus arises from the con-
centration of carbon technologies in the hands of capital, but equally 
from the capitalist acquisition of retentional technologies through 
which workers, systematically dispossessed of knowledge, become 
labourers, that is, servants of the machine. From this vast process is 
born that great division between capital and proletarianized labour 
on the basis of which Marx and Engels would construct a revolution-
ary politics.
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In fact, of course, this founding moment of the industrial revolution 
was only the first step of a history that would continue through many 
chapters, including ones that Marx could never have anticipated: one 
key way in which to understand this set of chapters is as the unfolding 
of the epochs of grammatization. To pursue this history in terms of 
the distinction between carbon and silicon, it is worthwhile returning 
to the recent proclamation by the Chinese president concerning his 
country’s ambition to produce 1.3 billion ‘global consumers’.
133 On the vision of a nation of 1.3 billion ‘global consumers’
An issue that has been raised many times by many commentators, with 
potentially very significant global macroeconomic consequences, 
is the wage pressure in China that seems bound to result from the 
enormous rise of Chinese prosperity. This prosperity has been gen-
erated by clever and concerted development policies, and by the so-
called ‘opening up’ of China to the world, but what was primarily 
made available through this opening up was the vast army of low-cost 
labour that China was able to supply to domestic and foreign manu-
facturers of all kinds. In this way, the consumers of the industrialized 
democracies became able to purchase low-cost consumer goods, cor-
porations became able to inexpensively mass produce products and 
thus maintain profitable businesses, and China was able to attract an 
increasingly large proportion of the global manufacturing sector to 
the mainland, together driving an economic transformation not just of 
the economy and society of the PRC but of the whole global economy.
Increasingly, of course, and by design, this is not a one-way street: 
exports into China are themselves increasingly profitable for foreign 
manufacturers, and likewise the enormous rise in Chinese prosperity 
opens up new opportunities for domestic producers. Hence President 
Xi’s declaration. His quantification of import levels is of course 
highly conditional upon global and Chinese economic conditions 
that could easily and unexpectedly shift (with the vagaries of what is 
wrongly called the economic ‘cycle’). Beyond that, however, China’s 
economic rise inevitably leads to pressure for the redistribution of the 
wealth that has been generated, ultimately including to the millions 
of subsistence labourers in Chinese factories. As this wage pressure 
becomes increasingly difficult to resist, even for an economy that is 
still subject to strong centralized control, the very basis of that gen-
eration of wealth is potentially threatened.
None of this would in any way count as news for President Xi. 
But if it is not news, then what is his strategy for dealing with this 
pressure? What are the implications of his statement that he wants to 
Bifurcate: ‘There is No Alternative’ 260
produce a country of 1.3 billion global consumers, especially given 
that he is also asserting the PRC’s capacity for long-term planning, 
at least compared with the government of his American ‘rival’ (who 
could argue?)? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that behind such a 
pronouncement is the thought that the solution to this dilemma lies in 
a transformation of manufacturing through which a high proportion 
of these labourers will become dispensable. In other words, to build 
this market of global consumers, a very great number of these labour-
ers will, in the medium term at most, need to be replaced, not by some 
new army of cheap human labourers, but by automation and AI, that 
is, by a process of robotization.
Such a transition obviously implies other questions concerning the 
need for a new basis for redistribution to replace the disrupted wage 
labour (and welfare) model that has been the engine of the Keynesian 
model for many decades. Such questions are difficult and fundamen-
tal, amounting to the question and the challenge of what Stiegler has 
called ‘automatic society’: in a world where labour requires fewer 
and fewer human beings to operate machines, what is the future of 
work (where we are thus distinguishing work from proletarianized 
labour, and where it is only the worker and not the labourer who has 
the possibility of transforming his or her conditions through such 
work) and what is the basis of the distribution of the income without 
which these ‘consumers’ will be unable to consume?24 It is ultimately 
these questions that are implied by the declaration of an intention to 
create a market of 1.3 billion Chinese global consumers, along with 
those ecological questions implied by the aforementioned aporia of 
sustainability.
The vision that lies behind such a declaration, therefore, bears some 
resemblance to that described by Marx and Engels in The German 
Ideology: a vision of a society that no longer forces me to constrain 
my existence to a fixed, limited role in order to subsist, and instead
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another 
tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear 
cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner.25
For Herbert Marcuse in 1969, this ‘early Marxian example’ did 
indeed sound ‘embarrassingly ridiculous’, but only because the vision 
it offers in fact refers to merely ‘a stage of the development of the 
productive forces which has been surpassed’.26 With ‘the development 
of the productive forces beyond their capitalist organization’, he sug-
gests, a transformation may well be accomplished in which the ‘quan-
titative reduction of necessary labor could turn into quality (freedom)’ 
and ‘the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist 
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progress would be abolished’. But Marcuse argues that this will also 
require a transformation of the noetic beings that we ourselves are: 
it ‘presupposes a type of man with a different sensitivity as well as 
consciousness’.27
Today, this vision might be reinterpreted as one in which the revo-
lutionary expansion of automation and artificial intelligence opens up 
prospects for the emergence of new forms of autonomy (ignoring, for 
the moment, the question of what it would mean to go ‘beyond capi-
talist organization’). In such an interpretation, it would be as if the 
technological system becomes a new kind of ‘preindividual milieu’ 
(in Simondon’s terms), simply supplying the background condi-
tions from out of which, liberated from the enervating toil of prole-
tarianized labour, new noetic beings will crystallize.28 But in 2018, 
President Xi’s concern does not seem to be with how to produce new 
forms of autonomy or noesis: by this statement at least, he wants to 
create neither new kinds of workers nor new kinds of citizens but 
‘global consumers’. The possibility of raising the latter prospect with-
out considering the former challenge, we argue, is symptomatic of a 
failure to address the real stakes of silicon technologies in the twenty-
first century.
Rising prosperity may well be bound by economic law to lead to 
rising consumption, but the manner of the correlation is dependent 
on numerous other factors. In China and Asia generally, for exam-
ple, there is a well-known tendency to save rather than spend (com-
pared with Western consumers), with overall macroeconomic effects 
on investment and consumption, not to mention the ‘global savings 
glut’ diagnosed by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2005, 
which is to say, a potentially unstable tendency in which savings 
are favoured too greatly over investment (from the standpoint of the 
existing macroeconomic model). In short, ‘global consumers’ are arti-
ficial beings, not natural ones: con-sumers must be pro-duced – they 
must be made.
134 Protentional technologies  
and the hyper-industrial capitalism of consumption
The twentieth century can be understood as the age of the global 
cinesphere.29 The pharmacological (which is to say, both entropic and 
negentropic) character of this cinesphere can be discerned by con-
joining two statements that appear in the first episode of Jean-Luc 
Godard’s Histoire(s) du Cinéma: first, that cinema replaces our gaze 
with a world that conforms with our desires, and second, that for fifty 
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years, in the dark, we burned imagination (that is, libidinal energy) in 
order to heat up reality.30
That consumers must be produced through cinespherical means 
was precisely the realization that came to capitalist producers at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. For Marx, the spread of machines 
(powered by carbon technologies and programmed by retentional 
technologies of mechanical grammatization) amongst the capitalist 
class was bound to make it increasingly difficult for any one capitalist 
to maintain an edge over others, leading to his diagnosis of a tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall. Economists ever since have disparaged this 
analysis, above all on the grounds that it is not what is observed in the 
economic history that has unfolded since it was described by Marx, 
‘natural’ boom-and-bust ‘cycles’ notwithstanding. Indeed, this his-
tory does not seem to confirm Marx’s analysis. But this may be the 
result less of analytical error than of a fundamental transformation 
of capitalism resulting from this tendency: in short, what Marx could 
not imagine was the development of a capitalist imagination capable 
of solving this dilemma, even if this solution is itself only a postpone-
ment of this tendency.
The essence of this ‘solution’ was the realization that it is pos-
sible to create new markets, not just by geographical expansion, but 
through the possibility of manipulating consumer desire and therefore 
consumer behaviour. If capitalism is a perpetual economic competi-
tion giving rise to perpetual technoscientific innovation, this is not 
just a matter of R&D and production: it is also a matter of the social-
ization of that innovation – all those processes through which new 
products are taken up by consumers, by which they are adopted.
The shift to a hyper-industrial capitalism of consumption was in 
part a matter of the new organization of consumption that arose when 
Henry Ford realised that the wages he was paying to those employed 
on his assembly lines could in turn be used by them to purchase the 
very products they were producing. But the large-scale investment 
required to achieve the productivity gains to be realised from mass 
production was feasible only if consumer behaviour could be more 
or less reliably predicted, which is to say, produced: for this new con-
sumer market in transport vehicles powered by internal combustion 
engines to succeed, it was necessary to invent public relations, or in 
other words, marketing.
As Stiegler has shown on many occasions, this invention was made 
possible not just by the discovery of this ‘idea’, but by the develop-
ment of new forms of grammatization, and specifically the ‘gram-
matization of the sensible’ inaugurated with audiovisual technologies 
such as radio, cinema and television. It is not technological change as 
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such that Marx could not anticipate, but the significance of the new 
analytical and programming possibilities opened up by these new 
retentional technologies (Guglielmo Marconi patented his wireless 
telegraphy system in 1896, Marx having died in 1883). With these 
powerful new tools that could be used to access and influence the 
minds of potential consumers on an industrial scale, it became pos-
sible to completely transform the basis of profit-making in industrial 
capitalism, by constantly manufacturing the market for the new prod-
ucts that could then be constantly introduced and updated.
By accessing consciousness and targeting the unconscious, mar-
keting and its associated technologies and techniques have progres-
sively learned how to make consumer behaviour controllable, by 
interpolating (in the literary sense) tertiary retentions into the stream 
of consciousness. The basis on which it can do so, however, depends 
on reducing desire as much as possible to a calculable phenomenon, 
which is to say, grammatizing the relationship to the future. In other 
words, this amounts to a grammatization of protention, Husserl’s term 
for my immediate expectation, but expanded here to include every 
form of motive, reason, expectation, dream and desire.
This in turn involves a detachment of desire from everything incal-
culable, incomparable and long-term (including every form of edu-
cation and inter-generational transmission), inducing a regressive 
tendency that aims instead only at the finite and short-term goals of 
the consumer behaviour required by the market. But this ultimately 
risks being self-destructive for the consumerist model itself, setting 
up a tendency for the libidinal economy (on which the macroeco-
nomic ‘perpetual growth model’ fundamentally depends) to collapse, 
as libidinal energy is depleted: the ability to stimulate the perpetual 
increase in consumption required by the consumerist economy is 
thereby threatened. It is ultimately for this reason (along with the apo-
ria of sustainability) that consumerist capitalism can be nothing but 
a postponement of Marx’s diagnosis with regard to the rate of profit.
135 Silicon technologies  
and the ultra-industrial capitalism of algorithmic platforms
The protentional grammatization technologies of the twentieth cen-
tury had only limited means of accessing the information and data 
that is necessary in order to calculate and predict the relationship 
between, first, grammatized content (for example, a television com-
mercial that, in Husserl’s terms, amounts to a kind of industrial 
temporal object), second, protentional conditioning, and third, con-
sumer behaviour: the clearest indicator was ultimately the success 
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or otherwise of a marketing campaign. But with the introduction of 
silicon technologies that now dominate the twenty-first century, this 
question is fundamentally transformed, because the consumers of 
such grammatized content are ceaselessly and immediately sending 
data back to producers. On the basis of such data, producers can ever 
more finely calculate the relationship between particular content and 
particular responses from particular ‘kinds’ of users.
The extreme speeds at which these processes occur in contem-
porary algorithmic silicon systems means that it is also possible for 
these producers to adjust content in a very rapid and targeted way that 
was simply impossible in the twentieth century. This speed exceeds 
that of noetic processes themselves, and this rapid exchange and algo-
rithmic control of vast amounts of user data gives rise to a kind of 
informational and protentional shock wave, analogous at the noetic 
level to the ‘sonic boom’ produced at flight speeds above Mach 1.31
Every major consumer platform today utilizes ultra-powerful algo-
rithmic techniques of this kind in order to absolutely maximize their 
ability to performatively influence consumer behaviour. Furthermore, 
global ‘platforms’ such as Alphabet and Facebook are now among the 
largest corporations on the planet and have become so through the 
new market they have created for the vast amounts of data generated 
by their users.
If the capitalism of analogue audiovisual technologies was already 
hyper-industrial and performative (in Austin’s sense), then the new 
market of platform capitalism based on silicon technologies, user pro-
filing and social networking is highly performative and can thus be 
considered an ultra-industrial capitalism of algorithmic platforms.32 
But this only intensifies the deleterious effects of such processes 
on the libidinal economy of consumers. And this in turn is bound 
to intensify the self-destructive tendencies of the consumerist mac-
roeconomy, since it ruins the very basis of its ‘success’: the con-
trol of desire.
136 The anti-politics of ultra-industrial populism 
 in the Entropocene
Behind this highly paradoxical intention to produce consumers lies the 
even more paradoxical belief that this mass of consumers can contin-
uously drive the engine of the global economy like a perpetual motion 
machine, and drive it to ever new heights. But perpetual motion is a 
myth based on the notion of an abstract machine that is thermody-
namically impossible, and the ‘heights’ to be reached are in this case 
transparently at odds with the unambiguous imperatives declared by 
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the IPCC. But in addition to that, the billions upon billions of bytes of 
data gathered from consumers by producers and platforms, fed into 
increasingly powerful and increasingly intelligent automated algo-
rithms designed to calculate and control behaviour according to the 
imperatives not of the IPCC but solely of the market, has an extremely 
ruinous effect on the psyches of the individual consumers of whom 
this market is composed (who are today targeted almost from birth, 
if not from before birth), giving rise as it does to an infernal spiral of 
consumerist addiction.
Evidence abounds throughout the industrialized democracies of 
the political consequences towards which this ruination tends. And 
these consequences are intensified by the fact that all these performa-
tive techniques are applied also in the political realm. If, as Stiegler 
suggests, this entails the replacement of the adoptive performativ-
ity of ‘democracy’ with the adaptive performativity of ‘telecracy’,33 
where the demos no longer finds itself in possession of any kratos, 
then the algorithmicization of this telecracy via the silicon technolo-
gies of platform capitalism is already exposing the utter vulnerability 
of ‘representational’ political systems to a thoroughgoing disintegra-
tion at the hands of the ‘owners’ of this data and the manipulators of 
these algorithms.
This can be described as an ultra-industrial political regression (a 
new form of what is often called ‘populism’) to which ultra-industrial 
capitalism tends to give rise. But regardless of the degree to which 
the leading industrial populists imagine they can cynically keep hold 
of the reins of power as they exploit the fears and irrationality of the 
crowd, the enormous risk that they are precipitating is of hubristically 
engendering processes that will completely run out of all control. All 
of this is what first began to get going with the shift from an indus-
trial capitalism of production to a hyper-industrial capitalism of con-
sumption a century ago, for which the immensely destructive wars of 
the twentieth century stand as testament, and it is all this that remains 
at stake in the wish to create a society of global consumers in an ultra-
industrial capitalism of algorithmic platforms.
137 On crystallization and crystal palaces
For Marcuse, as we have already mentioned, the reduction of the 
need for labour made possible by automation opens up the prospect 
of a new age of autonomy. Such autonomy, however, is by no means 
a guaranteed outcome: it ‘presupposes a type of man with a differ-
ent sensitivity as well as consciousness’. Marcuse himself describes 
what this means only rather abstractly as involving a ‘union between 
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causality by necessity and causality by freedom’, which he problem-
atically understands in terms of an ‘instinctual transformation’.34
In Simondonian terms, we might say that, in the age of silicon tech-
nologies, the invention of a new noetic milieu is in principle entirely 
possible (and, what’s more, that there is no future for knowledge, 
understood in the broadest possible sense, other than through sili-
con technologies, all knowledge always being a possibility for noetic 
beings that is only ever opened up intermittently, technically, reten-
tionally and protentionally). But this possibility of a new noetic ele-
ment is realizable only provided that the arrangement between the 
technical and the psychosocial is re-organized so as to foster (rather 
than undermine) psychic and collective individuation processes giv-
ing rise to the new sensitivity and consciousness (new noesis) for 
which Marcuse calls.
Simondon’s first, ‘physical’ model for the emergence of individua-
tion from out of a preindividual milieu is the way that crystals emerge 
from out of a parent liquid possessing just the right molecular compo-
sition for a process of crystallization to be catalysed by a germ. But as 
the artist Robert Smithson pointed out (via the work of the physicist 
Percy Bridgman), the crystals produced by this process run counter to 
the commonly-held layman’s conception of entropy as always leading 
from states of order to states of disorder:
But I think nevertheless, we do not feel altogether com-
fortable at being forced to say that the crystal is the seat of 
greater disorder than the parent liquid.35
The crystal seems to be organized, because it appears to our eyes to 
be orderly. In fact, as a perfectly ordinary thermodynamic process, it 
complies with the ‘arrow of time’ and corresponds to a lower state of 
potential energy: the regularity of the crystal gives rise to the illusion 
of what only seems to be a counter-entropic organizational process.
Genuinely counter-entropic processes are possible at the biologi-
cal and noetic levels – even if these counter-entropic tendencies, too, 
can only ever be localized and temporary. For exosomatic beings, 
such processes depend on the accumulation of past noetic wealth, the 
improbable memory of which they cultivate and transform in order 
to maintain the rich cohesion of a particular locality on a particular 
scale, and to produce new improbable futures.
Contemporary disruption and regression are, however, precisely a 
kind of illusion of counter-entropy of the sort produced at the molecu-
lar level by crystallization. This is not just a question of the crystal 
palaces of industrial capitalism but also of the silicon crystal palaces 
that form the exo-techno-cine-spherical tertiary layers of algorithmic 
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and ultra-industrial capitalism. They may be highly ordered and regu-
larized, but beneath this deceptive surface they are thoroughly entro-
pic for noetic processes, precisely because they fail to cultivate and 
draw upon this wealth of knowledge, instead destroying it and replac-
ing it with the dictates of the market of calculable information.
For Smithson, writing in the 1960s and 1970s, it was a question of 
thinking thermodynamic entropy beyond the pleasure principle:
There’s a certain kind of pleasure principle that comes out 
of a preoccupation with waste. Like if we want a bigger and 
better car we are going to have bigger and better waste pro-
ductions. So there’s a kind of equation there between the 
enjoyment of life and waste. Probably the opposite of waste 
is luxury.36
Smithson’s raising of the question of entropy also extended beyond 
the relationship between thermodynamics and the death drive already 
suggested by Freud. Hence his call for an ‘attempt to formulate an 
analog between “communication theory” and the ideas of physics’.37 
Unfortunately, how far he may have been led by these speculations 
will remain forever unknown, thanks to his untimely death in a plane 
crash in 1973.
138 Reinventing economics as the science of struggling  
against entropy in exosomatization
Carbon technologies are thermodynamic: their function is to contrib-
ute to the struggle of noetic, technical (that is, exosomatic) life against 
its irreducible entropic conditions. But in utilizing these technologies 
to pursue anti-entropic ends, and given that all negentropic systems 
are localized systems that are bound to remain entropic in an overall 
sense, we inevitably produce entropic consequences elsewhere. And 
when those systems have extended across the entire biosphere, cine-
sphere, technosphere and exosphere, then this ‘elsewhere’ remains 
precisely here, and the toxicity they produce is unavoidably self-poi-
soning, ruining its biospheric element just as does the infusorian in 
Freud’s petri dish.
Silicon technologies are informational: their function, too, is to 
contribute to the struggle of exosomatic life against its irreducible 
entropic conditions. But in this case, the toxicity they produce pol-
lutes not the biosphere but the noetic element of the knowing, techni-
cal beings who must nevertheless find the noetic resources to address 
all of these self-poisonings, whether carbonic or noetic, and to do so 
by making good collective decisions. It is this division between two 
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kinds of entropic toxicity, and the necessity of recognizing the gravity 
of informational entropy, that we here seek to highlight.
Most economic theory (like most philosophy) has, to its detriment, 
remained rooted in a mechanistic physical conception that predates 
the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics, at least if we 
believe the economic historian Philip Mirowski.38 This means that 
economic systems are not truly viewed as dynamic processes in per-
petual struggle against entropic tendencies but are instead understood 
as involving one or another kind of static or cyclical equilibrium mak-
ing possible the fantasy of perpetual growth.
From the work of the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, the mathemati-
cal biologist Alfred J. Lotka and the economist Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, however, it becomes possible to see biological (endosomatic) 
evolution as precisely involving manifold processes amounting to 
so many struggles against entropy, where these struggles are always 
localized – at the scale of the cell, the organism, the species, the 
ecosystem or the biosphere. And it also becomes possible to see that 
economic processes are what replace these evolutionary tendencies 
when life becomes technical (exosomatic), still always localized – 
at the scale of the tribe, ethnic group, society, nation or global eco-
nomic system.
Mirowski’s work has focused largely on the history of economics 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and more specifically on 
the way in which the history of neoliberalism has interacted both with 
the notion of information and with the integration of computation into 
economic theory and practice.39 From Hayek’s argument in 1945 that 
the ‘decentralized’ market makes better use of knowledge in society 
than do ‘centralized’ authorities and bureaucracies, the history of neo-
liberalism has amounted to the history of the notion of ‘the Market’ 
as a vast ‘information processor’. In the unfolding of this history, the 
market-qua-information-processor is found by neoliberal economists 
to depend less and less on the ‘rational agents’ of neoclassical eco-
nomics, as the concept of (economic) knowledge is reduced more and 
more to calculable information that may escape the level of the indi-
vidual altogether.
In turn, economists take advantage of this conception by redefining 
their function less as scientists and advisers and more as engineers 
and designers of markets, whether the market is being designed to 
facilitate the sale of the electromagnetic spectrum, to mitigate carbon 
emissions or to find market-based solutions for the market-induced 
problems of the global financial crisis.40 This, however, entails a con-
tradiction: setting out from an idea of ‘the Market’ as the best and 
most efficient guarantor of correct outcomes, if not as a transcendental 
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and universal processor of truth, neoliberal economists then start to 
manufacture diverse and specific markets. But the good outcomes 
promised by the purveyors of these markets (in competition with pur-
veyors of other markets) absolutely depend on the initial conditions 
set by economists, who are able to do so, they claim, thanks to their 
‘expertise’, which they then market to governments, institutions and 
other economic actors, including at the highest levels, arguing that 
this is the only way to ensure positive outcomes, since there is no such 
thing as the market itself.
The contradiction is thus between an absolutized, ‘universal’ con-
ception of ‘the Market’ and a localized (but still informational and 
computational) conception of specific but highly artificial markets, 
where the assertion of this universality in fact ends up authorizing 
the elimination of the wealth of actual knowledge embodied in insti-
tutions of exchange of all kinds. Furthermore, the consumer market, 
as we have already seen, is premised upon systemically depriving 
these consumers of knowledge in a way absolutely at odds with the 
conception of an economy of ‘rational actors’ contributing to some 
market-based information processor. Mirowski’s work makes clear 
that the dangerous turn of recent macroeconomic history – charac-
terized by neoliberalism, financial crisis and proletarianization (in 
Stiegler’s sense) – has everything to do with the failure of economic 
theory to incorporate an understanding of entropic and counter-entro-
pic processes, at both the thermodynamic and informational levels. 
The implicit question it raises is how to reinvent economic theory 
and practice by incorporating such an understanding from its found-
ing premises.
139 For a general theory of entropy
This in turn raises the question of the necessity of a theory of gen-
eral entropy. Such a theory would on the one hand seek to juxtapose 
and articulate the thermodynamic notion of entropy with the infor-
mational notion, and to exceed the limitations especially of the lat-
ter.41 And it would also be in this way an account of the relationship 
between every kind of anti-entropic system, which is to say every 
kind of localization and de-localization process that works against 
the tendency towards the elimination of improbabilities, which is to 
say the elimination of the past (as what, for any noetic system, opens 
the possibility of a future). But as Smithson’s association of entropy 
with both waste and luxury already suggests, this also bears upon 
Georges Bataille’s ‘notion of expenditure’ and ‘general economy’ (not 
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forgetting that for Bataille, expenditure beyond subsistence is not a 
question merely of waste but of an irreducible necessity of life).
What this implies, ultimately, is that any such theory is compelled 
to integrate difficult mathematical, scientific, economic, anthro-
pological and technological questions with others that exceed these 
divisions between fields of knowledge, in the first place because what 
is at stake is the anti-entropic function of knowledge itself. Stiegler 
has indeed begun a project to open up this question of entropy in 
terms of its thermodynamic, biological, informational and noetic 
dimensions (in all of its ‘exorganological’ dimensions, in Stiegler’s 
recent terms), drawing on the work of Vernadsky, Georgescu-Roegen 
and Lotka, among others, and in discussion with scientists such 
as Giuseppe Longo, but in truth it is extraordinarily complex and 
requires large-scale transdisciplinary contributory research projects 
to be established involving scholars across a wide variety of fields. 
Despite this apparent daunting complexity, it is the conclusion of this 
‘elemental critique of political economy’ that, in the context of the 
Anthropocene, such a theory of general entropy has today become an 
urgent necessity.
Why is such a theory necessary? Because what is ultimately at stake 
in the complex field that is unfolding between carbon technologies 
and silicon technologies in the Entropocene is the need to completely 
reinscribe old values in new terms, where values are what supply 
the criteria on the basis of which decisions are taken and resources 
invested in order to generate wealth (as distinct from narrowly cal-
culable economic ‘value’ or ‘prosperity’). Investment must here be 
understood in every sense and in a general sense as that ‘putting in 
reserve’ – that work – that alone is capable of opening the possibil-
ity of another future. Every question of investment is in this way a 
question of struggling to differ and defer entropy in general, in the 
movement of what Derrida called différance (but where this is also a 
differentiation beyond the limits of Derrida’s formulation).
In a context in which the globalized systems of consumerist capi-
talism are reaching their limits, and in the process dragging many 
other systems past their limits, including geophysical systems such 
as the climate system, and also including the noetic systems through 
which alone good collective decisions can ever hope to be made – in 
such a context, where a cascade of catastrophic system failures seems 
entirely possible if not highly probable, it is solely on the basis of 
such a theory that anti-entropic investment prospects with the poten-
tial to bifurcate away from such a globally dangerous and monstrous 
situation can be identified, imagined, invented and realised. Such a 
bifurcation, and the general theory on which it can be established, 
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will presuppose a reconsideration of the very basis and division of 
fields of knowledge, but it will also require a complete reorganiza-
tion of silicon technologies at least as profound as the elimination 
of carbon technologies called for by the IPCC, and on a comparably 
short timespan.
140 For a new critique of global governance
Finally, for all the seeming ‘straight talking’ by the IPCC, it remains 
captive to the institutional conditions it is compelled to occupy. If the 
questions raised by this body concern not just scientific understand-
ing but policy and action (in relation to which the term ‘mitigation’ 
is entirely inadequate), then this too is a question of the conditions 
of making good collective decisions. In truth, if the IPCC is to be 
something other than a diarist of the downfall, then it (or some related 
body) cannot avoid the question of the relationship between policy 
recommendations and the conditions of actual decision-making and 
actual transformation (or ‘transition’), including the conditions of 
will, belief and expectation, or alternatively of apathy and nihilism. 
In that case, it is also obvious that the question of the future of the 
noetic element cannot avoid confronting the question of the future 
of international decision-making, and vice versa – the question, pre-
cisely, of the wealth and diversity of elemental conditions required for 
neganthropic choices to be made and actions to be taken.
The United Nations is a body composed of a General Assembly 
whose individual autonomous members have a commitment to 
addressing the issues of carbon technologies that can be described 
as patchy at best, and subject to a Security Council with even less 
resolve, not least because of the economic fear generated by the apo-
ria of sustainability. This General Assembly and Security Council 
are themselves premised on the sovereignty of nation-states, whose 
political systems, whether representative or otherwise, are entirely 
subject to what we have called ‘telecratic’ tendencies. Furthermore, 
what ecologists and the IPCC must not avoid reckoning with, without 
denying the processes of psychosocial and economico-institutional 
denial that are also clearly operative, is the possibility that the fear 
generated by the aporia of sustainability is in many ways legitimate, 
and that this fear is itself a very significant threat in terms of the pos-
sibility of becoming a panic, even if it is also true that the paralysing 
consequences of such fear and panic in turn catastrophically seal the 
fate of the biosphere.
In short, it is a question of the possibility of dealing noetically 
with the aporia of sustainability. But the fact is that this society of 
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nations is also composed of members almost none of whom have any 
effective analyses or policies with respect to silicon technologies that 
reflect any true weighing of the stakes of the immense transforma-
tions such technologies have wrought and are continuing to bring. Yet 
these technologies are well on the way to destroying the local condi-
tions for the flourishing of noetic and exosomatic life (at all scales of 
locality), just as carbon technologies are well on the way to destroying 
the local conditions for the flourishing of biological and endosomatic 
life (at all scales of locality).
What this ultimately suggests is that a critique of the political 
economy of silicon technologies cannot avoid a critique of the char-
acter and institutions of decision-making at every level of locality 
from the sub-national to the international and global, as well as of the 
elemental conditions in which they operate. And the purpose of such 
a critique can only be the reformulation and reconstruction of these 
institutions and bodies on the basis of new values legitimating new 
criteria for investment to be derived from the kinds of considerations 
whose first steps we have tried to outline in this chapter, and whose 
ultimate basis must lie in a theory of general entropy and anti-entropy 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). For in the case of international governing and 
advising bodies such as the IPCC and the United Nations, these orga-
nizations, too, form a sometimes almost imperceptible aspect of the 
global element.
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Afterword: The Territorial Inscription of Law1
Alain Supiot2
In legal terminology, the notion of space was not, until recently, some 
Cartesian abstraction that might be applied to any sort of place. Its use 
was reserved for those parts of the world that cannot be occupied on 
a lasting basis because they have no discernible limits and are unfit 
for long-term human habitation: the seas and the oceans, the skies 
and interstellar space. In their current use, juridical notions of air 
space and outer space, maritime space and oceanic space, are always 
defined in opposition to the Earth. The Earth is not conceived by the 
law as an abstract space, but rather as a mesh of territories, domains 
(public or private), regions or countries, jurisdictions and sometimes 
sites or zones (subject to overriding clauses). It was the European 
Union that first defined itself in legal terms as an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’ (in French, an ‘espace de liberté, de sécurité et de 
justice’), without discernible limits, rather than as a territory or group 
of territories with clearly identified borders. Significantly, it was only 
with the creation of a ‘single market’ that the notion of space began to 
be used to refer to the land and not only to the skies or the seas. This 
indifferentiation of places goes hand in hand with the emergence of 
global law, which will assert its independence with respect to territo-
rially based legal systems.3
One may wonder about the meaning and future of this contempo-
rary aspiration for a spatial legal order that would be free from any 
territorial grounding. The place of civilization, in the primary legal 
sense of the word ‘civilized’ (subject to the rule of civil law), has 
until now never been the inherently formless space of the sea or the 
skies, but always the terra ferma. Civilizing space has always meant 
referring it to terrestrial dimensions that give it both a being and a 
form. Forma dat esse rei (‘the form gives being to the thing’4): this 
old adage of Roman law already registers the inaugural gesture by 
which all mythologies mark the birth or rebirth of the world, by mak-
ing the ‘higher waters’ of the Heavens rise up from the face of the 
waters, whereupon between the Heavens and the ocean there emerges 
dry land. This founding gesture is normative, assigning the world 
its first limits and hence making possible the measure of all things. 
Limiting and measuring are the two inseparable sides of the activity 
of the jurist as of the geometer, these two figures coming together in 
the figure of the surveyor who, in measuring the land, delimits what is 
due to each and what is common to all.
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This is how the world becomes habitable, in the multiple senses 
of this word derived from the Latin ‘habere’ (to have, to hold).5 To 
inhabit the world is to have a safe place in it, fit for habitation. For 
this, it is necessary to give form to it, to make it into a human habitat, 
through the words by which we name even the tiniest parcel of land 
and through the acts by which we fashion our landscapes. We must 
also conform to shared habits that govern the lives of inhabitants and 
take account of their ecological milieu. A habitable world is a world 
in which the human relationship to the land is instituted in rules that 
assign to each a place fit for living.
In the Western tradition, these rules are part of what we call the 
law, which encompasses penal and administrative law as well as civil 
law. Like all civilizations that have emerged from the religions of the 
Book, this tradition contains the ideal of a superhuman, atemporal 
and universal Law, which would apply to every person in every place 
and could ignore territorial diversity. But modern law is built on aban-
doning this ideal in favour of a territorial inscription of law. Implicitly 
responding to Pascal’s quips about the geographical limits of human 
laws (‘Odd kind of justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side 
of the Pyrenees, error on the other’6), Montesquieu affirmed that laws 
are necessarily relative in the introduction to The Spirit of the Laws:
They should be related to the physical aspect of the coun-
try; to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the 
properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way 
of life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herds-
men; they should relate to the degree of liberty that the con-
stitution can sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their 
inclinations, their wealth, their number, their commerce, 
their mores and their manners.7
In modern times, the territorial inscription of law is linked to legal 
systems in which the State crowns the institutional edifice. The world 
becomes a mosaic of sovereign States in competition with each other 
over borders, control of the seas and colonization overseas. But each 
acknowledges the other’s right to lay down the law within its own 
national territory. Carl Schmitt theorized just such an international 
order in his The Nomos of the Earth, while also diagnosing its grad-
ual decline.8 But his Nazi sympathies prevented him from seeing the 
deeper causes of the crisis affecting this State-based organization of 
the world. He attributed it to the rising power of the United States 
and the abstract pacifism of the founders of the League of Nations, 
and failed to notice the return to a belief in universal and timeless 
law, which was the hallmark of the major contemporary ideologies, 
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including the National Socialist theory of Lebensraum. These ideol-
ogies were based on scientistic certainties, and tended to deny any 
idea of limit or human measure. ‘Law’, said Hitler, ‘is a human inven-
tion. Nature knows neither the notary nor the surveyor. God knows 
only force.’9
If one can talk here of the return of a belief in superhuman laws, it 
is because, like divine laws, laws that appeal to science do not accept 
the borders defining States and their dominion transcends any territo-
rial limit. Just as the Catholic Church proclaims that it knows no ter-
ritory,10 so it is that the truth claimed by the ‘laws’ of economics, biol-
ogy or history covers the whole surface of the globe. However, unlike 
the religious laws that unified Medieval Europe, the universal laws 
invoked today are immanent and not transcendent. They do not appeal 
to the Heavens but to the nature of things and human nature. It is biol-
ogy, economics and history that are summoned to affirm their author-
ity over the terrestrial world. While this scientistic normativity was 
already present in the nineteenth century (particularly with Comte or 
Marx theoretically, and on the political level with the colonial enter-
prise), it flourished in the twentieth century in the guise of racial biol-
ogy and historical materialism, along with their respective political 
by-products: racism, social Darwinism and the class struggle. What 
distinguishes these modern variants of scientism from religious pros-
elytism, however, should not be forgotten: faith in these laws without 
a Legislator leads not to conversation but to ‘abolishing the parasitic 
sections of society’,11 to be treated like refuse12 destined for the ‘rub-
bish heap of history’.13 This is undoubtedly the specific mark of the 
insane massacres that accompanied the various imperial enterprises 
that dominated the history of the past century.
These empires have now fallen, and the countries they once ruled 
over have all donned the garments of the nation-state. Today the State 
crowns the legal edifice, both internally and internationally, and it is 
under the aegis of the State that today man inhabits the Earth (I). But 
no one can ignore that this institutional edifice is coming apart and 
that an imperial logic is still at work. This logic no longer assumes the 
guise of a localizable power bent on extending the territorial scope 
of its laws, but instead takes the form of a deterritorialization of law, 
carried out in the name of the globalization of the world (II). This 
deterritorialization of law has no more future than does nostalgia for 
a purely inter-state legal order. The only thing of which we can be 
certain is that man is an earth-bound animal who must discover anew 
a sense of measure by which to redraw a liveable world (III).
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I Inhabiting the World: The Institution of Territories
Just as all cosmogonies show the birth of the Heavens and the Earth 
from the cosmic Ocean, so too they all affirm the earthly substance 
of the human being. Adam, the first man in the religions of the Book, 
derives his name from the red earth (adama) with which God fash-
ioned him, and l’homme itself, man, comes from the Latin humus 
(damp earth): Homo is the one who comes from the earth and is des-
tined to return to it, to be inhumed.14 Although born of the earth, man 
is endowed with a divine spirit that entitles him to take possession of 
it, to fashion it in his image and to make it fruitful by his labour.15 This 
second aspect – the ‘taking of land’,16 taking possession by labour or 
force – has been dominant in the modern Western world, at the cost 
of repressing how humans belong to the land. This lop-sided vision, 
whose religious origins we can only surmise,17 sees nothing but the 
imprint of humans upon the Earth and remains blind to the imprint of 
Earth upon humans.
In order for our sight to be fully restored, we should turn to the civi-
lizations that have not yet been blinded to the earth-bound dimension 
of man.18 Black Africa has without a doubt remained most sensitive to 
what humans owe to the land,19 and it is on this continent that one can 
find the most subtle institutional manifestations of the complexity of 
this relationship. Thus, in all West African countries, there are two 
distinct and complementary authorities that preside over land rela-
tions: the village chief and the ‘master of the land’.20 The village chief 
parades the signs of his power and never walks barefoot. He embod-
ies ‘the fate of one who, in his relationship to the surrounding world, 
would have chosen no form of relation other than that between hunter 
and prey’.21 The master of the land, by contrast, lives humbly and 
walks barefoot, and his ‘essential task is to ensure that each person 
and the whole village have a viable relation to the land’.22 He presides 
over rituals designed to ensure the land’s fertility and settles disputes 
relating to its use or distribution. Compared to the predatory figure of 
the chief, he incarnates the authority of the forefathers and the stabil-
ity of territorial connections.
African civilizations thus invite us to make a distinction within our 
own institutions between: 1) what connects someone to the land; and 
2) what gives them control over it.
1 In the legal sphere, a person’s connection to the land con-
tinues to inform decisions on two fundamental issues: the 
determination of his or her identity and the laws which he 
or she must observe.
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The question of identity concerns the status of persons, 
and connection to a territory is at work in what is today 
called nationality law. ‘Nationality’ is related etymologi-
cally to the verb naître, ‘to be born’, and it situates each of 
us, from birth, at the intersection of a territory and a lin-
eage. Consequently, nationality law combines, in varying 
ways depending on the country, considerations of the place 
of birth (jus soli) with that of the nationality of the parents 
( jus sanguinis), to which should be added the possibility of 
acquiring one or more other nationalities later and hence 
of adopting new homelands. Nationality, which is an ele-
ment of identity in the legal sense, is the source of personal 
status, that is, of a non-negotiable set of rights and duties 
towards the State or States of which one is a national.23 This 
status can limit or even prevent the movement of a person 
beyond the territory to which he belongs.24 The weightiest 
duty, however, is to defend the national territory and hence 
run the risk of ‘dying for one’s country’.25 It was on the basis 
of such a duty that motherlands devoured their children by 
the millions in the last two World Wars.26
A person’s connection to a territory can be seen in a dif-
ferent light when the question is no longer who he is but by 
what law he is governed. Are people always and everywhere 
bound by the laws of their nation or must they obey the 
laws of the place in which they happen to be? In the West, 
the answer to this question has evolved over hundreds of 
years. In Europe, the invasion and dislocation of the Roman 
Empire led to populations living together while obeying 
different laws. The new barbarian masters followed their 
various customs while the descendants of the subjects of the 
Empire (and the Church) remained subject to a greatly adul-
terated version of ‘Roman law’. In this system, which lasted 
from the fifth to the eleventh century, each person lived by 
the law of his origins, that is, of his ethnic group.27 This 
principle, which was called the personality of laws, was 
undermined by the mingling of populations and the rise of 
feudalism, which led to the same local or regional customs, 
the same territorial law (lex loci), being applied to all the 
inhabitants of the same seigniory. This is how the princi-
ple of the territoriality of the laws gained currency, and its 
progress accompanied that of the nation-state.28
The world thus came to look like a jigsaw of separate 
legal regimes, with each State having sovereignty over 
Afterword 283
the laws to be applied on its territory. But since the bor-
ders between them were not watertight, it was necessary to 
decide what judge was entitled to adjudicate and what law 
was to be applied in situations involving a foreign element. 
The objective rules laid down for this constituted what is 
called Private International Law, which, despite its name, 
was until recently largely internal and differed from one 
State to the next. In all countries, however, the degree of 
territorial purchase of national law varies according to the 
situations it is a matter of governing: it has greatest territo-
rial purchase in the fields of immovables, liability in tort 
and public security, and the least purchase in the context of 
international transactions, which by definition are associ-
ated with different territories.29
2 Man’s hold over the land takes two distinct but complemen-
tary forms in modern law: sovereignty and property. Both 
establish an exclusive relationship between the sovereign or 
owner and the lands governed or possessed. This exclusiv-
ity is completely new in the long history of law and could 
well be only a passing phase. For if we take a comparative 
historical view of land laws, man’s rights in the land have 
at almost all times and places been a function of the bonds 
between men or with the gods.30 This stems from a deeply 
rooted sense that the human being, an earthly and mortal 
creature, cannot seriously lay claim to exercise sovereign 
power over natural elements. The power man holds over the 
land is always derived from another: from a master or a god 
who has granted man use of it but who may take it back.
In the history of Western law, this notion of tenure is 
linked to feudal structures, which, to varying degrees (in 
France more than elsewhere31), dominated the Medieval 
period.32 In the feudal world, it was the bonds of depen-
dence between people that determined their rights over 
land. This was true of political power (which the suzerain 
exercised only indirectly over the territory of his vassals) 
and also of economic power, which was divided (with the 
exception of allodial land) between the dominium eminens 
of the lord and the dominium utile of the vassal or tenant. 
Tenure, whether in its noble form (the fief) or common form 
(censive tenure), was always tenure-service, a concession 
granted in return for dues, leading to a division of rights 
between several people over one piece of land.
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Yet this type of legal arrangement was not restricted to 
Western feudalism, and there are other, more recent exam-
ples. In the Ottoman Empire, rights were divided between 
those who cultivated the land and thus had certain rights 
over it (provided they did so fruitfully), regional adminis-
trators who collected taxes on the produce, and lastly the 
imperial treasury, which had ultimate tenurial superiority.33 
Another example was studied by Jacques Berque: irrigated 
and cultivated terraces in the valleys of the High Atlas in 
Morocco, where each family has tenurial superiority over 
its plot, which is handed down from generation to genera-
tion, and can always demand to buy back the land from its 
present occupier.34 One of the common features of these 
variants is that several people may exercise different rights 
simultaneously in the same property, which itself remains 
indivisible.
With the advent of the modern right to property, the sit-
uation was reversed: land was no longer perceived as the 
site of relations between people but was treated as a thing 
submitted to the will of one person alone. The far-reaching 
consequences of this reversal could not fail to have consid-
erable impact on how human environments were shaped, 
corresponding in the legal sphere to what, from a geo-
graphical perspective, Augustin Berque called the ‘freeze 
on the object’.35
As Louis Dumont has shown, economic ideology implies 
that relations between people are subordinated to relations 
between people and things.36 Moreover, the market econ-
omy needs goods fit for exchange, that is, cleansed of any 
trace of personal bonds. In the Napoleonic Code the direct 
relation between persons and things (treated in Book II) 
forms the basis of the contractual relations between persons 
(treated, with successions, in Book III). The equivalent of 
this development in the political order was the establish-
ment of the figure of the sovereign, incarnated in the State 
as guarantor of respect for private property. Public and pri-
vate were no longer interlinked as they were in feudalism, 
but sharply differentiated: the public domain of national 
territory was controlled by the State and seamlessly37 jux-
taposed with private domains subject to the sovereign 
will of their owners. The dominium eminens of the State 
has not disappeared completely, however. Legislation pro-
vides for the expropriation of land for public use in return 
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for compensation,38 and, in the absence of legal claimants, 
property still escheats to the State. More generally, the right 
to property must be exercised in conformity with the law.39 
Exercising this right assumes the existence of a sovereign 
State to guarantee that the property of each is respected 
by all. When this condition no longer applies, the fiction 
of a direct and exclusive legal bond between people and 
things is no longer tenable and the relations of dependence 
between people once again come to the fore.40
II Globalizing the World: The Deterritorialization of Law
The terms ‘globalization’ or ‘mondialisation’ are slogans more than 
concepts, since they encompass a heterogeneous set of phenomena 
which should be carefully differentiated. The abolition of physical 
distances through the circulation of signs between people is a struc-
tural phenomenon enabled by new digital technologies. By contrast, 
the globalization of trade in things is a conjunctural phenomenon that 
stems from reversible political decisions (lifting trade barriers) and 
the temporary over-use of non-renewable natural resources (keeping 
transport costs artificially low). It is the combination of these two dif-
ferent phenomena that reduces the heterogeneity of signs and things 
by referring them to a single monetary standard, that is, by transform-
ing them into ‘liquidities’.41
Of course, territory does not escape this process of ‘liquidation’. It 
ceases to be seen as a place from which one comes and to whose laws 
one is subject, existing only as object of property and as such submit-
ted to laws that transcend its singularity. This process of uprooting 
laws from their territorial grounding has clearly not come to an end 
(nor can it, without an apocalyptic liquidation of the entire world). But 
it has led to the dislocation of territorial legal systems due to the dual 
pressure of: 1) personal laws undermining them from within; and 2) 
universal laws dismantling them from without.
1 The personality of laws first reappeared in Western legal 
systems with colonization, when the colonizers enjoyed a 
different status to that of the colonized.42 It then reached 
Europe when certain States began to base personal status 
on racial characteristics. Nazi Germany was obviously the 
main actor in this biologization of the juridical condition of 
human beings. It certainly had no monopoly on biologism 
or racial discrimination,43 but it took these to their most 
extreme consequences in its programmed extermination of 
the Jews and the massacre and enslavement of Slavs living 
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in the Lebensraum, which it wanted to annex. The monstros-
ity of these acts, together with the independence progres-
sively gained by colonized countries, explain why the idea 
of personal status was thoroughly discredited in the imme-
diate post-War period. However, it is reappearing today in 
different forms, but, instead of being imposed, it is actually 
claimed in the name of individual liberties. And it is no lon-
ger by racial biology but by genetics, referred to in certain 
legal provisions, that people are today being governed.
Today, the free choice of one’s status is in full swing, 
both economically and personally. In terms of economic 
exchange, the freedoms associated with free trade (freedom 
of establishment, to supply services and to put goods and 
capital into circulation) have been invoked to allow inves-
tors and firms to dodge the legislation of the country in 
which they operate in favour of one with more favourable 
laws. Flags of convenience, which used to be confined to 
the law of the sea, have been hoisted on dry land in the form 
of ‘law shopping’, which treats national law as a product 
competing on an international market of norms.44
This approach has been actively promoted in Europe by 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which 
upheld a company’s right to avoid the rules of the State 
in which it is operating by registering in a State with less 
restrictive rules.45 In order to facilitate such law shopping, 
the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ programme regularly 
ranks 178 countries (renamed ‘economies’) according to 
their tax and welfare legislation – the least stringent first.46 
The legal representation of the world implicit in these devel-
opments is that of a market of norms in which free indi-
viduals may choose to adopt the law that is most profitable 
for them. This sort of market will gradually eliminate the 
normative systems least capable of satisfying the financial 
expectations of investors.47
This free-market version of the personality of laws is not 
restricted to the economic field. The notion of personal law, 
which was reinvented in the nineteenth century in the con-
text of colonialism, has found a new lease of life through 
the vast numbers of people in Western countries who have 
been imported to work there for next to nothing or have 
been driven from their homes through the destruction 
of their traditional ways of life. Faced with this phenom-
enon, Western countries have opted for one of two policies: 
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assimilation or multiculturalism. Assimilation means 
upholding the territoriality of laws by subjecting all citizens 
to the same personal status. Multiculturalism reintroduces 
the personality of laws so that new citizens may conserve 
their former legal status. This kind of multiculturalism, 
however, in contrast to older forms of coexistence between 
communities (such as indigenous status under colonialism 
or the Ottoman millet system48), claims to act in the name 
of human rights and the freedom of the individual to choose 
his or her personal status. The Chief Justice of England and 
Wales, Lord Chief Justice Phillips, recently relied on the 
freedom of the parties to submit their agreements to a law 
other than English law (law shopping) in order to defend 
the idea that jurisdiction could be given in his country to 
Islamic or Rabbinical courts.49
In this context, claims shift from the realm of having to 
that of being, from the socio-economic to identity – and it 
is not only groups but individuals who want to become their 
own law-givers. On the collective level the ‘right to dif-
ference’ has been invoked by various minorities – ethnic, 
sexual and religious – which stake their claim as victims in 
order to have a special status attributed to them and hence 
to limit the scope of the law that applies to all the inhab-
itants of the same territory.50 On the individual level, the 
right to privacy is invoked in order to erode the principle 
of the inalienability of civil status so that each person may 
determine his or her own identity.51
As always in the history of law, the re-emergence of older 
legal structures does not imply a return to the past, but 
contributes to the construction of new categories. The per-
sonality of laws, in its individualist form of ‘a law for me’ 
and ‘myself as law’, is the legal expression of the poten-
tially devastating narcissism that is characteristic of this 
latest stage in Western culture,52 of which Islamism is in 
many respects only an inverted image, as evidenced by the 
so-called fatwamania in Sunni countries and the claim of 
any imam to be able to set himself up as a legislator.53 This 
narcissism is devastating because it involves the impasse 
described by Pierre Legendre:
Forcing the subject to act as the Third towards him-
self is no liberation; it crushes him, transforming 
social relations politically into a free-for-all concealed 
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beneath a discourse of generalized seduction. What is 
implicit in the new management-inspired legal initia-
tives can be revealed for all to see, and I would sum-
marize it as follows: good luck to you.54
The emergence of a biological status is the other facet of this 
contemporary version of the personality of laws. The idea 
of grounding private property in land on biological inequal-
ities is as old as economic liberalism itself.55 It was used to 
justify the colonization of peoples who persisted in seeing 
their land as an oecumene56 and not as a commodity, long 
before racial biology supplied ‘scientific’ arguments. ‘We 
shape the life of our people and our legislation according 
to the verdicts of genetics’, said the Nazis,57 thus express-
ing a conviction which today has become a commonplace: 
that the only laws really binding on man are those revealed 
by science. Population genetics may have given way to bio-
molecular genetics over the last half century, but explana-
tions based on the genome have simply replaced racial ones, 
within a discourse whose dogmatic structure has remained 
unaltered.58 Nowadays biotechnology enables us to ascer-
tain the genitor of any mammal. Consequently, complex 
institutional mechanisms, which used to refer every human 
being to a territory as much as to a filiation – and that filia-
tion itself to a familial status rather than to a ‘genetic truth’ 
– seem suddenly outdated.
Indeed, the last thirty years have seen the idea of a ‘bio-
logical truth’ of filiation gain ground, to varying degrees, 
in the legislation of European countries.59 In countries like 
Germany, where jus sanguinis was already the cornerstone 
of nationality, this produced little resistance.60 In coun-
tries attached to the jus soli, however, like France, people 
were less keen to let test tubes decide on a person’s iden-
tity61 but the pressure to do so was strong. The bill on the 
use of genetic testing to monitor immigrant family reunion 
programs, which had been thrown out in 1987, was adopted 
in 2007, with the approval of the Constitutional Council.62 
Moreover, the highest echelons of the French State make 
no secret of their belief that human behaviour is genetically 
determined, which would justify screenings and preven-
tive measures.63
A similar faith inspires the economists who look to biol-
ogy for the ultimate laws governing their vision of the 
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world. It is a world peopled by hordes of contracting par-
ticles whose behaviour could be explained and monitored 
by analysing their genes or cerebral cortex.64 Biological 
identification is even set to supplant civil status in border 
controls, through the progressive extension of biometrics, 
by which cosmopolitan elites entitled to circulate across the 
entire globe may reliably be distinguished from migrants 
driven out by penury, who are to be turned back or selec-
tively passed according to manpower needs.65 Inhabiting 
the global world in these two extreme ways – as winners or 
as losers – should not be confused with the ancient figure of 
the nomad. Nomadism is not defined by moving from place 
to place; the nomad is not without a territory but simply 
does not settle on any part of it.66 This doubtless makes him 
unassimilable to categories derived from Roman law, which 
all emanate from the idea of attributing to each his own. 
By contrast, insofar as biometric methods of identification 
extract identity from any territorial reference, they are ideal 
for controlling nomads (or what remains of them) as well 
as sedentary peoples, migrants and transnational managers.
2 The belief in universal laws is the second factor in the dislo-
cation of territorial laws. Today it takes the form of the eco-
nomic dogma of globalization. Unlike classical economic 
liberalism, which viewed the legal system as the institu-
tional basis for the production and distribution of wealth, 
this new credo views it simply as an instrument in the 
service of the supposedly immanent laws of the economy. 
This dogma was systematized in the West in the Law and 
Economics doctrine, which tallies with the Marxist creed 
of law as the ‘reflection’ of the economic base. It could 
therefore serve to justify combining capitalist and com-
munist systems in the development of what the Chinese 
Constitution calls the ‘communist market economy’.67 In 
this hybrid system, the free market has contributed the com-
petition of all against all, free trade and maximizing indi-
vidual utilities, while communism has contributed ‘limited 
democracy’, the instrumentalization of the legal system, 
an obsession with quantification and the abyss separating 
the lot of the rulers from that of the ruled. This system is 
not specific to China and it has gained ground, in differ-
ent guises and to varying degrees, in Eastern and Western 
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Europe.68 It has contributed to the deterritorialization of law 
in two different ways.
The first and most obvious effect has been the disman-
tling of any sort of legal limit that might hinder the circula-
tion of goods and capital or the provision of services inter-
nationally. The system’s ultimate goal is a Total Market 
encompassing all of humankind and all the products of the 
planet, within which each country would abolish its trade 
barriers in order to exploit its ‘comparative advantages’. 
Such a programme was clearly spelled out in the Preamble 
to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The growth in quantifiable economic 
indicators – employment levels, a large and steadily grow-
ing (sic) volume of income and demand; increased produc-
tion of and trade in goods and services – is presented in this 
text as an end in itself, to be attained by means of ‘the sub-
stantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and 
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations’.
Such a policy entails reducing the diversity of national 
legal systems, which are summoned to rid themselves of 
any rules liable to hinder the free circulation of goods and 
capital.69 Dismantling trade barriers in this way has sig-
nificant environmental effects,70 which are not addressed 
by the high-profile condemnation of countries that forbid 
the importation of goods whose mode of production does 
not conform to their own environmental legislation.71 This 
economic dogma is even applied to land itself, which is 
assimilated to a commodity and so must be open to invest-
ment or real estate speculation. According to the European 
Court of Justice:
Whatever the reasons for it, the purchase of immov-
able property in a Member State by a non-resident con-
stitutes an investment in real estate which falls within 
the category of capital movements between Member 
States. Freedom for such movements is guaranteed by 
[the] Treaty.72
It is in the context of this metamorphosis of land into an 
asset into a liquid value on a global market that the notion 
of space, which was previously restricted to the law of the 
sea, has now been extended to the ‘law of the earth’. The 
European Union, for example, no longer defines itself as a 
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single territory or a group of discrete territories but as an 
‘area without internal frontiers’ or an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’73 designed to include an indeterminate 
and indeterminable number of new member States.
This dissolution of the singularity of territories into an 
abstract, measurable and negotiable space encounters strong 
resistance in some countries and has not yet taken place at a 
global level as completely as it has in the European Union.74 
More generally, the process of globalization cannot of 
course ignore the concrete diversity of landscapes, human 
environments, modes of life, languages, cultural treasures 
and intellectual riches. Unlike commodities (and what the 
market economy assimilates to commodities, like work, 
land and money), their value has no market price, which is 
why their preservation and renewal should in principle be 
governed by the lex loci.
Yet the global market still considers them as resources 
to be taken into account when evaluating the comparative 
advantage of a country or a region of the globe. This is why 
new techniques designed to quantify and measure the rela-
tive value of these non-market goods and find a universal 
accounting image for them have emerged. Such scoring 
techniques are applied today in fields as diverse as scien-
tific research, comparative law (for the purposes of ‘law 
shopping’ mentioned above) and ‘human development’. 
Geographical elements such as towns, nations and territo-
ries are treated like competing trademarks, from which the 
notion of nation branding has emerged, based on quantita-
tive indicators of ‘local identity capital’.75 This presupposes 
that local identity can be broken down into a normalized 
list of features, which may be evaluated (landscape, cli-
mate, public infrastructures, public safety, cuisine, etc.) and 
that local political and economic ‘players’ are enlisted to 
vie with each other in ‘territorial competitiveness’.76
Here the law applicable to a territory gives way to a new 
type of normativity claiming to be based on the observa-
tion of fact and no longer on legal imperative. This is a final 
avatar of the positivist temptation to dissolve law into the 
immanent laws revealed by science, such that the political 
headaches and uncertainties of governing a territory may be 
swept away thanks to the techniques of good governance. 
The attempt to transform any and every singular quality 
into a measurable quantity launches us into a speculative 
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loop in which belief in quantitative representations gradu-
ally supplants any real contact with the realities to which 
these representations are supposed to refer. Typical of the 
communist market economy, territorial performance indi-
cators are founded on the same dogmas as Soviet planning 
and produce the same effects: public initiatives target quan-
titative objectives rather than concrete results, and the real 
situation of the economy and society is concealed from a 
governing class disconnected from the lives of those it gov-
erns. Quantified representations of the world, which today 
determine how private and public affairs are managed, 
imprison international organizations, States and companies 
in an autism of quantification that increasingly cuts them 
off from how people really live.77
III Redrawing the World: A Sense of Measure
The market economy is not a state of nature. In order to turn the mar-
ket into a general principle regulating economic life, it was neces-
sary to behave as though land, work and money were commodities, 
which clearly is not the case.78 The market economy is based on legal 
fictions, but fictions which are not the stuff of novels: they can be 
sustainable only if they are humanly liveable. From this perspective, 
environmental law could be defined as the set of rules that sustain the 
fiction of nature-as-commodity, just as labour law could be defined as 
the rules that sustain the fiction of work-as-commodity. These legal 
supports were established at the national level and are being eroded 
by the process of globalization. When the rules of the free market are 
no longer subtended by anything, their grounding in the diversity of 
territories and people collapses, which is bound to lead to ecological, 
social or monetary catastrophe.
Making competition into the only universal principle of the organi-
zation of the world leads to the same impasse as the totalitarianisms 
of the twentieth century, the common feature of which was precisely 
the subordination of the legal form to supposed laws of competition 
(between races or classes). Stating this, and predicting that such a 
doctrine is bound to generate insanity and violence, is not dictated by 
some political or moral stance. Rather, it stems from one of the rare 
certainties that the ‘science of Law’ may bring: namely, that since ego-
ism, greed and the struggle for life are well and truly present in this 
world as it is, they must be contained and channelled by a common 
reference to the world as it should be. By contrast, making universal 
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struggle into the founding principle of the legal system denies the lat-
ter’s very possibility and sets humanity on the road to disaster.
The West shows some signs of becoming aware of these risks. The 
dangers entailed by the disappearance of public space are at last being 
recognized in the countries most ‘advanced’ along the path towards 
‘to each his own law’.79 It is also becoming more difficult to ignore the 
systemic risks to the planet incurred by a real economy that is discon-
nected from the potential of our biosphere (ecological risk), from its 
monetary representation (financial risk) and from minimal standards 
of social justice (social risk). But this awareness of diffuse dangers 
has not as yet led to any genuine challenge to the economic dogma 
governing globalization. One can only hope that the rising economic 
powers will use the resources of their own cultures to avoid embark-
ing along the same calamitous paths.
In this respect China is eminently well placed. Confucianism is of 
course one such resource, with its emphasis on the close links between 
the cosmic and the social order. But the Legalist School, introduced 
to French jurists by the work of Léon Vandermeersch, is another.80 
In many respects, the Legalists of the Fa-kia School can be seen as 
precursors of Western utilitarianism. Two thousand years before the 
English political philosophers, the Legalists saw man as an egotistical 
being driven by self-interest alone. They had no notion of civil law 
and were also the first to develop a technocratic conception of law – 
with efficiency as the measure of legitimacy – and to use law purely 
as an instrument for exercising power. But unlike utilitarian philoso-
phy, they had the pessimism of intelligence and considered man’s ego-
ism and greed as a threat and not as a benefit from which the common 
good would spring spontaneously. They would not have dreamed of 
making the calculation of individual utility into the supreme univer-
sal norm. On the contrary, they viewed egoism as an energy, which 
the law should take into account, but in order to channel it so that 
it would serve the general interest. In this respect, they were jurists 
in the fullest sense, and the lessons we can draw from them can still 
today assist us in civilizing globalization.
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Appendix: Mission of the Association  
of Friends of the Thunberg Generation
Greta Thunberg calls on adults to take their responsibility. In so 
doing, she poses the problem of a kind of generalization of irrespon-
sibility that seems to have taken hold in various ways in much of the 
world, if not all of it.
The causes of this state of affairs are numerous, and have been 
interpreted in various ways. There is no doubt, however, that inter-
generational relations, which themselves seem to be fundamentally 
challenged by the most recent developments in industrial societies, 
play an essential role in this great civilizational malaise.
This situation poses enormous problems for parents and, more 
generally, educators, while the younger generations find themselves 
seriously harmed, all the more so given that their future is in far 
greater question than was their parents’ generation – a situation that 
oftentimes leads to a feeling of abandonment that can prove devastat-
ing, even fatal.
We have heard Greta Thunberg’s various appeals, and the appeals 
she has inspired in her generation around the world, particularly 
through Youth for Climate, and we wish to respond to Greta Thunberg 
and to the movements she has inspired. We have therefore taken the 
initiative to create the Association of the Friends of the Thunberg 
generation, to contribute to the establishment of a dialogue between 
the generations, building first and foremost on the work of scientific 
authorities.
It is not a question of organizing public meetings and media events, 
but of creating, wherever possible and expected, working groups to 
deal with well-defined questions, documented in advance, and with a 
view to producing, on the basis of this work, memoranda to be pub-
lished when the participants in these working groups consider them to 
be worthwhile.
In the face of the factual weakening of responsibility, Greta 
Thunberg and Youth for Climate call above all for rationality. Nothing 
is more precious, and we must encourage them.
Founding Members
Yves Citton, professor of literature, Université Paris VIII
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Victor Chaix, student, independent journalist and member of 
Extinction Rebellion (UK)
Michel Deguy, writer, philosopher
Hidetaka Ishida, professor of philosophy, University of Tokyo
Jean-Marie Le Clézio, writer, Nanjing University
Susanna Lindberg, philosopher, University of Helsinki
Giuseppe Longo, mathematician, École Normale 
Supérieure, Paris
Virgile Mouquet, geography student, Université de 
Bordeaux Michel de Montaigne and member of Youth for 
Climate, Bordeaux
Hans Ulrich Obrist, curator and director, Serpentine Galleries
Stéphane Paoli, journalist
Saskia Sassen, sociologist and urbanist, Columbia University 
and London School of Economics
Richard Sennett, sociologist, New York University and 
London School of Economics
Carlos Sonnenschein, doctor, biologist, Institut d’Études 
Avancées de Nantes and Tufts University
Ana Soto, biologist, Tufts University and École 
Normale Supérieure
Bernard Stiegler, philosopher, Institut de Recherche et 
d’Innovation, Paris, and Nanjing University
Yann Toma, artist, Université Paris I
Marie Chollat-namy, doctoral student in oncology, Université 
Paris-Saclay, member of Extinction Rebellion, Paris Centre
Esther Martin, high school senior, Lycée Richelieu Rueil-
Malmaison and member of Youth for Climate, Paris-IDF
Lexicon of the Internation: Introduction to  
the Concepts of Bernard Stiegler and  
the Internation Collective
Anne Alombert, Michał Krzykawski
We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too 
much of it. We lack creation. [...] The creation of concepts 
in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people 
that do not yet exist […]. Becoming stranger to oneself, to 
one’s language and nation, is not this the peculiarity of the 
philosopher and philosophy, their ‘style’, or what is called a 
philosophical gobbledygook?
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari1
Anthropocene/Entropocene
The term Anthropocene was introduced by the Nobel Prize-winning 
chemist Paul Crutzen. It describes the geological era that commenced 
when human activities began to have a significant global impact on 
the Earth’s ecosystem and the future of planet Earth, to the point 
of bringing into question the continued possibility of human life on 
Earth. This new era began at the end of the eighteenth century with 
the industrial revolution. One debate that has arisen about the term 
Anthropocene, however, concerns the proposal for an alternative 
concept, Capitalocene, put forward in order to emphasize the role 
of the capitalist economic system in ecological disaster. According 
to the philosopher Bernard Stiegler and the Internation Collective, 
however, the Anthropocene must also, and in a more general way, be 
characterized as an Entropocene, insofar as this period corresponds 
to a massive increase in rates of entropy, which must be conceived 
and theorized at all possible levels: physical (dissipation of energy), 
biological (destruction of biodiversity), informational (reduction of 
knowledge to information) and psycho-social (destruction of cultural 
and social diversity).
Supplement: from the Anthropocene to the Neganthropocene
Most researchers in Earth system science refer to the Anthropocene 
epoch and tie its advent to the start of ‘the Great Acceleration’, a 
period referring to the 1950s, when the human impact on the structure 
of the Earth and its ecosystems became undeniable, due in particular 
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to the development and intensified integration of science and technol-
ogy, the phenomenon of globalization and the fact that atmospheric 
nuclear detonation left traces that are detectable across the terrestrial 
surface. The upheavals of the biosphere resulting from these transfor-
mations have given rise to the argument that a new name is required 
to describe an epoch that succeeds the geological epoch known as the 
Holocene (itself referring to a ‘wholly new’ phase of the geological 
timescale corresponding to the rising human impact that began with 
the Neolithic revolution), because the impact of the human species on 
geology and ecology has now become, not just significant, but deci-
sive for the future of the biosphere.
Stiegler refers to the Anthropocene era: in so doing he does not 
mean to question the achievements of Earth system science, but rather 
to emphasize that our present time is an ‘epoch of the absence of 
epoch’, reflecting that it corresponds to ‘the possibility of the end of 
everything (of everything that makes human life possible)’,2 but also 
to the seeming impossibility for our contemporary existence to cohere 
into a sense of dwelling within a shared ‘world’: for Stiegler, one can 
refer to an epoch only if individuals and groups develop knowledge 
(the knowledge of how to do, how to live and how to theorize) that 
enables them to adopt the transformations of their technical or exo-
somatic milieus. Stiegler argues that the ‘non-epoch’ characteristic of 
the Anthropocene era results from an immeasurable acceleration in 
the evolution of exosomatic organs. Becoming more and more com-
plex, these organs are transformed so quickly that the knowledge 
required for their fruitful adoption does not have time to develop. 
Therefore, what is truly new in the Anthropocene era (the suffix -cene 
means new3) stems from a new relationship with non-living organs 
that did not exist during the Holocene, and from the explosion of tech-
nical evolution that occurred with the industrial revolution and inten-
sified once again in the second half of the twentieth century.
The term Neganthropocene was introduced by Stiegler to des-
ignate a new era that could and must succeed the Anthropocene: 
in the face of the massive increase in entropy rates (at the physical, 
biological, informational and psycho-social levels) characteristic of 
the Anthropocene, to open a path to the Neganthropocene involves 
implementing one or more economic models, based on the systemic 
valorization of anti-entropic production. This is the ambition of the 
contributory economy, which aims to be anti-entropic by fostering 
contributory or capacitating activities, corresponding to the practice 
and production of a diversity of knowledge (technical knowledge, 
practical knowledge, existential knowledge, as well as the knowledge 
of how to do, how to live and how to conceive), serving to readjust 
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the ‘disadjustment’ between the technical system and social systems 
characteristic of the Anthropocene.
Anthropy/Neganthropy/Anti-Anthropy
See also: Entropy/Negentropy/Anti-Entropy
In geography or ecology, the term anthropization refers to the trans-
formation of landscapes, ecosystems or environments under the effect 
of human activities. Anthropogenic forcing refers to the disturbance 
of certain dynamic systems due to human activities (for example, the 
disturbance of climate systems by greenhouse gas emissions or that of 
ecosystems by deforestation). Anthropy, an almost homophonous vari-
ation on entropy, can thus be understood as referring to the produc-
tion of entropy (disturbance, disorganization, dissipation of energy, 
depletion of resources) by human societies, that is to say, through the 
techno-economic processes of production and consumption.
The concepts of anthropy, neganthropy and anti-anthropy are used 
by Bernard Stiegler to designate the production of entropy, negent-
ropy and anti-entropy at the level of exosomatic life, which is to say of 
the technical, psychological and social life that is commonly known 
as ‘human’ life. Stiegler argues that it is now necessary to rethink 
this ‘human’ life in strict relation to the ‘passage from the organic 
to the organological’, organology being Stiegler’s term for a form of 
life that involves the inextricable entanglement of three levels – the 
individual, the collective and the technical, understood as the three 
‘transductive’ processes of individuation characteristic of exosomatic 
life. With artificial selection replacing natural selection, this passage 
to the organological, constituting the very history of the exosomatiza-
tion process, ‘displaces the play of entropy and negentropy’.4 It is thus 
a question of underlining the ambivalence of this process that comes 
to organize life ‘by means other than life’.5
Supplement: anthropy, neganthropy and  
anti-anthropy in exosomatic life
According to Bernard Stiegler, unlike the endosomatic or biological 
organs of living beings, which are always local and temporary pro-
ducers of negentropy (organization and diversification), exosomatic 
or technical organs are ambivalent. On the one hand, they can accel-
erate the production of entropy (through the process of combustion 
and energy dissipation that technological production involves, and 
through industrial standardization that homogenizes and standard-
izes behaviour). On the other hand, exosomatic organs can produce 
new, improbable and singular (social, artistic, cultural and technical) 
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forms of organization and diversification, provided that these are suc-
cessfully adopted by humans, through collectives that share and prac-
tise knowledge.
The production of knowledge thus corresponds to the production of 
neganthropy (organization and diversification on the psychic, techni-
cal and social levels). In other words, if a living organism is able to 
organize itself to produce anti-entropy through its biological organi-
zation, by temporarily and locally delaying entropy, human beings can 
and must organize themselves on the neganthropic and anti-anthropic 
level, by practising knowledge and constituting social organizations, 
in order to postpone the anthropogenic effects inevitably entailed by 
the production of exosomatic organs, which have now become indus-
trial and digital.
Neganthropic organizations, however, tend to themselves become 
anthropic: knowledge tends to rigidify (in the form of dogmas) and 
social institutions tend to close. Anti-anthropy refers to the abil-
ity to refresh knowledge and institutions by transforming them dia-
chronically, that is, by causing them to evolve or bifurcate towards 
new horizons.
Capacities/Skills
The development of capacities or capabilities is distinct from the 
acquisition of competences or skills.
Skills precede the individual who is supposed to acquire them and 
correspond to predetermined behavioural standards to which the 
individual is required to conform. An individual who has acquired 
skills applies pre-established rules and repeats learned behaviours, 
but does not produce anything new. Two individuals may individually 
acquire identical skills, in which case they become interchangeable 
on the labour market. Employment is based on the use of previously 
acquired skills, and skills are acquired for the sake of employability.
Capacities, on the contrary, correspond to each individual’s sin-
gular possibilities of existence. These possibilities can be exercised 
and actualized only when individuals individuate themselves collec-
tively and when they practise and share knowledge with other indi-
viduals, and thus ‘capabilize’ themselves: capacities are expressions 
of the singularity of individuals. It is true that, in order to be devel-
oped, capacities require the acquisition of skills or automatisms, yet 
what they require above all is the ability to dis-automatize acquired 
automatisms, through which improbable and singular practices may 
be invented, by making internalized rules bifurcate.
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In this sense, the process of capacitation can be understood as the 
development of what the economist Amartya Sen and the philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum define as ‘capabilities’, which increase the power 
of individuals to act as they individuate themselves within the group 
and which are the core of ‘human development’.
Contributory Economy
The thesis proposed by the contributory economy model consists in 
arguing that the productivity increases made possible by automation 
could free individuals from a certain number of proletarianizing jobs, 
and thus open new fields of capacitating and contributory activities 
based on the practice of knowledge. The goal of such an economy is 
to take advantage of the gains in time enabled by automation in the 
productive sphere, in order to develop processes of capacitation and 
contribution that make possible the production and sharing of the new 
knowledge necessary to face ongoing technological evolution (and its 
psychic, social, political and ecological impacts). Such an economic 
model is based on redistributing the time saved by automation to 
citizens, who may thus spend less time in employment but acquire 
the means to develop work activities that are both sustainable for the 
biosphere and desirable for populations, and producing anti-entropy 
and anti-anthropy in this sense. The contributory economy is there-
fore based on a systemic valuation of anti-entropic and anti-anthropic 
activities: for this reason, it implies the implementation of new indica-
tors of value.
Supplement: practical value, exchange value and use value
Whereas the market economy is concerned with the producer in 
terms of maximizing profit and the consumer in terms of the utility 
function, the contributory economy is characterized by the fact that 
economic actors are no longer separated into producers and consum-
ers: ‘contributors’ are neither producers nor consumers, because they 
share and produce different kinds of knowledge.
For an activity to be ‘contributory’ requires:
 ▪ the choice by individuals to participate in an empowering 
activity involving the practice of knowledge;
 ▪ the socialization of the knowledge thus practised, through 
the sharing or transmission of this knowledge with society.
The value produced by contributors is not fully monetizable: it cannot 
be reduced to exchange or use value because it does not increase with 
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scarcity and does not wear out over time. Indeed, the value of knowl-
edge increases as it is shared and practised, and for that reason it tends 
to gain in richness. Knowledge is built gradually and over the long 
term: the individuals who exchange it mutually enrich each other, by 
transforming and diversifying their ways of living and by improving 
the quality of their environment and their daily lives – in short, by 
expanding their possibilities of existence. In this sense, they are pro-
ducers of practical or societal value. A contributory economy does not, 
however, necessarily exclude other ways of producing and exchang-
ing, but goes hand in hand with them: for the short and medium term 
at least, it accepts the rules of the game of monetary exchange and is 
concerned with investment choices (particularly those that lead to the 
production of public goods).
Contributory Income and Intermittent Contributory Employment
See also: Contributory Economy
The role of the contributory economy model is to equitably distrib-
ute among citizens the time made available by the automation of 
production, and to put this time at the service of the capacitation of 
inhabitants and their contribution to the anti-anthropic development 
of the region. Fundamental to the notion of a contributory economy 
is the idea of intermittent contributory employment, that is, intermit-
tent employment in projects designated as contributory. This involves 
two dimensions:
 ▪ setting up a contributory income scheme designed to remu-
nerate the capacitation time of individuals (during which 
they collectively share, practise and produce knowledge);
 ▪ individuals can, however, receive such income only if the 
knowledge and capabilities developed in this way are inter-
mittently used in the context of casual employment in proj-
ects designated as contributory for the region.
The functioning of the proposed contributory income scheme is 
inspired by the longstanding scheme set up in France for casual work-
ers in entertainment and the performing arts [intermittents du specta-
cle]: the financing of preparatory capacitation activities is conditional 
upon the return of the fruits of this work to society in the form of 
employment in designated projects.
Contributory income is distinct from universal basic income (UBI), 
although it can be complementary to it: it may indeed be possible to 
understand contributory income as a right, but it is nevertheless condi-
tional upon participation in the contributory economy as it is inscribed 
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in the region. Because it requires acquired knowledge and capabili-
ties to be utilized in the service of projects designated as contributory 
or anti-anthropic by and for the region, it assumes the development 
of institutions authorized to designate such projects, institutions that 
will themselves involve collective deliberation and decision-making 
about the anti-anthropic, contributory or societal value of an activity.
Disruption
Disruption refers to the upheaval of social organizations and institu-
tions (from the family to government via businesses, languages, law, 
economic regulation, taxation, etc.) through the highly rapid develop-
ment of new technologies. Disruption results from the fact that the 
evolution of the technical system is occurring far quicker than the 
evolution of social organizations. This is not a new phenomenon. 
Bertrand Gille described it as disadjustment between the evolution 
of the technical system and the evolution of social systems, argu-
ing that disadjustment is typical of the industrial revolution.6 Gilbert 
Simondon defines this phenomenon as a phase shift between techni-
cal reality and cultural content.7 Lastly, Jacques Derrida refers to the 
dislocating effects resulting from technological acceleration.8 Today, 
however, these technical transformations occur so quickly that they 
leave the political and social realms behind, as well as public power 
in general, so that no new viable model of long-term social and eco-
nomic development can emerge. Under the regime of radical and 
permanent innovation, regulation, legislation and knowledge always 
arrive too late: the resulting constant expansion of legal vacuums and 
theoretical vacuums seems to be without historical precedent.
Entropy/Negentropy/Anti-Entropy
The production of entropy corresponds to the tendency towards dis-
organization, destructuration and disorder. Taken in its broadest 
sense, and not just as it is understood physically in thermodynamics, 
an entropic process is one that involves the tendency of a system to 
exhaust its dynamic potentials and its capacity for conservation or 
renewal. It can also be understood as the tendency for the probable to 
eliminate the improbable.
Anti-entropy refers to a tendency occurring in the opposite direc-
tion than the production of entropy – a tendency towards organiza-
tion, structuration, diversification and the production of novelty or 
improbability. Although anti-entropy can never eliminate the inevi-
table increase of entropy, it can locally delay or defer this increase. As 
a generalized concept, anti-entropy is intended to describe anything 
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that tends to create difference, choice or novelty – everything in the 
development of a system that tends to self-conservation, renewal or 
transformation towards improvement.
Supplement: entropy and anti-entropy as transversal concepts
The concept of entropy appeared in the nineteenth century in the 
field of thermodynamic physics and was coined by Rudolf Clausius. 
Initially arising from the need to engineer more energy-efficient 
steam engines, this ‘second law of thermodynamics’ was a way of 
describing the irreversible dissipation of energy. By recognizing 
that the entire universe could be understood as a closed system, the 
concept of entropy led to the nineteenth-century hypothesis of the 
eventual heat death of the universe. The philosopher Henri Bergson 
considered the second law of thermodynamics to be ‘the most meta-
physical of the laws of physics since it points out […] the direction in 
which the world is going’.9
In the 1950s, the theory of entropy was taken up in the field 
of information theory (in particular through the works of Claude 
Shannon10) and in cybernetics (in particular through the work of 
Norbert Wiener11). Despite referring to a completely different process 
than that which is described by the second law of thermodynamics, 
the name ‘entropy’ was used to describe the degree of uncertainty 
contained in a message, because the form of the equation turned out to 
be identical in both physics and computation. The significance of this 
has been much debated, but a fundamental reason for this identity lies 
in the fact that in both fields the equation can be seen to arise from a 
division of systems into statistically calculable microstates.
Of even greater importance, however, is the physicist Erwin 
Schrödinger’s effort to mobilize the notion of entropy in biology, in 
order to show that life entails a kind of ‘negative entropy’ or negent-
ropy, that is, a tendency that runs counter to the overall entropic pro-
cess.12 Living organisms are endowed with a metabolic capacity to 
reduce the increase of thermodynamic entropy by exchanging mat-
ter and energy with the environment, thus maintaining their life. It 
remains the case, however, that the very phenomenon of life is irre-
ducibly linked to the production of entropy: the living organism can 
fight against its own entropy only by continuing to add to the over-
all production of entropy in the universe. No living thing escapes the 
global entropic tendency, but organisms are engaged in a local and 
temporary struggle against the dissipation of energy and the result-
ing disorganization. The process of biological evolution can thus be 
understood as the differentiation of organs, functions and species that 
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occurs in the course of this negentropic postponement. Hence Norbert 
Wiener refers to living organisms as ‘local and temporary islands of 
decreasing entropy in a world in which the entropy as a whole tends 
to increase’.13
More recently, and unlike Wiener, who seems to conceive ‘anti-
entropy’ as a possibility common to biological organisms and 
machines, the philosophers and mathematicians Giuseppe Longo and 
Francis Bailly14 have developed a notion of ‘anti-entropy’ to describe 
the specific characteristics of the living state of matter, that is, of bio-
logically organized matter: they argue that life, unlike the machine, 
can arise only as a dynamic and historical process capable of main-
taining and differentiating the ‘multilevel entangled structure’ of 
living organisms. The high level of correlation of parts and whole 
involved in biological organization amounts to an ‘extended critical 
situation’ where the integration and regulation of the various levels of 
this organization is the crucial anti-entropic process of life.
Exorganisms (Simple and Complex/Lower and Higher)
See also: Exosomatization
The notion of an exorganism (exosomatic organism) was put forward 
by Bernard Stiegler, and is further divided between simple and com-
plex types. A simple exorganism is an exosomatic organism whose 
survival depends upon equipping itself with technical or prosthetic 
organs external to its own body (human beings are simple exorgan-
isms in this sense, because there is no human being anywhere who 
is not so equipped in one way or another). The notion of exorganism 
makes it possible to go beyond the analogy between organism and 
machine, which had been the source of many debates in philosophy 
and which is at the heart of cybernetic literature. The organism and 
the machine do not constitute two distinct terms that could be com-
pared to one another: on the contrary, they must be considered as a 
relational unit, as a whole to which the simple exorganism (tradition-
ally called an ‘individual’ and conceived as the union of body and 
soul, but which is here understood as the coupling between a living 
organism and its technical organs) precisely amounts.
Simple exorganisms, however, cannot survive on their own: they 
need to exist in groups, which are complex exorganisms, that is, a 
grouping of several simple exorganisms sharing a technical envi-
ronment and exosomatic organs. These complex exorganisms can 
be formed at various scales and take various forms: the family, the 
tribe, the ethnic group, the city, the nation are examples of complex 
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exorganisms, but we could also cite the crew of a boat or the members 
of a factory, a company or an institution.
Among complex exorganisms, it is necessary to distinguish lower 
complex exorganisms and higher complex exorganisms. Some com-
plex exorganisms are said to be ‘lower’ because they are subject to 
the rules or laws of other complex exorganisms, which are thus called 
‘higher’: for example, a company (lower complex exorganism) is sub-
ject to the laws of the state (higher complex exorganism) in which it 
is located, and the state is itself in principle subject to international 
law and to that extent constitutes a lower exorganism compared to an 
institution such as the UN, for example (although the legal and practi-
cal reality is more complicated than this example might suggest).
Supplement: exorganisms, territoriality, sovereignty and superiority
According to Stiegler, higher complex organisms are vectors of a 
‘process of the transindividuation of reference’, that is to say, they 
support a set of meanings or significations shared by all lower com-
plex exorganisms, allowing them to communicate and exchange (for 
example, a national language or an international law). It is this pro-
cess of the transindividuation of reference that gives higher exorgan-
isms their authority, their sovereignty and, therefore, their superiority.
Traditionally, a complex exorganism was always territorialized, 
that is, located in a given territory, although in fact it is also pos-
sible for a complex exorganism to be significantly delocalized (for 
example, a multinational corporation). The current era is nevertheless 
characterized by the emergence of complex planetary and extrater-
ritorial organizations: indeed, the exospheric platforms that constitute 
the infrastructures of giant tech companies (GAFAM) are extrater-
ritorial. These planetary complex exorganisms take advantage of their 
delocalization to bypass the rules of territorial complex exorganisms 
(notably sovereign nations and states, but also other social organiza-
tions), thus dispossessing the latter of their sovereignty, their author-
ity or their superiority. This phenomenon leads to what Antoinette 
Rouvroy and Thomas Berns describe as ‘algorithmic governmental-
ity’15 and to what Frank Pasquale describes as the ‘functional sover-
eignty’16 of platforms.
Nevertheless, such planetary exorganisms do not produce any pro-
cess of the transindividuation of reference: they exploit the natural 
resources of the territories and the psychic resources of individuals 
outside of any common law capable of limiting their toxicity. This 
is why their sovereignty is only ‘functional’: it is a matter of de 
facto efficiency without legal authority. This process leads complex 
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exorganisms of all kinds to a situation of disorder and instability, 
which is symptomatically revealed through the coming to power of 
authoritarian and nationalist governments, which can appear as reac-
tions to the short-circuiting of national legal authorities through the 
efficiency of extraterritorial platforms.
It thus seems necessary to reconstitute a process of the transindi-
viduation of reference at the planetary level, which can be done only 
through the constitution of a new international higher complex exor-
ganism (here referred to as the internation). To avoid the pitfalls of 
globalization and of what jurist Alain Supiot calls the ‘total market’,17 
such an inter-national higher complex exorganism should neverthe-
less respect, value and cultivate the singularities of the various locali-
ties constituting the biosphere (these singular localities are precisely 
what computational capitalism today tends to liquidate, through the 
elimination of local knowledge).
Exosomatization
Exosomatization refers to the technical externalization of living 
beings, that is, the production of non-biological organs by biological 
organisms. Exosomatic organs (usually described as technical or arti-
ficial organs) are organs that develop outside of the body or organism 
(‘exo’ and ‘soma’ meaning respectively ‘outside’ and ‘body’ in Latin). 
By contrast, endosomatic organs (usually referred to as biological or 
natural organs) are organs belonging to the body or organism (‘endo’ 
meaning ‘within’).
Those living beings usually described as ‘human’ are exosomatic 
organisms: they can survive only on the condition of producing arti-
ficial organs, which not only constitute their environment, but may 
also have effects on their minds and bodies. Exosomatic organs can 
become destructive for biological organisms, if they are not practised 
collectively according to shared rules. The function of social organi-
zations is to produce therapeutic arrangements between endosomatic 
organs (human psychosomatic organisms) and exosomatic organs 
(technical objects), by regulating and socializing the use of the latter.
Supplement: exosomatization in the age of the Anthropocene  
and transhumanism
The concept of exosomatization was introduced by the bio-mathema-
tician Alfred Lotka18 to refer to the production of technical organs by 
living organisms. We must therefore distinguish two types of organo-
genesis (organ production): endosomatic organogenesis and exoso-
matic organogenesis. Paleoanthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan19 has 
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shown that in the process that led to the human species, the evolu-
tion of exosomatic organs took precedence over that of endosomatic 
organs and therefore continued to accelerate: with the process of 
exosomatization, the diversification of species thus gives way to the 
ethnic and technical diversification of societies. The bio-economist 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen20 concludes that the evolution of human 
societies is no longer regulated by biological principles (evolution 
by ‘natural’ selection, the organogenesis and physiology of ‘natural’ 
endosomatic organs) but rather by economic principles (innovation, 
production, functioning and exchanges of exosomatic organs, that is, 
‘artificial’ selection and ‘artificial’ organs), in turn governed by cul-
tural rules and legal and political principles.
Unlike the production of biological organs, which allows a local 
decrease in entropy, the production of exosomatic organs is ambiva-
lent: it can just as easily accelerate the entropic tendency (exploitation 
of resources, disorganization and standardization) as it can intensify 
the anti-entropic tendency (renewal of resources, organization and 
diversification). To become producers of anti-entropy at the psycho-
social level, exosomatic organs must be adopted by living beings 
through the constitution of collective organizations and through the 
transformation of knowledge.
Throughout the Anthropocene, the entropic aspect of the exosoma-
tization process has become visible everywhere, now that it has been 
‘disembedded’ from any scientific, legal or political structure, sub-
jected to economic deregulation and market automatisms: once this 
disembedding of exosomatization has occurred, it threatens to lead 
to the destruction of the very possibility of the existence of complex 
life forms on Earth, eliminating the localities of endosomatic life 
(biological niches) and exosomatic life (technical milieus and social 
organizations). In this context, it seems necessary to rethink the ques-
tions raised by artificial intelligence and transhumanism no longer as 
possibilities of ‘enhancement’ but as a profoundly ambivalent step in 
the process of exosomatization.
Hermeneutic Web and Deliberative Social Networks
A hermeneutic web enables individuals to practise active interpreta-
tions and singular expressions, unlike current platforms that operate 
on the basis of capturing data and treating it through intensive com-
puting. A deliberative social network enables the constitution of peer 
groups, and rational deliberation and debate between these groups,21 
unlike the dominant model that links individuals to other individu-
als according to their data and profiles, thus isolating them within 
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fragmented and hyper-personalized informational environments (‘fil-
ter bubbles’).
The design and implementation of a hermeneutic web and delibera-
tive social networks would have the function of putting digital plat-
forms at the service of the creation of knowledge communities and no 
longer of capturing attention and exploiting data. Digital technologies 
would then become the supports of anti-entropic processes of co-indi-
viduation, rather than agents of psycho-social entropy.22
Supplement: the functionalities of the hermeneutic web  
and deliberative social networks
The creation of a hermeneutic web and deliberative social networks 
entails rethinking network architectures and data formats, in order 
to introduce new contributory and interpretive functions into current 
web formats and already existing tools.
For example:
 ▪ graphical annotation and shared categorization functions 
allowing active users to compare note-taking and content 
interpretation;
 ▪ data-analysis algorithms based on qualitative recommenda-
tion through the analysis of annotations enabling the consti-
tution of groups of interpretations or affinities;
 ▪ new types of social networks founded on linking groups 
rather than isolated individuals, enabling the conflict of 
interpretations, disputation and reasoned discussion, all of 
which are essential to the exercise of public debate and to 
the constitution of knowledge.
Internation
The internation designates an agreement, a consensus and a network 
between various open localities (nations, regions, metropolises), 
united by the common concern to design and experiment with new 
anti-entropic and anti-anthropic economic models – that is to say, 
economic models that take care of the biosphere and promote local 
knowledge and arts of living. The aim of the internation is to become 
a new kind of higher complex exorganism at a planetary scale, based 
on reticulated localities and constituting a new public power on the 
basis of a new law.
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Supplement: the internation, the reticulation of localities faced with 
globalization
The notion of the internation was proposed by Marcel Mauss in 1920,23 
when the internationalist movement was emerging in the post-war 
world: according to Mauss, the internation is diametrically opposed 
to nationalism (which ideologically and economically isolates the 
nation), but it does not for all that deny the nation (‘inter-nation’ is 
opposed to ‘a-nation’). According to Mauss, the ideal of internation-
alism should not lead to a ‘supranation’ that absorbs all nations, but 
should instead constitute the pillar of an internationalism aimed at 
uniting nations rather than erasing them.
One hundred years later, it seems necessary to rethink this ideal 
of the internation, distinguishing it from superficial notions of inter-
national cosmopolitanism, and considering its implications in the 
context of the Anthropocene and the ‘functional sovereignty’ of digi-
tal platforms. The current context indeed corresponds to a planetary 
industrial development that threatens the entire biosphere and is char-
acterized by a new ‘functional sovereignty’ established by extrater-
ritorial technological companies and their supranational economic 
organizations, disintegrating local public powers (including national 
public power) and leading to the revival of nationalist and reaction-
ary tendencies. As Jacques Derrida explained,24 the withdrawal of 
territories into national identities and the closing of national borders 
are reactions to the effects of dislocation generated by the global 
‘teletechnological’ acceleration.
In this context, the function of the internation is to open up an alter-
native path to both nationalism and globalization. Instead of produc-
ing a viable, liveable and desirable world for the majority of living 
organisms, globalization has become ‘de-worldization’:25 it is there-
fore a question of re-worldizing (of re-creating ‘worlds’) through the 
reconstitution of sustainable, solvent and diversified localities and 
through the cultivation of different forms of local knowledge, which 
always emerge from local potentialities. The localities reticulated 
through the internation aim at inventing and experimenting, in a col-
lective way, with various economic models capable of producing anti-
entropy (at the thermodynamic, biological, psychic, and social levels): 
that is to say, new ways of living, working and inhabiting that are eco-
logically sustainable, economically solvent and collectively desirable.
The constitution of the internation therefore requires the imple-
mentation of technological infrastructures allowing the opening of 
localities to one another and their reticulation, in particular through 
the circulation of knowledge, always localized, but always susceptible 
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to being deterritorialized, through the confrontation, sharing and 
enriching of this knowledge. The internation then has the chance to 
implement a new process of the transindividuation of reference at 
a planetary scale, and therefore to constitute a new higher complex 
exorganism, based on noetic exchanges between anti-entropic locali-
ties at different scales.
Knowledge
All forms of knowledge (from the knowledge of how to do and how 
to live to existential knowledge, as well as formal and theoretical 
knowledge of every kind) may be described as a ‘transindividual’ 
process: knowledge exists only if it is transmitted, practised and 
transformed by a group of individuals who share a certain number of 
common rules, themselves transmitted from generation to generation 
and transformed over time. By practising a form of knowledge, indi-
viduals transform themselves along with the knowledge they practise: 
inscribing singular bifurcations into knowledge, that is, dis-automa-
tizing the rules of this knowledge, they invent new ways of doing, 
living and thinking. In this regard, the practice of knowledge involves 
a normative capacity in a positive sense.
Supplement: knowledge and anti-anthropic processes of care
Knowledge is always social and collective, and always requires a 
technical milieu through which it can be shared and practised. This 
technical milieu serves as a memory support and allows psychic indi-
viduals to be connected with one another: groups collectively invent 
new norms (for example, new ways of producing, cooking, educat-
ing, inhabiting, living together, counting, measuring, etc.) through 
which they take care of themselves, of others and of their artificial 
environment, developing their capacities and cultivating social, tran-
sindividual and transgenerational relationships. For this reason, the 
Internation Collective argues that the wealth of a society is consti-
tuted by the practice of knowledge: knowledge produces practical 
or societal value by increasing collective memory, by strengthening 
social cohesion and by making possible the dynamic evolution of 
societies. At both the general social level, and at the level of the for-
mal knowledge produced by communities of peers, academic insti-
tutions and scholarly publication, the practice of knowledge thus 
has an anti-entropic function that in one way or another contributes 
to cultural and social renewal and diversification (socio-diversity or 
‘noodiversity’).
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Proletarianization
Proletarianization refers to a process that deprives individuals and 
communities of their knowledge. An individual is proletarianized 
when he or she fails to reappropriate/re-interiorize knowledge that 
has been exteriorized (and often automated) in a technical support. 
Indeed, transmitting or acquiring a form of knowledge always pre-
supposes that the knowledge that has been psychically interiorized by 
some individuals (those who transmit it) is technically exteriorized 
(in a medium, a memory-support). This knowledge can then be psy-
chically re-interiorized by other individuals (those who learn), who 
internalize it, collectively frequenting the supports on which this 
knowledge is conserved. ‘Proletarianization’ occurs when the re-inte-
riorization of knowledge exteriorized by psychic individuals in tech-
nical supports is made impossible – it occurs when memory supports 
are not socialized or practised. Individuals are then subordinated to 
the procedures exteriorized in apparatus [dispositifs], instead of using 
these supports to transmit and share different forms of knowledge.
Supplement: from the proletariat to generalized proletarianization
It can be argued that the problem of proletarianization was already an 
issue for Plato, as evidenced by the fact that Socrates described writ-
ing as a ‘pharmakon’ possessing the capacity both to aid memory and 
to undermine it, and that Plato’s or Socrates’s concern arose at a time 
when the spread of writing was creating new social classes capable 
of both generating new knowledge and exploiting its destruction. In 
the middle of the nineteenth century, this question of the external-
ization of knowledge in technology was raised in The Communist 
Manifesto. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels argued that ‘the proletariat 
is recruited from all classes of the population’, and that this is possible 
because the ‘specialized skill [of the workers] is rendered worthless 
by new methods of production’: due to ‘the use of machinery and divi-
sion of labor’, the latter becomes indifferent to the worker and loses 
‘all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the work-
man’. The proletarianized worker then becomes ‘an appendage of the 
machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most 
easily acquired knack, that is required of him’.26
A century later, in On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 
Gilbert Simondon will take up Marx’s analyses in order to insist on 
the epistemic dimension of the alienation of workers.27 According 
to Simondon, alienation derives not only from the fact that workers 
are dispossessed of the means of production, but also from the igno-
rance and incomprehension of workers and owners alike in the face 
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of machines. As a result, workers must subordinate themselves to the 
internal norms of the machine instead of being able to participate in 
its evolution (by repairing or improving it), just like users who can 
only consume or damage technical objects whose functioning they are 
not able to understand or alter.
Drawing upon Marx and Simondon, Stiegler broadens the concept 
of proletarianization in order to show how processes that destroy 
knowledge are manifested in the twenty-first century.28 Stiegler dis-
tinguishes three stages in the evolution of proletarianization, corre-
sponding to three stages in the history of capitalism:
 ▪ in the nineteenth century, the proletarianization of the 
knowledge of how to do work, which occurred through the 
development of industrial machinery and the implementa-
tion of the scientific organization of labour (productivist 
capitalism);
 ▪ in the twentieth century, the proletarianization of the 
knowledge of how to live, which occurred through the 
development of cultural ‘programme’ industries and of 
mass media such as radio, cinema and television (consum-
erist capitalism);
 ▪ in the twenty-first century, the proletarianization of the 
knowledge of how to conceptualize, which is occurring 
through the development of digital and algorithmic technol-
ogies, and of what is referred to as ‘artificial intelligence’ 
(computational capitalism).
In the nineteenth century, the development of industrial machinery, 
which marked the beginning of the Anthropocene, generated the first 
process of capitalist proletarianization: the first individuals affected 
by proletarianization were workers, and what they were deprived of 
was their knowledge of how to make and do, exteriorized and auto-
mated in machines (supports of mechanical knowledge), to which 
labouring bodies are subordinated in the functions of production.
During the twentieth century, however, what is proletarianized is 
not only the producer’s knowledge of how to make and do: it is also 
the citizen-cum-consumer’s knowledge of how to live. Indeed, mar-
keting and the advertising industry (based on mass media and ana-
logue technologies) tend to replace ways of life with ‘lifestyles’, by 
capturing attention and by standardizing behaviour: individuals find 
themselves increasingly unable to invent their own singular modes 
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of existence, while the arts of life are progressively replaced by con-
sumer behaviour – shopping and ‘brands’.
In the twenty-first century, which corresponds to the development 
of digital and network computer technologies, it is also designers, 
researchers and decision-makers who are proletarianized, through the 
application of high-performance computing to massive amounts of 
data (big data), which short-circuits the time for reflection and theo-
retical elaboration, or through computer programs providing ‘auto-
mated decision support systems’, which short-circuit processes of 
deliberation, interpretation and decision-making.
Rather than each new stage replacing the previous one, these three 
stages build upon and reinforce the proletarianization that came 
before. Therefore, what we are witnessing today amounts to a pro-
cess of generalized proletarianization that can be overcome only if 
the practice and production of all types of knowledge is systemi-
cally valorized.
Work/Employment
Leaning on the Greek distinction between ergon and ponos, work 
must here be distinguished from labour, insofar as it constitutes not 
only an expenditure of force or physical energy, but an investment 
by the individual or group in the production of (a) work. While work 
involves the practice of knowledge and self-realization, and therefore 
the production of practical value, employment is based on the trans-
formation of labour power into exchange value.
A work activity implies the transmission, circulation and trans-
formation of all forms of knowledge (which are always collective 
practices), during which the individuals ‘individuate’ (capacitate 
or transform) themselves through the transformation of their work-
ing environment and through a process of co-individuation with 
‘peers’. By working, individuals organize themselves collectively 
through sharing knowledge, each individual developing his or her 
singular capacities and thus participating in the transformation of 
knowledge itself.
In this sense, work can be considered an anti-entropic activity at 
the psycho-social level (because it produces organization, differ-
ences and novelty). Employment activities, on the contrary, are mostly 
based on the repetition of tasks or on the application of specific pro-
cedures requiring the controlled implementation of acquired skills. In 
this sense, employment activities (jobs) tend to lock the employee into 
pre-established and standardized behaviour. Employment thus tends 
to prevent the production of novelty and to promote the repetition of 
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the same: in this sense, it can be considered an entropic and prole-
tarianizing activity, isolating individuals and dispossessing them of 
their knowledge.
Supplement: work, employment and automatization
As André Gorz29 showed in the 1980s, with the advent of industrial 
modernity, work in the philosophical or anthropological sense (under-
stood as an activity through which the subject realizes him- or herself 
through what he or she creates or produces, by objectifying him- or 
herself in the world) has become ‘work-employment’, that is, a ‘job 
that we have’ rather than ‘work that we do’. Work has thus lost its 
function as a place of identification or a time of personal development 
for the majority of worker-employees, who sell their time by perform-
ing tasks that often seem meaningless and unnecessary. Far from 
allowing the liberation of time that it should have made possible, the 
exponential development of automation has only worsened, through 
the generalization of what David Graeber describes as ‘bullshit jobs’,30 
which Richard Sennett refers to as low-quality work.31
This is so because the (standardized and repetitive) activities 
mobilized in the context of bullshit jobs are easily automated: they 
are based on the repetition of programmed tasks that can be formal-
ized and implemented in a mechanical or algorithmic automatic sys-
tem. By contrast, the (singular and evolving) activities mobilized 
through activities of work can hardly be automated, since they imply 
the capacity to dis-automatize acquired automatisms and to produce 
unpredictable novelty, through the practice and the transformation of 
transmitted knowledge.
In a context of constant technological innovation, and according 
to the accelerating development of artificial intelligence and robot-
ics, we can foresee the automation of a considerable number of jobs 
in many sectors and activities. This automation is not limited to just 
a particular sector (industry, service, education, health): any job that 
does not imply the exercise of knowledge and the production of nov-
elty can by definition be automated. To cope with this gradual auto-
mation of jobs, which is putting the Fordo-Keynesian model of redis-
tribution (based on wages) into crisis, a solvent economy will have to 
encourage the development of work activities and the production of 
different forms of new knowledge. This is the aim of the contributory 
economy, which proposes to take advantage of the time freed up by 
automation in order to develop work activities implying the practice 
of different types of knowledge.
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Bifurcating means: reconstituting a political economy that reconnects local 
knowledge and practices with macroeconomic circulation and rethinks 
territoriality at its different scales of locality; developing an economy 
of contribution on the basis of a contributory income no longer tied to 
employment and once again valuing work as a knowledge activity; overhauling 
law, and government and corporate accounting, via economic and social 
experiments, including in laboratory territories, and in relation to cooperative, 
local market economies formed into networks and linked to international 
trade; revaluing research from a long-term perspective, independent of the 
short-term interests of political and economic powers; reorienting digital 
technology in the service of territories and territorial cooperation.
The collective work that produced this book is based on the claim that 
today’s destructive development model is reaching its ultimate limits, and 
that its toxicity, which is increasingly massive, manifest and multidimensional 
(medical, environmental, mental, epistemological, economic – accumulating 
pockets of insolvency, which become veritable oceans), is generated above all 
by the fact that the current industrial economy is based in every sector on an 
obsolete physical model: a mechanism that ignores the constraints of locality 
in biology and the entropic tendency in reticulated computational information. 
In these gravely perilous times, we must bifurcate: there is no alternative. 
